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The Union, especially during these difficult times, needs Cohesion Policy. It needs 
a policy that can make the investments that will help the Union and its regions 
emerge from the crisis, reduce disparities, and contribute to meeting the ambitious 
objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Cohesion Policy has already helped to improve economic, social and environmen-
tal conditions within our Union, as shown by our evaluations. However, these same 
evaluations concluded that focussing on a few key priorities, especially in the more 
developed regions, would be more effective. Therefore, Cohesion Policy should be-
come more selective. 
Future programmes should concentrate on only a few priorities closely linked to the 
Europe 2020 strategy so that each priority receives enough funding to deliver a real 
impact. These priorities will be identified in a dialogue between the Commission, 
the Member States and regions, based on a joint assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each Member State and of its regions.
We all share an interest in a Cohesion Policy that brings results. That is why we need 
to agree with the Member States and regions a more limited number of objectives 
per programme and carefully monitor progress. 
In the current period, Cohesion Policy has already been closely aligned with the ob-
jectives of the Lisbon Strategy. The link to the Europe 2020 strategy must be even 
stronger in the future. This requires putting in place good programmes, with clear 
conditions and strong incentives. Pre-conditions could require, for example, that in-
vestment in environmental infrastructure is preceded by a transposition of the rel-
evant EU environmental legislation. Incentives would reward regions and countries 
that have performed well and reached agreed European objectives. 
This report and its proposals has also benefitted from the past public consultations. 
In response to the consultation following the 4th Cohesion Report, we have proposed 
ways to streamline and simplify the delivery mechanisms to reduce the administra-
tive burden for beneficiaries. Following the debate launched by the Green Paper on 
territorial cohesion, this report explains what territorial cohesion adds to Cohesion 
Policy and presents new indicators that reveal the territorial dimension of issues like 
poverty and access to services. Consultations with stakeholders and Member States’ 
experts on the future of the Cohesion Policy have also highlighted the importance 
of enhancing the impact and visibility of the funds that support it, including for the 
investments made in human capital which are an important element of our new 
strategy.
The Cohesion Policy proposed for the period after 2013 allows all Member States and 
regions to actively pursue smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Our efforts will in 
particular support development in the poorest regions in line with our commitment 
to solidarity. But the Commission will also consider the difficulties and potential for 
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growth in other parts of the Union, such as urban deprived neighbourhoods, re-
gions undergoing economic restructuring and more generally the necessary shift 
to a more innovative and knowledge based economy thanks to a better educated 
workforce. 
The crisis has underlined the continued need for a policy that invests in the competi-
tiveness of Europe, the well-being of its citizens and the quality of our environment. 
Yet this policy can only succeed through coordinated action focused on the key pri-
orities. Only in this way can we promote economic, social and territorial cohesion 
and Europe 2020. 
Johannes Hahn 
European Commissioner  
for Regional Policy
László Andor   
European Commissioner   
for Employment, Social Affairs 
and InclusionFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion v
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Abbreviations
Official Order Country code Name
1 BE Belgium
2 BG Bulgaria
3 CZ Czech Republic
4 DK Denmark
5 DE Germany
6 EE Estonia
7 IE Ireland
8 EL Greece
9 ES Spain
10 FR France
11 IT Italy
12 CY Cyprus
13 LV Latvia
14 LT Lithuania
15 LU Luxembourg
16 HU Hungary
17 MT Malta
18 NL Netherlands
19 AT Austria
20 PL Poland
21 PT Portugal
22 RO Romania
23 SI Slovenia
24 SK Slovakia
25 FI Finland
26 SE Sweden
27 UK United Kingdom
COH:  Cohesion Countries including less developed plus moderately developed Member States (see below)
CONV:  Convergence regions covering the least prosperous NUTS 2 regions with GDP per head of less than 75% of 
the EU-25 average 
EFTA:  European Free Trade Association (EU-27 + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland)
EU:  European Union
OECD:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPS:  Purchasing Power Standards
RCE:   Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions: all regions other than Converge regions and Transi-
tion regions (see below)
TRANS:  Transition regions groups phasing-in and phasing-out regions. They are called transition to highlight their 
intermediate stage between convergence and regional competitiveness and employment regions.
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Geographical groupings
Member State groupings
By enlargement
EU-15:   All Member States which joined prior to 2004: BE, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK
EU-10: Member States which joined in 2004: CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL,  SI, SK
EU-12:  EU-10 plus Member States which joined in 2007: BG, RO
Geographic groupings
Central and Eastern Member States: EE, LV, LT, PL, SK, CZ, SI, HU, RO, BG
Southern Member States: PT, ES, IT, EL, MT, CY
Western Member States: EU-15
Nordic Member States: SE, DK, FI
Baltic States: EE, LV, LT
Benelux: BE, NL, LU
By level of development
Less developed Member States: (BG, RO, PL, LV, LT, HU, EE, SK) (GDP per head below 75% of EU average)
Moderately developed Member States: (PT, MT, CZ, SI, EL, CY) (GDP per head between 75% and 100% of EU average)
Highly developed Member States: (IT, ES, FR, BE, DE, UK, FI, SE, DK, AT, NL, IE, LU (GDP per head above EU average)
By status
Candidate countries: Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
Potential candidate countries:  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 
1244/99 and Iceland
Groups of NUTS 3 regions
This report includes a wide variety of classification of NUTS 3 regions. The Directorate-General for Regional Policy will 
publish a Regional Working Paper with a detailed methodology for each of these classifications.
Metropolitan regions
This classification was developed in cooperation with the OECD and consists of NUTS 3 approximation of all urban 
agglomerations of more than 250 000 inhabitants as defined by the Urban Audit’s Larger Urban Zones.
Predominantly urban, intermediate, predominantly rural regions
This is classification is based on the OECD classification, but revised by the Commission. A detailed methodology is 
included in the Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2010.
Border regions
Border regions are NUTS 3 regions which are eligible for cross-border co-operation programmes under the European 
Regional Development Fund regulation. 
Mountain regions
These are NUTS 3 regions where 50% of the population lives in a mountainous area or 50% of the land area is consid-
ered mountainous.
Island regions
These are NUTS 3 regions where the majority of the population live on one or more islands without fixed connections 
to the mainland, such as a bridge or a tunnel. 
Sparsely populated regions
Sparsely populated regions are NUTS 3 regions with a population density of less than 12.5 inhabitants per km². 
Data behind the maps and NUTS 3 classifications can be downloaded here:    
https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b35d4432-3434-496a-9726-641f55f8abaf/5CR_data_and_ 
typologies.zipFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xi
The fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion is adopted in the af-
termath of the worst financial and economic crisis in recent history. The EU and its 
Member States responded to this crisis by taking measures to keep businesses in 
operation and people in employment, to stimulate demand and increase public in-
vestment. 
Subsequently, several governments have faced difficulties refinancing their debts 
due to a combination of falling revenue and increasing expenditure on welfare pay-
ments and stimulus measures. Faced with large deficits and pressure from financial 
markets, most EU governments are in the process of implementing fiscal consolida-
tion measures.
In the midst of this, the EU has adopted an ambitious new strategy for long-term 
recovery, Europe 2020. Its key objective is smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. 
Even more than its predecessor, the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 emphasises the 
need for innovation, employment and social inclusion and a strong response to en-
vironmental challenges and climate change in order to meet this objective. 
The aim of this Cohesion Report is to support the Europe 2020 strategy and highlight 
the contribution that regions, and Cohesion Policy, can make to meet these objec-
tives. The report argues that the Europe 2020 headline targets cannot be achieved 
by policies formulated at EU or national level alone. Such an ambitious agenda can 
only succeed with strong national and regional participation and ownership on the 
ground. This is one of the main lessons learnt from the Lisbon Strategy. For example, 
reaching the employment target of 75% in the Convergence regions would have re-
quired almost 10 million extra jobs in 2008, more than in all other regions combined.
In addition, the regional diversity in the EU, where regions have vastly different char-
acteristics, opportunities and needs, requires going beyond ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies 
towards an approach that gives regions the ability to design and the means to de-
liver policies that meet their needs. This is what Cohesion Policy provides through its 
place-based approach.
The report argues that an efficient Europe 2020 strategy requires close coordination 
between Cohesion Policy and other EU policies. In many domains, public policies 
have a greater overall impact if they are closely coordinated rather than being im-
plemented in isolation. Recent work by the OECD suggests that it is important to 
combine investment in transport infrastructure with support for businesses and hu-
man capital development to achieve sustainable economic and social development. 
The fifth Cohesion Report is the first report adopted under the Lisbon Treaty, which 
added territorial cohesion to the twin goals of economic and social cohesion. To 
cover this, the report, first, analyses the territorial dimension of access to services. 
Second, it pays more attention to climate change and the environment. Third, it con-
siders how the territorial impact of policies can be measured. 
Executive SummaryExecutive Summary
xii Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
The report also includes a number of other novelties as compared with earlier re-
ports. The analysis of regional economic disparities has been expanded to include is-
sues relating to institutions and a new index of competitiveness is presented. More-
over, analysis of social cohesion, following the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, covers 
both objective and subjective indicators of well-being and several indicators which 
have never been presented at the regional level before. 
The report contains four chapters. The first focuses on the economic, social and ter-
ritorial situation and trends in the EU by considering how to (1) promote economic 
competitiveness and convergence, (2) improve well-being and reduce social exclu-
sion, and (3) enhance environmental sustainability. The second chapter assesses the 
contribution of national policies to cohesion. The third chapter presents an overview 
of how other EU policies have contributed to cohesion. The last chapter summarises 
the evidence on the positive impact of Cohesion Policy in furthering cohesion ob-
jectives and highlights the areas where there is room for improvement. 
Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
Chapter 1 provides an extensive overview of the situation and trends in EU regions 
from an economic, social and environmental perspective. All three perspectives re-
veal striking regional disparities from differences in productivity, to infant mortality 
rates and vulnerability to climate change. Many of these disparities have shrunk over 
the past decade, some quite quickly, but overall there remains a wide gap between 
the less developed and the highly developed EU regions. 
Although some of these regional disparities will never (completely) disappear, many 
of them are inefficient, unfair and unsustainable. To achieve real progress towards 
the goals of smart, green and inclusive growth, these regional disparities have to be 
reduced. 
Promoting competitiveness and convergence
The EU is not alone in facing significant regional development disparities. Many 
large countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia also have wide differences in 
regional GDP per head and have turned to EU Cohesion Policy to learn how to re-
duce them. 
Differences in GDP per head between the US States are relatively narrow, but the 
differences within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which also 
includes Canada and Mexico, are much larger than those in the EU. These regional 
disparities in NAFTA have not diminished over time. This implies that belonging to a 
large free trade zone alone is not sufficient to enable less developed regions to catch 
up, especially when the gap in infrastructure, institutional efficiency and innovation 
is wide. 
The EU’s single market has grown to half a billion people today. Such a large market 
creates new opportunities in terms of economies of scale and specialisation. Both 
can help to make EU firms highly productive and globally more competitive. The 
value added of EU firms lies more and more in knowledge-intensive and other ser-Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xiii
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vices, where the EU has a competitive edge as shown by a positive and growing 
trade balance in services with the rest of the world.
The internal market of the EU guarantees free movement not only of goods but also 
of people, services and capital. This allows people to travel more easily for leisure or 
work. The internal market opens up new horizons for investment or retirement and 
allows more people to find a job and more vacancies to get filled. This increasing in-
tegration can also be seen in growing trade and financial flows. Within the EU, trade 
in goods and services has expanded significantly, especially between countries in 
the EU-12 and between the EU-12 and the EU-15. Foreign direct investment and 
remittances from people working in another country have become crucial sources 
of capital for many of the less developed Member States. The crisis, however, has 
disrupted many of these flows. 
Economic growth per head is linked to changes in population, employment and 
productivity. Since population grew only slightly in most regions between 2000 
and 2007, it had little effect on regional growth and hardly any effect at EU level. 
Increases in employment had a strong effect in Transition regions and a moderate 
one in regional competitiveness and employment regions. In Convergence regions, 
employment made only a small contribution to growth, but the (very) low employ-
ment rates reveal a significantly underutilised resource. The main source of growth 
in all EU regions was higher productivity. Productivity growth was particularly high 
in Convergence regions fuelled by both increases within sectors (linked to innova-
tion in the broad sense) and shifts in employment to sectors with a higher value 
added (restructuring). In Competitiveness regions, higher productivity came almost 
exclusively from innovation. Productivity growth came mostly from innovation in 
Transition regions, but, true to their name, was partly due to restructuring. 
Innovation
To become more productive, the EU needs more innovation (in a broad sense) and 
more investment in education, training and life-long learning. Europe 2020 empha-
sises the need for more innovation. For example, only one region in ten has reached 
the Europe 2020 target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D. 
Innovation is important for all regions, whether or not they are at the forefront of 
research. In regions that are not, i.e. most regions, the focus should be more on ab-
sorbing and spreading innovative practice developed elsewhere, than on radical in-
novations. Accordingly, these regions need to support investment in the capability 
of firms to internalise innovative practice and train their work force as well as helping 
to strengthen the links between private enterprise, research centres and govern-
ment (the triple helix model).
The Europe 2020 target increasing the proportion of those aged 30–34 with a ter-
tiary education degree or equivalent to 40% has been reached in less than one in six 
regions and most others will need to increase greatly the capacity of universities and 
the number of young people remaining in education in order to meet this target by 
2020. Executive Summary
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The Europe 2020 ‘early-school leaving’ target of at most 10% of young people aged 
18–24 with no education beyond basic schooling has been reached in one in four re-
gions, but it will require a substantial effort in many regions to achieve it, especially 
in Malta and the 17 regions in Spain and Portugal where the rate is still above 30%.
In many cases, public action is necessary to ensure that these economies can exploit 
their assets and opportunities efficiently. Investment in innovation and education 
can boost economic growth markedly, but only if the right infrastructure and institu-
tions are in place. 
Infrastructure
Innovations lead to more growth if they can easily reach a large market. The infra-
structure needed to reach a large market is changing as more and more services 
can be purchased and distributed online, providing even remote regions with direct 
access to an EU-wide or even global market. Within the EU, this requires establish-
ing a single digital market and increasing access to broadband. Broadband access, 
however, is far from universal. In thinly populated areas in Romania, only 13% of 
households had a broadband connection in 2009, compared to Finland where 77% 
of households in thinly populated and 84% in densely populated areas had broad-
band access. 
Despite the growing importance of digital networks, the capacity to move people 
and goods by rail, road, air or water remains critically important. Transport infra-
structure, however, is unevenly distributed across the EU. Most central and eastern 
Member States still have considerably fewer motorways than other parts of the EU 
and much lower speeds on their rail network. Access to air transport in most of these 
countries is also poor due to fewer flights and poor connections to airports. 
Border regions often have lower grade transport infrastructure and less access to 
services and markets, especially along the external borders. This tends to reduce 
their GDP per head and employment rates. Cross-border cooperation can enhance 
welfare, but it may involve relatively high transaction costs due to different institu-
tional systems, cultures and languages. EU support can help overcome such obsta-
cles to bring untapped resources into use.
Institutions
Strong institutions are crucial for sustainable economic growth and social welfare. 
This is increasingly recognised by policy markers and researchers alike. The crisis has 
highlighted the need for stable macroeconomic conditions, but the strategies for 
recovery should balance the need for fiscal consolidation with the need for sufficient 
levels of public investment. Wider availability and use of e-government services can 
also help to increase the transparency and efficiency of public administrations, and 
cross-border and inter-regional cooperation can help to strengthen institutional ca-
pacity.
Combined efforts to improve infrastructure, institutions and the pace of innovation 
can help the EU’s economy become more productive and more competitive, which 
is key to sustaining adequate rates of growth and creating more and better jobs. To 
reach the Europe 2020 targets, a wide-ranging strategy is essential. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xv
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Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Life expectancy and health
The EU has one of the highest life expectancies in the world. The average age and 
share of population of 65 are also among the highest in the world as a result. This has 
consequences for both health services and the labour force. An increase in the share 
of older people implies an increased demand for health and related services. As the 
average age of the labour force increases and people continue in employment until 
later in life, the demand for (re-)training will increase as may the demand for more 
flexible working arrangements.
Despite life expectancy being high overall, differences between regions remain rela-
tively wide. The reasons are manifold, ranging from differences in income, education 
and living conditions to uneven access to high quality health care. Infant mortal-
ity, for example, is substantially higher in Romanian and Bulgarian regions, but also 
in some of the more remote or economically depressed regions in the EU-15. The 
same is true of death rates from cancer and heart disease. Road deaths per head of 
population differ by a factor of ten across EU regions, not so much because of the 
state of the road network but because of driver behaviour and the degree of law 
enforcement. 
Living conditions
Unemployment fell substantially between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, regional 
unemployment rates remained high in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and South-
ern Spain, even before the crisis. Since 2008, unemployment has risen dramatically 
in many Member States, notably in Spain and the Baltic States, where average rates 
were around 20% by early 2010. Considerable efforts will be needed to bring people 
back into employment in the years to come.
Labour mobility in the EU remains low, especially compared to the US, and this alone 
will not reduce the large regional disparities in unemployment across the EU. Never-
theless, regions with high unemployment have experienced larger outward migra-
tion, though the pattern of migration differs between the EU-12 and the EU-15. In 
the EU-12, migration has tended to be into predominantly urban regions, especially 
capital cities. In the EU-15, there has been more migration to predominantly rural 
regions than predominantly urban ones. Migration from outside the EU was until 
recently the most important source of population growth in EU regions, but the suc-
cessful integration of the people concerned remains uneven and they have consid-
erably lower employment rates than average in many Member States.
Within one generation, women have achieved and surpassed the level of education 
attained by men. In virtually all EU regions, many more women aged 25–34 than 
men have a university degree, while for women aged 55–64, this is the case in only a 
small minority of regions. This tendency has not yet led to more equal employment 
rates. In particular in southern European regions, employment rates of women are 
considerably lower than elsewhere, despite significant increases over the past dec-
ade, and unemployment among women is much higher than among men. Executive Summary
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Access to services differs in two main ways, the most important is the difference be-
tween more and less developed countries and the second is the difference between 
thinly and densely populated areas. In most of the more developed Member States 
access to services, such as education, health care or banking, is not a problem in all 
types of area. In the less developed Member States, however, access is more limited, 
especially in thinly populated areas. 
Densely populated areas, however, suffer from a combination of problems in all 
Member States, including from crime, violence, vandalism, pollution and noise. The 
share of population in densely populated areas experiencing these problems is two 
to three times larger than in other areas. Surveys of those living in cities, accordingly, 
show a high level of dissatisfaction with air quality and safety and, in several cases, 
low levels of trust.
Poverty
Europe 2020 aims to reduce poverty and exclusion. The indicator used to monitor 
this combines two absolute indicators (severe material deprivation and living in low 
work-intensity households) and a relative one (income below the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold). 
Severe material deprivation is highly concentrated in the less developed Member 
States and regions where up to a quarter of people are identified as being severely 
deprived. In the EU-12, the relative number tends to be larger in thinly populated 
areas, while in the EU-15 it is larger in densely populated ones. 
Households with low work intensity are most common in the UK, Hungary and Ire-
land, where at least one in 10 lives in such a situation. In the Baltic States, Cyprus and 
Slovakia, by contrast, the number is less than one in 20.
The share of population with an income level that puts them at risk of poverty (less 
than 60% of national median disposable income) also differs markedly between 
countries, ranging from one in four (in Romania) to one in 10 (in the Czech Republic). 
But the range is far wider at regional level: from around one in 17 in two Czech re-
gions and Trento in Italy to more than one in three in three southern Italian regions, 
two Spanish and one Romanian region. In several Member States, including the UK, 
Spain, Italy, Germany and Poland, the proportion is twice as large in the least pros-
perous regions than in the most prosperous ones.
Prior to the financial crisis, household income had increased markedly in many cen-
tral and eastern Member States. This lifted many people out of material deprivation 
and increased their overall life satisfaction and happiness. Unfortunately, the crisis 
not only brought this increase to an end but reversed it. Consequently, it is likely to 
have increased deprivation, especially in the most affected countries, such as the 
Baltic States.
Promoting active inclusion and reducing poverty means investing in education, 
training and skills, modernising labour markets, training and education systems 
and social and health services to help people anticipate and manage change and to 
build a cohesive society.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xvii
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Enhancing environmental sustainability
Adapting to climate change
Adapting to climate change will be most difficult in southern cities and regions and 
coastal and mountain areas. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were drastically re-
duced today, temperatures would still increase in the coming years and extreme 
weather events become more frequent, with more droughts, floods and reduced 
snow cover. Several regions which rely heavily on agriculture and winter or summer 
tourism are likely to have more droughts and less snow in the near future which 
could undermine these activities. At the same time, floods are likely to increase in 
other regions with many cities being particularly vulnerable.
Limiting climate change
Reaching the Europe 2020 target of 20% energy consumption from renewables will 
require substantially more investment in solar energy, particularly in southern Eu-
rope where there is most potential, and in wind energy, especially along the Atlantic 
and North Sea coasts. 
The target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% is ambitious and will re-
quire investment by both the private and the public sector. The private sector will 
largely be covered by the emissions trading scheme, but the public sector will still 
need to make substantial changes and investment to reduce emissions and energy 
consumption. Increasing energy efficiency will require investing in the insulation of 
buildings, different heating systems, more efficient modes of transport and perhaps 
promoting urban living and more compact cities. 
Improving environmental quality
The number of cities where waste water treatment is below EU standards has fallen 
over the past decade. Nevertheless, in several of the eastern Member States, more in-
vestment is still needed to comply fully with the urban waste water directive, which 
is why the accession treaties have foreseen a staggered transition. Though recycling 
of waste has increased and the use of landfills diminished, more progress in treating 
waste efficiently is still needed in some southern and eastern Member States. 
Air quality is poor in many regions, especially in city centres and in the south, with 
detrimental effects on health and the quality of life. Reducing ozone levels and par-
ticulate matter in the air will require increased efforts at local and regional level. 
Moreover, both the Natura 2000 areas and green infrastructure in the wider country-
side need to be properly managed and protected.
National policies and cohesion
National governments have implemented various regional development policies to 
further economic, social and territorial cohesion. While some Member States give 
priority to tackling regional disparities, others focus more on national competitive-
ness or on specific territorial features. Irrespective of the approach pursued, the em-
phasis is increasingly on stimulating endogenous development by providing support Executive Summary
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to areas of comparative advantage, rather than compensating regions for disadvan-
tages.
Sub-national governments in virtually all Member States are responsible for a rela-
tively large share of public investment. On average, some two-thirds of public in-
vestment is implemented by regional and local authorities across the EU, underlin-
ing the importance of their contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy.
Public investment is critical to improving the competitiveness of less developed 
regions, especially in those less well endowed with infrastructure. A number of re-
cent studies have concluded that public investment boosts growth under certain 
conditions, among which good institutional governance is critical. Cohesion Policy 
support ensures that less developed countries and regions can maintain the rates 
of public investment required to increase their growth potential and equally helps 
them strengthen their institutional capacity. 
Cohesion Policy funding means that public investment is higher relative to GDP in 
Cohesion countries than in the rest of the EU. The past decade has seen a positive 
correlation between rates of public investment and rates of economic growth, sug-
gesting both that public investment is important for convergence and that econom-
ic growth is important for public investment. 
Higher rates of public investment in Cohesion countries have mostly gone to im-
proving infrastructure, notably transport networks, and Cohesion Policy has played 
a crucial role in helping to narrow the gap with more advanced parts of the EU in 
this respect. 
Unlike in the case of their entitlement to EU funding under Cohesion, the relative 
prosperity of regions is not a major determinant of their access to national funds for 
investment, except in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Other factors such 
as geophysical features, the extent of fiscal and political autonomy or the attraction 
of capital cities seem to be at least as important as cohesion objectives in determin-
ing the regional distribution of public investment.
Cohesion Policy is important for boosting the competitiveness of more advanced 
regions as well as less-developed ones. On average it accounts for around 25% of 
total public investment at regional level in non-Convergence regions in Spain and 
France. It totals around 15% of public expenditure on environmental protection in 
the West Midlands and London and some 25% of public expenditure on improving 
the adaptability of workers and helping disadvantaged groups find employment in 
Central and Northern Italy.
The economic crisis led most national governments and some regional authorities 
to introduce ad hoc stimulus packages to mitigate the effects on growth and em-
ployment. Public investment was a major component of these packages. The legacy 
of the crisis, however, is a dramatic increase in government borrowing and debt. 
While this mostly stems from a fall in tax revenue, restoring macroeconomic stability 
and reducing government deficits in the coming years to more sustainable levels is 
likely to put pressure on public expenditure programmes and on public investment 
in particular. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xix
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Cohesion Policy, which accounts for a substantial proportion of financing for invest-
ment in many countries, is therefore likely to become increasingly important in the 
future. On the other hand, fiscal and budgetary constraints on Member States will 
have a significant impact on the environment in which Cohesion Policy operates. 
This might trigger a review of co-financing rules, which is a fundamental principle 
of Cohesion Policy underpinning the joint approach to EU funding and ensuring 
ownership of the policy on the ground.
The way that the additionality principle is verified to ensure that Cohesion Policy 
funding is used to support investment which is additional to what national govern-
ments would have otherwise undertaken needs to be revised. Currently, the method 
used is contested on grounds of reliability and lack of comparability between Mem-
ber States, because of its ad-hoc nature and complexity. A reform of the system is 
needed to make it more reliable, transparent and straight-forward.
Structural and institutional reforms are important to maximise the impact of Cohe-
sion Policy. However, the pace of reform over the past decade has been relatively 
slow and this has affected the impact of the policy ‘on the ground’. The Europe 2020 
strategy has set a new framework to which Cohesion Policy needs to adapt. A key 
aspect of this will be to establish closer links between the design and implementa-
tion of policy and the macroeconomic objectives and structural and institutional 
reforms pursued.
Cohesion Policy in the current period includes conditions linked to the macroeco-
nomic situation only in respect of the Cohesion Fund (apart from administrative re-
quirements on financial management and control systems). For the next program-
ming period, the issue of whether this kind of macroeconomic conditionality should 
be extended, and if so how, should be explored. Whether other conditions, such 
as incentives for reform in areas closely linked to the operation of Cohesion Policy 
and which might increase its impact, and value for money, might also be usefully 
examined. 
Other EU policies and cohesion
According to the EU Treaty, the design and implementation of all EU policies should 
take account of their effect on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Currently 
some policies have a clear territorial dimension, like transport or environment poli-
cy. Other policies have a partial territorial dimension, such as research, information 
society or health policy. Some policies do not or cannot distinguish in their imple-
mentation between different parts of the EU, for example the single market or trade. 
Policies do not need to have a specifically regional thrust to be able to assess their 
effect on cohesion. However, it does require having a thorough understanding of 
the local impact of a policy, whether it is spatially targeted or not. Such assessments 
of the territorial impact could be carried out, prior to the approval of a policy, or as 
part of an ex post evaluation.
Policies also tend to have inter-dependent effects. Without proper coordination, the 
impact of any one policy is likely to be severely diminished and might even be nega-Executive Summary
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tive. The impact of policies cannot therefore be maximised if a fragmented approach 
is adopted and policy decisions are taken in isolation. 
Infrastructure improvements, for example, do not lead automatically to higher 
growth and, in fact, might even result in a net reduction in economic activity in less 
developed regions (‘leaking by linking’). Investment in infrastructure needs to be 
combined with investment in education, enterprise, and innovation to ensure not 
only that it has a positive effect on development but that this effect is maximised by 
taking account of the complementary effects of this other investment. 
Similarly, innovation may be spatially concentrated, but its benefits are not. Invest-
ment in R&D and businesses therefore need to be complemented by investment in 
human capital, not only to foster the efficiency of the regional innovation process, 
but also to ensure that the benefits of innovation are distributed widely in spatial 
and social terms.
As regards R&D and innovation, Cohesion Policy needs to complement the activi-
ties carried out under the Research Framework Programme and the Competitive-
ness and Innovation Framework programme. This can be achieved by focusing the 
role of Cohesion Policy on spreading and applying examples of innovative practice 
across the EU at regional level (‘smart specialisation’) and on supporting investment 
in basic infrastructure, institutions and human resources in less developed regions 
so that they can participate fully in the knowledge economy.
Given the tightening budget constraints which will limit public expenditure over 
the next few years across the EU and the parallel need to support economic recov-
ery, these limited public resources should be used to maximum effect, which, as the 
Europe 2020 strategy makes clear, can only happen if all EU policies are mutually 
reinforcing. 
The impact of Cohesion Policy
Cohesion Policy is the EU’s main instrument for pursuing harmonious development 
across the Union. It is based on a broad vision, which encompasses not just the eco-
nomic development of lagging regions and support for vulnerable social groups, 
but also environmental sustainability and respect for the territorial and cultural fea-
tures of different parts of the EU. This breadth of vision is reflected in the variety of 
programmes, projects and partners that are supported under the policy.
In terms of the regional economy, the funding provided by Cohesion Policy over the 
period 2000–2006 created some 1 million jobs in enterprises across the EU, as well as 
perhaps adding as much as 10% to GDP in Objective 1 regions in the EU-15. As vari-
ous studies indicate, this tended to boost the trade and exports of net contributor 
countries, which helps to offset their contribution to funding the policy. Accordingly, 
macroeconomic model simulations indicate that Cohesion Policy had the net effect 
of raising the level of GDP in the EU as a whole. 
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: grants to enterprise provide valuable 
support, but too often in the past there has been an over-reliance on them. The trend 
towards a more balanced mix, including financial engineering (loans and venture Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxi
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capital) as well as more indirect measures, such as advice and guidance and sup-
port for networking and clustering, is a welcome one. The European Commission, 
in close partnership with the EIB, is actively encouraging such diversification of sup-
port measures through initiatives such as JEREMIE, JASMINE, JASPERS and JESSICA.
In addition, Cohesion Policy investment in motorways and roads in the less devel-
oped parts of the EU-15 over many years means that the job is now largely done. 
Investment should shift towards more environmentally-friendly modes of transport 
(notably rail and urban transport systems), though in the EU-12, the need to improve 
all transport links remains a priority.
Cohesion Policy also supports the training of around 10 million people a year, with 
a strong focus on young people, the long-term unemployed and the low skilled. 
Through various local development initiatives, Cohesion Policy has a strong track 
record of cross-border co-operation, regenerating deprived urban neighbourhoods, 
and improving access to services in rural areas.
Involving regional and local communities can improve policies. Evaluation evidence 
has demonstrated that the active participation of people and organisations in pro-
jects at regional and local level, from the design to the implementation stage, is a 
crucial success factor. Indeed, such partnership is one of the key sources of added-
value of Cohesion Policy, mobilising the skills and knowledge of those concerned to 
make programmes more effective and inclusive.
In terms of protecting the environment, more than half the Member States are track-
ing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a target in their Cohesion Policy 
programmes for the 2007–2013 period. 
More than 23 million people were connected to wastewater collection and treat-
ment systems and at least 20 million people connected to clean supply of drinking 
water through ERDF and Cohesion Fund support in 2000–2006. As a result, Cohesion 
Policy has helped many regions to meet the requirements of EU environmental Di-
rectives and by so doing has helped to protect the environment and to improve the 
quality of life. However, the sustainability of the facilities constructed needs more 
careful consideration to ensure that investment in environmental infrastructure is 
made with clear plans for long-term financing. 
In terms of policy management, strong and sound administration at national, re-
gional and local levels is important for the success and lasting effect of Cohesion 
Policy. Evaluations have found that the EU-12 countries have significantly improved 
administrative capacity since accession. Nevertheless, continued efforts are needed 
to ensure that all government levels in the EU have the necessary administrative 
capacity to deliver Cohesion Policy effectively.
A recurrent evaluation finding across all areas of investment was a preoccupation 
with ‘absorption’, i.e., with spending the money more than focusing on what the pro-
grammes were actually designed to achieve. While the former is obviously a pre-
condition for success, the latter is ultimately what matters. For example, monitoring 
systems typically prioritise spending and outputs (such as the number of people 
trained or kilometres of new roads constructed) rather than results (such as the Executive Summary
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number of people getting a job after training or the amount of journey time saved) 
let alone on impacts (the effect of a better trained work force or more efficient trans-
port networks on regional development).
Cohesion Policy needs to cultivate a focus on performance. This has to start from 
programmes identifying a limited number of policy priorities (concentration) with 
a clear view of how they will be achieved and how their achievement will contrib-
ute to the economic, social and territorial development of the regions, or Member 
States, concerned.
Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be improved across the EU to track per-
formance and to help redirect efforts as necessary to ensure that objectives are at-
tained. This requires a clear strategic vision of what the programme aims to achieve 
and how success will be recognised and measured (proper target setting). It also 
requires a greater recourse to rigorous evaluation methods, including counterfac-
tual impact evaluation, cost benefit analysis, beneficiary surveys, as well as a more 
rigorous use of qualitative methods such as case studies.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxiii
1. Introduction1
Europe faces a daunting task. It must exit from a deep crisis and reduce unemploy-
ment and poverty, while switching to a low-carbon economy. Such an ambitious 
task requires swift action on many fronts, which is why the European Council adopt-
ed the Europe 2020 Strategy2. For Europe to succeed, European, national, regional 
and local levels all need to play their part. Cohesion policy should continue to play 
a critical role in these difficult times, in order to deliver smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth, while promoting harmonious development of the Union and its regions 
by reducing regional disparities.
Cohesion policy has made a significant contribution to spreading growth and pros-
perity across the Union, while reducing economic, social and territorial disparities. 
The fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion shows that the policy has 
created new jobs, increased human capital, built critical infrastructure and improved 
environmental protection, especially in the less developed regions. Undoubtedly, 
without Cohesion Policy, disparities would be greater. Yet the lasting social effects 
of the crisis, the demand for innovation arising from increased global challenges 
and the imperative to make the most of every euro of public expenditure call for an 
ambitious reform of the policy.
As indicated in the EU budget review3, in particular, progress needs to be made in 
the following key areas: concentrating resources on the Europe 2020 objectives 
and targets; committing Member States to implementing the reforms needed for 
the policy to be effective; and improving the effectiveness of the policy with an in-
creased focus on results. The explicit linkage of Cohesion Policy and Europe 2020 
provides a real opportunity: to continue helping the poorer regions of the EU catch 
up, to facilitate coordination between EU policies, and to develop Cohesion Policy 
into a leading enabler of growth, also in qualitative terms, for the whole of the EU, 
while addressing societal challenges such as ageing and climate change.
With these conclusions, the Commission opens a public consultation on the future 
of Cohesion Policy. This is organised around a series of questions on the main ideas 
for its reform.
The following sections look, in turn, at how the policy can be made more effective 
and its impact improved so as to enhance the European added value (Section 2), at 
how governance of the policy can be further strengthened (Section 3), at how the 
delivery system can be streamlined and made simpler (Section 4) and at the archi-
tecture of the policy (Section 5).
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, COM(2010) 642 
final, 9.11.2010.
2  ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ — COM(2010) 2020, 3.3.2010.
3  ‘The EU budget review’ — COM(2010) 700, 19.10.2010.
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2. Enhancing the European added value of Cohesion Policy
The added value of Cohesion Policy is recurrently debated by policy-makers, aca-
demics and stakeholders. Some argue that Cohesion Policy is loosely linked to EU 
priorities, that it spreads resources too thinly across policy areas and that its impact 
is often difficult to measure. Though the report shows that Cohesion Policy has con-
tributed to economic and social development of regions and to the well-being of 
people, the Commission takes these criticisms very seriously.
Further reforms of Cohesion Policy, while preserving its overall objective, should 
therefore aim to steer the policy decisively towards results and enact the reforms 
needed in order to achieve results, while cutting red-tape and simplifying the daily 
management of the policy.
2.1. Reinforcing strategic programming
Cohesion Policy has already been substantially aligned with the Lisbon Strategy, in 
particular by earmarking financial resources. However, this alignment is not suffi-
cient due to a governance gap between the two strategic processes. More can be 
done in the future to further align Cohesion Policy with the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
This requires, first of all, clear guidance at European level and a more strategic nego-
tiating process and follow-up.
The EU budget review outlined a new strategic programming approach for Cohe-
sion Policy with a view to closer integration of EU policies to deliver the Europe 2020 
Strategy and the Integrated Guidelines. This approach would consist of: 
  • a common strategic framework (CSF) adopted by the Commission translating 
the targets and objectives of Europe 2020 into investment priorities. The frame-
work would cover the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Devel-
opment and the European Fisheries Fund; 
  • a development and investment partnership contract which, based on the 
common strategic framework, would set out the investment priorities, the al-
location of national and EU resources between priority areas and programmes, 
the agreed conditionalities, and the targets to be achieved. This contract would 
cover Cohesion Policy. In order to promote economic, social and territorial cohe-
sion in a coherent and integrated manner, it might be useful to extend its scope 
to other policies and EU funding instruments. The contract will be the fruit of the 
discussions between Member States and the Commission on the development 
strategy presented in their National Reform Programmes. It would also describe 
the coordination between EU funds at national level; and 
  • operational programmes (OPs) which, as in the current period, would be the 
main management tool and would translate the strategic documents into con-
crete investment priorities accompanied by clear and measurable targets — 
which should contribute to reach the national targets set in the framework of 
Europe 2020. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxv
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The timing of the annual reports monitoring progress towards the targets would 
be aligned with the Europe 2020 governance cycle. On this basis, a regular politi-
cal debate in the relevant Council formations and European Parliament committees 
would improve transparency, accountability and assessment of the effects of Cohe-
sion Policy. 
Three proposals in the EU budget review have a particular impact on Cohesion Pol-
icy: concentrating financial resources, the system of conditionality and incentives, 
and focus on results.
2.2. Increasing thematic concentration
The ex post evaluations of Cohesion Policy concluded that greater concentration of 
resources is required to build up a critical mass and make a tangible impact.
In the future it will therefore be necessary to ensure that Member States and regions 
concentrate EU and national resources on a small number of priorities responding 
to the specific challenges that they face. This could be achieved by establishing, in 
the Cohesion Policy regulations, a list of thematic priorities linked to the priorities, 
Integrated Guidelines and flagship initiatives of Europe 2020. 
Depending on the amount of EU funding involved, countries and regions would 
be required to focus on more or fewer priorities. Thus, Member States and regions 
receiving less funding would be required to allocate the entire financial allocation 
available to two or three priorities, whereas those receiving more financial support 
may select more. Certain priorities would be obligatory. 
At the same time, thematic concentration should not prevent Member States and 
regions to experiment and fund innovative projects. Ring-fencing expenditure for 
specific target groups or experimental approaches (e.g. local development) might 
also be considered, possibly in the form of global grants. 
2.3. Strengthening performance through 
conditionality and incentives 
The financial and economic crisis has already compelled the Commission to propose 
measures to improve the economic governance of the Union4. Sound macroeco-
nomic policies, a favourable microeconomic environment and strong institutional 
frameworks are preconditions for creating jobs, stimulate growth, reduce social ex-
clusion and bring about structural changes. 
This is even truer of Cohesion Policy, since its effectiveness largely depends on the 
economic environment in which it operates. It is therefore possible to strengthen 
the links between Cohesion Policy and the economic policy framework of the Union.
First, to support the new economic governance system new conditionality provi-
sions would be introduced creating incentives for reforms. Member States would 
be required to introduce the reforms needed to ensure effective use of financial re-
4  ‘Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs — Tools for stronger EU economic 
governance’ — COM(2010) 367, 30.6.2010..Conclusions: the future of cohesion policy
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sources in the areas directly linked to Cohesion Policy, for example environmental 
protection, flexicurity policies, education or research and innovation. 
For each thematic priority the CSF would establish the key principles which inter-
ventions should follow. These principles must leave room for adaptation to national 
and regional contexts. Their main purpose would be to help countries and regions 
to tackle the problems that past experience has shown to be particularly relevant to 
policy implementation. These principles could be linked to, for example, transposi-
tion of specific EU legislation, the financing of strategic EU projects, or administra-
tive, evaluation and institutional capacity. 
On this basis, specific binding conditionality in the areas directly linked to Cohesion 
Policy would be agreed with each Member State and/or region — depending on 
the institutional context — at the beginning of the programming cycle in the pro-
gramming documents (i.e. the development and investment partnership contracts 
and the operational programmes), in a coordinated approach with all relevant EU 
policies. Their fulfilment could be a prerequisite for disbursing cohesion resources 
either at the beginning of the programming period or during a review in which the 
Commission would assess progress towards completing agreed reforms.
Achievement of institutional reform is critical to underpin structural adjustment, fos-
ter growth and jobs and reduce social exclusion, notably by reducing regulatory and 
administrative burdens on businesses or by improving public services. As now, these 
would be complemented by support under Cohesion Policy to develop administra-
tive and institutional capacity and effective governance. This should be available to 
every Member State and region. 
Second, financial sanctions and incentives linked to the Stability and Growth Pact 
have been so far limited to the Cohesion Fund. The Commission has proposed to 
extend it to the rest of the EU budget as complementary leverage to ensure the 
respect of key macroeconomic conditions in the context of the corrective arm of 
the Pact. In cases of non-compliance with the rules of the Pact, incentives should be 
created by suspending or cancelling part of current or future appropriations from 
the EU budget without affecting end-beneficiaries of EU funds. Resources cancelled 
would remain within the EU budget.
Still in the context of the wider economic governance of the EU, the verification of 
the principle of additionality should be reformed by linking it to the EU economic 
surveillance process, using indicators already provided in the Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes which Member States submit to the Commission every year. 
Co-financing is one of the fundamental principles of Cohesion Policy ensuring own-
ership of the policy on the ground. Its level should be reviewed and, possibly, differ-
entiated to reflect better the level of development, EU added value, types of action 
and beneficiaries.
Finally, other instruments which could further strengthen the effectiveness of Cohe-
sion Policy also need to be explored. For example, a performance reserve could be 
established at EU level to encourage progress towards Europe 2020 targets and re-
lated national targets and objectives: a limited share of the cohesion budget would Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxvii
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be set aside and be allocated, during a mid-term review, to the Member States and 
regions whose programmes have contributed most — compared to their starting 
point — to the 2020 targets and objectives. Also, the experience gained over the 
current period has demonstrated that the Commission needs some resources to 
support directly experimentation and networking, along the lines of the innova-
tive actions of previous programming periods.
2.4. Improving evaluation, performance and results
Higher-quality, better-functioning monitoring and evaluation systems are crucial for 
moving towards a more strategic and results-oriented approach to Cohesion Policy. 
A number of changes would support this shift.
First, the starting point for a results-oriented approach is ex ante setting of clear 
and measurable targets and outcome indicators. Indicators must be clearly in-
terpretable, statistically validated, truly responsive and directly linked to policy in-
tervention, and promptly collected and publicised. Indicators and targets should be 
agreed in the discussions on the programming documents in addition to a few core 
Fund-specific indicators for all operational programmes linked to the Europe 2020 
framework. Moreover, timely and complete submission of accurate information on 
the indicators and on the progress towards the agreed targets would be central to 
the annual reports. 
Second, ex ante evaluations should focus on improving programme design so that 
the tools and incentives for achieving objectives and targets can be monitored and 
evaluated during implementation. 
Third, evaluation should make much greater use of rigorous methods in line with 
international standards, including impact evaluation. Whenever possible, impact 
evaluations would be designed at an early stage to ensure collection and dissemina-
tion of the appropriate data. Moreover, plans for on-going evaluation of each pro-
gramme would become an obligation, since they facilitate transparency at EU level, 
foster evaluation strategies and improve the overall quality of evaluations. Evalua-
tions could also be envisaged once a certain amount of the funds has been certified 
to the Commission. 
Finally, Member States could prepare a report synthesising results of on-going eval-
uations they conduct during the programming period with a view to giving a com-
prehensive summative evaluation of programme performance.
2.5. Supporting use of new financial instruments
The EU budget review makes a strong case for increasing the leverage effect of the 
EU budget. New forms of finance for investment have been developed in the 2007–
2013 programming period, moving away from traditional grant-based financing to-
wards innovative ways of combining grants and loans. The Commission would like 
Member States and regions to make a more extended use of such instruments in the 
future.Conclusions: the future of cohesion policy
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Financial instruments help to create revolving forms of finance, making them more 
sustainable over the longer term. This is also one way of helping Europe to increase 
resources for investment, especially in times of recession. It opens new markets to 
different forms of public-private partnership, bringing in the expertise of interna-
tional financial institutions.
To improve financial engineering instruments within Cohesion Policy, a number of 
measures could be examined:
  • provide greater clarity and differentiation between rules governing grant-
based financing and rules governing repayable forms of assistance in the regu-
latory framework, especially on eligibility of expenditure and audits;
  • channel generic financial support to firms mainly via financial engineering in-
struments and use grants to co-finance targeted support schemes (innovation, 
environmental investments, etc.);
  • extend both the scope and scale of financial engineering instruments: in 
terms of scope, to encompass new activities (e.g. sustainable urban transport, 
research and development, energy, local development, lifelong learning or mo-
bility actions, climate change and environment, ICT and broadband); in terms of 
scale, to combine interest subsidies with loan capital or other forms of repayable 
financing.
3. Strengthening governance
3.1. Introducing a third dimension: territorial cohesion
The Lisbon Treaty has added territorial cohesion to the goals of economic and social 
cohesion. As a result, it is necessary to address this objective in the new programmes, 
with particular emphasis on the role of cities, functional geographies, areas facing 
specific geographical or demographic problems and macro-regional strategies.
  • How could the Europe 2020 Strategy and Cohesion Policy be brought 
closer together at EU, national and sub-national levels?
  • Should the scope of the development and investment partnership con-
tract go beyond Cohesion Policy and, if so, what should it be? 
  • How could stronger thematic concentration on the Europe 2020 priori-
ties be achieved? 
  • How could conditionalities, incentives and results-based management 
make Cohesion Policy more effective? 
  • How could Cohesion Policy be made more results-oriented? Which priori-
ties should be obligatory?Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxix
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Urban areas can be the engines of growth and hubs for creativity and innovation. 
Higher growth levels and new jobs can be created provided a critical mass of actors 
like companies, universities and researchers is established. Urban problems, wheth-
er related to environmental degradation or to social exclusion, call for a specific re-
sponse and for direct involvement of the level of government concerned. Accord-
ingly, an ambitious urban agenda should be developed where financial resources 
are identified more clearly to address urban issues and urban authorities would play 
a stronger role in designing and implementing urban development strategies. Ur-
ban action, the related resources and the cities concerned should be clearly identi-
fied in the programming documents.
For the future, one aspect which should be examined is whether the regulatory ar-
chitecture of Cohesion Policy should allow greater flexibility in organising opera-
tional programmes in order to reflect the nature and geography of development 
processes better. Programmes could then be designed and managed not only at 
national and regional levels, but also, for example, at the level of groups of towns or 
of river and sea basins.
The report has shown that in some cases geographical or demographic features 
could intensify development problems. This is particularly true of the outermost re-
gions but also of northernmost regions with very low population density and island, 
cross-border and mountain regions, as explicitly recognised by the Lisbon Treaty. It 
will be necessary to develop targeted provisions to reflect these specificities, with-
out unnecessarily multiplying instruments and programmes. Territorial cohesion 
also means addressing urban-rural linkages in terms of access to affordable and 
quality infrastructures and services, and problems in regions with a high concentra-
tion of socially marginalised communities.
Finally, further work on new macro-regional strategies should be based on a thor-
ough review of existing strategies and the availability of resources. Macro-regional 
strategies should be broad-based integrated instruments focused on key challenges 
and supported by a reinforced trans-national strand, although the bulk of funding 
should come from the national and regional programmes co-financed by Cohesion 
Policy and from other national resources.
3.2. Reinforcing partnership
Effective implementation of Europe 2020 requires a governance system that involves 
the actors of change in Member States and that links the EU, national, regional and 
local levels of administration. 
In order to mobilise fully all involved, representation of local and regional stakehold-
ers, social partners and civil society in both the policy dialogue and implementation 
of Cohesion Policy should be strengthened. With this in mind, support for the dia-
logue between public and private entities, including socio-economic partners and 
non-governmental organisations, should be maintained.
In this context, the role of local development approaches under Cohesion Policy 
should be reinforced, for example, by supporting active inclusion, fostering social 
innovation, developing innovation strategies or designing schemes for regenera-Conclusions: the future of cohesion policy
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tion of deprived areas. These should be closely coordinated with similar actions sup-
ported under rural development and maritime policies.
4. A streamlined and simpler delivery system
Although it is too early to draw final conclusions on the effectiveness of the delivery 
system of Cohesion Policy in the period 2007–2013, Member States have argued 
against too frequent and drastic amendments of the rules that could hamper imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, a number of targeted changes deserve to be examined.
4.1. Financial management
In line with the recent proposal for revision of the Financial Regulation5, each year 
the authority responsible for managing Cohesion Policy programmes would present 
a management declaration accompanied by the annual accounts and an independ-
ent audit opinion. This would strengthen the line of accountability for expenditure 
co-financed by the EU budget in any given financial year. 
On the basis of the annual management declaration, the Commission proposes to in-
troduce a periodical clearance of accounts procedure for Cohesion Policy. This would 
reinforce the assurance process and also allow regular partial closure of programmes. 
The Commission has to consider whether not reimbursing national authorities until 
the corresponding EU contribution has been paid to beneficiaries would speed up 
payments of grants to beneficiaries and increase the incentive for strong national con-
trol.
Also, the Commission will examine the possibility of introducing output- or results-
based elements for disbursement of the EU contribution to operational programmes 
or parts of programmes, depending on the type of action.
Finally, simplified methods of reimbursement, such as the standard scale of unit 
costs and lump-sum payments for grants introduced for 2007–2013, should be fur-
ther promoted, thus increasing their impact. This would be another way of moving 
towards a more results-based approach.
5  ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Financial Regulation ap-
plicable to the general budget of the European Union’ — COM(2010) 260, 28.5.2010.
  • How can Cohesion Policy take better account of the key role of urban 
areas and of territories with particular geographical features in develop-
ment processes and of the emergence of macro-regional strategies?
  • How can the partnership principle and involvement of local and regional 
stakeholders, social partners and civil society be improved? Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxxi
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4.2. Reducing the administrative burden
The general approach for 2007–2013, under which eligibility rules are set at national 
level, should be retained. However, common rules should be adopted on key points 
such as overheads covering different EU Funds. Alignment of rules on eligibility of 
expenditures across policy areas, financial instruments and funds would simplify use 
of funds by beneficiaries and management of funds by national authorities, reduc-
ing the risk of errors while providing for differentiation where needed to reflect the 
specificities of the policy, the instrument and the beneficiaries.
In line with the proportionality principle, it would also be useful to examine how 
control measures could be made more cost-effective and risk-based to improve their 
effectiveness and efficiency while ensuring adequate coverage of the inherent risks 
at a reasonable cost, in accordance with the principle of sound financial manage-
ment.
4.3. Financial discipline
The de-commitment rule aims to ensure that projects are implemented within a rea-
sonable timeframe and to encourage financial discipline. However, it can distort the 
behaviour of Member States and regions by concentrating too much attention on 
quick, and too little on effective, use of resources. Furthermore, application of the 
de-commitment rule has been complicated by a number of derogations. There is 
a need to strike a careful balance between ensuring the quality of investment and 
smooth and rapid implementation. One possibility would be to apply N+2 with the 
exception of the first year to all programmes and remove exemptions and deroga-
tions.
4.4. Financial control
With regard to management and control systems, there is a need not only to deliver 
stronger assurance but also to achieve greater commitment, on the part of Member 
States, to quality control. This would allow the European Parliament, the Commis-
sion and Member States to focus more on the results and impact of the policy. 
The first proposal is to review the procedure for ex ante assessment of the systems, 
taking account of the experience gained from the ex ante compliance assessment 
for 2007–2013 programmes in order to prevent problems in management and con-
trol systems. The procedure should be streamlined whilst retaining its benefits. This 
can be achieved by targeting the assessment on the main management body re-
sponsible by means of an accreditation process and by reviewing the Commission’s 
involvement in this process. 
The second proposal is to reinforce assurance by concentrating responsibilities. An 
accredited body would assume sole responsibility for proper management and con-
trol of the operational programme.Conclusions: the future of cohesion policy
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5. The architecture of Cohesion Policy 
Cohesion policy aims to promote harmonious development of the Union and its 
regions by reducing regional disparities (Article 174 of the Treaty). It also underpins 
the growth model of the Europe 2020 strategy including the need to respond to 
societal and employment challenges all Member States and regions face. The policy 
supports such development with a clear investment strategy in every region by in-
creasing competitiveness, expanding employment, improving social inclusion and 
protecting and enhancing the environment. The multilevel governance system for 
the policy helps to make the EU more visible to its citizens.
All regions and Member States would be eligible to Cohesion Policy and able to tai-
lor their strategy in an integrated manner to their specific strengths and weaknesses.
As today, support would be differentiated between regions based on their level of 
economic development (measured by GDP per capita), drawing a clear distinction 
between ‘less’ and ‘more’ developed regions. To soften the transition between these 
two categories and ensure a fairer treatment for regions with similar level of eco-
nomic development, the question could be asked as to whether a simpler system 
with a new intermediate category of regions could replace the current phasing-out 
and phasing-in system. This category would also include regions currently eligible 
under the ‘convergence’ objective but whose GDP would be higher than 75% of the 
Union average according to the latest statistics. 
At the same time, and consistently with the EU budget review, there is a need to 
consider for the future architecture of Cohesion Policy, how the ESF could be re-
focused on securing the 2020 targets and objectives and how to achieve greater 
visibility and predictable funding volumes. It is also important to examine how the 
Fund could better serve the European employment strategy and contribute to the 
comprehensive European employment initiative called for by the EU budget review.
  • How can the audit process be simplified and how can audits by Member 
States and the Commission be better integrated, whilst maintaining a 
high level of assurance on expenditure co-financed?
  • How could application of the proportionality principle alleviate the 
administrative burden in terms of management and control? Should 
there be specific simplification measures for territorial cooperation pro-
grammes?
  • How can the right balance be struck between common rules for all the 
Funds and acknowledgement of Funds’ specificities when defining eligi-
bility rules?
  • How can financial discipline be ensured, while providing enough flexibil-
ity to design and implement complex programmes and projects?Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion xxxiii
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The policy will continue to focus on implementing the Integrated Guidelines for eco-
nomic and employment policies.
The Cohesion Fund would continue to benefit Member States whose GNI per capita 
is lower than 90 % of the Union average.
Finally, Cohesion Policy would continue to foster territorial dimensions of coopera-
tion (cross-border, transnational and inter-regional). This would include a review and 
simplification of the current arrangements for cross-border cooperation, including 
IPA, ENPI and EDF cross-border cooperation at the EU’s external borders, and also of 
current practices in transnational action supported both by the ERDF and the ESF.
6. Next steps
The fifth Cohesion Report sets out some of the Commission’s key ideas for the re-
form of Cohesion Policy following a long discussion which started with the fourth 
Cohesion Report in 2007. These will be fine-tuned and consolidated in the next few 
months.
The Commission invites all stakeholders to give their responses to the questions pre-
sented in this Communication. Comments can be posted until 31 January 2011 on:  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/index_en.htm.
Due account will be taken of the responses received when drafting the legislative 
proposals to be presented immediately after the adoption of the new Multi Annual 
Financial Framework in 2011.
The fifth Cohesion Forum which will take place in Brussels on 31 January and 1 Feb-
ruary 2011 will provide a good opportunity to discuss these ideas.
  • How can it be ensured that the architecture of Cohesion Policy takes into 
account the specificity of each Fund and in particular the need to provide 
greater visibility and predictable funding volumes for the ESF and to fo-
cus it on securing the 2020 objectives?
  • How could a new intermediate category of regions be designed to ac-
company regions which have not completed their process of catching 
up? Conclusions: the future of cohesion policy
xxxiv Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesionFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 1
Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
This is the first Cohesion Report adopted under the 
Lisbon Treaty, which added territorial cohesion to the 
twin goals of economic and social cohesion. To cover 
this new dimension, this report includes more analysis 
on four issues. First it examines the territorial dimen-
sion of access to services. Second, it pays more atten-
tion to the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development. Third, it focuses on functional regions 
and territorial cooperation. Fourth, it considers how 
the territorial impact of policies can be measured. 
The report also includes a number of other novelties as 
compared with earlier reports. The analysis of regional 
economic disparities has been expanded to include is-
sues relating to institutions and a new index of com-
petitiveness is presented. Moreover, analysis of social 
cohesion, following the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report and 
the Commission’s GDP and beyond Communication1, 
covers both objective and subjective indicators of well-
being and several indicators which have never been 
presented at the regional level before. 
Section 1. Promoting 
competitiveness and convergence
This section provides a broad overview of the main 
determinants of regional economic development. It 
starts by putting EU development and regional dis-
parities into a global context and shows the impact 
of growing trade in goods and services on regional 
development. It then highlights the diverse geogra-
phy of growth of the EU economy and how all types 
of regions have contributed to this. 
The next section examines the main drivers of growth, 
identifying the regional sources of growth and the 
central and increasing role of productivity growth and 
identifies the sectors which have contributed most to 
output and employment growth. 
The next three sections look at the main determinants 
of regional economic development: the level of inno-
1  COM(2009) 433.
vation, the quality of infrastructure and the capacity 
of institutions. 
The last section brings these different issues together 
in a new regional competitiveness index developed in 
cooperation with the Joint Research Centre. 
1.1 Globalisation and internal integration
Compared to the United States (US), Japan and 
Canada, the EU experienced higher economic growth 
per head2 between 2000 and 2007 (Table 1.1), largely 
due to the higher growth rates of the less developed 
and moderately developed EU Member States.
2  Measuring GDP growth per head corrects for difference in popula-
tion growth. It is a more comparable and more accurate measure of 
the additional value added created per person (Stiglitz et al 2009). 
These results may come as a surprise as the media usually only re-
ports GDP growth, which is higher in the US than in the EU due to 
its higher population growth. 
1.1 Growth of GDP per head in 
real terms, 2000–2007
Annual average change (%)
Brazil1 3.1
Russian Federation 7.7
India 5.2
China 9.9
Mexico2 0.6
USA 1.4
Canada2 1.4
Japan 1.5
EU-27 1.8
Highly developed MS 1.4
Moderately developed MS 2.9
Less developed MS 5.2
1 : 2002–2007 
2: 2000–2006 
Source: OECD and National Statistical Offices
Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and 
trendsChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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In the highly developed EU Member States, growth 
rates were almost identical to those in the US, Canada 
and Japan. 
Growth of GDP per head was higher in Brazil, Russia, 
India and China than in the EU. However, in the less 
developed Member States, it was much the same as 
in India or Brazil.
Growth in the less developed Member States was 
particularly high between 2002 and 2008 — almost 
three times higher than in the highly developed ones. 
This contributed strongly to regional convergence in 
the EU. Growth in the moderately developed Member 
States was also much higher than in highly developed 
ones, so that as the overall gap in GDP per head be-
tween the most and the least developed countries 
narrowed, so did regional differentials.
Globalisation and regional development
The trade in goods between the EU and the rest of 
the world grew significantly up until the recent crisis. 
Between 1999 and 2008, exports to third countries in-
creased from 8% of EU GDP to 10.5%. Imports from 
outside the EU rose by even more, from 8.5% of GDP 
in 1999 to 12.5% in 2008, the trade deficit widening 
over the period. In 2009, the recession, which hit the 
EU more than some other parts of the world, led to 
imports declining even more than exports and to a 
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narrowing of the trade deficit 
(Figure 1.3).
This increase in trade in goods 
reflects growing globalisa-
tion. The growth consists in 
large part of intra-sectoral 
and intra-firm trade, as major 
firms increasingly locate dif-
ferent parts of production in 
different parts of the world. 
This more dispersed produc-
tion system at the same time 
increases the demand for lo-
gistics and ordering and con-
trol systems.
Such a process creates both 
opportunities and threats 
for EU regions. The sectors 
where the EU has become less 
competitive include textiles, 
metals and electric and op-
tical equipment. The fourth 
Cohesion Report highlighted 
the challenge of globalisa-
tion to regions specialised in 
vulnerable sectors. A follow-
up study3, however, indicated 
that although the EU is losing 
employment in the sectors 
concerned, these losses tend 
to be concentrated in the less 
specialised regions. Many, but 
by no means all, regions spe-
cialised in vulnerable sectors 
have, therefore, been able to 
move up the value chain to 
higher value-added activities 
such as high-end production, 
niche markets or high-tech 
products. This has often al-
lowed them to maintain em-
ployment and increase out-
put.
3  EU regions vulnerable to globalisation and increase  trade (2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/
study_en.htm
Regional impact of the crisis
Although the impact of the economic crisis has been extreme in some regions, it 
was no worse, on average, in the less developed regions than in the highly devel-
oped ones. Accordingly, overall regional disparities have barely changed. In gen-
eral, EU-12 Convergence regions seem to have been affected less than those in the 
south of the EU-15.
The economic crisis hit regions specialised in manufacturing, in particular. The 
highest increases in unemployment, however, were in regions highly dependent 
on construction. Regions specialised in tourism, most of them with a GDP per head 
below the EU average, have not yet been affected significantly, just as regions with 
large shares of public employment. Regions specialised in financial and business 
services, most of them capital city regions or buoyant metropolitan regions, have 
been affected to an average extent in terms of the impact on GDP and employ-
ment. 
In general, more rapid recovery is projected to occur in industrial regions special-
ised in manufacturing and those with a large share of financial and business ser-
vices, while those more dependent on tourism, construction and public adminis-
tration are projected to recover more slowly.
Some 64 Convergence regions and 15 Transition regions are estimated to have 
fared better than the EU average during the crisis, while a number of previously 
buoyant regions in Ireland, the South of Finland and the North and Centre of Italy 
have been hit hard.
The performance of Convergence regions, however, has varied greatly. Most Polish 
regions have been affected relatively little, which is also the case for Greek regions 
specialised in tourism, the Eastern German Länder and the EU-12 capital city regions. 
In contrast, all three Baltic States, Western Hungarian regions, the Italian Mezzogior-
no and the South of Spain have experienced significant economic contraction. Out-
side the Convergence regions, some regions in the Netherlands, Austria and West 
and South Germany have performed better than the rest of the EU.
A relatively fast recovery is projected in some prosperous regions in Germany and 
the North of Belgium as well as some capital city regions in the North and the Cen-
tre of the EU. Regions in Poland are also projected to continue to perform relatively 
well and most other regions in the EU-12 are projected to recover quite quickly. By 
contrast, prospects are much less favourable for Convergence regions in Greece 
and, to a lesser extent, in Spain, Italy, Portugal and France.
So far, regions in Germany have managed to avoid large increases in unemploy-
ment, to a large extent because of the short-time working scheme and employers 
reducing working hours. Unemployment has also remained low in the North of 
Italy despite the depth of the recession. On the other hand, in virtually all regions 
in Spain, the Baltic States and Ireland, unemployment has increased dramatically. 
At the end of 2009, the highest unemployment rates (of between 17% and 30%) 
were in Southern Spain, the French outermost regions, Latvia and Brussels.
Prospects are not good for a quick reduction in unemployment, which in most 
regions is projected to increase further. Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Nevertheless, some regions have not been able to 
move up the value chain and have lost markets by 
competing for low-cost and low-quality products 
with emerging economies outside the EU. This high-
lights the critical role of investment in human capital, 
entrepreneurship and a favourable business environ-
ment and the problems created by delaying restruc-
turing and failing to encourage a move to activities 
where regions have the potential to develop a new 
comparative advantage.
The service sector has also witnessed strong trade 
growth. Indeed, the EU has a larger market share of 
services than of goods — 20% of the global market as 
against only 13% in 20074. Between 2003 and 2008, 
exports of services rose from 3.4% to 4.2% of GDP, 
while imports grew from 3% to 3.5% (Figure 1.4). In 
some specialised countries, exports far exceeded the 
EU average in 2008. For instance, Luxembourg (31.6% 
of its GDP) and Ireland (13.3%) have large trade sur-
pluses in services thanks to financial services and 
Cyprus (18.1%) and Malta (10.6%) thanks to transport 
services.
In contrast to goods, where the trade deficit wid-
ened from 2003 on, the surplus on trade in services 
4  WTO — International Trade Statistics 2008, http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008_e.pdf
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expanded, especially after 2005. Trade in services has 
also been less affected by the economic crisis. 
The increase in the trade surplus on services has 
boosted output and employment in financial and 
business services and logistics. Regions which have 
gained most from the growth of these exports tend 
to be highly specialised in the services concerned, be 
the locations of international headquarters and have 
strong transport connections to other parts of the 
world5. 
A second group of regions has also gained from in-
creased trade in goods and services and, in particular, 
from the stimulus to restructure faster and focus on 
higher value-added activities. As a result, productiv-
ity growth has tended to be higher in traded goods 
and services than in regions less linked into the global 
market and with a smaller share of employment in the 
sectors concerned. Regions can clearly gain from the 
increasing integration of global trade by raising the 
skill and technological content of their activities and 
using their specialisation to diversify into related ar-
eas. 
EU integration through the flows  
of goods, services, investments,  
remittances and people
The EU has created a unique environment for busi-
nesses to trade freely in the Single Market and for 
individuals to move freely to live and work in other 
Member States. No other group of Nation States has 
gone so far in economic integration. The effect of this 
integration is evident in the growth of intra-EU trade 
after each enlargement, the large and growing flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) between Member 
States, the remittances sent back to their home coun-
try by migrants and the movements of labour across 
the EU. This section shows the positive effects of inte-
gration.
Trade
Intra-EU trade has become increasingly important 
for the countries which joined the Union in 2004 
and 2007 (the EU-12). In 2000, exports of goods of 
5  EU regions benefitting from globalisation and increased trade. (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/
study_en.htm
Brazil, Russia, India and China
Brazil, Russia, India and China all have internal dispari-
ties in GDP per head between regions which are much 
wider than in the EU. Whereas the top quartile of re-
gions have a GDP per head which is 2.8 times higher 
than the bottom quartile in the EU, in Brazil and India, 
it is 3.6 times higher and in Russia 4.9 times higher 
(World Bank) (Map 1.1).
The ratio is also wider in China (3.2), but it cannot be 
compared to the EU, since data are published only for 
31 regions. These have an average population of 43 
million as against less than 2 million for NUTS 2 regions 
in the EU. 
Of the four countries, India is the least developed with 
a GDP per head of only USD 3000 in PPP terms (World 
Bank), just 10% of the EU average. China has a GDP per 
head twice that of India, Brazil over three times as high 
and Russia five times as high. GDP per head in Brazil is 
similar to that in Bulgaria, while in Russia, it is similar to 
that in Poland or Latvia.
Given the scale of regional disparities, Brazil, China and 
Russia have taken a keen interest in Cohesion Policy. 
The Commission has signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing with each of the three countries to help them 
develop their own regional strategies based on the 
EU’s long experience and incorporating open market 
principles, respect for the environment and partner-
ship in their conception and implementation.
The exchanges with Brazil, which have been at both 
national and regional level, have already led to policy 
changes. Moreover, the OECD, with DG Regional Policy 
support, is carrying out a ‘Territorial Review’ of Brazil to 
help the authorities develop their strategic capacity in 
regional development. 
Cooperation with China has led to a study comparing 
its regional policy with that in the EU and focussing on 
the definition of regions and multi-level governance, 
to be published at the end of 2010. A future study will 
focus on the role of regional clusters in interregional 
cooperation, especially as regards innovation. 
Cooperation with Russia has involved seminars in Mos-
cow on multi-level governance, capacity building, on 
the management of large projects and inter-regional 
and cross-border cooperation.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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the EU-12 countries to each other and to the EU-15 
amounted to 27% of their GDP. In 2008, this had risen 
to 35%. At the same time, their imports of goods from 
other EU Member States rose from 30% of GDP to 38% 
(Figure 1.5).
Trade increased markedly in countries that were al-
ready export oriented, such as the Czech Republic, 
where trade to the rest of the EU rose from 44% of 
GDP to 58% over the period, but also in the less ex-
port oriented, such as Poland, whose exports to the 
rest of the EU rose from 15% of GDP to 25%.
Flows between the EU-12 and EU-15 almost doubled 
between 2000 and 2008. Exports from the EU-12 to 
the EU-15 rose from 1% of EU-15 GDP to 2% and ex-
ports from the EU-15 to the EU-12 increased by more 
(from 1.4% of EU-15 GDP to 2.4%), reflecting the high-
er growth of the latter countries (Figure 1.6). 
FDI
Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) averaged 
4.6% of GDP in the EU over the period 2004–2008 and 
FDI outflows, 6.1% of GDP (Figure 1.7). The EU, there-
fore, invested more abroad than foreign companies in 
the EU. Inflows, however, substantially exceeded out-
flows in all the countries which joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007. FDI has, in fact, proved an important engine 
of growth in these countries. FDI flows from the EU-
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
EU-12 Imports (% of EU-12 GDP) EU-12 Exports (% of EU-12 GDP)
EU-15 Exports (% of EU-15 GDP) EU-15 Imports (% of EU-15 GDP) % of GDP
Exports and imports to other EU Member States, 2000-2008 1.5
Source: COMEXT, Eurostat
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2.0%
2.2%
2.4%
2.6%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2.0%
2.2%
2.4%
2.6%
Exports from EU-12 to EU-15
Exports from EU-15 to EU-12 % of EU-15 GDP
Trade between EU15 and EU12, 2000-2008 1.6
Source: COMEXT, EurostatChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
8 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
15 amounted on average to 4.5% of GDP in the EU-
12 Member States. In Bulgaria, net inflows averaged 
over 20% of GDP, in Malta, over 13% and in Romania, 
Estonia and Latvia, over 5%. In the EU-15, inflows ex-
ceeded outflows only in Belgium and Finland and in 
all the other countries, the reverse was the case. 
FDI is volatile and highly sensitive to the economic 
cycle. It contracted markedly in the economic crisis 
and ensuing period of uncertainty about economic 
prospects. Both inflows and outflows declined much 
more than GDP in 2009. Total FDI inflows amounted 
to just under 3% of GDP in 2009 and net outflows to 
around 4% (Figure 1.8), well below the average for the 
2004–2008 period.
The collapse hit those Member States with significant 
net inflows in particular, net FDI to the EU-12 coun-
tries declining from over 5% of GDP in 2007 to less 
than 1.5% in 2009. In Bulgaria and Estonia, the decline 
relative to the 2004–2008 average was over 10 per-
centage points of GDP.
Romania and Bulgaria are the main recipients of 
remittances
With enlargement and the opening up of employ-
ment opportunities in the EU-15 to people in the 
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EU-12, remittances from the former to the latter have 
grown markedly as people have moved to take up 
jobs in the EU-15. The total sum of intra-EU remittanc-
es amounted to over EUR 44 billion in 2008.
Bulgaria and Romania were by far the largest recipi-
ents of net remittances from other parts of the EU. In 
2008, these amounted to EUR 5.7 billion, or 4.2% of 
GDP, in Romania and to EUR 1.5 billion, 4.5% of GDP, 
in Bulgaria (Figure 1.9). Remittances are, therefore, an 
important source of income for households in the two 
countries. Over 80% of remittances to Romania were 
sent from Italy (EUR 2.5 billion) and Spain (EUR 2 bil-
lion) and some 55% of those to Bulgaria from Germany 
(EUR 450 million) and Greece (EUR 425 million).
The other countries where remittances were signifi-
cant were the three Baltic States (between 1.2% and 
1.8% of their respective GDPs) and Poland (1.4% of 
GDP).
In the main countries from which remittances were 
sent, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the sums 
involved amounted to less than 0.2% of GDP.
Remittances grew rapidly in Romania from 2004 to 
2007, by around EUR 1 billion a year. As a result of the 
crisis, however, they remained unchanged in 2008 
and fell markedly in 2009. The increase before the cri-
sis was also substantial in Lithuania and Poland.
In Romania and Lithuania, remittances were 40% low-
er in the first three quarters of 2009 than in the same 
period in 2008. This reduction was less in Bulgaria, 
Poland and the two other Baltic countries (around 
15% or less). These differences reflect the non-uniform 
effect of the crisis on jobs in the countries from which 
the remittances were sent. Job losses were substan-
tial in Spain (which accounts for a third of Romanian 
remittances) and, because of the decline in construc-
tion, hit migrant workers especially. By contrast, job 
losses have been relatively small in Germany from 
where 30% of Bulgarian remittances come. 
Labour mobility in the EU and the US
People in the US are much more likely to move to a 
different US State than people in the EU are to move 
to another EU region (Map 1.2 and Map 1.3)6. In the 
EU, those of working age who changed their region 
of residence in 2008 amounted to only 1.2% of total 
working-age population as against 2.8% in the US. 
This higher internal mobility gives the US a more flex-
ible labour market, which responds more to region-
al differences in wages and job opportunities, and 
tends to reduce both disparities in unemployment 
and labour shortages. Given the prospective decline 
in working-age population and the labour shortages 
which it could give rise to, there is likely to be an in-
creasing need for more labour mobility in the EU.
Within the EU, however, there are significant differ-
ences between countries in the extent of regional 
6  The data do not take into account seasonal work, education or 
training without a change in permanent residence.
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
movements, with a clear distinction between the 
countries in the Eastern and the Western part. In the 
EU-15, some 1.4% of working age population moved 
between regions in 2008, nearly four times more than 
in the Central and Eastern Member States. The regions 
which attracted the highest number of working-age 
residents were located in France: Limousin (4.8%), 
Midi-Pyrénées (4.5%), Poitou-Charentes (3.8%) and 
Languedoc-Roussillon (3.8%). Portugal (2.4%) was 
ranked second because of Lisbon (5.6%). The UK was 
ranked third, many regions having relatively large in-
flows of people of working age from other regions, 
from Inner and Outer London (4.7%) in particular.
In the EU-12 countries, the inflows were highest (at as 
around 1% of working-age population) in Opolskie 
and Dolnośląskie in Poland and virtually zero in 
Centru and Bucureşti-Ilfov in Romania. Only 16% of 
working age population moving between EU regions 
moved to regions in the EU-12.
In the US, where those moving to another State made 
up 2.8% of total working age population, the States 
with the largest inflows were the District of Columbia 
(10%), Alaska (6.7%), Wyoming (6.1%), Delaware 
(5.4%) and Montana (5.3%).
On average, more than 85% of the labour movement 
in the EU comprised movements between regions 
in the same country. Less than one in seven cases 
involved crossing a national border. Only 0.15% of 
people of working age, therefore, moved between 
Member States, less than movements into the EU 
from third countries (0.2% of working-age popula-
tion). Despite the freedom to move, very few people 
so far take advantage of this.
The low movement between Member States can be 
explained in terms of linguistic, cultural and labour 
legislation differences. In the case of those from the 
EU-12, it is also due to a number of restrictions on 
their mobility, which will be completely phased out 
by 2011. Currently, only Germany and Austria still limit 
the inflow from these countries, though Bulgarians 
and Romanians still have restricted access to employ-
ment in 10 EU-15 countries, which are due to be re-
moved by 2013 at the latest.
Regional growth and convergence 
Growth in EU-12 regions especially has led to a marked 
narrowing of regional disparities in GDP per head in 
PPS terms across the Union. Nevertheless, disparities 
remain pronounced with levels less than a third of the 
EU average in 7 Romanian and Bulgarian regions and 
levels over 50% higher than the EU average in 19 re-
gions, of which 11 are capital city regions (Map 1.4).
The coefficient of variation, a common measure of 
disparities, fell from 42.7 in 1996 to 39.1 in 2007 in the 
EU. Other dispersion measures, such as the Gini index 
or the S80/20 ratio (the ratio of the top 20% of regions 
to the bottom 20%), show much the same reduction 
(Figure 1.10).
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The fact that regional disparities have declined over 
the EU as a whole has not prevented disparities from 
increasing in a number of Member States, in particu-
lar in the EU-12. For instance, in Romania the coeffi-
cient of variation rose from 15 in 1995 to 44 in 2007, 
reflecting the relative concentration of growth in one 
or two regions, especially the capital city region.
However, widening internal disparities has not pre-
vented GDP per head in almost all regions in the EU-
12 converging towards the EU average (Map 1.5). In 
fact, between 2000 and 2007, only 8 regions in the 
new Member States recorded a lower average growth 
rate than the EU-27 average (Figure 1.11).
Measures of disparities such as the Gini or coefficient of 
variation can summarise a lot of information. However, 
they do not take account of the movement in the rela-
tive level of GDP per head of individual regions, exami-
nation of which can add considerable insight into the 
forces at work in the convergence process.
Examining individual movements in GDP per head 
serves to identify which regions are converging and 
which are falling behind. For example, 11 regions 
moved from the group of regions with a GDP per 
head below 50% of the EU average to the group be-
tween 50% and 75%. These are the three Baltic States, 
Yugozapaden (Bulgaria), Közép-Dunántúl (Hungary), 
four Polish regions and two Slovak regions. Bucureşti–
Ilfov (Romania) stands out in moving from below 50% 
of the average to above 75% in just over 10 years. The 
crisis has almost certainly had a significant effect on 
this pattern of convergence, though it will be some 
time before the data are available to assess what kind 
of effect.
Convergence is driven by a catching-up process as 
less developed EU regions grow faster than the high-
ly developed ones. Regional disparities in GDP per 
head widened in some of the less developed Member 
States between 1995 and 2007. Nevertheless, virtu-
ally all regions in less developed Member States con-
verged towards the EU-27 average.
Geography of growth 
Metropolitan regions
Metropolitan regions7 accounted for 60% of the EU 
population in 2007 and 68% of GDP. Between 2000 
and 2007, these shares remained much the same, 
though there was a marginal increase in their share 
of population. 
This overall stability, however, hides significant varia-
tion across the EU. In most EU-12 countries, growth 
was much higher in the metropolitan regions than in 
others. Disparities which were already pronounced 
between the capital city region and the rest of the 
7  Metropolitan regions are NUTS 3 regions or groups of NUTS 3 re-
gions that represent all EU agglomerations with more than 250,000 
inhabitants. See Regional Focus 1/2009, Dijkstra as updated by 
Metropolitan regions: towards a harmonisation of the OECD 
and European commission definitions. OECD, 2009 GOV/TDPC/
TI(2009)6.
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country in 2000 widened further. In the EU-15, the 
difference in GDP per head between the capital city 
region and the rest of the country was much smaller 
in 2000 and in most cases the difference narrowed be-
tween 2000 and 2007. 
In the EU-15, the difference between the capital city 
region and the second metropolitan region8 tends to 
be small. In 9 Member States, the second city region 
has a higher GDP per head than the capital. Moreover, 
employment rates are not necessarily higher in met-
ropolitan regions: in France, Germany and the UK, 
they are higher elsewhere.
8  ESPON 2013 study on Secondary Growth Poles (ongoing).
In the EU-12, the situation is more extreme and the 
differences between the capital city region and the 
other metropolitan regions are much larger. These 
differences are partly due to a less favourable busi-
ness environment outside the capital city region. 
Accessibility, IT usage, transport infrastructure and 
the level of education all tend to be significantly 
lower outside the capital city region. Employment 
rates in the capital city region are also typically much 
higher than elsewhere. These large discrepancies 
limit the possibility of rapid dispersion of economic 
growth, which may in turn reduce aggregate eco-
nomic growth. The tendency in the EU-12 to concen-
trate public investment in the capital city region (see 
Chapter II) contributes to this. 
Changing regional disparities in the EU-15
Convergence between regions in the EU-15 Member States was strong up to the mid 1990s, but the process since then has 
slowed down. From 1980 to 1996, there was clear narrowing of disparities, the coefficient of variation falling from 33 to 29. 
Since 1996, it has remained between 29 and 30. The results are in line with the findings regularly reported in the literature. 
As indicated earlier, measures of disparities do not capture the movement in individual regions. Looking in detail at these 
shows that convergence is still taking place in the EU-15. In almost half of the regions with a GDP per head below 60% of 
the EU-15 average in 1995, GDP per head had increased above the threshold by 2007. In one in three regions with a GDP 
per head between 60% and 75% of the EU-15 average in 1995, GDP per head had risen above 75% by 2007. This shows 
that while the convergence has already taken place for regions with a GDP per head above 75% of the EU-15 average, the 
process continues for those with a GDP per head below 75%. 
This tendency, however, is not captured by dispersion indices as both the number of regions with lower levels of GDP per 
head and their weight is relatively small.
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Economic and social development in candidate countries  
and the Western Balkans
Croatia, FYROM and the Western Balkans
In 2007 and 2008, the European Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that: ‘the future of the Western Balkans lies within the 
European Union’. The Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99. 
Croatia, which is expected to conclude accession negotiations in 2010, is closest to EU membership. It also has the highest 
GDP per head, the level in all three Croatian regions being above the Western Balkan average. In Sjeverozapadna Hrvatska, 
it is twice as high, in the coastal region of Jadranska Hrvatska, 66% higher and in Središnja i Istočna (Panonska) Hrvatska 
22% higher. GDP in the last region grew fastest in the 10 years 1995–2005, at a rate of 5.6% year, as against 4.7% a year in 
Sjeverozapanda Hrvatska and 2.8% a year in Jadranska Hrvatska. 
Between 1995 and 2008, GDP in Croatia grew by nearly 4% a year, but as a result of the global crisis, it fell by an estimated 
5.8% in 2009 and it is forecast to grow very little in 2010.
Though the level of economic development has increased since 1995, major structural imbalances remain. Participation 
and employment rates are low and long-term unemployment is high. In 2008, the employment rate was only 58% and 
for women just 50%. The unemployment rate was 8.4% in 2008, having fallen gradually from 15% in 2002. Because of the 
recession, it rose above 9% again in 2009 and may reach 10% in 2010. Over half of the unemployed in 2009 had been 
looking for a job for over a year. Over a third of the population aged 25–64 has only basic education and only 16% tertiary 
education.
Improvements in higher educa-
tion and in the operation of the 
labour market, together with 
judicial and administrative re-
forms, are included in the coun-
try’s Pre-accession Economic 
Programme (PEP) for 2009–2011. 
These are important for the fur-
ther development of the econo-
my and to enable companies to 
cope with the competitive pres-
sures they will face once Croatia 
joins the EU. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) has been a 
candidate country since Decem-
ber 2005. The Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) 
was signed in 2001 and entered 
into force in 2004. The Council 
adopted the Accession Partner-
ship, defining the main priori-
ties for progress in the accession 
process in February 2008. It also 
set 2010 as the start date for the 
process to begin. 
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The other countries in the region which are considered potential candidates for EU entry, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed SAAs in 2008. 
Montenegro has the second highest GDP per head in the region after Croatia (130% of the West Balkan average) followed 
by Serbia (105% of the average), FYROM (93% of the average), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania (both just over 70% 
of the average), with Kosovo having by far the lowest level (only 20% of the average). Except for FYROM, where growth of 
GDP was just under 3% a year between 2000 and 2008, the growth rate in the other countries averaged around 5% a year 
or more. As a result of the crisis, GDP declined in 2009 in all the countries.
Except in Serbia and Kosovo, population either remained unchanged over the period 2000–2008 or increased — by 0.8% 
a year in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest growth in the region.
All the potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans have similar structural problems to other transition countries. 
Overcoming them will be key to determining economic performance and EU entry.
0 300Km
REGIOgis
1.8 Turkey: GDP per head, 2006
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The Turkish economy is a complex mix of modern industry, commerce and a traditional agricultural sector that still ac-
counts for around 25% of employment. There is a strong and rapidly growing private sector and, while it remains a major 
participant in basic industry, banking, transport, and communications, the role of the State has been diminishing as the 
privatisation programme proceeds. The largest industrial sector, textiles and clothing, which accounts for a third of indus-
trial employment, faces stiff competition in international markets. Other sectors, however, notably the automotive and 
electronics industries are growing in importance as regards exports. 
Real GDP growth has frequently exceeded 6% a year, but has been interrupted by sharp declines in output in 1994, 1999 
and 2001. Growth was particularly strong between 2002 and 2007 largely due to inward investment and IMF backing. 
GDP, however, declined in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the global recession. Despite the large current account deficit and 
substantial foreign debts, further economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership are expected to boost 
foreign direct investment in the future. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 19
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GDP per head in Turkey in PPS terms was less than half the EU average in 2006. Moreover, regional disparities in GDP per 
head are relatively wide, with the level well above the national average in regions in the West and well below in those in the 
East. The Istanbul region, which accounts for 20% of the total population (70 million), had a GDP per head in 2006 which 
was 70% above the national average, whereas in Van, on the Iranian border, it was almost 70% below the average. Between 
1995 and 2005, GDP per head tended to increase by more in the regions with the lowest levels. 
Iceland
Iceland was one of the countries most severely hit by 
the financial crisis. GDP declined by around 10% in 
real terms in 2009 and unemployment leapt from only 
1.3% in September 2008 to 7.6% in October 2009. The 
banking system collapsed and the exchange value of 
the currency fell markedly.
Iceland submitted an application for EU membership 
in July 2009, a prospect which is expected to have a 
stabilising effect on the economy. Iceland is already 
integrated into the EU economy through its member-
ship of the European Economic Area (EEA) and since it 
is part of the Schengen area, its citizens can travel and 
work freely throughout the EU. 
The population of Iceland was 319,368 at the end of 
2009, smaller than any of the current Member States. 
In 2009, its GDP per head in PPS terms fell by over 10 
percentage points of the EU average to just 9% above. 
Domestic investment in 2009 was under a third of the 
level it had been two years earlier, with foreign direct 
investment halving. Inflation rate increased sharply 
in 2008 and was over 16% in 2009. Public sector debt 
doubled in 2008 to over 57% of GDP. Nevertheless, the 
country’s economic base remains strong.
GDP growth in Iceland was around 2 percentage points 
higher on average over the period 2000–2008 than 
the EU average and over 5 percentage points higher in 
2004 and 2005. As a result, the employment rate was 
much higher than in the EU and unemployment was 
just 1.6% of the labour force in 2008. Productivity, on 
the other hand, has fallen over time in relation to that 
in the EU to 2% below the EU average in 2008.
Economic and social development in 
the NAFTA countries
When the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was set up in 1994, most economists expect-
ed that Mexico as the least developed member coun-
try stood most to gain from the free trade area. How-
ever, the expected economic convergence has been 
limited at best1. Between 2000 and 2006, for example, 
regional disparities in GDP per head inside NAFTA did 
not change. 
Major factors inhibiting a stronger economic conver-
gence identified in the literature include the low qual-
ity of institutions, which can hinder or even block re-
gional economic convergence, and the development 
gap. An analysis of the convergence process indicates 
that the more developed Mexican regions gained 
more from trade integration than the less developed2. 
In 7 Mexican regions with among the lowest levels of 
GDP per head, GDP per head declined between 2000 
and 2006 (Map 1.9  and Map 1.10).
Regional disparities in employment and unemploy-
ment rates in NAFTA in 2006 were also substantial. 
Employment rates were below 65% in 23 Mexican 
regions, Newfoundland and Labrador and Northwest 
Territories in Canada and Mississippi and West Virginia 
in the US. Unemployment was above 7% in 6 of the 
Northern Canadian provinces and Michigan compared 
to less than 3% in 19 Mexican regions and 6 US States.
Regional disparities in GDP per head in the EU-27 are 
narrower than in NAFTA. Whereas in NAFTA disparities 
were not reduced between 2000 and 2006, in the EU, 
they diminished significantly partly because of a focus 
of policy support on the least developed regions.
1  Wise, C. (2007), Great Expectations: Mexico’s Short-Lived 
Convergence under NAFTA. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=964913.
2  Easterly, W. et al (2003), NAFTA and Convergence in 
North America: High Expectations, Big Events, Little 
Time in Economía, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1–53,  The Brookings 
Institution.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 21
Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
Canarias
Guyane Guadeloupe
Martinique
Réunion
Açores Madeira
Predominantly urban regions
Intermediate regions
Predominantly rural regions
1.11 Urban-rural typology of NUTS 3 regions
Typology based on a definition of
urban and rural 1 km² raster cells.
Source: Eurostat, JRC, EFGS, REGIO-GIS
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
0 500Km
REGIOgisChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
22 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
Predominantly rural, intermediate and 
predominantly urban regions
In the EU-27, around 24% of the population live in 
predominantly rural regions9, around 35% live in in-
termediate regions and slightly more than 40% live in 
predominantly urban regions (Table 1.2). In most of 
the EU-12 countries, a larger proportion of the popu-
lation live in intermediate and predominantly rural re-
gions, over 40% living in predominantly rural regions 
and only around 20% in predominantly urban ones 
(Map 1.11).
In the EU-15, less than 20% of population 
live in predominantly rural regions and 
over 46% live in predominantly urban 
ones. These proportions, however, differ 
between countries. In Ireland, Finland, 
Greece and Denmark, between 43% and 
72% of population live in predominantly 
rural regions, while in the Netherlands, 
the UK and Belgium, around 70% of the 
population live in predominantly urban 
ones. 
9  Dijkstra, L. and Poelman, H. (2010), A revised urban-rural typology. 
Chapter 15 of the Eurostat Regional Yearbook.
In the EU-12, GDP per head in predominantly rural re-
gions was only 73% of the national average in 2007 
and almost 60% below the average in predominantly 
urban regions. In the EU-15, GDP per head in predom-
inantly rural regions was more than 30% below that 
in predominantly urban ones (see also box on remote 
rural regions in the next section).
The high concentration of economic activity and 
growth in urban regions and the large disparities be-
tween types of region is a major feature of the tran-
sition process and occurs primarily in less developed 
countries with high growth rates. 
1.3 GDP per head (PPS) in 2007 and change 2000–2007 by urban-rural typology
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominantly 
Rural
Total
EU-12 relative to the EU-12 GDP per head index
GDP per head index 167 92 73 100
Change in GDP per head index1 4.6 -0.3 -2.6 0.0
EU-15 relative to the EU-15 GDP per head index
GDP per head index 114 91 82 100
Change in GDP per head index1 -0.2 -0.7 1.2 0.0
EU-12 relative to the EU-27 GDP per head index
GDP per head index 94 52 41 56
Change in GDP per head index1 20.4 10.0 6.9 10.9
EU-15
GDP per head index 128 101 91 112
Change in GDP per head index1 -4.5 -4.1 -1.6 -3.7
EU-27
GDP per head index 124 90 73 100
Change in GDP per head index1 -1.6 -0.3 2.1 0.0
1: percentage point change in index  
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
1.2 Share of population by urban-rural typology, 2007
% of total population
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominantly 
Rural
Total
EU-12 20.6 38.6 40.8 100
EU-15 46.2 34.7 19.2 100
EU-27 40.9 35.5 23.7 100
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculationsFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 23
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Indeed, in 2000–2007, GDP in the EU-12 has grown 
at twice the rate in the EU-15. Not all regions gained 
equally from economic growth, however, and for 
many, their share of national GDP declined. This de-
cline occurred mainly in intermediate and rural re-
gions. Nevertheless, GDP per head in these regions 
still increased relative to the EU average. In the EU-15, 
GDP per head in rural regions increased in relative 
terms (Table 1.3).
As underlined in a recent study10, as countries become 
more developed, the advantages of agglomeration 
become more widely spread throughout the country 
due to improvements in the business environment, 
communication and transport infrastructure and the 
education of the labour force outside the main ur-
ban regions. At the same time, some of the benefits 
of agglomeration are offset by congestion costs and 
high rents. As a result, economic activity will start to 
spread to less developed regions, often rural, and the 
gap between these and urban areas will start to close, 
leading to more balanced development. This seems 
to have occurred in the EU-15.
1.2 Sources of growth
The growth of GDP of a region is determined by the 
value added of the goods and services it produces for 
internal and external markets. Increases in value add-
ed, depending on efficiency gains and the capital and 
labour intensity of the sectors concerned, can lead to 
10  ESPON 2013 Programme, CAFE: The Case for Agglomeration 
Economies in Europe, Applied Research Project 2013/2/1, Interim 
report, 2009.
employment growth. The balance a regional econo-
my needs to strike is to ensure that, on the one hand, 
the services and goods it produces are competitively 
priced and, on the other, wages provide workers with 
a good quality of life. Productivity growth is key to pro-
viding higher wages without losing competitiveness. It 
is also the main source of growth of GDP per head and 
it is likely to become even more so as the share of peo-
ple of working age in total population shrinks. 
Growth of GDP per head can be broken down into 
changes in labour productivity, employment rates 
and the share of the working age population in the to-
tal. Table 1.4 shows the breakdown of growth in GDP 
per head over the period 2000–2007 between these 
three components.
Over the period, GDP per head in the EU regions as 
a whole grew by 1.8% a year. Productivity grew at an 
annual rate of 1.4% and was responsible for nearly 
80% of the growth. Employment increased by 0.4% a 
year and was responsible for 20% of the growth. The 
share of the working age population in the total re-
mained broadly unchanged. 
In the Convergence regions (i.e. those that from 
2007 have been eligible for ERDF support under this 
Objective), productivity grew by more than the EU av-
erage. Many of these regions are in the EU-12 and in 
a phase of transformation, with output and employ-
ment shifting from the less productive activities to 
1.4 Sources of economic growth, 2000–2007
Annual average % change
Change in GDP 
per head
= Change in  
productivity
+ Change in  
employment rate
+ Change in share 
of working-age 
population
EU-27 1.79 = 1.40 + 0.40 + 0.00
Type of region
Convergence 3.03 = 2.54 + 0.21 + 0.26
Transition 2.26 = 1.00 + 1.26 + 0.00
Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment
1.39 = 1.10 + 0.38 + -0.10
Source: DG REGIO, EurostatChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Territorial cohesion: new themes and new geographies
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, a third dimension was added to the objective of cohe-
sion: the EU ‘shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion.’ As with economic and social 
cohesion, territorial cohesion highlights a number of issues that merit more attention. Economic 
and social cohesion focuses on regional disparities in competitiveness and well-being; territorial 
cohesion reinforces the importance of access to services, sustainable development, ‘functional 
geographies’ and territorial analysis. 
(a)  Access to services of general economic interest
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced territorial cohesion in the article on access to servic-
es of general economic interest, which include education, health care and commercial, financial 
and business services. In remote and sparsely populated regions, physical accessibility is a promi-
nent concern. This is increasingly being overcome by e-services such as e-health, e-education, 
e-government and e-banking. In other regions, access may be hindered by cost or a lack of knowl-
edge of the system or, among migrants, of the local language. In some cases, discrimination may 
also limit this access.
(b)  The environmental dimension of sustainable development1
Environmental protection, climate change and renewable energy production all have a strong ter-
ritorial dimension. The territorial dimension of environmental protection, which ranges from air 
quality and waste water treatment to protected habitats and species under Natura 2000 and the 
provision of ecosystem services, is increasingly recognised. The growing threat of climate change 
and the political goal to radically increase the share of renewable energy in the EU underlines the 
fact that policies at different levels will need to be coordinated to respond to these various threats 
and opportunities in an efficient and effective way and to avoid them counteracting each other. 
(c)  Functional geographies
Whereas most policies focus on a single administrative geographic level, the pursuit of territorial 
cohesion implies a more functional and flexible approach. Depending on the issue, the appropri-
ate geographical dimension ranges from a macro region, such as the Baltic Sea or the Danube 
region, to metropolitan and cross-border regions or a group of rural areas and market towns. Such 
a flexible geography can better capture the positive and negative externalities of concentration, 
improve connections and facilitate cooperation and so be more effective in furthering territorial 
cohesion.
(d)  Territorial analysis
There is need for a better knowledge of the EU in territorial terms and more robust ways of es-
timating the territorial impact of EU policies. On this front, Eurostat, the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) and the European Environmental Agency (EEA) have already significantly increased the data 
available for more finely defined geographical areas. For example, the Urban Audit and the Ur-
ban Atlas provide more indicators for cities, Eurostat and the National Statistical Institutes have 
increased data at NUTS 3 level and the JRC and EEA are providing more grid data and developing 
more detailed models. ESPON is making use of these new data and undertaking territorial trend 
analyses, impact assessments and prospective studies (see section on Territorial Impact Assesse-
ment in Chapter 3).
1  The territorial dimension of environmental sustainability. Technical report No 9/2010, EEA, 2009, Copenhagen, 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/the-territorial-dimension-of-environmental-sustainabilityFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 25
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Border regions
Border regions1 consist of those along the internal borders of the EU, some external bor-
ders, maritime borders separated by a maximum distance of 150 km and regions that 
share borders with European Free Trade Area countries. Regions included in the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-Ac-
cession Assistance (IPA) are also included. 
A large proportion of the EU population lives in border regions — in 2007, over 196 mil-
lion people, or almost 40% of the total. Most of these live in internal border regions (36% 
of the EU population). Population growth between 2000 and 2007 was much the same in 
both internal and external border regions (at around 0.3% a year). 
On average, GDP per head is less than the EU average (89% of the average in 2007), 
though the gap narrowed slightly between 2000 and 2007. GDP per head is less in the 
external border regions (65% of the EU average) than in internal border regions (92% of 
the average), though growth was higher in the former group, because many of them are 
in the EU-12, than in the latter.
Unemployment was also higher in external border regions (8.3%) than in internal ones 
(7.3%). In addition, external border regions also have, on average, a larger share of their 
employment in agriculture than internal border regions.
Access to basic services is, on average, more limited in border regions, particularly in 
external ones, where proximity to a hospital or a university is much less than in the rest of 
the Union. This is also true of access to an airport, especially for regions in and around the 
Carpathian Mountains in Romania, in North-East Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
One of the major features of border regions is that levels of development between re-
gions located on the two sides of the border are sometimes very different. This is the 
case between Eastern external border regions of the EU and neighbouring regions, but 
also between some internal border regions. For instance, GDP per head is up to three 
times higher in border regions of Lithuania as in neighbouring regions of Belarus, though 
almost the same gap exists between Luxembourg and the neighbouring regions in Bel-
gium (though here commuting between the two is a significant reason for this). 
The challenges faced by internal and external border regions differ. For internal border 
regions, the main challenge is to develop further cross border cooperation so as to over-
come the remaining political and administrative barriers that hinder regional integra-
tion. For external border regions, especially in Central and Eastern Member States, the 
challenge is more one of expanding and improving basic infrastructure, including cross 
border transport and communication links. It is also one, in some cases, of having neigh-
bouring regions with very low levels of development, such as for Dél-Alföld in Hungary 
which is one of the poorest regions in the EU and shares a border with Serbia, which has 
a GDP per head of less than 20% of the EU average.
Environmental changes can equally have important cross-border effects. Already there 
are several nature reserves which cross national borders, such as the Kalmthoutse Heide 
in Belgium and the Netherlands and the Thayatal and Podyjí International Park in Austria 
and the Czech Republic. Environmental disasters such as floods or fires and air or water 
pollution also frequently cross borders. Good cross-border cooperation is key to minimis-
ing the damage to the environment from such events.
1  NUTS 3 level regions eligible for cross-border cooperation programmes under the ERDF regula-
tion.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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those with higher value added. As a consequence, the 
employment in this group grew by only 0.2% a year 
contributing just 7% to the total growth in GDP per 
head. On average, Convergence regions have a larger 
share of population in the younger age groups than 
the rest of the EU, resulting in working-age popula-
tion increasing relative to the total despite its decline 
in absolute terms. 
By contrast, changes in the employment rate contrib-
uted more to growth of GDP per head than productiv-
ity in the Transition11 regions. The number of people 
employed increased at the same time as productiv-
ity, indicating that there is no necessary trade-off be-
tween the two. The share of working age population 
in the total remained unchanged. 
The growth in RCE regions came almost entirely from 
productivity growth, while a decline in the share of 
working age population in total, reflecting demo-
graphic ageing, lowered the growth in GDP per head 
slightly. While the increase in GDP per head was high-
est on average in the Convergence regions (3%), there 
were widely different experiences within the group. 
In the 10 fastest growing regions12, GDP per head in-
creased by over 8% a year over the period. These were 
all located in the EU-12. The 10 slowest growing re-
gions13, many of them in Italy, had an average rate of 
growth of GDP per head of only 0.2% a year. 
In the group of top performers, productivity made the 
largest contribution to growth. With the exception of 
three Romanian regions, productivity increased along 
with an increase in the demand for labour — and the 
employment rate — and the share of working-age 
population. 
In slow-growing regions, sluggish growth of GDP 
per head was associated with declining productiv-
ity, which occurred in all the regions except Franche-
Comté, the only region in which employment fell. This 
11 Transition regions are regions eligible for phasing in or phasing-
out. They are called transition to highlight their intermediate stage 
between convergence and competitiveness regions.
12 Latvia, Yugozapaden (Bulgaria), Lithuania, Vest (Romania), Estonia, 
Nord-Vest (Romania), Západné Slovensko (Slovakia),Sud-Muntenia 
(Romania), Bucureşti-Ilfov (Romania), Bratislavský kraj (Slovakia).
13 Lombardia (Italy), Piemonte (Italy), Puglia (Italy), Franche-Comté 
(France), Emilia-Romagna (Italy), Abruzzo (Italy), Umbria (Italy), 
Berlin (Germany), Privincia Autonoma Trento (Italy), Illes Balears 
(Spain).
suggests a clear trade-off between growth of labour 
productivity and employment in these cases, any 
growth of the former being a result of lower employ-
ment rather than of a long-term improvement in pro-
ductive capacity. In addition, in all the regions in the 
group, except Illes Balears, the share of population of 
working age declined. This reflects outward migration 
and a lack of inward movement, since migration flows 
consist disproportionately of younger people. In a re-
gion with low employment rates, outward migration 
can help to free up jobs for those who stay, but it can 
also lead to less productive workers being employed 
and a decline in productivity.
Among the RCE regions, growth was highest in the 
Slovak and the Czech capital city regions followed 
by regions in Ireland (Southern and Eastern), Finland 
(Pohjois-Suomi, Länsi-Suomi), the Netherlands 
(Flevoland), the UK (East Anglia, Hampshire and Isle 
of Wight), and Sweden (Västsverige). Along with lit-
tle change or a slight decline (Pohjois-Suomi, Länsi-
Suomi) in the share of working age population, both, 
productivity and the employment rate increased si-
multaneously in these regions. Overall, the increase in 
GDP per head was largest in regions that succeeded 
in increasing productivity together with employment 
(see also the box Factors of growth below).
A declining share of working-age population
The share of working age population indicates the po-
tential supply of labour relative to total population. As 
in the EU, life expectancy continues to increase and the 
number of births to fall (further) below the replace-
ment level, the share of the working age population is 
likely to decline in the coming decades. At the EU level, 
the change in the share of working age population has 
been close to zero but in many regions it has already 
started to decline, so reducing the potential growth in 
GDP per head. In 2009, two out of three regions had 
a declining share of working-age population. By 2013, 
this is projected to be the case in 9 out of 10 regions 
and will continue to be so over the next two decades. 
The Eurostat regional population projections indicate 
that the decline in the share of working age popu-
lation could be particularly pronounced in parts of 
Germany, France, Poland, Finland and Sweden. On the 
other hand, Romania, Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
are likely to have considerably smaller reductions.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 27
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Growth in employment rates can help less 
developed regions 
Growth in employment rates was the main source of 
growth in the Transition regions. In Convergence and 
RCE regions, the contribution of employment was 
much smaller14. This, however, hides substantial differ-
ences between regions and the potential for increases 
in employment rates to push up GDP per head. 
This potential contribution can be estimated by ex-
amining the effect of increasing employment rates of 
people aged 20–64 to 75%, a target set by the Europe 
2020 strategy. Achieving this target will require not 
only a reduction in unemployment but also many of 
the inactive to enter the labour market, particularly 
in the Convergence regions where labour participa-
tion tends to be lower than in the more developed 
regions. This target can only be reached if there is an 
increase in the participation in the labour market of 
women especially. This might require more favoura-
ble, or flexible, employment conditions and sufficient 
child care provision to allow parents of young chil-
dren, especially mothers, to combine employment 
with raising a family. 
Raising the employment rate to 75% would increase 
GDP per head15 in the EU by more than 6%. While 
the effect would be much more important in the 
Convergence regions (17%), it is also significant in RCE 
regions (3% and from a higher base value) (Map 1.12).
The main issue is how to achieve these results and to 
overcome the main obstacles. For example, the posi-
tive employment growth in Transition regions could 
be the result of a sufficiently high output growth to 
allow employment to grow at the same time as pro-
ductivity gains are realised. Convergence regions, 
on the other hand, are still in the process of restruc-
turing with rapid falls in employment in agriculture 
(see next section) and increases in employment in 
the other sectors. Increasing output sufficiently to al-
low Convergence regions to reach 75% employment 
rates while productivity catches up with that in the 
rest of the EU could take more than a decade. Output 
14 In this growth decomposition, employment rates are calculated 
based on employment figures from regional accounts. As a result, 
these rates and their changes over time may not correspond exact-
ly with employment rates as measured by the Labour Force Survey.
15 Assuming the additional employment created has the same aver-
age productivity as the current employment.
and productivity in RCE regions are already high, but 
employment rate could still increase in some RCE re-
gions. Here the constraint on increasing employment 
further could be a lack of incentive to pursue higher 
rates of output growth, coupled with rigidities in the 
labour market which obstruct employment growth, 
underlining the need for continuing structural re-
forms.
Employment rates in the Nordic countries, the UK and 
the Netherlands are already in most regions above 
the 75% target. On the other hand, in Southern Spain, 
Southern Italy, Greece, and many of the regions in the 
EU-12 rates are considerably below 65% (Map 1.13).
In regions with high levels of employment rates, em-
ployment rates cannot increase much more and so 
cannot make an important contribution to economic 
growth. In these regions, economic growth depends 
almost entirely on productivity growth, the focus of 
the next section. 
Innovation and restructuring have the 
largest impact
Productivity growth is the combined effect of im-
provements in productivity within a sector (i.e. inno-
vation) and shifts between sectors (i.e. restructuring). 
Restructuring shifts employment to more productive 
sectors. This occurs mostly in countries at an earlier 
stage of economic development. Productivity growth 
within sectors can have a long-lasting impact on the 
economy and on competitiveness. Innovation in the 
broad sense, including investment in R&D as well as 
better use of existing technology and resources, new 
management and organisation techniques, is a major 
source of the latter.
Map 1.15 shows the increase in productivity growth 
within sectors. It shows that in most regions in the EU-
12, the increase has been significant, reflecting the 
introduction of more technically advanced and more 
efficient production and organisation. 
FDI is an important channel for innovation. Regions 
with a higher share of FDI tend to have higher growth 
of productivity within sectors. The Convergence re-
gions in the EU-15 show only small increases in pro-
ductivity within sectors and in many of them, mainly 
in Italy and Greece, competitiveness declined. The ex-Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
amples of Finland, Sweden, UK and Ireland show that 
innovation can increase productivity at any stage of 
economic development.
The growth of productivity through restructuring 
and a shift to higher value-added sectors — from ag-
riculture to industry and services — has been most 
marked in the Convergence regions (Map  1.16). In 
the Convergence regions, around 48% of the increase 
in labour productivity was due to restructuring and 
52% to productivity growth within sectors. In the 
RCE regions, there was limited employment shift be-
tween sectors and productivity differences were less 
marked, so almost 90% of the increase in productivity 
came from productivity growth within sectors.
Table 1.5 shows the effect of restructuring which is 
strongest in the Convergence regions, where it rep-
resents mainly a shift from less productive to more 
productive sectors, from agriculture to industry and 
services. The RCE regions have on average a much 
higher level of productivity and a larger share of em-
ployment in high value-added sectors. Employment 
shifts occur mainly within sectors, e.g. from low to 
high-tech industry, or from industry to services where 
deindustrialisation is still occurring (as in Germany).
1.3 Innovation is the main driver of 
regional development
Financial and business services experienced the high-
est employment growth in the EU between 2000 and 
2007. With an annual average growth rate of 2.6%, it 
was much higher than overall employment growth 
of only 0.6%. This sec-
tor also had the highest 
employment growth in 
all three types of region 
(Convergence, Transition 
and RCE) (Table 1.6).
Employment decline was 
concentrated in agricul-
ture, where it amount-
ed to 5.6% a year, and 
industry, where it was 
0.6% a year. The pattern 
across the three types 
of regions, however, is 
radically different. The 
decline in agricultural employment was the largest 
in the Convergence regions, while industrial employ-
ment actually increased a little in these regions. The 
largest decline in industrial employment was in the 
RCE regions, where it amounted to 1.3% a year.
Though these changes led to some convergence in the 
structure of employment across regions, this still differs 
substantially. Despite the strong decline, Convergence 
regions continue to have a far larger share of employ-
ment in agriculture — 14% of the total, almost three 
times that in Transition regions and six times that in 
RCE regions. Although productivity growth in agricul-
ture was very high in the Convergence regions (6.4% 
a year), the modernisation of the sector still has a long 
way to go to close the gap in productivity with RCE re-
gions (where it is three times higher).
The share of employment in industry is also larger in 
Convergence regions and has increased since 2000, 
whereas it has diminished in Transition and RCE re-
gions. This is particularly striking given that industrial 
productivity is three times higher in RCE regions than 
in Convergence regions.
The construction sector has grown substantially in 
Convergence and Transition regions and accounts for 
a larger share of employment than in RCE regions. The 
crisis, however, has reduced employment substantially, 
especially in countries where real estate values fell dra-
matically, such as in Spain, Ireland and the Baltic States.
The strength of the service sector is linked to the level 
of regional development. It accounts for the largest 
1.5 Sources of growth in labour productivity, 2000–2007
Annual average % change
Growth of  
productivity
= Growth of  
productivity 
within sectors
+ Employment 
shifts between 
sectors
EU-27 1.4 = 1.0 + 0.4
Type of region
Convergence 2.5 = 1.3 + 1.2
Transition 1.0 = 0.7 + 0.3
Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment
1.1 = 1.0 + 0.1
Source: DG REGIO, EurostatChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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share of employment in the RCE regions, where the 
share of business and financial services is also large. In 
Transition regions, the employment share of distribu-
tion, transport and communications is larger than in 
the RCE regions, whereas business and financial ser-
vices are considerably less developed. In Convergence 
regions, the employment share in all three service sec-
tors is below the EU average. In particular, the share of 
employment in business and financial services is only 
half that in the RCE regions and the share of gross val-
ue-added, two-thirds as high.
Human capital
Training and higher education can increase labour 
productivity. Higher education also tends to increase 
people’s income and life satisfaction independently of 
income levels (see next section). The share of people 
aged 25–64 with tertiary education, however, var-
ies greatly across regions (Map 1.17). In 9 regions, it 
is over 40% (Inner London, Brussels and the two sur-
rounding regions, Utrecht, País Vasco, and the capital 
city regions of Denmark, Sweden and Finland). All of 
these, except País Vasco, are capital city regions or ad-
join a capital city region. In all Member States, except 
1.6 Employment and productivity by sector, 2007
Share in 2007 (%) Employment GVA
CONV TRANS RCE EU-27 CONV TRANS RCE EU-27
Agriculture, hunting and fishing 13.7 4.8 2.4 5.8 4.1 2.6 1.4 1.8
Total industry, including energy 21.4 14.3 17.3 18.3 21.4 16.1 20.0 19.9
Construction 8.5 10.7 7.1 7.7 8.2 8.6 5.9 6.4
Trade, transport & communication 23.6 29.0 25.2 25.0 22.7 26.1 20.6 21.3
Financial and business services 8.4 11.6 16.8 14.1 20.2 22.3 30.2 28.2
Other services 24.4 29.6 31.2 29.1 23.5 24.4 22.0 22.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Annual average % change,  
2000–2007
Employment GVA
CONV TRANS RCE EU-27 CONV TRANS RCE EU-27
Agriculture, hunting and fishing -5.6 -1.7 -1.2 -4.4 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4
Total industry, including energy 0.5 -0.3 -1.3 -0.6 4.1 2.1 1.4 1.8
Construction 3.3 3.6 1.7 2.4 2.2 3.7 1.5 1.8
Trade, transport & communication 1.9 2.0 0.6 1.1 3.5 4.1 2.3 2.5
Financial and business services 3.2 4.6 2.3 2.6 3.7 3.9 2.9 3.0
Other services 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.5 1.3 1.4
Total 0.4 2.0 0.6 0.6 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.2
Productivity  
(GVA in PPS per person employed)
Index (EU=100), 2007  Annual average % change, 
2000–2007
CONV TRANS RCE EU-27 CONV TRANS RCE EU-27
Agriculture, hunting and fishing 20 52 64 34 6 0 1 5
Total industry, including energy 69 109 135 111 4 3 3 3
Construction 62 78 97 84 0 0 -0 0
Trade, transport & communication 64 89 95 86 3 2 2 2
Financial and business services 151 189 207 196 1 -0 1 1
Other services 59 79 81 76 -0 0 -0 -0
Total 65 98 116 100 4 1 1 2
Source: EurostatFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 33
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Germany and Spain, the capital city region has the 
largest share of people with tertiary education (see 
also the section on metropolitan regions).
In four regions, the share was less than 10%: 
Severozápad in the Czech Republic, the Açores, and 
Sud–Muntenia and Sud-Est in Romania. Overall re-
gions with small numbers of tertiary educated people 
are concentrated in Italy, Portugal, Romania and the 
Czech Republic.
Figure 1.13 indicates the extent to which the regional 
variation is concealed by the national averages. For 
example, Belgium has a smaller average share than 
Ireland, but in Brussels and the surrounding two re-
gions, the share is larger than in the capital city re-
gion of Ireland. The same holds true for Romania and 
Greece. The more educated also tend to be more mo-
bile. Their concentration in capital city regions is a re-
sult not only of universities being disproportionately 
located there, but also of people moving there after 
completing their tertiary education elsewhere. 
Differences in the share of highly educated are also 
apparent between the three types of regions. In RCE 
and transition regions, 26–27% of people aged 25–64 
have tertiary education. In Convergence regions, the 
proportion is only 18%. 
The younger generation right across the EU is almost 
twice as likely to have completed tertiary education as 
those aged 55–64 (31% as against 16%). The increase 
between these two generations, however, is bigger in 
RCE than Convergence regions, which means that the 
gap between the two types of regions has widened 
over the past 30 years. 
Regions with a larger share of tertiary educated have 
considerably higher levels of productivity than those 
with smaller shares, which is one of the reasons why 
the Europe 2020 strategy aims to increase the share 
of tertiary educated aged 30–34 to at least 40% 
(Map 1.19). The tertiary educated, and in particular 
researchers, play a key role in production, transfer 
and exploitation of new knowledge.  In 2007, the 
average relationship between productivity and the 
share of tertiary educated aged 25–64 indicated that 
productivity was 780 PPS higher for every percent-
age point the share of tertiary educated was above 
average16. This suggests that raising the share of ter-
tiary educated would also lead to an increase in GDP 
(though not automatically so, since other factors may 
well contribute to the relationship observed). Most re-
gions would stand to gain (Map 1.20). On the basis of 
the relationship, GDP per head in the EU, as well as in 
the Transition and RCE regions, would stand to rise by 
3–4% and in the Convergence regions by 10%.
16 This estimate is based on the correlation between regional produc-
tivity and regional shares of tertiary educated aged 25–64 in 2007. 
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Canarias
Guyane Guadeloupe
Martinique
Réunion
Açores
Distance to the Europe 2020 target
(thousands of persons)
142
106
71
36
12
4
< 17.5
17.5 - 25
25 - 32.5
32.5 - 40
>= 40
No Data
< 17.5
17.5 - 25
25 - 32.5
32.5 - 40
>= 40
No Data
% of population aged 30–34
1.19 Population aged 30–34 with a tertiary education in 2008 and distance to Europe 
2020 target
The Europe 2020 target for the share of 
population aged 30–34 with tertiary education 
is 40%
EU-27 = 31.1
ISCED levels 5 and 6
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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1.20 Potential increase in GDP per head from raising the share of tertiary-educated 
aged 25–34 to 40%, 2007
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Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
Of course, increasing the share of tertiary educated 
people aged 25–64 cannot be done overnight. Most 
people across the EU complete their university de-
gree by the age of 25 and almost all by the time they 
are 35. Evidence from the Labour Force Survey indi-
cates that very few people who have started working 
interrupt their career to spend 3–4 years completing 
a tertiary degree course. This underlines the impor-
tance of lifelong learning, which includes access to 
training of various kinds as well as university courses. 
As a result, most of the increase in the share of the ter-
tiary educated working age population comes from 
those under 35, one of the reasons why they are the 
focus of the Europe 2020 strategy.
At present, only a fifth of the EU regions have a ter-
tiary educated share among the population aged 
25–64 of 30% or more. If current trends continue, only 
half of EU regions will reach 30% by 2020. Simulations 
show that the share of tertiary educated among 25–
64 year-olds would increase to nearly 30% if the share 
of tertiary educated among those aged 25–34 were 
raised to 40%. Even achieving this target achieved in 
all regions from 2010 onwards, however, would still 
mean that one in three regions would have a share of 
tertiary educated among those of 25–64 below 30% 
in 2020. This makes it particularly important to push 
the trend up.
Nevertheless, tertiary education is neither the only 
nor an automatic source of highly skilled workers. 
Skills upgrading at all levels can significantly increase 
the number of highly skilled workers, especially when 
linked to labour market needs — a link that can be 
more easily established at regional level17 (Map 1.21). 
17 Intangible Assets and Regional Economic Growth (IAREG) Scientific 
Executive Summary, 2010.
The precise number and nature of the jobs in the fu-
ture — and of the skills they will require — will de-
pend on long-term structural factors such as research, 
innovation, technological change, globalisation and 
demographic trends but also on the extent and pace 
of the recovery from the current economic downturn. 
Projections up to 2020 show that the share of jobs 
employing those with upper secondary (i.e. medium 
level) qualifications is likely to remain substantial, at 
around 50%18. Those in work will need to update and 
upgrade their skills, especially the low-qualified, who 
are far less likely to participate in lifelong learning 
than those with tertiary education. 
Increasing the employment rate (as indicated in sec-
tion 1.2.2) or the share of tertiary educated, alone, can 
have important benefits on the economy, especially in 
the lagging regions but the effect increases and lasts 
longer if the two occur simultaneously (Table  1.7). 
Increasing the employment rate at the same time as 
the share of tertiary educated is likely to mean that 
the additional jobs created have a higher productiv-
ity then the current one. In other words, regions will 
not only create jobs but they will create the kinds of 
job that raise productivity and living standards. This 
would lead to an increase in GDP per head in the EU of 
11% and in the Convergence regions of nearly a third. 
As indicated in the table, an integrated approach to 
investment in both employment and education, es-
pecially in regions with low employment rates, as 
in many of the Convergence and Transition regions, 
means that the result is more than the sum of its parts. 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that increasing edu-
cation levels in less developed regions will not only 
18 Cedefop (2010) Skills supply and demand in Europe. Medium term 
forecasts to 2020.
1.7 Potential increase in GDP per head from achieving the Europe 2020 targets for the 
employment rate and tertiary education, 2007
% change
EU-27 CONV TRANS RCE
1 Increasing the employment rate, 20–64, to 75% 6 17 11 3
2 Increasing the share of tertiary educated 
population, 25–34, to 40%
4 10 4 3
3 1 and 2 simultaneously 11 29 16 6
 Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculationsChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
benefit the economy but will also contribute to better 
local institutions.
The share of people with low education — who have 
at the most only completed compulsory education 
— is substantial in all the Southern Member States, 
except Cyprus, varying on average between 40% and 
75% of those aged 25–64 (Map 1.18 and Figure 1.14). 
All five countries have regions where only half of the 
potential work force has at most completed lower 
secondary education. People with a low education 
are less likely to have a job and more likely to have low 
income and low life expectancy. Encouraging more 
people to complete at least upper secondary educa-
tion is, accordingly, not just beneficial for economic 
growth.
The Europe 2020 ‘early-school leaving’ target of hav-
ing at most 10% of people aged 18–24 with no edu-
cation beyond basic schooling has been reached in 
73 NUTS 2 regions, around one in four, but it will re-
quire a substantial effort in many regions to achieve 
it, especially in Malta and the 17 regions in Spain and 
Portugal where the rate is still above 30% (Map 1.22). 
The quality of secondary education, however, is as 
important as the quantity. Surveys carried out by the 
OECD in this regard (Map 1.23) shows that the share 
of low achievers in mathematics, reading and science 
also differs substantially between Member States. 
Bulgaria and Romania consistently show a share 
of more than 30% of low achievers in these areas. 
Greece, Italy and Portugal have more than 30% of low 
achievers in mathematics, but score slightly better in 
the other two areas.
Regional innovation systems
Innovation and creativity have many sources ranging 
from cultural diversity and tolerance, to entrepreneur-
ship and the creative class19. In this section, the focus 
is mostly on technological innovation and its diffu-
sion and absorption.
Disparities remain wide across both Member States 
and regions as regards innovation capacity. According 
to the Summary Innovation Index (SII) of the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS)20, the highest innovative 
capacity is found in the Nordic countries, with Sweden 
and Finland having a higher capacity than Japan and 
the US. Performance is in general lower than aver-
19 COM(2009) 295.
20 The SII gives an overview of aggregate national innovation perfor-
mance. It is calculated as a composite of the 29 indicators grouped 
into 7 different innovation dimensions and 3 major groups of di-
mensions: (i) ‘Enablers’, i.e. the main drivers of innovation external 
to the firm. It is divided into a ‘Human resources’ and a ‘Finance and 
support’ dimensions; (ii) ‘Firm activities’, i.e. innovation efforts that 
firms undertake. It covers 3 dimensions: ‘Firm investments’ (a range 
of different investments firms make in order to generate innova-
tions); ‘Linkages & entrepreneurship’ (capturing the entrepreneur-
ial efforts and the related collaboration efforts); and ‘Throughputs’ 
(capturing among others the Intellectual Property Rights generat-
ed as a throughput in the innovation process); (iii) ‘Outputs’, i.e. the 
outputs of firm activities. It is divided into 2 dimensions: ‘Innovators’ 
(the number of firms that have introduced innovations onto the 
market or within their organisations) and ‘Economic effects’ (suc-
cess of innovation in terms of employment, exports and sales due 
to innovation activities).
MT PT ES IT EL LU IE BE FR CY NL UK RO BG DK HU AT FI SI SE DE LV PL EE SK LT CZ
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age in the EU-12 countries, although some of these 
(Cyprus, Estonia and the Czech Republic) perform bet-
ter than Southern EU-15 Member States.
The EIS distinguishes four groups of country:
  • Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the UK 
with innovation performance well above the EU 
average;
  • Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands with innovation perfor-
mance slightly above the EU average;
  • Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain with perfor-
mance slightly below the EU average;
  • Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia with performance 
well below the EU average.
Changes which have occurred in innovation perfor-
mance over recent years point to a process of conver-
gence. Except for Italy, Lithuania and Spain, Member 
States with innovative capacity below the EU aver-
age recorded higher than average increases in per-
formance. At the same time, except for Austria and 
Ireland, in Member States with innovation capacity 
above the EU average, innovation performance has 
risen by much the same or less than the EU average. 
According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard21 
the most innovative regions are typically in the most 
innovative countries. Nearly all of these are located in 
the group of ‘Innovation Leader’ countries identified 
in the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS). Similarly 
all of the ‘low innovator’ regions are located in coun-
tries that have below average performance in the EIS. 
However, the results also show regions that outper-
form their country level: 
  • Noord-Brabant is a high innovating region lo-
cated in an ‘Innovation follower’ country (the 
Netherlands). 
  • Praha in the Czech Republic, País Vasco, 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Comunidad de 
21 http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/regional-innovation-score-
board
Madrid and Cataluña in Spain, Lombardia and 
Emilia-Romagna in Italy and Zahodna Slovenija in 
Slovenia are all medium-high innovating regions 
in moderate innovator and catching up countries. 
  • The capital city regions in Hungary and Slovakia 
show an innovation level around the EU average 
but are located in catching up countries whose 
overall innovation performance is well below av-
erage. 
Regions have different strengths and weaknesses. 
According to more detailed analysis of those regions 
where good data are available, regions are perform-
ing at different levels across three dimensions of in-
novation included in the EIS: innovation enablers, firm 
activities and innovation outputs. Although the rela-
tionship between levels of performance and relative 
strengths is not straight-forward, many of the ‘low in-
novators’ have a relative weakness as regards innova-
tion enablers which includes human resources. 
Regional performance appears relatively stable since 
2004. The pattern of innovation was broadly un-
changed between 2004 and 2006, with only a few 
changes in the membership of the different groups. 
More specifically, most of the changes are positive 
and concern Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, Illes 
Balears, and Ceuta (Spain), Bassin Parisien, Est and 
Sud-Ouest (France), Unterfranken (Germany), Közép-
Dunántúl (Hungary) and Algarve (Portugal). Longer 
time series data is needed to analyse the dynamics of 
regional innovation performance and how this might 
be related to other factors such as changes in GDP, in-
dustrial structure and public policies. 
R&D expenditure in EU regions
Disparities are even wider across EU regions. 
According to the latest data available, expenditure 
on R&D in the EU averaged around 1.9% of GDP in 
2007. Expenditure, however, ranged from 5–6% of 
GDP in Braunschweig and Stuttgart in Germany and 
Västsverige in Sweden to less than 0.1% in Severen 
tsentralen in Bulgaria and Lubuskie in Poland.
Expenditure exceeds the Europe 2020 target of 3% in 
only one in 10 regions, while it is less than 1% in al-
most half (48%) the regions (Map 1.24). Among the 
20 regions with the highest expenditure on R&D, 17 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 43
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Factors of growth
As emphasised by the OECD1, since the end of the 1990’s Governments across the EU have 
progressively emphasised the regional dimension of economic policy. At the centre of this 
approach is the challenge of designing policies that are appropriate at the local level. 
However, the prerequisite for the success of such a policy is the ability to identify the key 
determinants of growth at regional level. This is precisely the objective of an on-going study 
commissioned by DG REGIO which seeks to deepen understanding of economic develop-
ment in EU regions and analyse the factors underlying the diversity of performance.
The literature tends to group determinants of growth into the following broad categories2:
Accumulation of factors of production, usually physical and human capital as well as tech-
nology. Such accumulation is supposed to be facilitated by well functioning financial and 
labour markets and is affected by various other features such as:
  • the age structure of the population; 
  • natural geography which includes the endowment of natural resources but also the re-
gion’s topography;
  • economic geography which focuses on aspects such as access to large product or factor 
markets or the density of economic activity within the region;
  • the policy and institutional context which encompasses aspects such as the quality of 
governance or the macroeconomic framework of which the regional economy is a part.
Up to date econometric techniques have been used to assess which of a large number (more 
than 60) of potential growth determinants included in the categories above are the most 
robust drivers of regional growth: 
  • education levels (or human capital) appear to be one of the most important growth fac-
tors, especially the share of working age population with tertiary education. This also 
links to innovation as a higher educated and skilled workforce facilitates a rapid diffusion 
of knowledge and new techniques. The estimates imply that an increase of 10% in the 
share of highly educated in working-age population tends on average to raise growth of 
GDP per head by 0.6 percentage points a year;
  • gross fixed capital formation is also identified as an important factor. This directly affects 
the productive capacity of regions by increasing the stock of physical capital but mainly 
by increasing productivity and the diffusion of innovation since capital tends to embody 
the latest technology; 
  • low unemployment rates, which reflect the sound operation of labour markets as well as 
factor accumulation, regional flexibility and social cohesion, also favour growth; 
  • neighbourhood effects are important, in the sense that the growth performance of a 
region partly depends on growth in surrounding regions. 
Regions with capital cities tend equally to have higher growth rates than other regions. In 
general employment density (rather than population density) has a positive effect on growth, 
reflecting the fact that high job density leads to dense social interaction which increases the 
scope for knowledge dissemination, so in turn stimulating innovations and growth.
1  OECD (2009), Investing for Growth: Building Innovative Regions, Background Report for the Meeting 
of the Territorial Development Policy Committee at Ministerial Level.
2  Besides the initial level of development which is at the basis of the process of catching-up.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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are highly developed (with GDP per head above the 
EU average) and 3 of them are capital city regions (in 
Austria, Sweden and Denmark). With the exception of 
Åland in Finland, the regions recording low levels of 
expenditure on R&D are mostly located in the EU-12 
or are regions in the EU-15 with relatively low levels 
of GDP per head.
The concentration of R&D expenditure in regions with 
high levels of GDP per head also emerges from exami-
nation of expenditure on R&D by the private sector. 
In 2007, almost none of the lagging regions had R&D 
expenditure levels above 2% (the Barcelona target for 
business R&D). The only exception is Stredni Cechy 
(the region surrounding Prague) where business R&D 
expenditure amounts to about 2.5% of GDP.
Human resources in science and technology
Another common indicator of innovative capacity is 
the proportion of the work force with tertiary level 
education in science and technology and who work 
in jobs typically requiring this type of qualification 
(HRSTC).
Regional disparities in this regard are equally wide. 
In 2008, HRSTC was 30% or above in Brabant Wallon 
in Belgium, Stockholm, Inner London and Berlin. It 
was less than 8% in Corse, Sud-Muntenia in Romania, 
Açores in Portugal and Severozapad in Bulgaria 
(Map 1.25). Again, regions highly endowed with an 
educated workforce generally have higher levels of 
GDP per head and are often capital city regions. Only 
4 out of the top 20 regions in terms of HRSTC have a 
GDP per head below the EU average and 12 are capi-
tal city regions.
High-tech employment
The relative number of people employed in high-tech 
sectors is also a measure of R&D input (Map 1.26). 
According to the most recent data (2007–2008), 
the largest proportion (9–11%) is in the EU-15, in 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire in the 
UK, Stockholm in Sweden and Karlsruhe in Germany. 
The proportion is also high (7–8%) in some regions in 
the EU-12, in the capital regions of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia. The proportion tends to be 
smallest in regions with low levels of GDP per head. 
Only 4 of the 20 regions with the lowest proportions 
have a GDP per head above 75% of the EU average.
Increases in the proportion of employment in high 
tech sectors also occur more often in more developed 
regions than in lagging regions, only 3 of the 20 re-
gions where the increase was highest between 2000 
and 2007 having a GDP per head below 75% of the 
EU average (Vest in Romania, Západné Slovensko in 
Slovakia and Moravskoslezsko in the Czech Republic).
Patents
Wide regional variations, which follow the same pat-
tern, are equally evident as regards output indica-
tors of R&D, in particular patent applications to the 
European Patent Office. In Convergence regions, 
these was only 11% of the EU average in 2005–2006 
(the latest data available), whereas in RCE regions, it 
was 53% above the EU average. Applications are dis-
proportionately concentrated in the most developed 
regions, 87% of regions with applications above the 
EU average also having GDP per head above the aver-
age.
The culture of innovation differs substantially be-
tween the EU and the US, where applying for a patent 
is much more common. This, however, explains only 
part of the difference in patenting intensity between 
the two. In the US, there were 262 patent applications 
per million inhabitants in 2007–2008. In the EU-15, 
there were 139 and in the EU-27, 111 (in 2006–2007), 
though in Germany, reflecting the specialisation in 
medium-to-high tech manufacturing, there were 280, 
more than in the US, and in Sweden and Finland, only 
slightly less (251 and 248, respectively).
Patent applications vary widely between regions in 
both the US and the EU (Map 1.27 and Map 1.28). In the 
US, they tend to be higher on the East and West coast, 
in California, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont and 
Washington, where there were over 400 applications 
per 1 million. In the EU, the largest number is in Noord-
Brabant, in the Netherlands (723) and Stuttgart (630), 
Oberbayern (572) and Tübingen (524) in Germany. 
Numbers at the other end of the spectrum are much 
lower in both areas. In the US, the number was less 
than 100 in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, while 
in the EU, Ionia Nisia and Voreio Aigaio in Greece, Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
Açores in Portugal and 
Ceuta and Melilla in Spain 
did not record any pat-
ents.
Regional Innovation 
Performance Index
This general picture of 
innovative capacity be-
ing concentrated in the 
most developed EU re-
gions is confirmed by 
the Regional Innovation 
Performance Index (RIPI), 
a composite indicator 
comprising 16 of the 29 
indicators used in the 
EIS22. It covers 201 regions 
(Map 1.29) at various geo-
graphical levels according to data availability23. 
The indicator suggests, as evident from the above, 
that the most innovative regions are generally located 
in the most innovative countries and vice versa. 
There are, however, a number of regions which out-
performed the average, such as Noord-Brabant, Praha, 
País Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Comunidad 
de Madrid and Cataluña in Spain, Lombardia and 
Emilia-Romagna in Italy, Zahodna Slovenija and the 
capital city regions in Hungary and Slovakia.
Innovation by type of region
As is also evident from the above, Convergence re-
gions perform less well than Transition and RCE re-
gions on all the measures examined (Table 1.8). The 
data, however, also show a catching up process with 
Convergence regions having higher increases than 
22 Hollanders, H., Tarantola, S. and Loschky, A. (2009), Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard 2009, INNO Metrics Thematic Paper, 
Brussels: European Commission, DG Enterprise.
23 Due to data availability, the RIPI is computed at the NUTS 1 level 
for 3 regions from Austria, 3 regions from Belgium, 2 regions from 
Bulgaria, 9 regions from France, 9 regions from Germany, 3 re-
gions from Greece, 1 region from Hungary, 2 regions from Spain, 
12 regions from UK. The computation is also made for 1 merged 
region in Greece (Anatoliki Makedonia Thraki, Dytiki Makedonia 
and Thessalia), 2 merged regions in Italy (Valle d’Aosta and 
Piemonte; Molise and Abruzzo) and 1 merged region in Portugal 
(Região Autónoma dos Açores and Região Autónoma da Madeira). 
Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta 
are included at the country level.
the other two groups. This is a result of a number 
of factors including the transfer of technology from 
other regions (notably through direct investment), 
changes in their structure towards higher value-add-
ed sectors and increased access to EU markets which 
raises the expected return from innovation.
Productivity
Although the indicators described above are helpful 
in measuring regional innovation performance, they 
also have serious limitations24. In particular, they fail 
in the main to capture some important inputs into 
the innovation process, such as product design, mar-
ket analysis, training of employees or investment in 
research infrastructure. They also neglect the often 
informal innovation activities of smaller firms. In ad-
dition, the regional disaggregation of data is a serious 
problem as all of a company’s innovation activity may 
be reported by the head office while in fact occurring 
in many different places. Moreover, many innovations 
are not patented or indeed patentable, such as new 
software systems.
Equally importantly, most of the indicators are fo-
cused on technological innovation and ignore other 
forms such as in processing, marketing or organisa-
24 See for instance: Kleinkecht, A., Van Monfort,  K. and Brouwer, 
E. (2002),The non-Trivial Choice Between Innovation Indicators, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Volume 11, Issue 2, 
pp. 109–121.
1.8 Regional innovation performance
CONV TRANS RCE EU-27
Levels
EPO patents applications, 2006–2007  
(applications per inhabitant, Index EU-27=100)
11.3 32.7 153 100
Total R&D expenditure, 2007  
(% of GDP)
0.89 0.99 2.08 1.85
Human resources in S&T, 2008  
(% of total employment)
14.7 17.8 18.8 17.6
Employment in high-technology sectors, 2008  
(% of total employment)
3.1 3.4 5.1 4.4
Percentage point change
Human resources in S&T, 2000–2008  
(% of total employment)
3.9 2.8 3 3.3
Employment in high-tech sectors, 2000–2008  
(% of total employment)
1.1 0.5 -0.2 0.3
Source: EurostatChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1.29 Regional Innovation Performance Index, 2006
Source: DG Enterprise, MERIT
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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< 67.8
67.8 - 88.1
88.1 - 98.1
98.1 - 103.9
103.9 - 111.5
>= 111.5
< 67.8
67.8 - 88.1
88.1 - 98.1
98.1 - 103.9
103.9 - 111.5
>= 111.5
GVA per person employed in industry and services. EU-27 = 100
1.30 Labour productivity in industry and services, 2007
UKN0: 2005
Source: Eurostat
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
0 500Km
REGIOgisChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
52 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
tion. These may be particularly important for produc-
ers in less advanced regions which mostly innovate 
by absorbing technologies developed elsewhere, by 
adapting their product to the needs of new markets, 
or by adopting more efficient methods of organising 
their operations.
Innovation is primarily a means of increasing produc-
tivity, especially labour productivity. It remains, there-
fore, to examine changes in regional labour produc-
tivity in industry and services as a broad measure of 
the outcome of various forms of innovation.
Labour productivity in industry and services is gener-
ally higher in more developed regions (Map 1.30). The 
average level in RCE regions is almost twice that in 
Convergence regions. None of the Convergence and 
Transition regions has a level of productivity higher 
than the EU average which is the case for around 69% 
of RCE regions. 
However, growth of productivity has tended to be 
higher in less developed regions. The average annual 
growth rate in Convergence regions was twice as high 
as in RCE regions over the pe-
riod 2000–2007 (Table 1.9). There 
are also around 36% of RCE re-
gions which experienced higher 
growth of productivity than the 
EU average and 24% of Transition 
regions.
This underlines the fact that a 
broad definition of innovation25 is less concentrated 
in developed regions than technological innovation. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.15, high growth in labour 
productivity in industry and services, which is partly 
due to innovation, occurred in some RCE regions but 
also in a large number of Convergence regions. 
The highest productivity growth among RCE regions 
(around 4% a year in Övre Norrland, Sweden) is in fact 
not much lower than the highest productivity growth 
among Convergence regions (4.4% in Latvia).
Innovation potential and bottlenecks
The wide variations between EU regions in innova-
tion performance and in the process of development 
reflect their specific features and, in particular, their 
endowment of the basic factors which are important 
for innovation. 
25 The 6th progress report on economic and social cohesion defined 
innovation as ‘putting a new and useful idea into practice’ and new 
and useful was defined as ‘new and useful to the region’. 
1.9 Labour productivity in industry and services, 2007
CONV TRANS RCE EU-27
GDP per person employed in PPS, 2007 65.0 97.6 115.9 100
Annual average % change, 2000–2007 3.5 1.3 1.2 1.9
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculation
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Regions matter for innovation policy1
The role of innovation in economic growth is expected to increase as other sources of growth 
decline in OECD countries. The challenge for national and regional governments is to iden-
tify the most appropriate policy levers for different stages of the innovation process — from 
knowledge generation and invention to innovation and commercialisation — each of which 
can have a different spatial dimension. In this regard, the OECD and the EU (DG REGIO) are 
working together to identify the most effective use of innovation policy funding for regions.
As in the EU, innovative capacity varies markedly across OECD regions. Only 13% of regions 
account for over half of R&D expenditure in the OECD area, and the top 10% of regions gen-
erate on average around 280 patents per million inhabitants, while 40% are responsible for 
fewer than 20. There are different factors underlying this variation. Several of the top regions 
with high R&D expenditure relative to GDP are capital city regions or have major national 
research centres. 
Spatial proximity continues to matter. Many of the regions which are strongest in biotech-
nology, as reflected in the number of patents, tend also to be the strongest in nanotechnol-
ogy, though there are exceptions. Nevertheless, access to global pipelines of knowledge 
generation and knowledge exploitation remain important for all types of region, as innova-
tion processes are increasingly open, global, multi-disciplinary and multi-actor.
Many innovations, however, occur without R&D. The share of firms with new-to-market 
products that did not invest in R&D is at least 30% in several countries, such as Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Other analysis estimates that 52% of innovating 
firms do not perform R&D for their innovations2. The ‘technological’ forms of innovation (in 
products or processes) are often introduced in the same firms that also report ‘non-techno-
logical’ forms (marketing or organisation innovations). There is, therefore, not necessarily a 
direct mapping between technological innovation and leading regions or between non-
technological innovation and lagging regions.
The relationship between regional growth and innovation is not always linear. It is known, 
however, that human capital is needed to reap the benefits of investment in infrastructure 
and equipment, and, among leading OECD regions closest to the ‘technology frontier’, those 
that are growing faster have higher values for traditional innovation indicators than those 
growing more slowly. Tailored regional approaches with different policy mixes are, there-
fore, needed to respond to these individual growth paths.
Regional governments in the OECD are also determining their own innovation policies. 
On average, 64% of all capital expenditure in OECD countries comes from regional or local 
governments. Comparable budget information at this level for investment and spending in 
innovation does not yet exist, but according to the recent OECD Survey on the Multi-level 
Governance of Science, Technology and Innovation, a wide range of measures to support 
innovation at regional level are being used, with significant budgets. Moreover, it is known 
that in Germany, for example, just over 50% of public R&D expenditure is financed by the 
Länder.
1  For further information, see OECD, Regions Matter for Innovation Policy (forthcoming), 2011; OECD, 
Measuring and Monitoring Innovation, 2010; OECD, Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation 
and Sustainable Growth, 2009; OECD, Regions at a Glance 2009; OECD, How Regions Grow: Trends 
and Analysis, 2009.
2  2007 European Innovation Scoreboard thematic paper, Neglected innovators: How do innovative 
firms that do not perform R&D innovate?, http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/thematic-papers-2Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1.31 Regional innovation potential, 2008
Source: Eurostat, CWTS, OECD, JRC, DG REGIO
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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This is well captured by a synthetic indicator devel-
oped by DG REGIO which includes different aspects 
which are central for technological innovation (such 
as R&D spending), innovation absorption (such as ed-
ucation attainment) or innovation diffusion (such as 
the connectivity of regions to the rest of the world). 
The index is helpful for identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of EU regions in these terms. Three main 
groups of regions can be distinguished (Map 1.31).
The first group (labelled as strong generators of inno-
vation) includes regions which are close to the global 
technology frontier, which are mostly located in the 
highly developed North-Western Member States. 
Their main characteristic is the capacity to produce 
new technologies, and their growth process hinges 
on R&D and innovation as well as on the accumula-
tion of human capital in order to move the technol-
ogy frontier outwards.
The second group (labelled as weak absorbers) are 
regions which are catching up on the first group 
through a process of technology absorption, which 
requires high levels of human capital. The main chal-
lenge for these regions is therefore to increase the 
education level of the workforce. They broadly corre-
spond to the moderately developed regions in the EU.
The third group (labelled as weak diffusers) comprises 
regions mostly located in the EU-12 countries, which 
are catching up on the first group at an even faster 
pace. This process is generally based on the restruc-
turing of their economies and critically rests on their 
capacity to benefit from technology diffusion. For 
these regions where the level of education is often 
relatively high, the main limiting factor is their low en-
dowment of infrastructure and the nature of the busi-
ness environment.
This great diversity in development pathways and tra-
jectories of innovation across regions is also confirmed 
by a recent study26. The main findings highlight the 
multidimensional aspects of a regional knowledge-
based economy. It includes a variety of knowledge 
activities and multiple interactions among a range of 
actors including universities, research institutes, en-
terprises, knowledge workers and institutions.
26  European Commission, The regional impact of technological 
change in 2020, Synthesis report, 2010.
Accordingly, the spatial patterns and trends for the 
different aspects of the knowledge-based economy 
vary significantly across the EU. However, regional in-
novation is relevant for all regions: in technologically 
leading regions to remain ahead, in peripheral regions 
to catch up, though innovation strategies should dif-
fer. Common to all regions is the need to shift from 
technology-push policies towards those focusing on 
demand-pull. Promoting applications, user-driven in-
novation, innovation in services and in the public sec-
tor and addressing societal challenges have increas-
ingly shaped the innovation policy agenda.
1.4 Infrastructure for the 21st century
Regional competitiveness and development pros-
pects are also affected by infrastructure endowment, 
such as transport or telecommunication networks. As 
indicated by many studies, the provision of public in-
frastructure has a positive and large effect on produc-
tivity and growth27. 
Transport
A good transport system is important for regional 
economic development. It reduces journey times and, 
accordingly, production costs, so increasing competi-
tiveness. It improves access to markets for consumers, 
workers and business and is an important aspect of 
the attractiveness of a region for investors.
However, a good transport system in itself is not suf-
ficient to ensure regional development. The effect of 
investment in transport and other infrastructure on 
economic performance also depends on the region’s 
capacity to use it efficiently, as well as on investment 
in other factors important for development, such as 
in human capital and innovation. This partly explains 
why the return on investment in infrastructure can 
vary significantly between regions.
Improved transport links between regions and coun-
tries facilitate access to EU-wide markets, which is 
likely to create new opportunities for growth. It also, 
however, increases competition between regions, 
which may adversely affect both businesses and 
27 Physical infrastructure can adversely affect the environment, es-
pecially heavy and long-lasting infrastructure such as roads, mo-
torways, railway lines and modifications to water courses. In such 
cases, the trade-off between economic and environmental costs 
and benefits needs to be explicitly and properly taken into account.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
workers. The overall effect depends on a region’s ca-
pacity to exploit and further develop its comparative 
advantage.
The situation of EU regions with regard to 
transport infrastructure
Endowment of transport infrastructure varies widely 
across the EU, especially in terms of roads. Density 
of motorways28 is three times the EU average in the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg but is below 10% of av-
erage in Romania, while Latvia and Malta have no mo-
torways at all. In 7 Member States, 6 of which are EU-
12 countries, density is less than half the EU average.
Differences are even more marked between EU re-
gions with big differences in motorway density. In the 
east many regions have no motorway at all. For exam-
ple, in Poland, 7 of the 16 regions and in Romania, 6 
out of the 8 have no motorways. 
A new way to show the difference in the quality of the 
infrastructure between regions is to compare current 
accessibility to low speed and high speed scenarios29 
(Map 1.32 and Map 1.33). A comparison with the low 
speed scenario highlights the regions which benefit 
from existing motorways. Most German, Austrian and 
French regions benefit from an extensive motorway 
network, while bringing about a more even distribu-
tion of high speed roads would significantly increase 
the accessibility of Northern and Eastern Poland and 
all of Romania (Map 1.34). 
Between 2000 and 2008, new investment in mo-
torways tended to be concentrated in less devel-
oped regions of the EU. In almost three-quarters of 
Convergence regions, density increased relative to 
the EU average, while in RCE regions, only a quarter 
experienced an increase. In the EU-15, investment 
was especially high in regions in Spain, Portugal and 
Germany. In the EU-12, there was no clear link be-
28 The density of motorways is defined as the length of motorway per 
inhabitant or per square kilometre. The indicator used here is an 
average of the densities per inhabitant and per square kilometre.
29 The high speed scenario increases the speed to 90 km per hour on 
all roads to mimic a more even and uniform distribution of high-
ways. However, in certain regions such speeds may not be feasible 
because of the type of terrain. In addition, it is not a realistic sce-
nario to increase the actual average speed everywhere to 90km. As 
a result some of the benefits shown may not be capable in reality of 
being achieved in a cost effective way, especially in regions with a 
small and dispersed population.
tween new motorway construction and the initial en-
dowment.
Variations in the quality of the road network are re-
flected in some degree in differences in the number 
of accidents and road fatalities, though, as indicated 
below, other factors are also important. These re-
main high in most regions of the EU-12 as well as in 
Greece, Spain, Italy and France. They are much lower 
in Germany, the Nordic countries and the UK. 
The situation in the EU-15 and the EU-12 is radically 
different as regards the extent to which the road net-
work connects urban centres and ensures a high level 
of accessibility. The extremely dense road network in 
the core part of the EU running from the South East 
of the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and South-West 
Germany achieves both. Connectivity is also good in 
France (especially around Ile de France), Spain and 
Northern Italy. In the EU-12, the road network overall 
is limited and fragmented.
The importance of transport networks for regional 
development is indicated by a territorial impact as-
sessment of a projected enhanced infrastructure sce-
nario30. This shows a general economic benefit for the 
EU as a whole and a much greater one for the EU-12, 
through increasing market potential, regional com-
petitiveness and GDP per head, which could even 
lead to the emergence of a new economic growth 
area spanning Praha, Krakow, Budapest, and Vienna.
In the EU-15, substantial potential benefits are also 
identified, in particular, through better links between 
regions inside countries, notably Spain and Germany, 
so enabling development to spread out from the ma-
jor centres to smaller cities. In the EU-12, inter-region-
al connections are mostly missing, even the capital 
cities not being well connected to each other.
Regional disparities are less as regards railways, at 
least in terms of the density of track, though not of its 
efficiency (Map 1.35). Some 37% of Convergence re-
gions have a density of railways which is less than half 
30 This assessment is part of the TIPTAP ESPON project. In particu-
lar, the project examined a scenario referred as Infrastructure 
Enhancement, where policies are oriented towards new infra-
structure provision. It is based on a High Growth 2030 scenario as 
defined in TRANSVisions study. ESPON 2013 Programme, TIPTAP: 
Territorial Impact Package for Transport and Agricultural Policies, 
Applied Research Project 2013/1/6, 2010.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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the EU average as against 25% of RCE regions. In the 
EU-12, the density of the rail network is much higher 
than for roads. However, despite significant invest-
ment in the modernisation of the network, much of it 
remains out of date and in a poor state of repair. Many 
lines are single-track and in most countries, few are 
electrified. The difference with the EU-15 is, therefore, 
predominantly in the average speed of the network. 
This difference in speed also emerges from comparing 
the current situation with a low and high speed sce-
nario (Map 1.36 and Map 1.37). Existing high-speed 
rail lines benefit most regions in France and Germany, 
but also several regions in Spain, Italy, the UK, Belgium 
and Austria. The high speed scenario31 shows that re-
gions in the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria, especially those which do not include a 
major city but are located close to one, would benefit 
significantly from improving the speed on the railway 
network to at least 90 km per hour.
Air travel has continued to grow over the past few 
years up until the onset of the crisis in 2008. The high-
est growth in traffic has been in secondary airports, 
which are mostly used by low-cost airlines as well as in 
the airports in the capital cities in the EU-12. Despite 
this, the density of air traffic in the latter is much lower 
than in the EU-15 (the largest airport in terms of traf-
fic, Praha/Ruzyne, being ranked only in 30th position 
in the EU in 2008).
The accessibility of airports differs widely across re-
gions (Map 1.38). Only around 5% of the EU population 
lives more than 90 minutes from an airport and 51% 
can access between 10 and 500 flights a day within 90 
minutes. However, accessibility is much higher in the 
EU-15, particularly in the core part. People in many re-
gions in the EU-12 have access to only 10 flights a day 
within 90 minutes and many live beyond a 90 minute 
drive. In Spain too a significant proportion of people 
live beyond a 90 minute drive to the nearest airport.
31 The high speed scenario does not consider whether in practice all 
the railway links can be improved to accommodate higher speeds, 
which may be very difficult to do, particularly in mountainous re-
gions. Accordingly, the increases in accessibility of regions like 
Corsica or the regions in the Massif Central in France which are as-
sumed may not be realistic. As with the high-speed road scenario, 
this scenario is not realistic and investment to increase the speed 
of certain railway lines may not be cost effective, in particular if the 
population of the region is small and dispersed.
The situation in the EU-12 is expected to improve as 
the quality of the road network and city-airport con-
nections continue to be developed.
ICT Networks
Access to high-speed ICT networks is increasingly 
considered to be a key factor of competitiveness, as 
determining the capacity to compete in, and benefit 
from, the global market. It is also a major determi-
nant of the facility to adopt new technologies, which 
is central to the growth of less developed regions. At 
the same time, it is critical to the development of e-
services, whether public or private.
According to the last Digital Competitiveness report32, 
the average national coverage of DSL networks33 in 
the EU increased from 87% of the population in 2005 
to 94% in 2009. The gap between Member States has 
narrowed substantially as coverage rates have risen 
in countries where they were lowest. For example, in 
Greece, coverage increased from 12% to 91% over the 
period, while in Slovenia, it rose from 55% to 93%, in 
Cyprus from 70% to 96%, in Poland from 55% to 75% 
and in Slovakia, from 61% to 82%.
Broadband coverage in thinly populated areas gen-
erally lags behind that in densely populated ones. In 
three countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus, broad-
band covers less than 50% of population in thinly 
populated areas. In some countries, like Slovenia, 
Italy, Germany and Sweden, efforts were concentrat-
ed on reducing the gap between thinly and densely 
populated areas with some success. In Austria, Estonia 
and Ireland, mobile technologies have played a key 
role in closing the gap. Further efforts, however, are 
needed in Greece, Slovakia, Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria, where between 48 and 67% of the popula-
tion in thinly populated areas have as yet no access 
to broadband. The Europe 202034 strategy and the EU 
Digital Agenda35 have the goal of achieving universal 
coverage of broadband internet by 2013 and of in-
creasing the speed to 30Mbps by 2020 for all and to 
32 European Commission, Europe’s Digital Competitiveness Report, 
Main achievements of the i2010 strategy 2005–2009, 2010.
33 Coverage of DSL and cable modem networks well summarises 
broadband coverage. As these two networks tend to overlap, DSL 
coverage has been used as proxy measurement for broadband cov-
erage in Europe.
34 COM(2010) 2020.
35 COM(2010) 245.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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100Mbps for one in two households. This will require 
a substantial amount of investment.
Regional data on levels of digital, or computer, skills 
also show that despite some recent progress, lev-
els are often lower in less developed regions than in 
more developed ones. The lowest levels are in regions 
in Southern Europe, especially in Greece, Italy, Malta 
and Spain, as well as Latvia and Ireland. Moreover, as 
central and more advanced regions in the EU invest 
in next generation networks, there is an increased risk 
that more peripheral and thinly populated areas will 
be left behind. The lack of private investment in Next 
Generation Networks outside large conurbations could 
lead to another digital divide emerging between more 
developed and less developed regions in the EU. 
The actual use of broadband by households (i.e. the 
take-up) has also increased rapidly in recent years 
along with access. In 2009, around 55% of households 
in the EU had broadband36. In Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Denmark, the proportion was around 77–79%. At 
the other extreme, only around a quarter or less of 
households had broadband in Romania and Bulgaria, 
and in Greece 34%, Italy 39% and Portugal 46%.
36 The broadband platforms taken into consideration are primarily 
ADSL, cable and FTTx (including VDSL), WLL/WLAN, satellite and 
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In general, disparities remain between thinly and 
more densely populated areas, though these are 
relatively small in the UK, Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands, they are wide in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Lithuania and Ireland (Figure 1.16).
The situation, however, is changing rapidly. The pro-
portion of households with broadband in the EU in-
creased from 23% in 2005 to 56% in 2009, the biggest 
increases occurring in general in the countries where 
it was lowest initially (Figure 1.17). 
Regional disparities across the EU are even wider 
than between countries. In Groningen and Noord-
Holland in the Netherlands, around 79% of house-
holds have broadband as compared with only 12% in 
Severozapaden in Bulgaria and Anatoliki Makedonia 
and Thraki in Greece (Map 1.39).
Energy
Final energy consumption increased by around 0.4% 
a year in the EU between 1996 and 2007. Growth, 
however, was much higher in Malta, Spain and Ireland 
(between 3 and 4% a year), and Greece, Luxembourg 
and Cyprus (by around 2.5%). On the other hand, 
consumption declined in Romania and Bulgaria (by 
around 1–2% a year), partly reflecting the progressive 
modernisation of the production system and the clo-
sure of inefficient generating plants with high levels 
of pollution.
While the share of oil in energy consumption remained 
relatively constant at 42% in the EU as a whole over 
the period, it increased markedly in Bulgaria, Poland 
and the Czech Republic. In other countries, the share 
declined, notably in Germany, Cyprus, Portugal and 
Sweden. 
Electricity production in the EU relies relatively heav-
ily on coal and lignite, which together account for 
27% of the total. In five Member States, they account 
for over half; as much as 90% in the case of Poland 
and Estonia. Some coal power plants emit high levels 
of health and environmentally damaging pollutants 
(SO2, NOx, PM, CO2). Accordingly, further investment 
and technological progress are needed to reduce 
these emissions and to capture the carbon released.
Efforts are, therefore, needed to increase energy ef-
ficiency further, particularly that of buildings, light-
ing and transport. A wider use of intelligent energy 
systems could help. Recent developments in smart 
energy grids, based on digital technology to control 
appliances in homes to save energy and reduce costs, 
open up promising opportunities in this regard. In ad-
dition, the growing production of electricity from re-
newable sources will place new demands on the grid, 
increasing the need for such systems.
1.5 Institutions
Macroeconomic situation
It is widely accepted that a necessary condition for 
sustained growth is the stability of the macroeconom-
ic framework. According to the World Bank, macroe-
conomic stability is where inflation is low and predict-
able, real interest rates are appropriate, fiscal policy is 
stable and sustainable, the real exchange rate is com-
petitive and predictable and the balance of payment 
situation is viable.
These criteria lack precision but they refer in very 
broad terms to a macroeconomic environment which 
is characterised by a low degree of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is identified as the main reason why the 
macroeconomic situation affects growth. According to 
Fisher (1993)37, there are two main channels through 
which this occurs. First, macroeconomic uncertainty 
reduces the capacity of the price mechanism to en-
sure an efficient allocation of resources, which in turn 
reduces productivity. Secondly, uncertainty reduces 
investment by making assessment of the return more 
difficult. In addition, investment might also be ham-
pered by high interest rates.
The macroeconomic situation in the EU has been 
greatly affected by the crisis. As indicated by the latest 
figures, there has been a sharp fall in economic activ-
ity which was translated into declining prices in many 
cases and large increases in budget deficits and pub-
lic debt. Both are detrimental to growth prospects. 
Uncertainty concerning the timing of the recovery 
has led to the postponement or even cancellation of 
investment. At the same time, growing public defi-
37 Fisher, S. (1993), The role of macroeconomic factors in growth, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp. 485–512.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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cits and increasing needs in terms of social security 
spending may lead governments to reduce public 
investment targeted at improving the structure of 
the economy. In such a context, Cohesion Policy and 
the measures taken under the European Economy 
Recovery Plan may play a key role in facilitating stra-
tegic investment which is essential for regional devel-
opment in the future.
Institutions
Economists have increasingly realised that the qual-
ity of institutions can have a significant effect on 
economic growth and development in general. Poor 
institutions can, in particular, hinder the effectiveness 
of regional development strategies. This is one of the 
main reasons that the World Bank38 has put more em-
phasis on the need to improve institutions and gov-
ernance. They use the following definition of govern-
ance: 
The traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is exercised. This includes: (1) the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored, and re-
placed, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them39. 
38 World Development Report 2009, World Bank, Washington.
39 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi M. (2005), Governance 
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3630. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=718081
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Improving the quality of government 
through cross-border learning
Cooperation between EU-15 and EU-12 regions and 
Member States can significantly increase the institu-
tional capacity in the latter. The improvement in the 
quality of government in Estonia has been helped 
through its close ties with Finland, Sweden and Ger-
many. Finland has consistently provided support 
through exchange of experience and examples of 
policies to improve institutional capacity. Sweden has 
also been a source of knowledge and good practice. 
Estonia conducted its first elections in 1991, two years 
before its Baltic neighbours, and introduced radical re-
forms with the help of German experts.
Jihozápad in the Czech Republic forms part of the 
Jihočeský Kraj cross-border cooperation programme 
with Austrian and Bavarian regions. In particular, coop-
eration between Jihozápad and Bavaria goes back cen-
turies. This has led to better transport connections and 
more German investment in local industries. Coopera-
tion has also helped to improve the institutional capac-
ity of the region, judged to be one of the strongest in 
the Czech Republic in a recent survey1.
Prior to joining the Union, EU-12 countries received 
funding from the PHARE programme to help to 
strengthen public administration and institutions. Af-
ter joining, funding has continued to support capacity 
building under Cohesion Policy.
1  Quality of Government Institute. Measuring the quality of 
government and subnational variation. financed by DG 
REGIO (forthcoming).Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Degree of urbanisation: densely populated, intermediate and thinly 
populated areas
The concept of the ‘degree of urbanisation’ was defined as part of the Labour Force Survey. The same 
classification has been used in many other surveys as well including the EU-SILC and IT surveys. 
Three types of area are defined using a criterion of geographical contiguity in combination with a 
minimum population threshold based on local administrative units level 2 (LAU2) and 2001 census 
data.
  • Densely-populated area
This is a contiguous set of LAU2s, each of which has a density of more than 500 inhabitants per 
square km, where the total population for the set is at least 50,000.
  • Intermediate area
This is a contiguous set of LAU2, which is not part of a densely-populated area, each of which 
has a density above 100 inhabitants per square km, either with a total population for the set of 
at least 50,000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated area.
  • Thinly-populated area
This is a contiguous set of LAU2s which is not part of either a densely-populated nor an interme-
diate area. A set of LAU2s totalling less than square 100 km, not reaching the required density, 
but entirely enclosed within a densely-populated or intermediate area, is considered to form 
part of that area. If it is enclosed within a densely-populated area and an intermediate area it is 
considered to form part of the intermediate area.
A GIS layer with this information can be downloaded here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/
page/portal/gisco/geodata/reference 
Exceptions: France, Greece, Finland and Ireland
A number of countries have opted to use a modified classification rather than the one described 
above.
  • France
The French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) uses a different methodology to define the de-
gree of urbanisation of its communes.
  • Greece
The definition described above has been applied to the LAU1 level by Eurostat as it did not have 
the Greek LAU2 digital boundaries. However, Greece has classified its LAU2 regions according to 
this methodology
  • Finland
Finland has applied the above methodology to a more recent set of LAU2 boundaries.
  • Ireland
Ireland also uses a different approach than that described above, classifying LAU1 instead of 
LAU2s. As a result, the following cities (LAU1) are classified as densely populated: Cork City, Dub-
lin, Galway, Limerick and Waterford. The remainder of the country is thinly populated.
For more information on these exceptions please see: https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/
SpacesStore/b65ef11a-ade2-40e2-8696-e5224e28b59d/CNTR_DEGURBA.zip Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 67
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The World Bank data indicate that overall governance 
is of a high quality in the EU, but that some signifi-
cant differences between Member States remain. It 
also highlights that several Member States have im-
proved their governance since the 1990s, particularly 
the Baltic countries have made significant progress. 
Bulgaria has benefitted from preparations for EU 
membership leading to improvements in their gov-
ernance indicators since compared to the 1990s. 
E-government services can contribute to making 
public administrations more efficient and transpar-
ent. The European Digital Competitiveness Report40 
tracks the availability of 20 basic e-government ser-
vices and the share of individuals and enterprises that 
use e-government services. The UK, Portugal, Austria 
and Malta provided all of these 20 basic services on-
line in 2009 (Figure 1.18). In all Member States, with 
the exception of Romania, more than one in two en-
terprises interacted with public authorities online in 
2009. Only 30% individuals interacted online with 
public authorities as compared to 72% of enterprises. 
Only in the Nordic Member States, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg did at least one in two individuals 
interact online with public authorities in 2009. 
1.6 Competitiveness
The economic crisis has not only changed the global 
economic landscape, it has also highlighted the fact 
that in many countries sources of growth were not 
sufficiently robust, so emphasising the need for bet-
ter measures of economic performance that incor-
porate the critical elements of sustainable economic 
growth. The World Economic Forum publishes each 
year a global competitiveness report for countries. 
Following a similar approach, a new regional com-
petitiveness index has been created for all NUTS 2 re-
gions (Map 1.41). It consists of eleven pillars based on 
a total of 69 indicators organised into three groups. 
These indicators span a far wider range than only nar-
row economic aspects and include many indicators 
relating to quality of life, life expectancy adjusted by 
perception of health and trust. 
The basic group represents the key drivers of all types 
of economy:
40 Europe’s Digital Competitiveness Report 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/
digital-agenda
1  Institutions
2  Macroeconomic stability
3  Infrastructure
4  Health
5  Quality of primary and secondary education
The efficiency group represents aspects which be-
come more important as a region develops:
6  Higher education and lifelong learning
7  Labour market efficiency
8  Market size
The innovation group includes the drivers of ad-
vanced regional economies:
9  Technological readiness
10  Business sophistication
11  Innovation
Each of these pillars allows the performance of a re-
gion to be assessed in relation to all the other EU re-
gions. As a result, they can be seen as indicating the 
strengths and weaknesses of every NUTS 2 region in 
an EU perspective.
As regions move along their development paths, their 
socio-economic conditions change and different de-
terminants become more important for their com-
petitiveness. Accordingly, the best way to improve 
competitiveness of a more developed region may 
not be the same as for a less developed one. To take 
this into account, the weights attached to each of the 
three groups depends on the GDP per head of a re-
gion, which is similar to the way the World Economic 
Forum index is constructed.
  • In less developed EU regions, the basic group is 
assigned a weight of 40% and innovation only 
10% (efficiency has a fixed weight of 50%). 
  • In medium developed regions, the basic group 
has a weight of only 30%, while the weight of in-
novation doubles to 20%. 
  • In the highly developed regions, the basic group 
has a weight of only 20% and innovation one of 
30%. 
This implicitly provides a guide for policy makers. For 
example, it implies that the competitiveness of a less 
developed region is likely to be strengthened more Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 69
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The Regional index of sustainable economic well-being
The East Midlands Development Agency has a strong view that sustainable economic prosperity and societal well-being 
are important to regional success, as reflected in their objective:
… by 2020, the East Midlands will be a flourishing region — with growing and innovative businesses, skilled people in good 
quality jobs, participating in healthy, inclusive communities and living in thriving and attractive places. (Flourishing Region RES 
2006)
The agency has developed a Regional Index of Sustainable Economic Wellbeing (RISEW) with the New Economics Founda-
tion to capture aspects of sustainable economic development left out of account by conventional measures of economic 
progress.
The index includes costs and benefits not traditionally measured in monetary terms, bringing together a wide range of 
economic, social and environmental aspects. The basis is consumer expenditure, which is then adjusted to take account 
of both positive and negative social, economic and environmental factors. For example, unpaid household work and vol-
unteering are valued and added to the index, together with public expenditure on healthcare and education. At the same 
time, the environmental costs from habitat loss, pollution, depletion of non-renewable resources and climate change; the 
social costs associated with crime, divorce, commuting and unequal income distribution; and the health costs of road and 
workplace accidents are deducted. 
The index was first calculated for the East Midlands in 2005 and used to assess progress towards the ‘’flourishing region’’ 
objective. In 2007, it was calculated for all English regions, when the value of the index for the East Midlands was slightly 
above the average for England.
  • The highest value of the RISEW per head was in the South West, above that of London, which had a much higher Gross 
value-added per head;
  • The lowest value of the RISEW per head was in Yorkshire and Humber, whereas the lowest gross value-added per head 
was in the North East.
Between 1994 and 2007, the RISEW per head doubled in the East Midlands, as against an average increase of 35% for 
England.
A consortium led by the East Midlands Development Agency and including Natural England is developing the index fur-
ther.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
South West London North West East Midlands West Midlands North East EasternS outh East Yorkshire &
Humber
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
RISEW GVA GBP at 2007-08 prices
Regional Index of Sustainable Economic Well-being and gross value-added per 
head in England, 2007
1.19
Source: RISEW for EN regions, NEF, January 2010Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 71
Section 1 Promoting competitiveness and convergence
by improving institutions and basic education than by 
trying to increase the number of patent applications 
or R&D expenditure. It also means that as a region be-
comes more developed, it may lose competitiveness 
if it does not invest more in innovation.
Overall competitiveness is high in the Nordic regions 
as well as in South-East England, the Netherlands and 
in Southern Germany. 
In some Member States, differences in competi-
tiveness between regions are large. For example 
in Belgium, Brussels, the two surrounding regions 
and most Flemish regions score very high, but most 
Walloon regions have low to very low scores. Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece also display significant re-
gional differences in competitiveness. These results 
emphasise the fact that competitiveness has a strong 
regional dimension, which national level measures 
cannot capture. 
In most countries, whether more developed or less 
developed, the capital city region has the highest 
competitiveness score, while the outermost regions 
tend to have lower scores than others (Map  1.41). 
While in the most developed Member States, highly 
competitive regions are surrounded by other compet-
itive regions, the trend in the less developed Member 
States is that their most competitive region tends to 
be surrounded by far less competitive regions. This 
shows that in the most developed Member States fac-
tors of competitiveness are more evenly distributed 
and competitiveness tends to spill over into neigh-
bouring regions. In less developed Member States, 
factors of competitiveness are highly concentrated 
in the capital city region and spillovers to neighbour-
ing regions are still quite limited. This may be due to 
limited transport connections between regions and 
substantial differences in the quality of the business 
environment in these countries.
1.7 Conclusions
Globalisation and the emergence of new major play-
ers in world trade have had a considerable impact on 
the EU economy. Importing and exporting goods to 
the rest of the world is now more important for the 
GDP of the Union. The trade balance in goods has 
shifted from just being positive to just being nega-
tive over the last ten years. Trade in services, however, 
has been growing fast and the positive trade balance 
on these has been increasing, underlining the strong 
global position the EU occupies in this area.
New trade patterns have also emerged. Major firms in 
many sectors now locate different parts of their pro-
duction in different parts of the world. This more dis-
persed production system increases the demand for 
logistics and command and control functions, which 
tends to favour the major cities and regions that host 
these services. 
In the EU, productivity growth is the main source of 
growth in GDP per head. Between 2000 and 2007, in-
creased productivity was responsible for 80% of the 
growth which occurred, the rest being due to increas-
es in the employment rate and in working-age popu-
lation. Productivity is, accordingly, a central element 
of EU competitiveness, generating the income which 
enables regions to offer both a high quality of life and 
a favourable business environment.
The productivity growth which has occurred at na-
tional and regional level is the combined effect of im-
provements in productivity within sectors, i.e. innova-
tion broadly defined, and shifts between sectors, i.e. 
restructuring. The effect of shifting to higher value-
added sectors is strongest in less developed regions, 
while the effect of productivity growth within sectors 
is important in all regions.
Innovation in a broad sense is the main source of pro-
ductivity growth within sectors and firms. It covers 
many aspects ranging from technological innovation 
to the more efficient use of existing technology and 
resources and to new management and organisation 
techniques. Innovation depends on the potential to 
generate, absorb and diffuse knowledge. This is why 
human capital is a key driver of growth. Education 
and skills are important areas of investment through-
out the EU, but particular efforts are needed in many 
regions in Southern Europe to reach the Europe 2020 
education targets.
To obtain the full benefits of innovation, however, the 
appropriate infrastructure and institutions need to 
be in place. In the 21st century, digital networks are 
playing an increasingly important role in the develop-
ment of services and access to them. Providing broad-
band internet access to all individuals and enterprises Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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can, therefore, have a real impact on growth and the 
quality of life. Despite the importance of digital infra-
structure, good transport networks remain essential. 
Road and rail networks in many EU-12 regions, how-
ever, still require major investment to reach compara-
ble levels to those in the EU-15. 
Last but not least, institutions have a strong influence 
on national and regional development. These include 
a sound macroeconomic framework, integrated EU 
markets, a legislative and regulatory system which fa-
cilitates business and job creation and online access 
to e-government services.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 73
Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Section 2. Improving well-being 
and reducing exclusion
The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the 
well-being of its peoples1.
Well-being is a broad concept, which is difficult to 
capture in a single measure. Accordingly, this section 
considers a variety of measures ranging from objec-
tive ones, such as life expectancy and at-risk-of-pov-
erty rates, to subjective ones, including perceptions 
of health and happiness. These measures provide 
different perspectives on well-being. However, they 
do not necessarily always change in the same direc-
tion, emphasising their virtual independence in some 
cases from each other. In combination, they show a 
diverse and interesting picture.
The first section focuses on a life expectancy, infant 
mortality and access to health care. The second exam-
ines issues relating to living standards. The third sec-
tion focuses on people’s absolute and relative living 
conditions. 
The analysis provides insights into people’s access to 
purchasing power and ability to live a pleasant life 
and to participate in society. The point to bear in mind 
is that living standards cannot be measured only in 
terms of access to market commodities, i.e. goods and 
services which can be acquired for payment of mon-
ey, disregarding all those items which are commonly 
available outside of the market. 
A pleasant, safe, secure and non-polluted environ-
ment, good neighbour relations, clean water on tap, 
reciprocal trust and so on are all ‘’common goods’’ 
which contribute greatly to the standard of living 
but are largely not marketable. In addition, there are 
many home-produced ‘private’ goods and services, 
ranging from cleaning, to preparing a meal and child 
care, which equally contribute to living standards, 
which, though marketable, are nevertheless not pro-
duced for the market and so not captured by standard 
accounting systems. 
Recently the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (2009) report has 
articulated the tension between existing national ac-
counts and more complete and meaningful definitions 
1  Article 3 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).
of societal well-being and social progress, highlighting 
the growing awareness of the divergence between 
standard GDP measures on the one side and quality of 
life measures on the other. The report calls on research-
ers and policy makers to make more consistent use of 
indicators which are alternative or complementary to 
GDP when trying to assess standards of living. 
Many of these indicators are obvious and readily avail-
able, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, gender 
equality; security and unemployment. These are ex-
amined here, along with the concept of ‘adjusted’ 
disposable income of households, which includes the 
value of ‘in-kind’ goods and services available free or 
at subsidised prices income.
2.1 Life expectancy and health 
Living longer and longer 
The EU has an enviably high life expectancy. In 
2007, life expectancy at birth stood at 79 years in 
the EU compared to an average global expectancy 
of only 67 (UN). Outside Europe, only 6 countries 
in the world (Japan, Australia, Israel, Canada, New 
Zealand and Singapore) have a higher life expectan-
cy. Neighbouring countries in the east have a con-
siderably lower life expectancy, of around 68 years 
in Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Moldova. It is slightly 
higher in North African countries, at 70 for men and 
74 for women, but still below the EU average. 
Within the EU, life expectancy also differs and more for 
men than for women. While for women, life expectan-
cy varies from 86 in Comunidad Foral de Navarra to 75 
in Yugoiztochen in Bulgaria (Map 1.42), for men, it var-
ies from 80 in Marche in Italy to a mere 65 in Lithuania 
(Map 1.43). This variation has a wide range of causes 
including differences in life style, climate and diet, but 
also education, income and access to health care and 
other social services which affect health. This section 
considers some of the main causes of low life expec-
tancy.
Unequal access to quality health care 
Infant mortality in the EU at 5 per 1000 live births in 
2006 was among the lowest in the world. Only 7 coun-
tries outside Europe have a lower rate, the six cited 
above with a higher life expectancy and South Korea. Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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The differences in Austria have the opposite pattern 
to those in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While the 
capital city region in Austria has substantially higher 
death rates for both cancer and heart disease than all 
the other regions in the country, the opposite is true 
in the other two countries.
These three indicators reveal large disparities in health 
risks between regions. The reasons are many and vary 
between regions. In regions with low disposable in-
come and high poverty, many people may have to 
wait too long before they can visit a doctor. In more 
remote regions, physical accessibility may be a factor, 
while in others it may be the quality of available care. 
In regions with a large share of foreign-born popula-
tion (Map 1.61), the lack of knowledge of the health 
care system or the language spoken in the country 
may lead to higher death rates. In some regions, ac-
cess to treatment may depend on ability to pay rather 
than need, despite the system being nominally free. 
Such variations in health risks and the underlying fac-
tors show the need for a health care policy that can 
target regional needs, and problem in a differentiated 
manner.
Traffic fatalities and suicides 
The two main causes of death for young people are 
traffic fatalities and suicide. Both predominantly af-
fect young men. Three out of four people killed in 
traffic accidents are men, those in the early 20s being 
especially vulnerable. These premature deaths also 
reduce average life expectancy, but many of these 
traffic fatalities can be avoided. 
In the EU, traffic fatalities relative to population were 
reduced by 50% between 1991 and 20083. On cur-
rent trends, however, the EU target of reducing the 
number by 50% in 2010 compared to 2000 will not 
be reached.
In the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, fatalities av-
erage only around 40 per million people (Map 1.47) 
because traffic safety has been a political priority for 
many years. As a result, these three countries, which 
together with Malta, already had the lowest rates 
in 1991, reduced them by 50% by 2008. In Bulgaria, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, traf-
3  DG MOVE CARE database.
The average global infant mortality rate is ten times 
higher than that of the EU. 
Three out of four EU regions have an infant mortal-
ity rate of 5 or less and one in five a rate below three. 
However, all Romanian regions except the capital 
city region have rates between 12 and 15, while the 
rate is also around 12 in Guyane. In Bulgaria, four of 
the six regions have rates of over 10 (Map 1.44). This 
means that a newborn baby in Romania is over six 
times more likely to die before the age of one than in 
Brabant Wallon in Belgium. High infant mortality rates 
have a major effect on the life expectancy figures at 
birth. Romanian and Bulgarian regions, therefore, also 
have the lowest life expectancy in the EU. 
The two main causes of death for adults under 65 
are cancer and heart disease. Out of 100 000 people 
under 65, cancer kills 75 and heart disease 52 annu-
ally. These rates, however, vary substantially across 
regions. In both cases, the highest rates occur in 
Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian regions and the 
three Baltic States. The death rate for cancer, there-
fore, is over 120 in all Hungarian regions, while in 10 
EU regions it is below 25 (Map 1.45).
People living in the countries concerned also tend 
to judge their health care provision as poor2. In par-
ticular, in Romania and Bulgaria, less than 25% of re-
spondents to the survey thought that health care in 
their country was good compared to more than 90% 
in Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The death rate from heart disease for those under 65 
is 3–4 times the EU average in all Bulgarian regions 
and over twice the EU average in the Baltic States, 
Hungary, Romania and Eastern Slovakia (Map 1.46). 
These are also regions with low levels of develop-
ment. Yet the correlation between life expectancy and 
GDP per head is by no means systematic.
In the more developed regions, some interesting fea-
tures can be detected. In the UK, the death rates from 
both cancer and heart disease tend to be higher in 
more peripheral regions such as the Scottish regions 
and West Wales and the Valleys, but also in some of 
the large conurbations, such as Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside (which includes Liverpool) and London. 
2  Eurobarometer 315, 2010.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 77
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fic fatality rates were all around three times higher at 
140 per million, indicating that there is still significant 
room for reduction.
Eight regions — three in Greece, Luxembourg and 
Namur in Belgium, Alentejo in Portugal, La Rioja in 
Spain and Lithuania — had between 200 and 300 
traffic fatalities per million people. This is substantially 
above the EU average of 92, and even further above 
the regions with the lowest rates, Bremen, Berlin, 
Hamburg, Vienna, and Brussels, which all had rates of 
less than 30 per million, partly because of their urban 
nature and the low average speed of traffic.
Traffic fatalities depend primarily on the number of 
accidents. These have a range of causes from alco-
hol consumption and the extent of law enforcement 
to the quality of roads. The countries with the lowest 
fatalities have taken an integrated approach to re-
ducing the figures. They influence driver behaviour 
through clear rules, targeted enforcement and better 
driver education, and they have improved roads by 
separating pedestrians and cyclists from cars where 
speeds are high and by reducing speeds where sepa-
ration is not possible. A similar approach could lead 
to significant reductions in traffic fatalities in many EU 
regions. 
Men also have a lower life expectancy than women 
because they are over three times more likely to com-
mit suicide. Standardised death rates4 from suicide 
vary considerably between regions (Map  1.48). In 
ten regions — Lithuania, three Hungarian regions, 
Bretagne, Itä-Suomi in Finland and four Belgian re-
gions — the rate is above 20 per 100 000 people. By 
contrast, 30 regions, all those in Greece, 6 in Spain 
and Italy, Flevoland in the Netherlands, Cyprus, Outer 
London, Norte in Portugal and Bucureşti — Ilfov in 
Romania, had rates below 5.
The striking aspect of these differences is that they 
do not seem to be related to socio-economic factors, 
at least across countries. The regions with the lowest 
suicide rates include both those with high levels of in-
come such as Flevoland and Outer London and those 
4  Standardised death rates correct for the differences in age compo-
sition of population between regions. As the prevalence of causes 
of death differs among age groups, standardised death rates are 
more comparable since they are based on assuming that different 
regions had exactly the same population composition.
with much lower levels, such as Norte and some of the 
Greek and Italian regions. 
Within countries, however, suicide rates tend to be 
higher in the less developed regions. For example, in 
Romania, all regions outside the capital city region 
have rates which are consistently 2–3 times higher. 
In part, this may be due to better emergency services 
in the capital, but better employment opportunities 
and higher income are also likely to reduce suicides. 
In Belgium too the highest rates also tend to be in re-
gions with lower incomes and higher unemployment. 
In EU-12 countries which have grown rapidly since 
the mid-1990s, the suicide death rate has dropped 
considerably. For example, in Estonia the rate fell from 
almost 40 per 100 000 inhabitants in 1994–1997 to 15 
in 2006–2008, which is still above the EU average (10) 
but much lower than it was. A similar reduction oc-
curred in the two other Baltic States and Slovenia.
Ageing
Increasing life expectancy coupled with a low birth 
rate is associated with a rising median age of the 
population and a growing share of older people. 
According to the latest regional population projec-
tions, the median age in the EU will rise from 40 to 
45 between 2008 and 2030 and the share of those of 
65 and over will increase from 17% to 24%. In 2008, 
only two regions in the EU had a share as high as this: 
Liguria in Italy and Chemnitz in Germany. In 2030, in 
half of the regions, the share will be 24% or higher5. 
The rising share of older people has already sparked 
much debate. In Member States, where there is still a 
pay-as-you-go system where the employed pay for the 
pensions of the currently retired, affordability will be a 
growing issue since the employed will have to pay for 
an increasing number of pensions. In countries, where 
there are funded systems, the funds will equally have 
to cover growing pension numbers and, accordingly, 
will need to generate the increasing income required, 
which in turn will depend on economic performance. 
As a result, the Lisbon agenda focused on increasing 
the share of people aged 55–64 in employment. In ad-
dition, in many Member States, proposals to raise the 
5  Giannakouris, K. Regional population projections EUROPOP2008: 
Most EU regions face older population profile in 2030. Statistics in 
Focus 1/2010, Luxembourg.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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effective retirement age are being actively considered 
and in some cases introduced. 
The regional dimension of ageing has implications 
for the demand for services. An ageing population 
will require more health care services and more and 
different other kinds of services. Regions with grow-
ing numbers of older people will have to expand their 
infrastructure and services and ensure that they are 
accessible. 
The growth in the number of older people differs 
considerably between regions, not only because of 
differences in life expectancy but also because older 
people have become more mobile and many have 
moved to warmer climates in the EU. This is evident 
in many Spanish and French regions which have at-
tracted significant numbers of senior citizens from 
the UK, Germany and the Netherlands either for the 
winter or all year round. Although people in the EU 
tend to move less than their counterparts in the US, 
the freedom of movement in the EU and the reciproc-
ity of healthcare arrangements open up a wide choice 
of places in which to retire for those that can afford it. 
Differences in the share of older people between re-
gions also reflect the fact that cities tend to attract 
more migrants who tend to be younger than the resi-
dent population than rural areas. 
Health
Good health is an important aspect of well-being. 
People’s self perception of their health, however, var-
ies widely. In 7 Member States — Portugal, Hungary, 
the three Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia, between 
15% and 20% of the population perceived their 
health to be poor compared to an EU average of 10% 
(Figure  1.20). Ireland has the smallest share of the 
population who consider their health to be poor (just 
2.5%).
2.2 Living conditions
Unemployment dropped until the crisis
Unemployment rates declined in most regions be-
tween 2000 and 2008 (Map  1.50). At the EU level, 
unemployment fell by 2 percentage points over 
this period. The largest regional reduction was in 
Severoiztochen in Bulgaria and Warmińsko-Mazurskie 
in Poland where the rate fell by over 15 percentage 
points to 8.6% and 7.4%, respectively. Only 36 regions 
experienced an increase of more than 1 percentage 
point. The increase was largest in Norte in Portugal 
where it increased by 4 percentage points to 8.7%.
Sparsely populated regions
In 2008, 3 million people in the EU, or 0.6% of the 
population, lived in sparsely populated regions1. There 
are 18 of these among 1 303 NUTS 3 regions. Most 
of them are located in Northern Europe, five each in 
Finland and Sweden, in addition to three in Spain and 
the UK, one in Greece and one in France. The biggest 
is Pohjois-Pohjanmaa in Finland with a population of 
383 000 and the smallest Evrytania in Greece with a 
population of less than 20 000.
The small size of their populations generally implies 
that public service provision in these areas is more 
expensive. Several of the regions are experimenting 
with e-services to provide good access to services ef-
ficiently. 
Overall, the population in sparsely populated regions 
remained broadly unchanged between 2001 and 
2008, but there were differences between them. In 
particular, population grew strongly in French Guyane, 
rising by around 4% a year, while it fell in Kainuu in Fin-
land by almost 1% a year. In half of the regions con-
cerned, population increased or remained unchanged, 
in the other half, it declined.
The age structure of the regions also varies signifi-
cantly. Some regions have a young population, like, 
for instance, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa or Lappi where, re-
spectively, 14% and 18% of people are 65 or over. In 
French Guyane, less than 4% of the population is 65 or 
more. In other regions, the population is on average 
much older. In the Spanish sparsely populated regions, 
around one in four is 65 or over while in Evrytania, it is 
one in three.
1  Sparsely populated areas are regions with a population 
density below a given threshold. Paragraph 30 (b) of the 
Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007–2013 (2006/C 
54/08) defines low population density regions as ‘NUTS 2 
geographic regions with a population density of less than 
8 inhabitants per km², or NUTS 3 geographic regions with 
a population density of less than 12.5 inhabitants per km²’.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 81
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Despite these overall reductions, unemployment in 
2008 was still above 20% in the French overseas terri-
tories and above 15% in Andalucía, Canarias, Brussels, 
Extremadura and Berlin (Map 1.49). Regional dispari-
ties in unemployment rates were particularly wide in 
Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy (Figure 1.21).
Unemployment rates have converged substantially 
since 2000. The regional dispersion in rates narrowed 
by 30% between 2000 and 2007. In 2008, however, it 
widened by 7% and in 2009, because of the crisis, it 
may have widened further.
Unemployment in the EU has risen rapidly during the 
crisis to above 10% in 20106 and it is forecast to re-
main there in 2011. Rates are also forecast to remain 
above 10% in the US, despite much lower unemploy-
ment before the crisis hit.
The effect of the crisis, however, varies widely across 
the EU. Increases in unemployment in Ireland, Spain 
and the Baltic States have been especially large, rang-
ing from 7 to 15 percentage points between 2008 
and the end of 2009. As a result, rates are well above 
10% in all five countries. In Latvia, unemployment was 
6  European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, European Economic Forecast – autumn 2009. 
Brussels, 2009. 
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above 20% by the end of 2009 and in Spain, it reached 
20% by mid-2010. 
In the vast majority of Member States, however, in-
creases have been much less dramatic. In two thirds of 
cases, the increase was less than 3 percentage points 
between 2008 and the end of 2009. In Germany and 
Luxembourg, it was less than 1 percentage point, 
though because of the delayed effect of the crisis, 
rates may still rise in the future.
Unemployment has a damaging effect on well-being 
far beyond the loss of income. This is all the more the 
case for so-called discouraged workers, those who 
have given up looking for a job because they consider 
none are available, who are no longer counted as be-
ing unemployed but as economically inactive. 
Unemployment increases the risk of poverty. This is 
especially so for long-term unemployment which 
is particularly high in the French overseas depart-
ments, the two eastern Slovakian regions and Berlin 
(Map  1.51). The crisis is likely to mean persistently 
high levels of unemployment and, therefore, more 
long term unemployed and more people at risk of 
poverty across the EU.
Reducing the time needed for the unemployed to 
find a job and ensuring adequate social benefits dur-
ing their spell of unemployment can greatly reduce 
their risk of poverty.
The unemployment rate of those under 25 averaged 
15.5% in 2008, twice the overall rate. In 34 EU regions, 
more than one in four of those under 25 and in the 
labour force was unemployed (Map 1.52).
The unemployment rate of young people covers only 
those who have entered the labour force and are look-
ing for work. It does not cover those who are in edu-
cation or training and not looking for work, nor does 
it include the discouraged ones who have stopped 
looking for work. The proportion of people aged 15 to 
24 not in work, education or training includes both of 
these groups and indicates in which regions a signifi-
cant number of young people are neither employed 
nor acquiring the education and skills for their future 
working careers. In the EU in 2008, this proportion av-
eraged 11% of the age group, but it was over 20% in 
five regions in Bulgaria and five in southern Italy. By 
contrast, it was between 3% and 4% in Prague, Trier, 
Copenhagen and five Dutch regions (Map 1.53).
In search of better opportunities: migration 
Between 2001 and 2007, net migration added almost 
0.3% a year to EU population and was the main source 
of population growth. Overall, two thirds of all NUTS 3 
regions had a positive net inward migration largely 
because of migration from outside the EU (Map 1.54).
At EU level, there has been a high level of net outward 
migration from regions in the Central and Eastern 
Member States, while the highest rates of net inward 
migration were, until the crisis, in Ireland, parts of 
Spain, France and Italy. A large part of these migration 
flows was driven by poor employment opportunities 
in the Central and Eastern countries coupled with sig-
nificant job growth in Ireland and Spain, especially. 
The crisis has reduced these flows and led to reverse 
migration.
The outermost regions
Outermost regions have a distinct character. They are 
located far away from their national capital and often 
the rest of the country. Most of them are islands or 
archipelagos and mountainous, with seismic activity 
and extreme climatic conditions. The small size of the 
local market and (for some of them) their location in 
less developed parts of the world also represent major 
challenges for their development.
In 2007, around 4.25 million people lived in the out-
ermost regions, 0.9% of EU population. In some cas-
es, the proportion of young people is very large and 
growing, such as in French Guyane, where 36% of the 
population is under 15 and population is growing at 
almost 4% a year. 
In general, the level of development is below the EU 
average. In 2007, while GDP per head in the Canarias 
was under 8% below, in French Guyane it was over 
50% below. However, rates of growth are higher and 
the regions are catching-up with the rest of the Union.
Employment performance is also mixed. In 2008, un-
employment was over 20% in all of the French outer-
most regions and almost 25% in Réunion, whereas in 
Açores and Madeira, it was only 5.5% and 6.0% respec-
tively, well below the EU-27 average of 7%.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 85
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Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
In a number of Member States, geographic shifts of 
population are evident — in Germany, from east to 
west, in Sweden, Finland and France, from northern 
regions to southern ones and in Italy, the reverse, 
from south to north. 
At a lower level, shifts to certain cities are evident. 
In the Central and Eastern Member States, there has 
been net inward migration into every capital city re-
gion. In Poland, this is also the case for many of the 
other large cities such as Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław, 
Poznań, Toruń and Rzeszów. 
In the Western Member States, the pattern is less 
clear, with some cities gaining population and oth-
ers losing. In the UK, several cities have experienced 
outward migration, including most parts of London, 
Birmingham, Coventry, Leicester, Liverpool, Greater 
Manchester, Belfast and Aberdeen. In Germany, some 
cities have experienced net inward migration while, in 
the surrounding regions, there has been net outward 
migration as in the case of Leipzig or Dresden. In other 
cases, both the city and the surrounding regions have 
had net inward migration as in the case of Munich or 
Berlin. Other cities have lost population due to out-
ward migration, as in the case of Bremen or Chemnitz 
where population has also fallen in the surrounding 
regions. In France, all but one of the NUTS 3 regions in 
Ile de France have lost population because of outward 
migration, while population declined in Copenhagen 
and the surrounding region as well.
The natural change in population was negative in al-
most two-thirds of NUTS 3 regions between 2001 and 
2007 (Map 1.55). This was especially so in the Baltic 
States, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Portugal and parts of Italy, Spain and France 
On the other hand, there was for the most part natural 
growth in Ireland and the Netherlands.
As the main determinant of population change in the 
EU is migration, differences in the overall population 
change between regions largely reflect the extent of 
this. Only one in five regions with net outward migra-
tion have had high enough natural population growth 
to prevent population from falling. On the other hand, 
in only two out of five regions with a natural decline 
in population, net inward migration has been large 
enough to avoid an overall reduction.
Islands
Over 21 million people — 4.3% of EU population — 
lived in island regions1 in 2007. Between 2000 and 
2007, island population grew by around 1.1% a year, 
almost three times the EU average growth rate. Islands 
can be divided into three broad geographical areas, 
the Atlantic, the North and the Mediterranean. Howev-
er, they differ markedly in their population size, rang-
ing from 6.1 million people in Ireland to only 10 000 in 
El Hierro in Spain, which makes comparisons between 
them very difficult. 
The rate of population growth was particularly high 
between 2000 and 2007 in small and medium-sized is-
lands, of up to 1.6% a year, though population growth 
has more to do with the location of the islands than 
their size. The highest growth was in Fuerteventura in 
Canarias (5.6% a year) and Lanzarote (4.8% a year). By 
contrast, population in Bornholm in Denmark fell by 
0.5% a year. 
Most of the increase in population in most regions is 
due to net inward migration and in many small islands, 
population would have fallen in the absence of migra-
tion.
The proportion of older people of 65 and over is high-
est in the smaller southern islands, which, to some ex-
tent, reflects the inward movement of people to retire. 
As underlined by a recent study2, islands face challenges 
to their ecosystems. A number of islands have rich and 
diversified natural assets, notably those in the Mediter-
ranean. However, these assets are generally fragile and 
under various pressures, such as from urban sprawl, 
tourism and the construction of second homes, short-
age of water, fires, soil erosion and pollution of the sea. 
Climate change is also a concern since islands tend to 
be more vulnerable than the mainland to extreme cli-
matic conditions and rises in the sea level.
1  Formally, island regions are defined as one or more 
NUTS 3 regions which consist entirely of one or more is-
lands. In practice, this definition covers islands with more 
than one NUTS 3 region (e.g. Sicily), islands corresponding 
to one NUTS 3 region (e.g. Gozo) and NUTS 3 regions with 
several islands (e.g. Kyklades). It does not include NUTS 3 
regions with a major continental part in which the island 
population is marginal. In addition, islands with a fixed 
link to the mainland such as a bridge, tunnel or a dyke are 
not included.
2  ESPON 2013 Programme, The Development of the Islands 
— European Islands and Cohesion Policy, Targeted analy-
sis 2013/2/2, Interim Report, 2010.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Population trends in predominantly rural regions 
in the EU-15 and the EU-12 follow distinct patterns 
(Table 1.10). In the EU-15, predominantly rural regions 
on average experienced population growth over the 
period 2001–2007 because of net inward migration, 
which was higher than in predominantly urban re-
gions. There was a natural decline in population, how-
ever, in predominantly rural regions.
In the EU-12, population declined in predominantly 
rural regions due to a combination of a natural reduc-
tion, which also occurred in predominantly urban re-
gions, and net outward migration, while there was net 
inward migration in predominantly urban regions. 
In the EU-12, the population under 15 represents a 
much larger share of the total in predominantly rural 
regions than in predominantly urban ones: 16.1% as 
opposed 13.4%. In the EU-15, the share of population 
under 15 is half a percentage point larger in predomi-
nantly urban regions than in the other two regional 
types (Table 1.11). Population of 65 or over is fairly 
equally distributed across the three types of region 
in the EU-12, but in the EU-15 it represents a signifi-
cantly larger share of the total in predominantly rural 
regions than in predominantly urban ones: 19.4% as 
against 16.4%. 
Trends in predominantly rural regions in the EU-12 
and the EU-15 tend go in opposite directions: popula-
tion decline in one, population growth in the other, 
1.11 Population age structure by urban-rural typology, 2007
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominantly 
Rural
Total
% of total population EU-12
population aged 14 or less 13.4 15.4 16.1 15.4
population aged 65 or more 14.8 14.2 14.7 14.6
EU-15
population aged 14 or less 16.2 15.7 15.7 16.0
population aged 65 or more 16.4 18.1 19.4 17.6
EU-27
population aged 14 or less 15.9 15.6 15.9 15.8
population aged 65 or more 16.3 17.2 17.7 17.0
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
1.10 Population change, natural change and migration by urban-rural typology, 2001–2007
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominantly 
Rural
Total
Average annual % change EU-12
Total population change 0.4 -1.1 -3.3 -2.5
Natural population change -1.8 -1.2 -1.8 -1.6
Net migration 2.2 0.1 -1.6 -0.9
EU-15
Total population change 5.9 5.6 3.6 5.3
Natural population change 2.1 0.5 -0.5 1.0
Net migration 3.8 5.1 4.2 4.2
EU-27
Total population change 5.3 4.1 1.1 3.6
Natural population change 1.7 0.1 -1.0 0.6
Net migration 3.6 4.0 2.1 2.9
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIOFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 89
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high outward migration in one, high inward migra-
tion in the other, a large share of children in one, a 
large share of older people in the other. Accordingly, 
the EU-27 figures in which these opposing trends 
are present show a much less clear picture of demo-
graphic trends in predominantly rural regions. 
Work life balance
According to survey evidence, half of the people in 
the EU find it difficult to combine work and family, 
one in seven very difficult (Figure 1.22). The propor-
tion varies markedly between countries. In Finland 
and the Netherlands, less than one in four reported 
difficulty, whereas in Hungary and Portugal, it was 
three out of four.
In general, women find combining work and fam-
ily more difficult than men (55% as against 46%) be-
cause childcare responsibilities tend to fall on them. 
Lone parents reported most difficulty, as might be ex-
pected (49% of men and 57% of women). The differ-
ences between different types of household, howev-
er, though significant, are considerably smaller than 
those between countries.
Long working days are one of the main reasons for 
difficulties. In less developed countries, people tend 
to work longer hours than elsewhere, possibly to 
compensate for lower hourly wages. Accordingly, it is 
mostly in the less developed EU Member States that 
people report the most difficulties. There are, how-
ever, exceptions, such as Slovakia, where only 44% 
reported a difficulty as against an EU average of 55% 
and 67% in Spain.
(Un)Equal Opportunities
An inclusive society means non-discrimination against 
minorities. The 6th Progress Report showed that in sev-
eral Member States, people are not comfortable with 
a neighbour or someone in the highest elected politi-
cal position being of different ethnic origin or, having 
a different religion or belief, a different sexual orien-
tation or a disability. Discrimination on all of these 
grounds is prohibited in the EU7. A survey conducted 
in 20088 revealed that in 17 Member States, people 
felt that at least one type of discrimination was more 
widespread than five years earlier. In almost all cases, 
this included ethnic discrimination, but also in many, 
discrimination on grounds of religion, sexual orienta-
tion or gender. 
Gender
Overall in the EU, the unemployment rate of women 
in 2008 was almost one percentage point higher than 
for men. In 29 regions, however, unemployment of 
women was 5 percentage points or more higher than 
for men. These regions were predominantly in Greece, 
Spain and Italy (Map 1.57). These differences, moreo-
ver, had nothing to do with differences in education 
attainment. 
7  Art. 21 EU Charter of fundamental rights.
8  Special Eurobarometer 263.
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In 2008, women had a lower employment rate than 
men in every single region of the EU. The Lisbon em-
ployment target for women was also some 20 per-
centage points lower than for men. In 2008, 33 re-
gions had a gap in employment rates between men 
and women of over 20 percentage points. Again, 
these were mainly regions in Greece, Spain and Italy 
(Map 1.58).
In terms of education levels, however, women out-
perform men in most regions. In the EU, for every 
100 men aged 25–64 with a tertiary education, there 
are 105 women. For those aged 25–34, there are 
126 women with tertiary education per 100 men 
(Map  1.60), compared to only 80 for women aged 
55–64 (Map 1.59). This tendency is equally evident at 
regional level. In two-thirds of regions, more women 
aged 25–64 have a higher education degree than 
men. For those aged 25–34, this is the case in almost 
90% of regions, while for women aged 55–64 this is 
the case in only 27% of regions.
There are also, however, more women than men with 
only basic schooling. For every 100 men aged 25–64 
who have not completed upper secondary education, 
there are 110 women. Equally, in two-thirds of the re-
gions, more women aged 25–64 have a low education 
than men. 
Nevertheless, this situation has changed markedly 
over time. For every 100 men aged 25–34 who have 
not completed upper secondary education, there are 
only 83 women, and in only a third of the regions do 
more women than men have a low level of education. 
Foreign born
People born outside the EU — i.e. those with a mi-
grant background — tend to have fewer employment 
opportunities than those born in the EU and often 
face cultural and linguistic barriers to working. On 
average, according to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
just under 7% of the working-age population in the 
EU was born outside the EU. The figure is above 10% 
in only one of every six regions, while in half it is less 
than 5%. In the Central and Eastern countries, apart 
from the Baltic States, the figures are very small (1% 
or less). The figures tend to be highest in the more de-
veloped regions and in large cities as well as in tourist 
regions (Map 1.61).
People born outside the EU tend to have lower em-
ployment rates in most Member States (Figure 1.23). 
In Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Benelux, Austria, 
the UK and France, the employment rate of people 
aged 15–64 born outside the EU is at least 8 per-
centage points lower than those born inside the EU. 
However, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and 
Cyprus, as well as in the three Baltic States, the rate is 
4 to 8 percentage points higher.
One reason for the higher rate in the latter countries 
may be that those born outside the EU tend to live 
in regions with relatively high employment rates. 
This explains more than half the difference in rates in 
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Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Spain and more than a third of the difference in Italy, 
though in the other countries, it is not an explanation.
The right to move freely within the EU means that 
people can move to where the jobs are or to where 
jobs are most attractive. People who have moved to 
the EU from the outside, however, tend to face longer 
distances and larger differences in job opportunities 
and the quality of life if they wish to return home. 
Migrants from outside the EU also face more obsta-
cles on the labour market than people moving be-
tween Member States. The average employment rate 
of those born outside the EU is, therefore, 6 percent-
age points lower than that of migrants born inside the 
EU.
As compared with the EU-15, the US has almost twice 
the share of people born abroad (16%). In California, 
one third of people aged 18–64 were born outside the 
US in 2008 (Map 1.62). The only region in the EU with a 
similar share is Inner London, though California has 37 
million inhabitants, Inner London 3 million. 
Elsewhere, in New York, New Jersey and Nevada, a 
quarter of the population is foreign born. In the EU, 
only Vienna, Brussels and Outer London have a share 
as large as this. In the US, only 6 relatively rural States 
have a foreign-born population which is less than 3% 
of the total9. In the EU, 86 NUTS 2 regions, a third, have 
figures of less than 3%.
9  Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North and South Dakota, and West 
Virginia.
Remote rural areas
Population in the remote rural regions in the EU — 
those some distance away from a town or city of any 
size — has tended to rise more slowly (in the EU-15) or 
decline faster (in the EU-12) than in rural regions close 
to a city (Map 1.63). In the EU-15, natural population 
growth in remote rural regions is less than in rural re-
gions close to a city. Net inward migration, however, 
is similar. In Central and Eastern regions, by contrast, 
natural population has declined and there has been 
net outward migration rates in both types of region, 
but more so in the remote regions.
The effects of remoteness can also be seen in Mexico, 
Canada and the US (Map 1.64). In each case, popula-
tion increased in rural regions close to a city, whereas it 
declined in remote regions in Mexico and Canada and 
grew by much less in the US.
Growth of GDP in rural regions in the EU-15 followed 
a different pattern. In 2000–2007, growth was higher 
in remote rural regions than in those close to a city 
(an increase of 0.5% as against only 0.1%). In the EU-
12 countries, both types of region grew more slowly 
than others regions, though more so for those close 
to a city.
In the EU-15, rural regions close to a city have a higher 
share of tertiary educated in working-age population 
(21%) as against 18% in remote regions. The share of 
people with a low education is much larger in remote 
rural regions (46%) than in those close to a city (33%). 
In the CEEC’s, the differences in the levels of education 
are lower.
Employment also increased by more in remote rural 
regions in the EU-15 (1.4% a year) than in those close 
to a city (0.8% a year). As a result, the gap in employ-
ment rates between the two closed almost completely 
(65–66% in both). Employment in both types of region 
in the EU-12, however, declined at a similar rate, leav-
ing the employment rate in remote rural regions (58%) 
lower than in those close to a city (61%). Remote rural 
regions, however, have larger shares of employment 
in agriculture, which, especially in the EU-12, includes 
a large share of subsistence farming.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Access to services
Access to basic services, such as compulsory schools, 
primary health care and banking differ both between 
and within countries. Figures 1.24 –1.26 show coun-
tries ranked according to the proportion of popula-
tion reporting difficulties accessing these services. 
The differences between countries are substantial. 
For compulsory schools, the proportion varies be-
tween 9% in Cyprus, Finland and Sweden to 24% in 
Portugal and Latvia. For banking services, they vary 
from 4% in the Netherlands to 56% in Romania. For 
primary health, the variation is between 6% in the UK 
and France to 35% in Latvia. 
In addition to these differences, the graphs show the 
proportion of people reporting access difficulties by 
type of area (see box on Degree of urbanisation in 
Section 1.1). Access tends to be more difficult in the 
thinly populated areas, in particular. However, since 
the share of a country’s population living in thinly 
populated areas ranges from zero to two-thirds, the 
bubble size in the graph is adjusted to reflect the 
share of the country’s population having difficulty ac-
cessing the service living in this type of area. 
For example, in Belgium, 32% of people living in thinly 
populated areas have difficulty in accessing primary 
health. However, as only 4% of Belgium population 
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Share of population reporting difficulty of access to compulsory schools by degree 
of urbanisation, 2008
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Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Note: Countries ranked by share of population with difficult access
Bubble size is population with difficulty by area as % of total population with difficulty
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live in thinly populated areas, the people with diffi-
culty accessing primary health in such areas represent 
only 12% of the total in Belgium having this difficulty. 
In some countries, there are negligible differences in 
the proportion reporting access difficulties between 
the three types of area. This is the case in France and 
the UK for access to primary health care. 
The above figures, however, are based on what peo-
ple report, i.e. their subjective views which may re-
flect their expectations about access, which in turn 
are likely to vary across countries according to what 
people are used to. Nor do they reveal why people 
are having difficulties, which may, for example, result 
from physical distance or a problem of affordability. 
Accordingly, the answers do not indicate what can be 
done to improve the situation.
Policies with an overall equity objective will focus on 
the types of area where most people with difficulty 
live (the biggest bubble). Policies with a concern for 
territorial cohesion will also focus on reducing differ-
ences between the three types of area where these 
differences are large.
Access to a grocery store is particularly relevant for 
the elderly, those with disabilities who cannot af-
ford a car or live in a thinly populated area. A recent 
Commission Report10 highlighted that residents of 
10  European Commission, Retail market monitoring report,   
COM(2010) 355.
towns with less than 10 000 inhabitants were consid-
erably less satisfied with their choice of shops in 2008. 
It indicated that the recent trend to establish small 
neighbourhood shops in towns and villages and a 
stronger e-commerce sector could help to address 
this lack of choice.
Safety and trust
Crime figures influence how safe people feel and levels 
of trust (Figure 1.27). Extensive media coverage of vio-
lent crime and murders, in particular, tends to feed feel-
ings of insecurity, even when crime rates are declining. 
Fortunately, murder rates tend to be low in the EU. 
In 20 Member States, rates are less than two murders 
per 100 000 inhabitants (Map 1.65). Only 6 EU regions 
had rates of 5 per 100 000 or higher. The three high-
est rates were in Lithuania, Estonia and Corsica at 8 
or more per 100 000. In Member States, where con-
sistent data are available, murder rates have declined 
or remained low over time. The only exception is 
Portugal, where murder rates have increased by al-
most 5% a year since 1998.
The US has a murder rate of 5.5 per 100 000, over 
three times the EU average. Only 7 of the 50 US States 
have a murder rate under two per 100 000 (Map 1.66), 
while in 25 States, i.e. half, the rate is 5 per 100 000 or 
higher. Explanations for this higher rate vary, though 
they include cultural differences, the heterogeneity of 
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US society, higher poverty rates and the ease of ac-
cess to firearms. 
Problems related to crime, violence and vandalism 
are concentrated in densely populated areas, where 
on average one in five people report such prob-
lems. In intermediate areas, only one in ten reports 
problems and in thinly populated areas, even fewer 
(Figure 1.28). Problems relating to noise and pollution 
are also much more often reported in densely popu-
lated areas than in others.
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Share of population reporting crime, violence or vandalism by degree of 
urbanisation, 2008
1.28
Bubble size is population with problems by area as % of total population with problems 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Note: Countries ranked by share of population having problems
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Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
The Urban Audit Perception Survey1
The Urban Audit Perception Survey measures the satisfaction of the residents of 75 
European cities. Here, their responses to 7 indicators are examined for 16 cities to il-
lustrate the situation across the EU. Interviewees were asked to judge their satisfaction 
of the following features of the cities in which they lived: public transport, air quality, 
safety, quality of city government, job opportunities, cost and availability of housing 
and integration of foreigners. The results are plotted in cobweb graphs (Figure 1.29) 
and compared with the median satisfaction in the EU.
Satisfaction, it should be noted, is not an absolute indicator but a relative measure 
comparing the perceptions of residents with what they expect. For instance, those in 
small cities might be very satisfied with basic public transport services whereas those 
in large cities might expect more. 
Indeed, the size of the city is especially relevant. Air quality, for example, tends to be an 
issue only in bigger cities. Similarly, the cost and availability of housing are much more 
issues in large cities, especially capitals, than smaller ones.
This is confirmed by the examples of Rostock, Groningen, Leipzig and Piatra Neamţ 
which recorded very high levels of satisfaction with both air quality and housing avail-
ability.
The problems of poor air quality and housing availability in big cities are usually coun-
terbalanced in part by more job opportunities. This is the case, for example, in Paris, 
London and Warsaw, where overall satisfaction is similar to the EU average.
Some smaller capital cities — Vienna, Stockholm and Helsinki — record higher sat-
isfaction in the quality of government and people there are generally more satisfied 
than in other capitals.
Residents of Budapest and Sofia are particularly dissatisfied with the city government, 
safety and air quality, while those in Athens report being very dissatisfied on most 
counts, only public transport and housing registering similar levels of satisfaction as 
the EU average (investment for the Olympic Games might be relevant here).
Satisfaction levels in smaller cities, except for air quality and housing, reflect their spe-
cific features. Groningen and Piatra Neamt have the most satisfied residents, Palermo 
the least, with Athens just above.
1  The Urban Audit Perception Survey on quality of life in European cities was conducted in 
2009 to measure the perceptions of quality of life in 75 cities in the EU, Croatia and Turkey. A 
previous survey was done in 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/themes/urban/audit/
index_en.htmChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1.29 Level of satisfaction of residents with aspects of quality of life in selected cities, 2009 
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2.3 Income, poverty and deprivation
Income and transfers in kind
Comparing household income between countries 
simply in monetary terms is distorted because of the 
failure to take account of the services financed or sub-
sidised by government (benefits or transfers in kind), 
such as healthcare, education and child and elderly 
care. 
Net adjusted disposable household income (Map 1.67) 
corrects for these differences in transfers in kind as 
recommended by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report. This 
is critical since it adds an estimated 43% and 39% to 
net disposable household income in Denmark and 
Sweden, compared to only 3% in Slovenia and 11% 
in Greece. In most Member States transfers in kind are 
estimated to add between 15% and 25% to net dis-
posable household income. 
Without this type of adjustment, household income 
is underestimated in countries with extensive public 
services (like the Nordic Member States) and overes-
timated in those where households have to pay for 
most of these services out of their disposable income.
Disparities in net adjusted household income be-
tween regions across the EU are less than for GDP per 
head, but remain substantial. For example, almost all 
regions in Romania and Bulgaria have an income be-
low a third of the EU average, while 11 regions in the 
EU-15 have an income over a third above the EU aver-
age.
The adjustments for transfers in kind are currently 
only available for 23 Member States. Moreover, trans-
fers in kind cannot be assigned to specific households. 
Accordingly, at-risk-of-poverty rates do not take these 
transfers into account. There is also no information 
about the regional distribution of transfers in kind — 
the estimates presented here assume that this is in 
line with the distribution of population.
Housing costs not included in income or at-risk-
of-poverty rates 
One of the main determinants of people’s well-be-
ing and social participation is access to affordable 
and decent housing. Indeed, according to a recent 
Eurobarometer survey, for 26 % of people in the EU the 
GDP differs from income
GDP per head is often used as a proxy for income, regions 
with a high GDP per head being regarded as prosperous. 
GDP per head, however, is a poor proxy for household 
income. 
Differences in GDP per head explain only 60% of the 
variation in net adjusted disposable household income. 
The difference in the ranking of regions is also large. The 
ranking of 17 regions is 100 places higher on one meas-
ure than the other. The ranking of 66 regions changes 
by more than 50 places. For example, the Brussels Re-
gion has the third highest GDP per head in the EU but 
is ranked only 142nd in terms of adjusted disposable 
household income per head (Map 1.4). In many regions, 
therefore GDP per head does not reflect the relative level 
of household income.
The top five NUTS 2 regions with the highest GDP per 
head include four where inward commuting inflates GDP 
per head significantly. As accurate data on commuting 
flows are not available, much of the distortion they cre-
ate can be corrected by calculating the figure for the 
entire metropolitan region (i.e. including some of the 
surrounding NUTS  2 regions from which commuting 
emanates) to provide a more accurate estimate of their 
economic activity relative to their population. For exam-
ple, Inner London has a GDP per head of 336% of the EU 
average, while for the London metro region it is 164% of 
the average, for Brussels, it is 233%, while for the Brus-
sels Metro region it is 147% and for Hamburg, 200% and 
154%, respectively. 
Income is also not identical to GDP. In two Member States, 
the difference is particularly large. Ireland has the second 
highest GDP per head in the EU, but its gross national in-
come (GNI) per head is 14% lower and only the 8th high-
est in the EU. Luxembourg’s GNI is 25% lower than its 
GDP. The main difference between the two measures is 
that GNI takes account of the income of companies sent 
to and received from abroad, as well as transfers of in-
dividuals, and excludes the compensation of employees 
living outside the country (and so corrects for the impact 
of commuting). 
In 2006, 17% of Luxembourg’s GDP consisted of com-
pensation of employees living outside Luxembourg. The 
same differences apply at regional level but regional fig-
ures for gross income are not available. In many regions, 
however, it is likely that a substantial share of the eco-
nomic wealth generated there goes to other regions and 
countries.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 105
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Index, EU-27 = 100
1.67 Net adjusted disposable income of private households (PPCS), 2007
EU-27 = 17,606 PPS per inhabitant 
(PPCS measured in terms of consumer prices)
Net adjusted disposable income includes "transfers in kind". 
These include services such as education, health care
and other public services that are provided for free or below
provision cost. 
RO: no adjustment
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO estimates. 
CY, LU, MT: 2nd EQLS, Eurofound.
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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1.68 Population at risk of poverty after social transfers, 2008
EU-27 = 17
At-risk- of-poverty is defined as having equivalised disposable income (i.e. adjusted for household size and 
composition) of less than 60% of national median.
The Europe 2020 target is to lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion.
This is defined as people who are either at risk-of-poverty and/or severely materially deprived
and/or living in households with very low work intensity.
Source: DE: 2008 data Microcensus - DESTATIS; FR: 2007 data; 
PT: based on HBS 2005; NL: CBS - 2008;  
UK: Households Below Average Income - 2007/09; all other data EU-SILC.
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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fact that decent housing is too expensive is the main 
reason why people are poor. People with incomes be-
low the poverty threshold11 also spend more on hous-
ing in relative terms than those above (on average in 
the EU 33% of disposable income as opposed to 17%) 
and 39% of them report that housing costs are a bur-
den (against 7% for those above the poverty thresh-
old). They live in worse housing conditions as well, 
some 27% living in overcrowded accommodation, as 
opposed to 15% of the rest of the population and 38% 
of them are affected by at least one of the housing 
deprivation factors12. Housing costs are at present not 
taken into account at EU level and in most countries in 
the measure of the risk of poverty. 
Relative poverty: at-risk-of-poverty income 
relative to the national median income
In 2008, 17% of the EU population had an income af-
ter social transfers below 60% of median disposable 
income in the country in which they live — the at-
risk-of-poverty rate. The rate was 20% for children and 
19% for older people of 65 and over. For the unem-
ployed, the rate was much higher at 44%. 
Regional differences are also pronounced. Those at 
risk of poverty range from below 6% of the popula-
tion in Trento, Praha and Jihozápadat to over 35% in 
Ceuta and Extremadura in Spain and Campania, Sicilia 
and Calabria in Italy (Map 1.68).
Within a country, the level of regional development 
has a substantial effect on the risk of poverty. Less 
developed regions tend to have the highest rates, 
whereas the most developed regions tend to have 
much lower rates. This can be clearly seen in the UK, 
Spain, Italy and Germany.
In some countries, the capital city region has a lower 
poverty rate than the national average, as in Spain, 
11 Measured conventionally as 60% of median equivalised disposable 
household income in each country (‘equivalised’ meaning that an 
adjustment is made for the size and composition of households). 
Those with income below 60% of the median are referred to as be-
ing at risk of poverty.
12 Housing deprivation factors include: damp walls, leaking roofs 
or rot in windows, no bath or shower in the dwelling; no indoor 
flushing toilet for the sole use of the household; dwelling too 
dark. For a full analysis of housing costs and housing deprivation, 
see the supporting document to the 2010 Joint Report on Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=757&langId=en and the 2009 Social Situation Report 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=501&langId=en 
Portugal, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Finland 
and Sweden. In others, the capital region has a higher 
rate, as in Brussels, London, Vienna and Berlin. In all 
four cases, this may reflect a concentration of those at 
risk of poverty in deprived inner city areas. 
The at-risk-of-poverty rate is measured against a na-
tional benchmark, which varies greatly across the EU. 
If adjusted for differences in the cost of living (values 
expressed in purchasing power standards), the pov-
erty threshold for a single-person household varies 
from about PPS 1 900 a year in Romania, PPS 2 800 in 
Bulgaria and around PPS 4 000 in Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia to over PPS 10 000 in 10 Member States and 
PPS 16 500 in Luxembourg. The poverty threshold is, 
therefore, 4–5 times higher in the countries with the 
highest income levels than in those with the lowest 
levels. Being at risk of poverty, therefore, means hav-
ing a very different income level in the former than in 
the latter.
Absolute poverty: material deprivation 
Measuring material deprivation rather than the risk 
of poverty is a means of taking account of these dif-
ferences in absolute income, since it is measured in 
relation to a common set of goods and services. It 
is defined for comparison purposes as the enforced 
lack of at least three of the nine following items; abil-
ity to face unexpected expenses, ability to pay for a 
one week annual holiday away from home, existence 
of arrears on bills (mortgage or rent payments, utility 
bills, or hire purchase instalments or other loan pay-
ments), capacity to have a meal with meat, chicken or 
fish every second day, capacity to keep the home ad-
equately warm, ability to afford a washing machine, 
colour TV, telephone or car.
As such, it takes account of savings and accumulated 
wealth; which the at-risk-of-poverty rate does not and 
which means that a household will not necessarily 
experience material deprivation if their income drops 
below the poverty threshold. It also takes account 
of people’s ability to manage their finances13. Some 
households with a relatively high income may still 
experience material deprivation because they fail to 
manage their finances properly. 
13 OECD (2005) Improving Financial Literacy: Analysis of Issues and 
Policies. Paris.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1.69 Population suffering from severe material deprivation, 2008
EU-27 = 8.4 
Severe material deprivation is defined as being unable to afford 4 or more of 9 items 
specified in the survey.
The Europe 2020 target is to lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty 
and exclusion. This is defined as people who are either at risk-of-poverty and/or severely 
materially deprived and/or living in households with very low work intensity.
Source: EU-SILC
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Some 17% of people in the EU were measured as be-
ing materially deprived in 2008 according to this indi-
cator. The figure, however, is very much higher in the 
lower income countries than in the more prosperous 
ones. In the EU-15, the proportion of materially de-
prived is much larger in Portugal and Greece (22% in 
each) than the EU-15 average (13%). 
The Europe-2020 objective14 is to lift 20 million people 
out of a risk of poverty and exclusion. The indicator 
chosen covers the number of people who are either 
at risk-of-poverty and/or severely materially deprived 
14 Member States can propose indicators suited to their circumstanc-
es and priorities.
and/or living in households with very low work inten-
sity. 
Severe material deprivation (being unable to afford 
at least 4 of the 9 items listed above) differs consid-
erably between Member States. Less than 2% of the 
population in Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Denmark are severely materially deprived, while 
in Romania and Bulgaria, the proportion is over 30% 
(Map 1.69).
The share of people in households with a very low 
work intensity in most Member States ranges be-
tween 4% and 7%. In Hungary and the UK, however, it 
was over 12% in 2008 (Figure 1.30). 
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The combination of the three criteria used in Europe 
2020 classifies almost one in four EU residents as at-
risk-of-poverty or exclusion (Figure 1.31). This share 
of population varies considerably between just over 
15% in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and 
Luxembourg to 38% in Bulgaria and 44% in Romania.
Deprivation and poverty by degree of 
urbanisation
The share of population experiencing material dep-
rivation is considerably higher in thinly populated ar-
eas  in Romania and Bulgaria than in other parts of the 
two countries (20 and 14 percentage points higher). In 
most Member States, however, material deprivation 
is the same or lower in such areas (Figure 1.32). This is 
particularly so in countries with relatively low rates of 
material deprivation. As material deprivation declines, 
therefore, it appears that the disadvantages of living in 
a thinly populated area diminish to such an extent that 
it becomes more prominent in densely populated ar-
eas. For severe material deprivation, this pattern is even 
stronger: in two out of three Member States severe ma-
terial deprivation is higher in densely populated areas 
than in thinly populated ones (Figure 1.33).
A similar pattern is evident for the share of popula-
tion that lacks the capacity to face unexpected finan-
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Share of population materially deprived by degree of urbanisation, 2008 1.32
Bubble size is population with material deprivation by area as % of total population with material deprivation
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Note: Countries ranked by share of population materially deprived. 'Materially deprived' defined as living in a household lacking at least 3 out of 9 important items.
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cial expenses (Figure 1.34). Significantly higher rates 
in thinly populated areas occur mostly in Central and 
Eastern Member States. In Western Member States, 
the rates in these areas are in general lower than else-
where and are higher in densely populated areas.
The share of population with income below the pov-
erty threshold shows a similar pattern but less uni-
formly (Figure 1.35). This indicator, however, suffers 
from a number of drawbacks when comparing across 
areas by degree of urbanisation, since it does not take 
account of differences in living costs or whether a 
household owns or rents its home. Since the cost of 
living is on average higher in densely populated ar-
eas15 and more households rent their accommoda-
tion, the share of people at-risk-of-poverty may well 
be higher in densely populated areas than is shown 
in the chart once income is adjusted for these differ-
ences.
15 See for example the Regional Price Index as calculated by the 
German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs 
and Spatial Development (BBSR www.bbsr.bund.de ).
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Changes in material deprivation, at-risk-of-poverty and income in six less developed 
Member States
In Poland, Slovakia and the three Baltic States, the share of population experiencing material deprivation declined by be-
tween 15 and 25 percentage points between 2005 and 2008 (though the crisis may lead to renewed increases, especially 
in the three Baltic States). Given that average net adjusted household income (i.e. allowing for transfers in kind) per person 
increased by between 15% and 34%, over these three years, the highest rises in the EU, this should come as no surprise 
(Table 1.12). 
However, only in Poland and Slovakia was there a reduction in the at-risk-of-poverty rate. In part, the failure of the rate to 
fall in the other countries is due to rising average income, which increased the poverty threshold significantly each year. 
Relative to the poverty threshold anchored in 2005, however, the share of population at risk of poverty halved in all 5 
countries (Table 1.13).
In Hungary, the share of population measured as being material deprived fell by only 3 percentage points over the period, 
from 40% to 37%. In 2005, it had the second lowest rate of these six countries. In 2008, it had the highest rate. Over the pe-
riod, real disposable household income actually diminished, which is the main reason for the small fall. By 2008, therefore, 
income had declined below that in Slovakia and Lithuania.
1.12 Changes in material deprivation and net household income in six less 
developed Member States, 2005–2008
Material deprivation  Net adjusted household income
2005 2008 2005–2008 2005 2008 2005–2008
(% of total population) (% point 
change)
PPCS1 per inhabitant % change in  
real terms
Estonia 27 12 -15 7 476 9 773 28
Latvia 56 35 -21 6 797 9 585 34
Lithuania 52 27 -25 7 980 10 519 28
Hungary 40 37 -3 9 704 10 122 -2
Poland 51 32 -19 7 986 10 007 15
Slovakia 43 28 -15 8 342 10 933 19
1 Purchasing power standard for consumers’ expenditure 
Source: Eurostat
1.13 At-risk of-poverty rates in six less developed Member States,  
2005–2008
Population with income below 60% of median as % of total population
2005 2008 % point change 
2005–2008
2008, relative to 
 2005 threshold1
% point change 
2005–2008
Estonia 18 19 1 5 -13
Latvia 19 26 7 7 -12
Lithuania 21 20 -1 5 -16
Hungary 13 12 -1 9 -4
Poland 21 17 -4 8 -13
Slovakia 13 11 -2 5 -8
1 % of population in 2008 with income below 2005 poverty threshold 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILCFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 113
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2.4 UN Human Development Index and 
Human Poverty Index
The UN has developed the Human Development 
Index (HDI) to emphasise the fact that aspects other 
than economic activities and their growth are impor-
tant for development. The HDI is based on life expec-
tancy, GDP per head, literacy and enrolment rates. 
Within the EU, however, this indicator is highly corre-
lated with GDP per head; primarily because literacy, 
enrolment and life expectancy are all similarly high 
from a global perspective. 
To gain a better perspective on human development 
diversity within the EU, an EU regional HDI has been 
calculated, which includes healthy life expectancy, 
net adjusted household income16 and low and high 
educational attainment for people aged 25–64. This 
indicator is less closely correlated to GDP than the UN 
one and provides a complementary perspective. 
16  Following the recommendations in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report. 
This does create difficulties as data is missing for Cyprus, Malta, 
Luxembourg and Romania. For this index, Romanian regions use 
unadjusted disposable household income. For Luxembourg data 
was based on EQLS.
The top 10 regions include five English ones, the 
capital city regions of Sweden and France, and two 
regions surrounding Brussels (Map 1.70). Of these 10 
regions, only three appear in the top 10 based on GDP 
per head. 
The bottom 10 regions comprise 7 in Romania, two in 
Hungary and one in Bulgaria. Half of them are also in 
the bottom 10 regions in terms of GDP per head.
The UN has also created a Human Poverty Index17, 
which allows for the fact that averages can hide large 
disparities. The Index has one version for less devel-
oped countries and one for developed countries (HPI 
2). This latter index was also calculated for all EU re-
gions based on the probability at birth of not reach-
ing 65, the at-risk-of-poverty rate, long term unem-
ployment and the share of population aged 25–64 
with only basic schooling. 
The highest levels of human poverty on this measure 
are in Portugal, Southern Spain, Southern Italy and 
Greece (Map  1.71). The lowest levels are in highly, 
moderately and less developed Member States — in 
17 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hpi/.
Did the rise in income in the 6 countries listed above lead to an increase in happiness or satisfaction with life? Although 
the periods do not precisely correspond, there are clear signs of increases in happiness in 5 of them. In Hungary, however, 
both happiness and satisfaction with life declined (Table 1.14).
1.14 Happiness and life satisfaction indices in six less developed Member 
States, 2003–2007
Happiness index1 Life Satisfaction index2
2003 2007 2003–2007 
(% point 
change)
2003 2007 2003–2007 
(% point 
change)
Estonia 6.8 7.4 0.6 5.9 6.7 0.8
Latvia 6.4 6.8 0.4 5.5 6.0 0.5
Lithuania 6.4 7.3 0.9 5.4 6.3 0.9
Hungary 7.1 7.0 -0.1 5.9 5.6 -0.3
Poland 6.9 7.4 0.5 6.2 6.9 0.7
Slovakia 6.5 7.5 1.0 5.7 6.7 1.0
1 Average of responses to the following question: Taking all things together on a scale of 1 to 10, how happy 
would you say you are? Here 1 means you are very unhappy and 10 means you are very happy 
2 Average of responses to the following question: All things considered, how satisfied would you say you are 
with your life these days? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very dissatisfied and 10 means 
very satisfied 
Source: EUROFOUND, EQLS 2003 & 2007Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 2 Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 
The striking feature of the HPI and HDI is that they are 
only weakly correlated. Only a few regions score well 
on both, such as Stockholm, or poorly on both, such 
as Açores. The vast majority combine a high score on 
one index and a low one on the other. This is notably 
the case in Bruxelles-Brussel, Luxembourg, Navarra 
and País Vasco, where the human poverty index is 
much higher than the human development index 
would imply.
One of the main reasons for the difference in the two 
indices is that the HDI is based on a per capita aver-
age of an absolute measure of income (net adjusted 
household income), while HPI includes a relative 
measure (the portion of population below the na-
tional poverty threshold). Accordingly, a region with 
an unequal distribution of a high level of income can 
have both a high average level of human develop-
ment and a high level of poverty. A region with low 
income but relatively equal distribution of it will have 
a low HDI and a low HPI.
The increases in average income in the 5 less devel-
oped countries listed above did, in fact, lead to higher 
levels of life satisfaction and happiness, despite the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate remaining unchanged. It could 
be argued, therefore, that improving well-being, es-
pecially in less developed Member States depends on 
improving the factors behind the HDI and other abso-
lute measures of well-being.
Relative measures of poverty add nuance and can 
guide policy choices in situations where circumstanc-
es are similar. For example, in regions with similar lev-
els of HDI, average well-being is likely to be higher in 
the region with a lower HPI. Relative measures, how-
ever, are difficult to compare in radically different situ-
ations. For example, Stockholm and Bratislava have 
a very similar HPI, yet residents in Stockholm report 
being much more satisfied with their life and happier 
than in Bratislava.
2.5 Conclusions
Although the EU has an enviably long life expectancy 
from a global perspective, too many EU regions still 
have considerably shorter life expectancy than the av-
Happiness and life satisfaction
And they lived happily ever after. 
(Traditional ending of a fairytale)
Life is no fairy tale. Nevertheless, a growing number 
of academics1, researchers2 and politicians argue that 
well-being, in the form of a long and happy life, should 
be an important goal of public policy3. Research has 
shown4 that although more developed countries tend 
to be happier than less developed ones, more eco-
nomic growth does not necessarily lead to a happier 
population.
An increase in economic activity does not always lead 
to more and better jobs. Nor does it automatically lead 
to an increase in average income. In some countries, 
the benefits of economic growth have largely gone to 
high income groups or to companies, while median 
household income has barely increased or has even 
fallen. Economic growth can also be accompanied by 
longer working hours, more stress and a deterioration 
in the quality of life. 
In 2007, the three Member States with the highest 
scores on the happiness index were the three Nordic 
countries. The three with the lowest scores were Bul-
garia, Latvia and Portugal.
Although overall, happiness tends to be less in the less 
developed Member States, this is not always the case. 
Malta is an extreme case, ranking only 18th in terms of 
GDP per head, but 7th according to the happiness in-
dex, while Austria has the 4th highest GDP per head but 
ranks 19th on the happiness index.
Life satisfaction is another frequently used subjective 
indicator of well-being. It is highly correlated with hap-
piness. The three Nordic Member States also had the 
highest life satisfaction, according to a Eurobarometer 
survey conducted in 2009. One reason cited for the 
high levels of happiness in these countries is not only 
their high income but also the relatively equal distribu-
tion of this.
1  Layard, R. (2006), Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, 
Penguin, London.
2 nef (2009), National Accounts of Well-being, New 
Economics Foundation, London.
3  Stiglitz, J., Sen, A. and Fitoussi, J. (2009), Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Perfor-
mance and Social Progress,  www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr.
4  Veenhoven, R. (2000), Well-being in the welfare state: 
Level not higher, distribution not more equitable, Journal 
of Comparative Policy Analysis, vol. 2, pp 91–125.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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The least satisfied Member States were Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Lithuania and Romania. These are also among 
the least developed. However, some countries are far less satisfied than their level of development would imply and vice 
versa. For example, Poland ranked 24th out of the 27 Member States in terms of GDP per head in 2008, but was ranked 16th 
in terms of life satisfaction in 2009. Portugal was ranked 19th in terms of GDP per head, but 24th in life satisfaction.
The impact of the crisis is also evident in the changes in life satisfaction between 2007 and 2009. This declined in 23 Mem-
ber States and remained unchanged in the remaining four. In Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Portugal, the index fell by 10%. 
Satisfaction in other domains, such as family life, were not much affected by the crisis. 
Being happy is even better if it lasts. The Happy Life Years index combines data on life expectancy in good health with the 
happiness index5. This reaches 60 or more in the three Nordic countries and Ireland, but is only 37 in Bulgaria and Romania. 
In general, the Happy Life Years indicator is also closely correlated with GDP per head. The ranking by GDP per head and 
Happy Life Years only changes by a maximum of 2 places for 19 Member States. There are a few striking exceptions. Malta is 
in sixth place for Happy Life Years and 18th for GDP per head. Austria, which is 14th on the first and 4th on GDP per head. Italy 
and Luxembourg drop 5 and 6 places, while Poland and Malta move up 5 and 12 places. It is striking, though the levels of 
GDP per head are similar, Malta is much happier than Portugal and Spain is much happier than Italy.
5  Veenhoven, R. (2006), ‘Quality of life in modern society, Measured with Happy Life Years.’ in: Yew-Kwang Ng & Lok Sang Ho (Eds.) 
Happiness and Public Policy, Theory, Case studies and Implications Palgrave-Macmillan, New York.
1.15 Happiness and GDP per head, 2007
Happiness 
index1
Number of 
Happy Life 
Years 2007
GDP per 
head, Index 
EU-27=100
Rank Difference in rank  
relative to GDP
Happiness Happy Life 
Years
GDP per 
head
Happiness Happy Life 
Years
DK 8.3 61 121.3 1 5 6 5 1
FI 8.3 61 118.0 1 4 7 6 3
SE 8.2 63 122.8 3 1 4 1 3
IE 8.0 62 148.1 4 2 2 -2 0
LU 8.0 59 150.0 4 7 1 -3 -6
NL 8.0 62 132.2 4 3 3 -1 0
MT 7.9 60 76.4 7 6 18 11 12
BE 7.8 58 115.7 8 10 10 2 0
FR 7.8 58 108.5 8 9 11 3 2
UK 7.8 59 116.7 8 8 8 0 0
CY 7.7 55 93.6 11 12 14 3 2
SI 7.7 52 88.6 11 16 16 5 0
ES 7.6 55 105.0 13 13 12 -1 -1
CZ 7.5 51 80.1 14 17 17 3 0
DE 7.5 55 115.8 14 11 9 -5 -2
SK 7.5 47 67.7 14 21 21 7 0
EE 7.4 48 68.8 17 19 20 3 1
PL 7.4 47 54.4 17 20 25 8 5
AT 7.3 54 122.8 19 14 4 -15 -10
EL 7.3 53 92.8 19 15 15 -4 0
LT 7.3 45 59.3 19 23 23 4 0
HU 7.0 42 62.6 22 24 22 0 -2
IT 7.0 51 103.4 22 18 13 -9 -5
RO 7.0 37 41.6 22 26 26 4 0
PT 6.9 45 75.6 25 22 19 -6 -3
LV 6.8 41 55.7 26 25 24 -2 -1
BG 5.8 37 37.7 27 27 27 0 0
1 Average of responses to the following question: Taking all things together on a scale of 1 to 10, how happy would you say you are? Here 
1 means you are very unhappy and 10 means you are very happy 
Source: EUROFOUND, EQLS 2003 & 2007Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 117
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erage at birth. The reasons are manifold, ranging from 
differences in income, education and living condi-
tions to differential access to high quality health care. 
Romanian and Bulgarian regions score the worst on 
health indicators such as infant mortality and (stand-
ardised) mortality rates from cancer and heart disease. 
These indicators, however, are not uniformly high in 
the more developed parts of the EU. Some of the more 
remote and/or economically depressed regions have 
poor scores on these indicators. 
Road fatalities disproportionately affect young men 
and significantly reduce male life expectancy. The large 
regional differences in road fatalities, however, are not 
related to the quality of transport infrastructure and 
are probably more influenced by driver behaviour and 
the extent to which laws are enforced. 
Unemployment declined substantially between 2000 
and 2008. Nevertheless, regional unemployment rates 
remained high in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and 
Southern Spain even before the crisis. Since 2008, un-
employment has risen dramatically in many Member 
States, notably in Spain, and the Baltic States, where av-
erage rates were between 17% and 22% by early 2010. 
Reaching the Europe 2020 employment rate target of 
75% of poeple aged 20–64 will require a wide ranging 
strategy.
Regions with high unemployment rates also tend to 
have more outward than inward migration, although 
overall regional labour mobility in the EU remains low 
compared to the US. Between 2001 and 2007, most re-
gions in the EU-12 and Eastern Germany had net out-
ward migration, especially the predominantly rural re-
gions. By contrast, regions in the EU-15 had mostly net 
inward migration and the predominantly rural regions 
more so than the predominantly urban ones. 
Access to services, such as primary and secondary edu-
cation, primary health care and banking services was 
typically considered more difficult in thinly populated 
areas, especially in the less developed Member States. 
In the most developed Member States few people 
experienced difficulties and the differences between 
densely and thinly populated areas were small. Densely 
populated areas consistently had a larger share of their 
population that reported problems relating to crime 
and pollution. 
Within one generation, women have achieved and 
surpassed the education attainment level of men. In 
virtually all EU regions, more women than men aged 
25–34 have a university degree or the equivalent, while 
for women aged 55–64, this is the case only in a small 
minority of regions. This increase in the education at-
tainment of women has not yet led to more equal em-
ployment rates. In many parts of southern Europe, in 
particular, employment rates of women remain consid-
erably below those of men despite increasing over the 
past decade. 
Prior to the crisis, household income had grown mark-
edly in many of the central and eastern Member States. 
This lifted many people out of (severe) material depri-
vation and increased their overall life satisfaction and 
happiness. The crisis, unfortunately, is likely to have 
reversed this tendency and increased deprivation, es-
pecially in the worst affected countries like the Baltic 
States.
The relative number of people with income which 
puts them at risk of poverty (less than 60% of national 
median disposable income) differs not only between 
Member States but also between regions within 
Member States. In several Member States, including in 
the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and Poland, the relative 
number is twice as large in the least prosperous regions 
as in the most prosperous. 
In most EU-15 countries, densely populated areas have 
a larger proportion of people who are materially de-
prived than thinly populated ones, while in most EU-12 
countries, the proportion is larger in thinly populated 
areas. 
The UN human development index (HDI) and the UN 
human poverty index (HPI) highlight both the abso-
lute and relative dimensions of well-being. The first 
provides an index of absolute levels of development, 
the second focuses on the distribution of the aspects 
which make this up across the population. The analy-
sis here indicates that improvements in the HDI in less 
developed regions can have a strong impact on well-
being, while in more developed regions a reduction 
in the HPI, i.e. in inequalities, is more likely to improve 
well-being.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Section 3. Enhancing 
environmental sustainability
Among the main challenges facing regions in the 
EU are climate change and its impact, environmen-
tal degradation, biodiversity loss and unsustainable 
use of natural resources. Mitigating climate change 
and improving resource efficiency, notably by limit-
ing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the 
consequences, have become key priorities of the EU. 
As a result, the White Paper on adaptation to climate 
change1 highlights the role of environmental capacity, 
green infrastructure and ecosystem services in adap-
tation, the recognition of regional and urban-rural dif-
ferences, and the need for more strategic, long-term 
spatial planning and regional development. In addi-
tion, there is a need for cost-benefit analysis of public 
investment to consider using an ecosystem-based ap-
proach for climate change adaptation and mitigation 
(especially in building green infrastructure)2.
Measures to encourage the production of renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and water treatment feature 
prominently among the interventions funded under 
Cohesion Policy. However, there are major differences 
between regions as regards the scope for action and 
the likely consequences of climate change.
3.1 Adapting to climate change already 
underway
The severity of the impact of climate change will vary 
across the EU according to geophysical vulnerability, 
the natural and human capacity to adapt, and the 
level of economic development. In the face of these 
variations, it is crucial for regions to plan an adapta-
tion strategy most appropriate for them.
Regions most vulnerable to climate change are large-
ly located in the South and East of Europe. A number 
of regions in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Malta will be seriously affected in terms 
of reduced precipitation and increased temperatures. 
Many of these regions are also highly dependent on   
1  COM(2009) 147 final, 1.4.2009.
2  The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity TEEB-CIU, 2010 
http://www.teebweb.org//.
vulnerable sectors such as agriculture and tourism3. 
Less pressure is expected in the North and West of 
Europe except in low-lying coastal regions around 
the North Sea and in regions exposed to coastal ero-
sion around the Baltic Sea. Regions with low GDP per 
head are likely to experience more pressure because 
of their lower capacity to adapt. 
In the long-term, climate change will increase aver-
age temperatures, modify rainfall patterns and raise 
sea levels. Accordingly, the activities most affected 
are likely to be agriculture, forestry, fisheries, en-
ergy production and tourism. The built environment 
will also be affected by extreme weather, and there 
will equally be direct and indirect effects on human 
health. Major investment will be required to combat 
and prevent drought, desertification, fires, coastal 
erosion and flooding. There are likely to be damaging 
economic, social and environmental effects, though 
the increased need for mitigating investment could 
also boost GDP growth in the short term.
Temperature changes
The EU has declared an objective of limiting the rise 
in temperature to 2°C. The IPCC (Inter-governmental 
Panel on Climate Change) has prepared climate 
forecasts under several possible future scenarios for 
2070–2099. According to the IPCC A1B scenario4, tem-
peratures will rise by 3–5°C in Europe as compared 
with the average for 1961–1990. Only in Ireland and 
Scotland will temperatures increase by much less 
than in the rest of Europe. The number of nights when 
the temperature does not fall below 20°C is likely to 
increase, especially around the Mediterranean and in 
Bulgaria and southern Romania, though also in cen-
tral France and Hungary (Map 1.72).
3  For a sectoral economic sensitivity to climate change, see ESPON 
2013 Programme, Climate Change and Territorial Effects on Regions 
and Local Economies, Applied Research Project 2013/2/1, Interim 
report, 2010.
4  The A1B scenario describes a future world of high economic 
growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines 
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technologies. Major underlying assumptions include increased cul-
tural and social interaction and a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in GDP per head, as well as balance between fossil and 
non-fossil energy sources.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 119
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1.72 Projected change in number of tropical nights between 1961–1990 and 2071–2100
Average at NUTS 2 level.
Change in number of days with min. temperature > 20°C
during the summer season (June, July, August).
Source: CLM scenario A1B, JRC-IES, REGIO-GIS
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Change in snow cover
As a direct consequence of increased temperatures, 
the number of days with snow cover is likely to di-
minish, affecting in particular mountain areas, es-
pecially in the Alps though also in the Pyrenees and 
Carpathians (Map 1.73). 
The retreat of alpine glaciers is of particular concern 
since this will directly reduce water reserves, 40% of 
Europe’s fresh water comes from this source and feeds 
the Danube, Rhine, Po, Rhone and other rivers. Climate 
change is, therefore, threatening the delicate interac-
tion between winter storage and summer release of 
water, resulting in more extreme flows of water with a 
significant increase in the risk of floods and drought.
The reduction in snow cover will also hit many moun-
tain regions dependent on winter sports significantly. 
The fragile natural environment of mountain areas 
may be affected as well, with direct consequences for 
biodiversity and local activities.
Water scarcity
Water is necessary for life, sustaining ecosystems and 
regulating our climate. But it is a finite resource, and 
less than 1% of the world’s fresh water is accessible 
for direct human use. Competition for water poses a 
growing risk to the economy, communities and the 
ecosystems that rely on it. If climate change continues 
to raise average temperatures across Europe, water is 
expected to become even scarcer in many areas, so it 
is vital to find solutions to protect it. 
A reduction in rainfall is likely to mean an increase 
in water scarcity5. Summers are expected to become 
much drier and EU regions as a whole are expected 
to experience a reduction in rainfall of over 20% over 
the next 60 years and in some cases, over 40%. At 
the same time, precipitation in winter in Baltic and 
Northern Sea regions could rise by 20% or even 40% 
(Map 1.74). 
The combined effect of over-exploitation, changes in 
temperature and precipitation could affect environ-
mental conditions and biodiversity severely. Some 
5  Water scarcity occurs when demand for water exceeds the available 
sustainable resources, while drought refers to a temporary reduc-
tion in water availability, for example, when it does not rain over a 
long period of time.
‘’semi-arid’’ regions already exist in Europe (e.g. in 
Cyprus, Spain and Greece) but by 2100 Murcia is pre-
dicted to have become the first totally arid region in 
Europe. 
Sicily and Sardinia are likely to become semi-arid, 
along with southern Romania, including Bucharest, 
and parts of Bulgaria, while Spain and Greece will be 
almost totally ‘semi-arid6‘. Moreover, several French 
regions and parts of central Europe could come to be 
classified as ‘dry sub-humid’. As a result, the availabil-
ity of drinking water could diminish, so affecting the 
health and well-being of people and the viability of 
many businesses.
Impact on soil quality
Climate change will put further pressure on the qual-
ity of soil and will increase the risk of desertification. 
This already affects the southern Member States and 
is expected to gradually move north. For instance, the 
changes in rainfall patterns will contribute to an in-
crease in erosion of vulnerable soils which often suffer 
from low organic matter content. Moreover, a rise in 
global temperature will accelerate carbon losses from 
the soil, driving up the concentration of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere. 
Forest fires
Forest fires are a recurring phenomenon in the EU 
affecting large areas of the Mediterranean. They can 
destroy soils and release carbon dioxide into the at-
mosphere. With changing climatic conditions, the vul-
nerability of forests to fires in Member States which 
have so far not been endangered is increasing. Fires 
can be detrimental to biodiversity and necessitate 
huge restoration efforts, in particular in Natura 2000 
areas where the ‘green infrastructure’ risks becoming 
fragmented. 
Flood hazards
Flooding of rivers is expected to become more fre-
quent due to more extreme weather conditions and 
continued construction in areas at risk. The most 
6  Ratio of potential evaporation (E0) to precipitation (P), commonly 
known as the aridity index (φ), in (a) the HIRHAM control run (1961–
1990) and (b) the scenario run (2071–2100). Values of φ have been 
classified following Ponce et al. (2000) into humid (φ < 0.75), sub-
humid (0.75 ≤ φ < 2), semi-arid (2 ≤ φ < 5) and arid (φ ≥ 5) regions.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1.74 Projected change of temperature and precipitation between 1961–1990 and 
2071–2100
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vulnerable areas7 are the Po Valley, areas along the 
Rhine (especially in France and the Netherlands), and 
lower Loire, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and west-
ern Poland, together with areas bordering the River 
Pineios in Thelassia, Greece. As a result of climate 
change, all of Europe will become more susceptible 
to flash floods.
In the longer term, the rise in sea levels is expected 
to lead to the flooding of a number of coastal areas, 
especially in the Netherlands and other low-lying 
coastal areas.
The threat to tourism
Changing weather conditions will adversely affect liv-
ing conditions in many areas, especially around the 
Mediterranean, which could become excessively hot 
and arid. Areas further North are likely to become 
more attractive for tourists, so damaging the econo-
mies of present destinations for summer holidays 
(Map 1.75).
The climate change vulnerability index
The combined outcome of these effects is a wide di-
versity of regional experience. Regions subject to the 
most pressure are generally located in the South and 
the South East of the EU. In particular the regions that 
appear to be more vulnerable to climate change are 
Extremadura, Algarve, Ionia Nisia, and Thelassia. Many 
regions in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Malta, however, are also likely to be af-
fected significantly (Map 1.76).
3.2 Limiting future climate change
In 2007, the European Council adopted an integrated 
approach to tackling climate change and increasing 
energy security while strengthening EU competitive-
ness, with the aim of transforming the Union into a 
highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy. To this 
end, a number of targets (so-called ’20-20-20’ targets) 
were set to be met by 2020:
7 http://floods.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
  • a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at 
least 20% below 1990 levels8;
  • 20% of EU final energy consumption to come 
from renewable sources;
  • a reduction in primary energy use of 20% from 
projected levels to be achieved by improving en-
ergy efficiency. 
Binding legislation to implement the 20-20-20 tar-
gets was agreed by the European Parliament and the 
Council in December 2008 and became law in June 
2009. There were four elements to this:
1  A revision of the Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS), with the number of emission allowances 
available to large emitters being progressively 
reduced from 2013 to 21% below the 2005 level 
by 2020 and the free allocation of allowances 
replaced by auctioning. 
2  An ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ governing emissions 
from sectors not covered by the EU ETS, such as 
transport, housing, agriculture and waste, un-
der which each Member State committed to a 
binding national emissions limitation target for 
2020 taking into account GDP per head. These 
national targets should reduce the EU’s overall 
emissions from these sectors by 10% by 2020 
on 2005 levels. 
3  Binding national targets for renewable energy 
which collectively should increase the share 
across the EU to 20% by 2020. 
4  A legal framework to encourage the develop-
ment and safe use of carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS)9. 
Up until now, the implementation of the EU ETS, 
which started in 2005, has not resulted in a significant 
change in CO2 prices, partly because the allocations 
for the 2005–2007 trading period were above annu-
8  The EU leaders also offered to increase the EU’s emissions reduction 
to 30%, on condition that other major emitting countries in the de-
veloped and developing worlds commit to do their share under a 
global climate agreement. United Nations negotiations on this are 
ongoing.
9  CCS is a family of technologies that capture the carbon dioxide 
emitted by industrial processes and store it underground geo-
logical formations where it cannot contribute to global warming. 
Although the different components of CCS are already deployed 
commercially, its technical and economic viability has yet to be 
shown. The EU plans to set up a network of CCS demonstration 
plants by 2015 to test its viability.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 125
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al emissions while for the 2009–2012, the economic 
crisis reduced emissions below the anticipated level. 
Allocations and external crediting are expected to ex-
ceed demand up until 201310. The package is, there-
fore, an opportunity to strengthen the EU ETS, since, 
between 2013 and 2020, it should be a key means of 
reducing emissions to meet the target of 20% below 
1990 levels11.
Less green house gas emissions
The limitation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions is a 
major part of the measures to tackle climate change. 
As a party to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Commission monitors 
GHG emissions in the EU. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the EU-15 also committed to reducing emissions 
by 8% between 2008 and 2012 relative to the ‘base 
year’12.
In 2008, total GHG emissions by the EU-27 were 
11.3% less than in 1990, falling by 1.9% between 2007 
and 2008. According to the European Environment 
10 Curien, I. and Lewis, M. (2009), The ETS review: unfinished business, 
Deutsche Bank Global Market Research.
11 As recent study also accounts for a ‘Carbon leakage’ effect, that 
is the possibility that companies decide to transfer their produc-
tion facilities to countries outside the EU if production costs rise 
as a result of carbon taxes. See ESPON 2013 Programme, ReRISK 
— Regions at Risk of Energy Poverty, Applied Research Project 
2013/1/5, Final report, 2010.
12 For the EU-15, the base year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; for 
fluorinated gases, 1995 for 12 Member States and 1990 for Austria, 
France and Italy.
Agency (which monitors performance in meeting 
Kyoto Protocol goals), the EU-15 and the EU-12 are 
likely to meet their obligations. For the EU-15, howev-
er, this will partly depend on the success of additional 
measures taken by Member States and on the import 
of carbon credits through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) from developing countries with 
excess supply. The estimated reduction of GHG by 
2010 would only be around 7% relative to the base 
year with existing measures but could reach 13% if 
supplemented by Kyoto Protocol Flexibility mecha-
nisms (reducing it by 2%), carbon sinks (by 1%), credit 
acquisition by EU ETS sectors (by 1.5%) and additional 
measures (by 15%) (Figure 1.36).
For EU-12 countries, reductions have generally ex-
ceeded their targets, mainly because of the mod-
ernisation of old, polluting industrial plants. Between 
1990 and 2008, GHG emissions in these countries 
fell by 27.2% (Figure 1.37). However, high economic 
growth has led to a steady increase in emissions since 
2002 and in 2010, the reduction is expected to fall to 
21% in relation to 1990.
Reductions in GHG emissions and compliance with 
the Kyoto targets vary widely across Member States. 
Reductions have been large not only in most EU-12 
Member States but also in some EU-15 countries, like 
Germany and the UK. Emissions increased in some 
countries, notably in Cyprus, where they rose by over 
85% (Figure 1.38).
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Compliance with Kyoto targets depends in part on the 
commitment of Member States under the Protocol. 
Variations in the extent of reduction in emissions are 
taken into account by the ‘burden sharing’ mecha-
nism which allows some countries to increase emis-
sions while others compensate for this by accepting 
deeper cuts. The large reduction in EU-12 countries 
has meant that they have overshot their targets, as 
noted above, while for some EU-15 countries, compli-
ance will depend on the use of additional measures 
(Figure  1.39). Even so, great efforts are needed to 
meet the targets in some countries like Luxembourg 
or Austria.
More renewable energy
Another important aspect of the agreed package is 
the aim of increasing renewable energy sources. The 
national targets range from a share of renewables 
in the total of 10% in Malta to 49% in Sweden, while 
the actual shares in 2008 ranged from zero in Malta 
to 43% in Sweden. The efforts required to meet the 
2020 target, therefore, vary across the EU, the UK hav-
ing to increase the share by 12.7 percentage points, 
Romania by only 3.7 percentage points (Figure 1.40).
While there are various sources of renewable energy, 
the potential of the two main ones, wind and solar 
power, varies across regions. 
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Regions exposed to the wind from the North Sea gen-
erally have more potential from this source (Map 1.77). 
This also applies to some small Mediterranean islands 
and the southern part of the Baltic. At the same time, 
conditions can change markedly within a short dis-
tance and the potential for wind power can some-
times vary substantially within NUTS 2 regions, as in 
many coastal areas in Spain and Portugal. 
Given the high fixed cost of windmill construction 
and maintenance and the minimal running costs, av-
erage production costs of wind power fall rapidly as 
output increases. The generating costs are, therefore, 
lowest in regions where the potential use is greatest. 
The intermittent character of these sources of renew-
able energy makes energy storage a key issue13.
Southern regions of the EU generally have much 
greater access to solar power than those in the North 
because of the many more sunny days but also be-
cause of their more southerly position which increas-
es solar irradiation. Regions with the highest potential 
for the generation of solar power are mostly located 
in the Mediterranean, though the potential is also rel-
atively high in Bulgaria, Central France, Northern Italy 
and Romania (Map 1.78).
13 MacKay, D. (2008), Sustainable Energy without the hot air, UIT, 
Cambridge, http://www.withouthotair.com//
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More investment, research and technological devel-
opment in other sources of renewable energy, such as 
wave, tidal, biomass, bio-fuel and geothermal power, 
could also lead to these making an important contri-
bution to the production of renewable energy.
Given the different potential for exploiting different 
sources, the development of intelligent energy distri-
bution networks is central for sharing the power gen-
erated in different places. 
Increased energy efficiency
More efficient transport
Energy efficiency in transport14 mainly depends on 
three aspects: the technology embodied in vehicles, 
the modes of transport and the standard of the trans-
port network.
The latest generation of vehicles often embodies 
technology with higher fuel efficiency (i.e. less fuel 
per unit of distance travelled), while efficient trans-
port networks tend to be those with higher rates of 
vehicle occupancy. In addition, trains are generally 
much more energy efficient than cars and lorries for 
both passenger and freight transport.
The traffic going by road continues to increase relative 
to that going by rail and inland waterways, in particu-
lar for freight (Figures 1.41 and 1.42). Rail transport, 
14 This can be expressed in terms of consumption per unit of distance 
per vehicle, per passenger or per unit of cargo transported.
however, varies in importance across the EU, account-
ing for over 20% of freight in most EU-12 countries as 
well as in Finland, Sweden and Germany.
Policies for increasing the efficiency of modes of 
transport need to adapt to the local situation and will 
differ significantly between EU-15 and EU-12 coun-
tries. In the EU-15, the road network is generally well 
developed and often extremely dense. As a result, in-
vestment in new roads in the EU-15 is likely to have 
only a limited effect on accessibility and congestion; 
especially if not accompanied by measures to encour-
age modal shifts and travel outside of peak hours. The 
challenge is, therefore, to make modes of transport 
other than roads more attractive and competitive, 
notably by improving the ‘quality’ of service offered, 
though increasing speed and/or the regularity of ser-
vice and by aligning prices more with the environ-
mental cost. 
In the EU-12, the road network is generally of low 
standard and its improvement partly conditions de-
velopment prospects of many of the regions. The 
challenge is to do this while minimising damage to 
the environment.
The environmental impact of the transport sector was 
examined in the TIPTAP ESPON project15, which inves-
tigated a regulatory and pricing scenario, in which 
15 ESPON 2013 Programme, TIPTAP: Territorial Impact Package for 
Transport and Agricultural Policies, Applied Research Project 
2013/1/6, 2010.
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policies are oriented towards taxation, internalisation 
of transport externalities and incentives for a modal 
shift towards rail and maritime transport16. This is 
judged to have a positive outcome for most regions, 
but especially for Ireland, the UK and EU-12 countries, 
though also for Spain, Portugal, Northern Italy and 
South-Western France, mainly as a result of reduced 
road congestion (Map 1.79).
Regulatory and pricing measures should reduce traf-
fic across the entire transport network and shift travel 
from roads where they are congested to other modes 
(e.g. in Western Germany, the Netherlands, London, 
Milan and Rome) or other regions distant from 
the main European centres (e.g. Lisbon, Ljubljana, 
Budapest, Prague, Bucharest and Sofia). The scenario 
shows substantial reductions in CO2 emissions, most 
notably in Spain, Portugal, central Italy and Poland.
Rail can also provide an alternative to air transport, 
especially for passengers, though this depends criti-
cally on the rail connections between urban centres. 
In practice, there are few flights which are in direct 
competition with rail for journeys of less than 500 km 
(Map 1.80). In Spain and Italy, in particular, air trans-
port is the main form of connection between most re-
gions and the capital city (which is usually the nation-
al hub for international flights). The situation is quite 
16  This scenario is based on Low Growth 2030 as defined in 
TRANSVisions study. TRANS-TOOLS, official DG MOVE forecast 
model has been used to move from policies to the assessment indi-
cators above defined.
different in France where high-speed train connec-
tions have been put in place and where there is direct 
competition between rail and air between London, 
Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels (Map 1.81). 
More efficient housing
Housing, and buildings generally, is another area 
where major improvements in energy efficiency are 
possible, which can, in addition, increase job creation. 
By improving the energy efficiency of new and exist-
ing buildings, energy consumption could be signifi-
cantly reduced.
A study commissioned by DG Energy examined cur-
rent and future potential for energy saving in the 
EU-27 Member States17. The results show that a ‘High 
Policy Intensity Scenario’, involving the removal of 
barriers to energy efficiency, increased policy effort 
and low interest rates for investment can lead to 
considerable energy savings, notably in households 
through the adoption of more efficient heating and 
water heating systems, insulation and electrical appli-
ances.
17 Study on the Energy Savings Potentials in EU Member States, 
Candidate Countries and EEA Countries, Final Report for 
the European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and 
Transport, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/studies/
doc/2009_03_15_esd_efficiency_potentials_short_report.pdf
0
20
40
60
80
100
L
T
U
K
N
L
S
I
P
L
P
T
D
E
F
I
F
R
L
U
I
E
S
E
I
T
E
L
L
V
E
S
D
K
E
E
A
T
B
E
R
O
C
Z
B
G
S
K
H
U
E
U
1
5
E
U
2
7 0
20
40
60
80
100
Cars Trains Buses passenger-km as % of total inland passenger transport 
Share of passengers by mode of transport in EU Member States, 2008 1.42
Source: Eurostat
Note: no data for CY and MTChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
132 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
1.79 Congestion index on the main road network, 2009
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
0 500Km
REGIOgis
Canarias
Guyane Guadeloupe
Martinique
Réunion
Açores Madeira
Weekday speed as percentage 
of freeflow speed
Main road network:
• Roads with speed limit of at least 100 km/h.
• Speed profiles are based on GPS Telemetry.
Population in a neighbourhood of 100 km radius: 
• inverse-distance weighted sum of local population.
Source: 
• TeleAtlas, REGIO-GIS, JRC, EFGS, 
Eurostat, NSOs
Potential population index (EU-27 = 100) Congestion index (%)
95.1 - 100.0
90.1 - 95.0
85.1 - 90.0
80.1 - 85.0
< 80.0
No data
0 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 200
201 - 500
> 501Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 133
Section 3 Enhancing environmental sustainability
1
.
8
0
 
P
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
 
f
l
i
g
h
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
5
0
0
 
k
m
,
 
2
0
0
8
©
 
E
u
r
o
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
s
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
s
 
p
e
r
 
d
a
y
5
0
0
 
-
 
1
5
0
0
1
5
0
0
 
-
 
2
5
0
0
2
5
0
0
 
-
 
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
 
-
 
7
5
0
0
>
 
7
5
0
0
R
E
G
I
O
g
i
s
0
5
0
0
K
m
C
a
n
a
r
i
a
s
G
u
y
a
n
e
G
u
a
d
e
l
o
u
p
e
M
a
r
t
i
n
i
q
u
e
R
é
u
n
i
o
n
A
ç
o
r
e
s
M
a
d
e
i
r
a
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
1
 
d
e
p
a
r
t
i
n
g
 
f
l
i
g
h
t
 
p
e
r
 
d
a
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
o
f
 
5
0
0
 
p
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
s
 
d
a
i
l
y
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
E
u
r
o
s
t
a
t
,
 
R
E
G
I
O
-
G
I
S
1
.
8
1
 
H
i
g
h
e
s
t
 
s
p
e
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
a
i
l
w
a
y
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
i
m
e
t
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
2
0
1
0
0
5
0
0
K
m
k
m
/
h
<
=
 
5
0
5
1
 
-
 
8
0
8
1
 
-
 
1
2
0
1
2
1
 
-
 
1
6
0
1
6
1
 
-
 
2
0
0
2
0
1
 
-
 
3
2
0
C
a
n
a
r
i
a
s
G
u
y
a
n
e
G
u
a
d
e
l
o
u
p
e
M
a
r
t
i
n
i
q
u
e
R
é
u
n
i
o
n
A
ç
o
r
e
s
M
a
d
e
i
r
a
R
E
G
I
O
g
i
s
©
 
E
u
r
o
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
s
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s
S
i
n
c
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
t
r
a
i
n
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
s
p
e
e
d
s
 
m
a
y
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
 
a
l
o
n
g
 
r
a
i
l
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
s
p
e
e
d
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
s
p
e
e
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
a
s
t
e
s
t
 
t
r
a
i
n
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
.
R
a
i
l
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
r
e
i
g
h
t
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
s
h
o
w
n
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
R
R
G
 
G
I
S
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
 
R
a
i
l
w
a
y
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
'
s
 
t
i
m
e
t
a
b
l
e
sChapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
134 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
A policy of diffusing energy saving technologies as-
sumed in the scenario18 would enable household 
energy consumption to be reduced by an estimated 
42% by 2030, though the potential saving in Sweden 
is much less (29%) because of the already strong focus 
of policy on energy efficiency. 
Potential savings are greatest from improvements in 
heating systems. The hottest countries are generally 
the least efficient in this regard and, therefore, offer 
the most potential for major savings. There is much 
less scope for energy saving in respect of electrical 
and electronic appliances since major reductions 
have already been made, though because replace-
ment rates are lower in EU-12 countries, potential sav-
ings (of 35%) are more than in the EU-15 (27%). 
Green cities
Cities will play an important role in combating climate 
change, since they accommodate both a large share 
of the population and a large share of economic ac-
tivity. As a result, they are also the location of a large 
proportion of GHG emissions. They provide oppor-
tunities for energy saving measures in, for example 
transport and heating because of their high popula-
tion density. This is one of the reasons that the EU has 
set up a Smart Cities Initiative19 as part of its Strategic 
Energy Technology Plan.
As emphasised in a recent report from OECD (2009)20, 
even if there is wide variation in their situation, there 
are at least three areas in which action is particularly 
appropriate in cities:
  • GHG emissions are mostly the result of the energy 
used by lighting, heating, cooling and transport. 
Cities should anticipate future rises in carbon pric-
es and favour less carbon-intensive investment;
18 The High policy intensity scenario describes the diffusion of the 
most energy saving technologies to the maximum possible extent 
from an economic perspective and compares this with a baseline 
scenario which assumes that technology diffusion continues at the 
same pace as in the past, though it takes account of the potential 
effect of policies already introduced as well as of changes in market 
prices of energy.
19 http://setis.ec.europa.eu/about-setis/technology-roadmap/euro-
pean-initiative-on-smart-cities
20 Kamal-Chaoui, L. and Robert, A. (eds.) (2009), Competitive Cities 
and Climate Change, OECD Regional Development Working Papers 
N° 2, OECD.
  • a substantial part of energy used in cities is re-
lated to buildings, so increasing their energy ef-
ficiency is particularly important. Since there tend 
to be many public buildings in cities, these should 
be a specific focus of attention;
  • moving to a low-carbon, and low environmen-
tal impact, way of life often requires investment 
for which the benefits only outweigh the cost if 
they are spread across a large proportion of the 
population. City authorities can play a key role in 
establishing the appropriate structure of incen-
tives, such as by subsidising energy audits, adapt-
ing regulations to encourage energy efficiency 
and favouring environmentally-friendly modes of 
transport.
From a household perspective, however, cities already 
offer a more resource efficient way of life21 and there 
is an explicit aim in many cases to go further in this 
direction. In January 2008, the ‘Covenant of Mayors’ 
initiative was launched to reduce the impact of cities 
on climate change, with a formal commitment to go 
beyond the EU objectives for reducing CO2 emissions 
and to prepare a Sustainable Energy Action Plan, as 
well as to report periodically on progress. Over 1 000 
towns and cities, with a combined population of over 
140 million in 36 countries, have signed up to the 
Covenant. In addition, Ministers responsible for urban 
development decided in Marseille in 2008 to estab-
lish a common European Reference Framework for 
Sustainable Cities.
Compact cities tend to be more resource efficient 
than sprawling ones. The Urban Atlas22  provides a 
new insight in the different urban forms across the 
EU. Bucharest, for example, is a highly compact city 
(Map 1.82). Outside the city centre, there are only a few 
isolated houses and other buildings. Its urban fabric is 
concentrated within a radius of 4 km from the centre 
(see Figure below map). This tends to reduce the av-
erage length of journeys and makes public transport 
more efficient, so reducing energy consumption and 
GHG emissions.
21 See for example The Green metropolis by David Owen and work by 
energy and fuel use by household at NUTS 4 level as published by 
UK Dept of Energy and Climate Change. http://www.decc.gov.uk/
en/content/cms/statistics/regional/high_level/high_level.aspx
22 The Urban Atlas is the first high resolution land use mapping of all 
major urban agglomerations in the EU. It was designed especially 
to facilitate European wide comparison of urban land use patterns.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 135
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Brussels, on the other hand, has far more dispersed 
settlements surrounding the city. The density of the 
urban fabric also quickly diminishes as one moves 
away from the centre.
In Vienna and Cologne, construction outside the city 
centre is mostly clustered in villages or neighbour-
hoods with open spaces between them. These cen-
tres can be served by public transport more efficiently 
than where settlements are more dispersed. In addi-
tion, this clustering of construction safeguards the 
open spaces between these settlements.
In Warsaw, many of the roads leading out of the city 
have been built up along the sides, though construc-
tion is generally of a high density. This type of strip 
development can also be seen outside Lyon and 
Brussels, but there it tends to be of lower density. 
Green urban areas and sports and leisure facilities can 
make city living more attractive and healthy. Cologne, 
Warsaw, Vienna and Brussels all have many parks and 
leisure areas both close to and further away from the 
centre. Bucharest and Barcelona, by contrast, have 
relatively few green areas. 
Barcelona and Copenhagen are both located on the 
sea. Barcelona which has the sea on one side and 
mountains on the other has developed in a compact 
way. Copenhagen has been developed according to a 
‘’five fingers plan’’ since 1947 to ensure good access to 
open spaces. Development is concentrated along the 
five fingers with protected stretches of fields, forest, 
urban parks, footpaths and bicycle paths in between.
Land use can also be improved in a number of cit-
ies. Around a third of the cities covered by the urban 
atlas have more than 0.5% of their land which could 
potentially be used more efficiently. In particular, sites 
which are abandoned, such as old industrial plants, 
factories and warehouses, can almost always be de-
veloped for use. 
3.3 Improving environmental quality
The quality of the environment is mostly conditioned 
by human activities. Improving quality requires both 
limiting the negative environmental effects of the 
activities concerned and preserving natural assets. 
At the EU level, this has been achieved through both 
normative requirements, e.g. on the concentration of 
pollutants, and investments in infrastructure.
Waste water treatment
Treatment of waste water is necessary to preserve the 
quality of water reserves, for drinking, use by industry, 
tourism and agriculture and for environmental rea-
sons generally. For urban areas, treatment which re-
moves most contaminants from sewage is mandatory 
so as to protect the natural environment23.
Overall, close to 90% of urban waste water is treated 
across the EU-15. However gaps still remain. In the 
case of the EU-12, the Accession Treaties provide 
for staggered transition, extending to 2015 and for 
Romania to 2018. Waste water treatment is still well 
under 100% in a number of urban areas in the EU-12 
(Map 1.83)24. This is particularly so in Romania, where 
in some regions, including Bucuresti, less than 30% of 
urban waste water is treated.
Waste management
Member States are obliged to establish and evaluate 
waste management plans for all parts of the country. 
Plans are often made at regional level, and in some 
cases they have been co-financed under Cohesion 
Policy, especially in the EU-12, and southern Member 
States, where problems remain. Such plans are the 
main vehicle for implementing the central aim of the 
Waste Framework Directive of diverting waste from 
landfills to recycling and recovery. 
The proportion of waste which is recycled is rising, 
while that disposed in landfills is falling. Waste treat-
ment sites are undertaking more recycling and more 
recovery of energy through incineration. At the same 
time, hazardous waste and illegal dumping have be-
come more tightly controlled. Waste management 
also has potentially important economic effects. Solid 
waste management and recycling industries have 
an annual turnover of EUR 137 billion, over 1% of EU 
GDP, and are estimated to have created over 2 million 
jobs25.
23 Directive 91/271/EEC.
24 The map describes the treatment capacity of the urban areas in the 
region and not the treatment capacity of the whole territory of the 
region (urban and non urban areas).
25 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/compost/pdf/sec_bio-
waste.pdf, pp.13–14.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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Air quality
Good air quality helps to prevent respiratory diseases 
and premature death. The emission of many pollut-
ants as well as the permissible concentrations of those 
pollutants in the air is regulated by EU Directives26. 
There are limits on the emissions of several pollutants 
that can be released into the air as well as on the con-
centration of particulate matter and other damaging 
pollutants. Regions most affected by high particulate 
matter concentrations are those in the central part of 
the EU, in south and central Poland, in a few parts of 
Hungary and around Bucharest (the most polluted 
area) (Map 1.84).
There is much evidence that high ground-level ozone 
concentrations can harm lungs and irritate the res-
piratory system. A daily concentration limit has, there-
fore, been established, though this is often exceeded 
in a number of regions (Map 1.85). This was especially 
so in Italian regions in 2008, and to a lesser extent 
in Malta, Bulgaria, Cyprus, some Greek regions and 
southern Romania. Indeed, except for the Spanish re-
gions, almost all the regions in the Mediterranean ex-
ceeded the concentration limit for a significant num-
ber of days (15 or more).
Land use patterns
Soil sealing
Soil sealing refers to the ground being covered with 
impervious materials. This is typically a result of urban 
development and the construction of infrastructure. 
The ecological soil functions of sealed areas are se-
verely impaired or even prevented (e.g. the soil work-
ing as a buffer and filter system or as a carbon sink). 
In addition, surrounding soils may be affected by 
changes in water flow patterns or the fragmentation 
of habitats. Sealed soils contribute to increasing flood 
hazards as the capacity to absorb and store excess 
water is reduced, and run-off therefore increases.
26 Pollutant emissions: mainly Directives 2008/1/EC, 2001/80/EC and 
2001/81/EC. Ambient air quality: mainly Directives 1999/30/EC and 
1996/62/EC. A full list of relevant legislation can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/legis.htm. A revision and 
streamlining of Directive 2008/1/EC, 2001/80/EC and of five other 
Directives has recently been completed. These Directives will be 
repealed and replaced by the new Industrial Emissions Directive. A 
revision of the air quality framework is foreseen for 2013.
Soil sealing is particularly high in highly urbanised ar-
eas such as parts of the Netherlands, North Belgium, 
West and South Germany and central and south-
eastern parts of the UK. In Mediterranean regions, 
soil sealing is relatively high along the coasts where 
rapid urbanisation is associated with the expansion 
of tourism. In EU-12 countries, the extent of soil seal-
ing27 is generally much lower, but it is likely to increase 
(Map 1.86). 
The extent of soil sealing also depends on the way 
people live and where companies locate. Besides the 
effect of tourism, it can also be caused by a combi-
nation of lax land use planning and a preference for 
living and working outside city centres, for bigger 
houses coupled with out of town developments, such 
as supermarkets, leisure centres and the associated 
transport infrastructure. Soil sealing per inhabitant 
is the lowest in all major urban regions (Map 1.87). 
Although a few rural regions in southern and eastern 
EU regions (in Southern Italy, Greece and Romania) 
also have low levels of soil sealing, overall rural regions 
have the highest level of soil sealing per inhabitant28.
Natura 2000 and biodiversity
Natura 2000 is an EU wide network of nature preser-
vation areas. The aim is to ensure the long-term sur-
vival of threatened species and habitats. According 
to the EU Nature Directives, conservation should be 
achieved while taking account of economic, social, 
cultural, regional and recreational needs. Regions 
should, therefore, not consider the sites concerned 
as merely areas to protect but as important assets in 
development strategies: NATURA 2000 areas could be 
used for instance to attract more visitors and to devel-
op economic activities related to ecotourism, as well 
as enhancing the quality of life of the people living in 
the regions concerned. 
The Natura 2000 Network currently covers approxi-
mately 18% of the land area of the EU (Map 1.88). 
To ensure that biodiversity and ecosystems contin-
ue to contribute to human and economic prosper-
ity (e.g. through pollination, water purification, and 
27 State of the Environment Report 2010, European Environmental 
Agency.
28 Note that this indicator may be somewhat biased in regions with 
a small population because part of the infrastructure which is re-
sponsible for soil sealing (e.g. transport infrastructure) also serves 
the population of neighbouring regions.Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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flood prevention), these protected areas and the 
wider countryside need to be properly managed. 
Developing ‘green infrastructure’, avoiding the frag-
mentation of landscapes and reducing the impact of 
fragmentation through ecological networks, particu-
larly Natura 2000, is key to maintaining a sustainable 
environment.
The network of protected areas is particularly dense 
in Slovenia, Spain and Bulgaria. Protected areas cover 
a smaller part of the land area in many English and 
French regions as well as in those in Southern Finland 
and Sweden. However, there tends to be relatively 
high sensitivity to environmental issues in these coun-
tries, which leads to areas in addition to the Natura 
2000 ones being protected.
3.4 Conclusions
Protecting the environment and improving its qual-
ity, together with the effect of adapting to climate 
change and mitigating its consequences, are crucial 
issues for EU regions. However, their importance dif-
fers substantially across regions. 
The impact of climate change will be most severe in 
Southern and Eastern European regions. They will suf-
fer longer and more severe droughts, with possibility 
of water shortage in the medium-term. Regions that 
depend on activities directly or indirectly affected 
by increase in temperature and changes in weather 
conditions (such as tourism and agriculture) are par-
ticularly vulnerable. Others will face an increased risk 
of natural disasters. These prospective developments 
need to be incorporated in spatial planning and re-
gional development strategies. 
Limiting the extent of climate change will require swift 
action to achieve the targets set out in the EU Climate 
and Energy Package, which is part of the Europe 2020 
strategy. The ambitious reductions in GHG emissions 
will depend for their achievement mostly on chang-
es in the sectors covered by the emissions trading 
scheme. Nevertheless, reaching the overall emissions 
reduction target also depends on improvements out-
side this scheme, particularly in respect of transport 
and buildings, areas where public authorities play a 
decisive role. 
The production of renewable energy has a strong ge-
ographical dimension. Solar energy potential, for ex-
ample, is far greater in the southern regions, while the 
potential of wind power is greatest in areas along the 
Atlantic and North Sea coasts. Regions can, accord-
ingly, play an important strong role in facilitating and 
encouraging renewable energy production. 
Increasing energy efficiency depends on the actions 
of individuals and organisation in both the private 
and public sectors. The former will invest in energy 
efficiency if they can recoup the cost involved, which 
depends on energy prices and technological advance. 
In the public sector, authorities should consider the 
shift to a low-carbon economy and the possibility of 
much higher energy prices when deciding their poli-
cies and investment, especially in infrastructure likely 
to last for a great many years. 
The protection of the environment and its quality still 
vary greatly across the EU. Urban centres continue to 
suffer from poor air quality. Ozone concentrations of-
ten exceed EU thresholds in cities, especially in south-
ern Europe, and concentrations of particulate matter 
are too high in many cities, including Paris, Brussels, 
Milan, Budapest and Bucharest. Yet living in city cen-
tres, especially in those in compact cities, means peo-
ple usually need to travel shorter distances to get 
where they have to be. This means lower energy use 
of transport and even more so if journeys are made 
on foot, by bicycle or public transport. Living in cit-
ies also means lower levels of soil sealing per person, 
especially in compact cities. 
Urban waste water is not yet treated adequately 
in every Member State, especially in regions in the 
EU-12, but also several in the EU-15. The waste man-
agement sector, on the other hand, is recycling more 
waste, relying less on land fill and recovering more en-
ergy from incineration. Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
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1. Introduction
EU Cohesion Policy operates alongside an array of na-
tional and regional policies devised and implemented 
in many different places and under widely differing 
circumstances.
The objective of promoting harmonious development 
across the EU and a reduction in disparities between 
regions enshrined in Article 174 of the Treaty is a joint 
task with Member States. According to Treaty (Article 
175), the latter should conduct and coordinate their 
policies to attain economic, social and territorial co-
hesion.
This chapter examines the contribution of Member 
States to the pursuit of this objective. In doing so, it 
considers the size and composition of public expendi-
ture over the past decade, paying particular attention 
to investment decisions in key areas for growth and 
employment. It draws a picture of the main features 
and differences across countries as regards govern-
ment spending and the involvement of regional and 
local authorities in public investment. For the first 
time, public investment is broken down at NUTS 2 
level and examined in terms of its variation across re-
gions, its relationship to total investment and its con-
tribution to Cohesion Policy. 
A specific issue covered is the role of regional and lo-
cal authorities in policy implementation, particularly 
in public investment, and in raising revenue, to exam-
ine whether or not the process of decentralisation of 
competences which has occurred has been accompa-
nied by a transfer of financial resources. 
National responses to the economic recession are also 
examined. These have varied markedly across the EU, 
in general, in line with the size of the public sector, 
the fiscal ‘space’ available to implement ad hoc meas-
ures1 and the relative impact of the crisis. The impact 
on budgets is also specific to each country, though 
1  Fiscal space is the scope for governments to expand expenditure 
without jeopardising the sustainability of its fiscal position or the 
stability of the economy.
revenue has fallen everywhere. The measures taken, 
however, and the resulting increase in public deficits 
is likely significantly to constrain the room for public 
investment in future years in most Member States. 
The final section summarises the steps made to im-
prove the context in which Cohesion Policy operates. 
While most public policies which have an impact 
on economic, social and territorial cohesion involve 
spending, there are others that do not which set the 
conditions for successful development. These include 
measures to improve the functioning of labour mar-
kets or to boost competition.
2. National approaches to economic, 
social and territorial cohesion
The precise policy priorities set by Member States de-
pends not only on the scale of regional disparities that 
exist but also on factors such as social preferences, the 
division of power across the country, the nature of the 
regional challenges faced and the financial resources 
available.
The most obvious policy objective associated with co-
hesion is avoiding excessive disparities across regions. 
This is a constitutional requirement in some Member 
States. In Germany, for instance, the Basic Law refers to 
the creation of equivalent living conditions through-
out the country and, under federal legislation, regions 
should be supported if development is below the 
national average. In Italy too there is a constitutional 
commitment to reducing disparities between regions 
by channelling additional resources to them. In Spain, 
the Constitution includes the objective of promot-
ing ‘a more equitable distribution of income’ and ‘a fair 
and adequate economic balance between the different 
parts of the Spanish territory’. Other countries, such as 
Greece or Bulgaria, also have explicit constitutional 
references to regional and social inequalities or to 
the needs of specific areas. Yet, the fact that lagging 
regions might be supported by specific regional poli-
cies does not always mean that they are favoured by 
public intervention.
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The past decade has witnessed a gradual shift from 
policies aimed at reducing disparities towards those 
aimed at strengthening regional and national com-
petitiveness, with a focus on exploiting regional po-
tential to contribute to national growth. This is the 
approach in most Cohesion countries where reduc-
ing the gap between national GDP per head and 
the EU average is a major objective. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands, the policy emphasis is on seizing op-
portunities of national significance wherever they 
happen to be located, while in the UK, the aim is to 
provide ‘the environment for business and communities 
to maximise their potential’.
The aim tends to be pursued through investments in 
infrastructure and aid to businesses targeted at lag-
ging or problem regions. In Germany, for example, 
funding amounting to around 4% of their GDP is 
channelled to the Eastern Länder under the Solidarity 
Pact II to support investment for economic develop-
ment. In Spain, the Compensation Fund (Fondo de 
Compensación Interterritorial) is similarly aimed at cor-
recting regional disparities through public investment 
projects, and in Italy, the Fund for the Underutilised 
Areas’ (Fondo per le Aree Sottoutilizzate) is designed 
to increase investment in the lagging regions of the 
Mezzogiorno, the sum involved amounting to 3–4% of 
their GDP over the period 2007–2013 (though this was 
reduced significantly in 2009). In Poland too, there is a 
specific policy for the less developed Eastern regions.
In Member States with less pronounced regional dis-
parities but geographical diversity, regional policies 
are mostly focused on areas with specific features, of-
ten taking the form of aid to business. In Finland and 
Sweden, such aid is directed to firms located in the 
sparsely populated Northern regions. These regions 
also receive a transport grant to compensate for their 
extra costs of travel. In Denmark too, peripheral areas 
receive additional funding for business development. 
In France, special measures support areas affected by 
industrial restructuring and assist development in ru-
ral and mountain areas as well as in Corsica. Similar 
measures exist in Greece. In Cyprus a significant 
strand of regional policy is aimed at tackling under-
development of rural areas. In Malta there is a specific 
focus on the development of the island of Gozo. A 
particular feature of regional polices over the past 10 
years, is that they have tended to become more ex-
tensive reflecting the shift to support of endogenous 
development2. Public investment policies aimed at 
reducing territorial disparities need to take increas-
ing account of their effects in terms of efficiency and 
economic growth as well as of their coherence with 
sectoral policies. Fiscal equalisation mechanisms op-
erate in almost all Member States in order to ensure 
an acceptable provision of public goods and services 
across the country. They channel funding towards the 
less developed areas or those in which the cost of the 
provision is higher. They tend to level living standards 
by financing local authorities which are unable to col-
lect sufficient revenues to finance public goods and 
services that they provide.
At the same time, sectoral policies may have a con-
siderable impact on cohesion even though cohesion-
related objectives are rarely made explicit and the 
effects are often unintended. This is, for instance, the 
case for transport policy. The setting of priorities, the 
favouring of a particular system of transport and the 
design and implementation of projects all have an im-
pact on cohesion which often goes beyond national 
borders. Employment policy can also have significant 
effects on economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
The demographic structure of the population often 
differs markedly across regions in a country. Equally, 
unemployment affects different locations and social 
groups unevenly, so that measures adopted by gov-
ernments to tackle the problem and increase labour 
force participation have an impact on cohesion. The 
impact may also be considerable from other policies 
such as on education, research and innovation, tour-
ism or rural development, though it is frequently not 
easy to measure.
2  A recent study provides evidence from a number of countries that 
such polices tend to favour weaker regions. See Yuill, D., Ferry, 
M. and Vironen, H. (2008), New Policy Frameworks, New Policy 
Approaches: Recent Regional Policy Developments in the EU and 
Norway, EoRPA Paper 08/1, University of Strathclyde.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 147
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3. Public spending and investment 
in EU Member States 
3.1 Trends in public expenditure 
and public investment in the EU
The public sector tends to be larger 
in Member States with the highest 
levels of GDP per head … 
Public expenditure3 in relation to both GDP and pop-
ulation varies across Member States with their level 
of GDP per head. Expenditure on social protection ac-
counts for most of this variation. By contrast, public 
investment tends to be higher relative to GDP, though 
not population, in the less prosperous countries. This 
is linked to a large extent to EU Cohesion Policy sup-
port, which accounts in the Cohesion countries for 
around 55% of public expenditure on environmental 
protection, over 25% of that on transport, telecom-
munications and energy and around 10% of that on 
human capital development4.
Public expenditure declined slightly relative to GDP 
(by about 1 percentage point) over the period 2002–
2007 but increased by the same amount in 2008 and 
jumped in 2009 mostly as a result of the sharp drop 
in GDP caused by the recession. Up until 2008, there 
was a gradual convergence of both total public ex-
penditure and public investment relative to popula-
tion in Cohesion countries towards the EU average. 
Following the economic crisis, prospects for public 
investment are bleak in many of these countries, un-
derlining the importance of Cohesion Policy support.
Total public expenditure amounted to just under 47% 
of GDP in the EU in 2008 but rose to almost 51% in 
2009. The collapse of GDP rather than higher expendi-
ture is the predominant reason for this. Nevertheless, 
there are marked differences in the scale of public 
expenditure across Member States which varies from 
over 58% of GDP in Denmark to only just over 40% in 
Romania, broadly in line with variation in GDP per head 
3  The definition of public expenditure here is that used in the 
European System of Accounts (ESA-95). It includes all expenditure 
incurred by general government; both central and sub-national 
level expenditure by public corporations or similar bodies is not 
included.
4  The Member States which are eligible for Cohesion Fund support in 
the 2007–2013 programming period — i.e. the 12 Member States 
which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 plus Greece and Portugal.
(Figure 2.1). Most of the differences are explained by 
the level of expenditure on social protection.
After the reductions in the run-up to the Monetary 
Union in 1999, public expenditure in the EU remained 
broadly unchanged relative to GDP for almost a dec-
ade. In most of the Member States which have joined 
the Union since 2004, however, public expenditure 
declined relative to GDP up until 2007. In 2009, public 
expenditure rose back to 1997 levels as a share of GDP 
and public deficits and accumulated debts increased 
dramatically.
Public investment: a problematic 
concept in the European 
System of Accounts
Public investment is defined in this report as the sum 
of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (P51 in ESA-95) and 
consolidated Capital Transfers (D9_CO), after netting 
out transfers between the different levels of Govern-
ment. This takes account of the process of privatisation 
in many Member States over the past few decades, 
which often changes the economic category to which 
expenditure is assigned. Instead of investment being 
associated only with fixed capital formation, it is also 
associated with transfers to the privatised organisa-
tions which undertake the investment in place of pub-
lic authorities. Making a sharp distinction between 
gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers then 
becomes of questionable meaningfulness and the sum 
of the two together is the most relevant concept for 
identifying overall expenditure on regional develop-
ment. 
A further consequence of privatisation is that sales 
of public assets have tended to become more impor-
tant. Since in the ESA 95 system of accounts, these are 
treated as negative expenditure and are netted off  
gross capital formation in the published figures, the 
data for public investment presented here are also net 
of this item, which can be large in some countries (the 
UK is an example). The figures, therefore, do not neces-
sarily indicate ‘new’ investment as such but might sig-
nificantly understate this in some cases. With the data 
available, however, it is not possible to judge the size of 
this distortion and how it affects changes in the figures 
over time. The figures should be interpreted with this 
in mind. Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
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The large differences in GDP across the EU mean 
that public expenditure needs to be expressed on a 
per head basis in order to capture its size in different 
Member States. The relative level in these terms is 
even higher in the more prosperous countries, their 
larger GDP per head enabling them to devote more 
resources to the public sector. 
Public expenditure per head in PPS terms in Cohesion 
countries was on average only around half (49%) of 
that in other Member States in 2009. The gap nar-
rowed gradually (from 42% in 2000) up until 2008 
(reaching 51%) but widened in 2009 (Figure  2.2). 
Accordingly, the largest increases in public expendi-
ture per head over the period 2000–2008 occurred in 
Member States with GDP per head below the EU aver-
age. These in general experienced the highest rates of 
economic growth, underlining the importance of this 
for governments to be able to respond to demands 
for more development and social spending.
… but public investment is higher relative 
to GDP in the less prosperous countries
Public investment accounts for a relatively small share 
of total public expenditure in the EU (just under 9% 
in 2009). The dividing line between this and current 
spending however, is not altogether meaningful. 
Expenditure on education and training and on R&D is 
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classified as current, even though like capital spend-
ing, it produces returns over a number of years. Both 
are at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy (as they 
were in the Lisbon strategy).
Public investment also remained largely unchanged 
in the EU relative to GDP over the period 2000–2007. 
Between 2007 and 2009, however, it increased from 
3.7% of GDP to 4.4%, more proportionately than the 
rise in total spending (Figure 2.3). In EU-12 countries, 
in particular, public investment has risen as a share of 
public expenditure, especially since their entry into 
the Union.
In general, public investment has been consistently 
higher relative to GDP in countries with below average 
GDP per head. It accounted, on average, for around 
5% of GDP over the period 2000–2009 in Cohesion 
countries as against under 4% in the other Member 
States. This might reflect relatively low endowment 
of infrastructure and so a greater need for investment 
than in more developed countries.
Accordingly, while public investment per head in PPS 
terms was on average lower in Cohesion countries 
than in others over the period 2000–2009, the differ-
ence was much smaller than in the case of total public 
spending (Figure 2.4). The difference, moreover, has 
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narrowed over time, the level in Cohesion countries 
rising from 64% of that in other Member States in 
2000 to 75% in 2008, though falling to 69% in 2009 
due largely to the smaller effect of the crisis on GDP in 
Poland especially. In the Czech Republic and Greece, 
public investment per head was above the EU average 
in PPS terms and in Cyprus and Malta, around the av-
erage. By contrast, in Denmark, Germany and Finland, 
it was below the EU average, despite the higher level 
of GDP per head.
Public investment has increased dramatically 
in some Cohesion countries while declining 
in those with high levels of public debt
Public investment increased by around 14% in real 
terms in the EU between 2000–2004 and 2005–
20095 (Figure 2.5). The increase was slightly higher in 
Cohesion countries (19%) than in others (16%).
This average masks significant differences between 
Member States and, most especially, between 
Cohesion countries. Public investment declined in 
real terms in seven Member States, five of which were 
Cohesion countries (Greece, Hungary, Malta, Portugal 
and Slovakia). On the other hand, the six countries 
with the highest increases are also Cohesion countries, 
the rise amounting to over 60% in Poland, Estonia, 
Romania and Lithuania and over 100% in Latvia and 
Bulgaria, in all of them much more than the increase 
5  Averages are used to avoid distortions caused by fluctuations in 
expenditure.
in total expenditure. Among non-cohesion countries, 
the highest growth was in Ireland and the UK (over 
45% in both cases).
There seems to be a negative correlation between 
changes in public investment and public debt levels, 
suggesting perhaps that the possible need to limit 
expenditure affects public investment in particular. 
In 2008, Greece, Hungary, Malta and Portugal had 
the highest levels of debt relative to GDP among 
Cohesion countries and public investment declined in 
all of them, partly perhaps to make room for interest 
payments (which account for over 3% of GDP in Malta 
and Portugal and over 4% in Hungary and Greece), 
which were relatively small in Cohesion countries 
where public investment increased by most (under 
1% of GDP).
Countries with the highest levels of public investment 
relative to GDP over the period 2000–2009 also had 
the highest increases in GDP per head (Luxembourg, 
Ireland and the three Baltic States), though whether 
the former led to the latter or vice versa is uncertain. 
By contrast, only one of the 10 countries with the low-
est levels of public investment experienced an above 
average growth of GDP per head. This was the UK, 
where public investment rose over the period.
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3.2 The case for public investment 
and the rationale for additionality
A recurring issue in academic research concerns the 
net effect of public investment on economic growth. 
Although findings are mixed, a number of recent 
studies have concluded that public investment tends 
to boost growth, though they also stress the impor-
tance of the institutional setting (see Box).
EU Cohesion Policy is aimed at strengthening the 
competitiveness of regions through support for in-
vestment to increase their growth potential. To have 
the maximum effect, investments undertaken by 
national governments should be maintained. This is 
the reason why, under the principle of additionality 
(Article 15 of Regulation 1083/2006), it is stipulated 
that finance from Cohesion Policy should not replace 
equivalent expenditure by Member States, which are 
required to maintain public investment rather than 
diverting funding to other purposes.
The ‘ex-ante’ verification of additionality for the period 
2007–2013 indicated that an estimated EUR 94 billion 
or more a year (in 2006 prices) was planned to be in-
vested in Convergence regions over the period from 
national sources, additional to the amount financed 
from Cohesion Policy6. A mid-term verification of ad-
ditionality will be carried out in 2011 on the basis of 
public investment since 2007 and the prospects up to 
20137.
Additionality is critical to maintaining the structural 
nature of Cohesion Policy, to preventing Member 
States from diverting the finance received from pub-
lic investment to other non structural purpose and to 
ensuring that it results in higher rates of growth en-
hancing investments. Yet, the current system for veri-
fying additionality is often contested on the grounds 
that results are not fully reliable and not comparable 
across Member States and this is an ‘ad hoc’ exercise 
which is often cumbersome.
4. The composition of public 
expenditure in the EU
The aim here is to identify the main policy areas ac-
counting for the differences in public expenditure 
across Member States — i.e. whether they are due 
to investment in physical or human capital, current 
spending on social transfers or debt interest payments 
(which varied from 5% of GDP in Italy — nearly 10% of 
total public expenditure — and over 4% in Belgium, 
6  Carried out by the Commission in cooperation with Member States 
under Article 15 of the Regulation N° 1083/2006.
7  A revision of the baselines agreed in the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (NSRF) for the period might then be decided 
in the light of the impact of the crisis on public finances and their 
sustainability over the medium and long term.
The effect of public investment 
on economic growth
On the basis of a critical appraisal of recent theoreti-
cal studies on the link between government spending 
and economic activity, Imen and Kuehnel1 conclude 
that public investment tends to increase the rate of re-
turn to private capital and, in the long run, boosts eco-
nomic growth. Several researchers2 stress the impor-
tance of the institutional setting for maximising the 
positive effects of public investment in the economy. 
One study3 claims that there is more consensus in re-
cent literature about the positive effects of public capi-
tal on economic growth. It points out that the effect 
differs across regions and sectors and confirms that it 
is often dependent on institutional and policy factors. 
EU Cohesion Policy has also been widely analysed. A 
number of studies have demonstrated that invest-
ment financed by Cohesion Policy in infrastructure4, 
education5 and R&D6 has a positive effect on economic 
performance.
1  Irmen, A. and Kuehne, J. (2009), Productive Government 
Expenditure and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp. 692–733.
2 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson J. (2005) 
,‘Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run 
Growth’ in Aghion P. and Durlauf S. (eds.) Handbook of 
Economic Growth and Helpman E. (2008) Institutions and 
Economic Performance, Harvard University Press.
3  Romp, W. and De Haan, J. (2007), Public Capital and 
Economic Growth: A Critical Survey, Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 8, pp. 6–52.
4 Bouvet, F. (2007), ‘Labor Productivity, Infrastructure 
Endowment, and Regional Spillovers in the European 
Union’ in European Union Studies Association (EUSA), 
Tenth Biennial International Conference, May 17–19, 2007, 
pages 27, Montreal, Canada.
5 Rodriguez-Pose, A. and Fratesi, U. (2004) Between 
Development and Social Policies: the Impact of European 
Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions, Regional Studies, 
Vol. 38, pp. 97–113.
6  Hsu, F., Horng, D., Hsueh C. (2009), The effect of govern-
ment-sponsored R&D programmes on additionality in re-
cipient firms in Taiwan, Technovation, Vol. 29, pp. 204–217.Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
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Greece and Hungary to below 1% in the Baltic States 
and Luxembourg).
Overall, as noted, expenditure on social protection 
explains most of the difference in total public spend-
ing. Countries with below average GDP per head tend 
to spend more on energy, transport and communica-
tions, other items of expenditure not tending to vary 
systematically with GDP per head.
The most common basis of analysing the composition 
of public spending is through the UN Classification of 
Functions of Government8 (COFOG). Complete data 
for all Member Sates are available only for the 10 main 
COFOG Divisions (Figure  2.6). Most public invest-
ment is concentrated in a few of these, over a third in 
Economic Affairs (mostly in transport).
Social protection explains most 
of the differences in total public 
expenditure across Member States...
Social protection accounted, on average, for around 
39% of total public expenditure in the EU and over 
18% of GDP in 2008. In the three Member States 
with the highest levels of spending on social protec-
tion (France, Denmark and Sweden), which were also 
those with the highest levels of total public expendi-
ture, it amounted to over 20% of GDP. Conversely, it 
was below 10% of GDP in Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia and 
8  The expenditure is classified into Divisions (10), Groups (74) and 
Classes.
Romania and averaged under 14% of GDP in Cohesion 
countries as against over 18% in others. Expenditure 
per person in PPS terms in the former, however, rose 
from 47% of the EU average in 2002 to just over 50% 
in 2008 (Figure 2.7).
However, differences in public expenditure on social 
protection may conceal differences across countries in 
the way that protection is provided. In some Member 
States, the private sector plays a significant role in 
providing social support, while in others, support is 
provided through tax reliefs rather than through pub-
lic expenditure.
The inclusion of private expenditure tends to widen 
the existing gap across Member States even further, 
this tending to be lower in countries with below 
average GDP per head9. On the other hand, private 
expenditure narrows differences between Member 
States with GDP per head above average. The pri-
vate sector share is over 40% of the total in Belgium 
and the Netherlands and only slightly less in Ireland, 
the UK and Spain as against under 30% in France and 
Sweden and under 25% in Denmark, where public 
expenditure is highest. Tax concessions together 
with the taxes and social contributions payable on 
social transfers have a similar effect (though a de-
9  The figures are derived by combining data on Government 
Statistics in ESA-95 with the European System of Integrated Social 
Protection Statistics- ESSPROS).
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tailed analysis of this goes beyond the scope of this 
report10). 
… while public expenditure on physical 
and human capital is largely unrelated 
to levels of total public expenditure
On the other hand, public expenditure on transport, 
telecommunications and energy as a share of GDP 
tends to be highest in Member States with below 
average GDP per head11. In the 18 Member States for 
which full data are available, expenditure in these ar-
eas accounted for 3.4% of GDP on average in 2008 in 
Cohesion countries — in the Czech Republic, for al-
most 5.5% — as against just 2.2% in the others. This 
difference reflects the greater need to expand infra-
structure in the former. Such investments to popula-
tion rose from 70% of the EU average in 2002 to al-
most 79% in 2008 in these countries.
EU funding under Cohesion Policy12 for transport, tel-
ecommunications and energy in Cohesion countries 
amounted to almost 1% of their combined GDP, as 
10 Further information may be found in Adema, W. and and Ladaique,   
M. (2009), How expensive is the Welfare State?, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers N°92.
11 Expenditure in these areas is recorded in the COFOG category 
‘Economic Affairs’ which also includes agriculture, fishing, manu-
facturing and construction. Complete data are not available in 9 
Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia).
12 The codes taken into account for the comparison are the following: 
10–15 (Information Society), 16–32 (Transport) 33–43 (Energy) ac-
cording to the spending categories of Annex IV of the EC Regulation 
N° 1083/2006.
against only 0.1% in other Member States. As such, 
it accounted for around 75% of the difference in ex-
penditure between the former and the latter in 2008. 
Public investment as a share of GDP in these areas was, 
accordingly, around 35% higher in Cohesion countries 
than others, with the ERDF plus the Cohesion Fund fi-
nancing an estimated 28% of total investment — al-
most 40% in Lithuania and just under 35% in Poland 
(Figure 2.8).
Public expenditure on environmental protection 
tends to be higher relative to GDP in Member States 
with above average GDP per head though not sys-
tematically so. In 2008, it averaged around just over 
0.7% of GDP. In Bulgaria, Estonia and Malta as well 
as Ireland and Luxembourg, the Figure was over 1% 
(Figure 2.9).
In the Cohesion countries, EU funding accounted on 
average for over 55% of total public expenditure on 
the environment. This enabled them to maintain ex-
penditure at a more comparable level to that in other 
countries. In 2008, their expenditure per head was 
58% of the EU average in PPS terms as against 49% 
in 2002. In the Czech Republic and Malta, it has risen 
above the EU average in these terms.
Public expenditure on education amounted to just 
over 5% of GDP in the EU in 2008 and marginally 
more in Member States with above average GDP per 
head than in Cohesion countries. In Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Cyprus and Poland, however, expenditure 
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on education was above the EU average in these 
terms (Figure 2.10). Relative to population, expendi-
ture on education in Cohesion countries in PPS terms 
increased slightly relative to the EU average between 
2002 and 2008 (from 56% to 58%).
Since only a small part of spending on education is 
eligible for EU support, Cohesion Policy accounted 
for only a minor part of the difference in expenditure 
across Member States. Expenditure on primary and 
secondary education makes up most of the total but 
this is largely excluded from Cohesion Policy support. 
Nevertheless, Cohesion Policy financed over 10% of 
expenditure on education in 2008 in five EU-12 coun-
tries as well as in Greece and Portugal.
Economic growth enabled public 
expenditure in key areas for economic 
and social cohesion to be increased 
in most Cohesion countries
Total public expenditure in the EU was much the 
same in 2008 as in 2002 as a share of GDP (47%). In 
real terms, it was around 10% higher, but over 30% 
higher in Cohesion countries, even though as a share 
of GDP, it declined slightly because of their higher 
rates of growth.
The increase in expenditure was highest in environ-
ment and transport (included in economic affairs) at 
around 12% on average, though over 24% in Cohesion 
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countries. The increase was less on 
education and social protection, 
below 5% in both, but over 12% 
in the latter in Cohesion countries 
and 7% in education (Table 2.1).
The rise in public expenditure 
relative to population in Cohesion 
countries was more than double 
that in other countries in all these 
areas, especially in those where EU 
funding was most important. This 
rise occurred despite public ex-
penditure declining relative to GDP, 
reflecting the significant growth in 
GDP and demonstrating the im-
portance of the latter for the ability 
of governments to increase spend-
ing in key areas for social welfare 
and economic development.
5. Public spending 
and public 
investment at regional level
5.1 Decentralisation of public 
expenditure and investment
There has been a shift in responsibility for public 
expenditure from central to lower levels of govern-
ment13 over recent decades. This trend, however, has 
not been accompanied by increased resources for 
the latter. Since the 1990s, the share of sub-national 
government spending relative to GDP has been fair-
ly stable across the EU as a whole, despite the trend 
of decentralisation of competences. In some coun-
tries, however, it increased significantly (in Belgium, 
13 Sub-national levels of Government refer to all administrative levels 
other than the Central Government and Social Security, i.e. mainly 
regional and local authorities.
2.1 Public expenditure by policy area, 2002 and 2008
% of GDP  PPS per head (2004 prices)
2002 2008 2002 2008
Economic Affairs
EU 3.9 4.2 862.1 967.9
COH MS 5.0 5.6 610.8 758.6
NON-COH MS 3.8 4.0 949.7 1038.2
Environment
EU 0.7 0.7 150.8 168.4
COH MS 0.6 0.7 73.5 91.5
NON-COH MS 0.7 0.7 177.7 194.2
Education
EU 5.3 5.2 1131.2 1174.8
COH MS 5.3 5.0 631.1 676.7
NON-COH MS 5.3 5.2 1305.6 1342.1
Social protection
EU 18.5 18.2 3898.7 4089.7
COH MS 15.4 15.5 1839.2 2059.6
NON-COH MS 18.7 18.5 4616.9 4771.6
Source: Eurostat and DG REGIO calculations
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Denmark and Spain) while in others it declined (in 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria).
Less than a third of public 
expenditure is decentralised … 
Expenditure of sub-national levels of government 
in the EU accounted for around 28% of the total in 
2009 though with large differences across Member 
States. Expenditure tends to be more decentralised 
in Member States with a federal system (Germany, 
Austria and Belgium) but also in Spain and the Nordic 
countries where local authorities play an important 
role in the provision of public goods and services. In 
Denmark, the sub-national level accounted for over 
45% of total public spending in 2009, in Sweden and 
Spain for over 40% and in Germany, for over 35%. By 
contrast, in EU-12 countries, it averaged around 25%.
The share of sub-national governments in total ex-
penditure has remained much the same over the past 
decade despite the gradual decentralisation of com-
petences. However, in most Member States, there was 
a trend towards decentralisation of revenue, if modest 
in most cases. The most significant decentralisation of 
expenditure occurred in Slovakia and Romania, while 
decentralisation of revenue was most marked in 
Spain and Sweden. By contrast, expenditure became 
more centralised in Ireland as well as in two federal 
countries, Germany and Austria (Figure 2.11). In sum, 
devolution of power to sub-national levels of govern-
ment does not always go in parallel with decentralisa-
tion of financial resources. The former seems to have 
occurred more than the latter.
IE 
DE  HU 
NL  AT  UK  LU  LT  PT  BG  MT  EL 
IT  CY  DK BE  EE  LV  SI 
PL 
FR  FI  CZ 
SE 
ES  RO 
SK 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
%
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
,
 
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
9
Sub-national public expenditure as a share of GDP in 2009 and change 2000-2009 2.11
% of GDP
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculations
Spain — A rapid decentralisation 
of public expenditure
Spain had the highest degree of decentralisation of 
public expenditure in the EU in 2009 after Denmark 
and Sweden. Public finances have been significantly 
decentralised over the past 15 years in parallel with 
gradual devolution to the regions. For the first time, 
expenditure of the regions (Comunidades Autónomas) 
overtook that of Central Government in 2008 though 
it was reversed in 2009 due to the impact of the crisis. 
Decentralisation has occurred much faster in Spain 
in recent years than in the rest of the EU — the share 
of the sub-national level increasing on average by 13 
percentage points between 1999 and 2007 as against 
just 1 percentage point elsewhere. Public investment 
followed the same tendency, around two-thirds of the 
total being undertaken at sub-national level.
The process of devolution is reflected in the composi-
tion of public expenditure in the regions. The transfer 
of education and health to them led in over half of their 
annual budgets being devoted to these, investment in 
basic infrastructure, included in Economic Affairs, ac-
counting for just under 15%. A distinct tendency over 
the period 2000–2006 was a progressive increase of 
expenditure on health coupled with a relative decline 
in spending on education and training.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 157
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Education and social protection are the main items of 
public expenditure at sub-national level, accounting 
on average for around 21% and 19% of total spending 
at this level, respectively. Social protection expendi-
ture at sub-national level is particularly important 
in the UK (28%), Finland (27%), Germany (25%) and 
Sweden (23%). Expenditure on education is the main 
item at sub-national level in most of the EU-12 coun-
tries, local authorities being responsible for spending 
on primary and secondary schools. The other areas 
which account on average for more than 10% of total 
sub-national expenditure are Health (13%) — though 
over 20% in Italy, Sweden, Finland, Spain and Austria 
— and Economic Affairs (12% — over 20% in the 
Czech Republic and Romania).
...while two-thirds of public 
investment is decentralised 
Public investment14 is significantly more decentralised 
than public expenditure, accounting for a larger share 
of total spending at the sub-national level than at cen-
tral level in virtually all Member States. On average, 
some two thirds of public investment is carried out by 
sub-national governments in the EU (Figure 2.13).
The federal countries (Belgium, Germany and Austria) 
have the largest sub-national shares, together with 
Italy, Spain and France (over 70% of the total in 2009 
14 Public investment here includes only gross fixed capital formation, 
since there is not sufficient information to distinguish capital trans-
fers between different levels of government.
in each case). The share in the Nordic countries is simi-
lar to the EU average, while in EU-12 countries, it is 
below 50% on average, though over 60% in Poland, 
Latvia and the Slovakia, where there has been a rapid 
decentralisation of public investment. The impor-
tance of local government over the past decade has 
increased too in Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania.
While the above figures provide some insight into 
the importance of sub-national government in public 
finances, it should be emphasised that decentralisa-
tion of expenditure and revenue is just one aspect 
of a wider process. Expenditure at sub-national level 
does not necessarily reflect the power of the authori-
ties concerned over spending which may be limited 
to following central government instructions and im-
plementing programmes decided elsewhere.
Environmental protection is by far the most decen-
tralised area of spending in the EU, almost 80% of ex-
penditure occurring at regional and local level, indi-
cating the crucial role of the authorities concerned in 
tackling challenges like sustainable development or 
climate change. There are, however, a few countries, 
where expenditure is much less decentralised, nota-
bly Cyprus and Greece but also Poland and the Czech 
Republic to a lesser extent.
Around 40% of expenditure on Economic Affairs 
(mostly transport) is undertaken at sub-national level, 
though more in Federal States, Italy and Spain, reflect-
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ing the major involvement of regional and local au-
thorities in investment in infrastructure.
5.2 Regional breakdown of investment
As of now, there are no official EU statistics on pub-
lic expenditure at regional level and, accordingly, no 
consistent and comparable set of data in this regard. 
This is a serious obstacle to analysing the distribu-
tion of public expenditure and investment across EU 
regions15. In the meantime, data at regional level are 
available only from national sources, though not in all 
cases or on a comparable basis. However, an attempt 
has been made to align national data, where they ex-
ist, with Government Finance Statistics on an ESA-95 
basis in order to give some indication of the scale of 
expenditure and how it varies across regions.
Public investment in this section is defined to cover 
General Government gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) and capital transfers to businesses16.
Public investment is not particularly 
concentrated in less developed regions … 
While the regional distribution of public investment 
and changes in this vary across Member States, 
15 The Commission is currently cooperating with Member States 
to make such statistics available in the new ESA-95 Transmission 
Programme from 2014 on, the aim being that data at NUTS 2 level 
are reported for main categories of public expenditure.
16 This means that current expenditure on education and training is 
excluded, part of which is part of cohesion spending though this 
part cannot be separately distinguished at regional level.
public investment per head was on average high-
er in Competitiveness and Employment (RCE) and 
Transition regions (TRANS) than in Convergence ones 
(CONV) over the period 2002–200617 (Figure  2.14). 
Only in France and Germany did CONV regions have 
higher public investment per head. This was especial-
ly the case in Germany, where expenditure per head 
17 The classification of the current programming period 2007–2013 is 
used as the different Objectives were set using the state of regional 
disparities in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
Regionalisation of public 
expenditure data in Italy
Italy is an exception among EU countries in having 
a full set of public expenditure and revenue data at 
NUTS 2 regional level, which has been the case since 
1994.
La Banca Dati Conti Pubblici Territoriali (CPT) provides 
information on revenue and expenditure (both cur-
rent and capital) of the different public authorities in 
each region. It is coordinated by a Central Technical 
Unit in the Italian Development and Cohesion Depart-
ment and 21 Operational Units, one per region. These 
Operational Units collect data from public bodies on a 
harmonised basis. Data cover the public sector, includ-
ing public corporations, and are divided by adminis-
trative level, policy area and function, so enabling the 
distribution of public expenditure across regions and 
its composition in each case to be examined.
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was more than twice that in other regions in the coun-
try. In Spain, Greece and the UK, public investment 
was relatively evenly distributed across regions, while 
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, there 
was significant concentration in capital city regions. In 
consequence, other factors seem to have been more 
important than GDP per head in determining the lo-
cation of public investment. Accordingly, people liv-
ing in lagging regions often benefit less from public 
investment than those elsewhere, implying a widen-
ing of disparities in the endowment of public goods 
and services over time.
… as factors other than GDP per head 
seem to determine the location of 
public investment to a greater extent
Public investment seems particularly high in regions 
with specific geographical features, such as the Alpine 
regions of Tirol in Austria and Valle d’Aosta, Bolzano 
and Trento in Italy. The islands of Corse in France, 
Sardegna in Italy and Açores and Madeira in Portugal 
also have a higher level than other regions in the re-
spective countries. The same is the case in Sweden in 
respect of the two most northerly regions, while in 
Spain, public investment tends to be higher the lower 
the density of population, with Castilla y León and 
Aragón having the highest levels per head over the 
period 2002–2006 (Map 2.1).
Another element which seems relevant is the de-
gree of political and administrative autonomy which 
in some cases overlaps with the geographical fea-
tures, as in the Italian, French and Portuguese regions 
mentioned above. Other cases include the city state 
of Bremen in Germany or the devolved regions of 
Scotland and Northern Ireland in the UK.
In some countries, public investment also tends to 
be concentrated in capital city regions in per capita 
terms, as in Austria, the UK and Sweden as well as in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Central 
government investment explains most of this, the 
higher level perhaps reflecting to some extent the 
large number of commuters which add to the need 
for public goods and services.
The lack of data on public investment by region, es-
pecially that of central government, however, in some 
countries, such as in Germany and France, limits the 
extent to which this tendency can be fully examined.
EU Cohesion Policy, therefore, operates in different 
national contexts, where public investment is only 
partially concentrated in less developed regions. 
Figures on public investment per head seem to sug-
gest a relatively limited effort to improve the endow-
ment of public goods and services in the regions con-
cerned, which implies a risk of widening disparities in 
terms of development opportunity. 
Four groups of countries can be broadly distinguished 
in terms of the scale of regional disparities and the re-
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gional distribution of public investment over the 
period 2002–2006.
The first group comprises Member States with 
large regional disparities in which public invest-
ment was higher in the less advanced regions. 
Germany stands out, with public investment in the 
5 Eastern Länder much higher than in the rest of 
the country. In France, the same was the case in the 
four outermost regions as well as in Corse.
The second group includes Member States where 
public investment was not concentrated in less 
developed regions despite significant regional dis-
parities. In Italy, public investment per head was 
slightly higher in the more prosperous regions in 
the Centre and North of the country, being espe-
cially high in the affluent regions of Aosta, Bolzano 
and Trento, than in the Mezzogiorno despite the 
special funds devoted to the latter. In Spain, pub-
lic investment was above the national average in 
the Convergence regions of Galicia, Extremadura 
and Castilla-La-Mancha but below it in Andalucía, 
the other Convergence region and the most popu-
lated in the country. In Portugal, the highest rates 
of public investment by far were in the outermost 
regions of Madeira, with the second highest level 
of GDP per head in the country, and Açores. 
The third group consists of countries with rela-
tively small regional disparities, where, in general, 
public investment tends to be higher in peripheral 
regions and those with specific geographical fea-
tures. In Austria, public investment was highest in 
the Alpine region of Tirol, in Sweden, in the two 
northern-most regions and in the UK, in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. In these countries, however, 
public investment per head was also higher than 
the national average in the capital region.
The fourth group includes Member States with 
GDP per head below the EU average, where public 
investment is concentrated in the capital region. 
These are countries which have joined the EU since 
2004. The most prominent examples are the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
The case of the Italian Mezzogiorno
The Mezzogiorno comprises the 8 regions in the South of 
Italy, all of them recipients of Objective 1 support in the 
2000–2006 period except Abruzzo and Molise which had 
transitional ‘phasing-out’ status. Most of the regions were 
among those with the lowest rate of GDP growth in the EU 
over the period, their average GDP per head in PPS terms 
falling from 76% of the EU-27 average in 2000 to 68% in 
2006.
Although employment rates increased, they remained 
low as compared with rates in the rest of the EU and, in-
deed, the rest of the country. This was especially so for 
employment rates of women.
The low growth in the Mezzogiorno, however, reflects that 
in the Italian economy as a whole, GDP per head in PPS 
terms declining from 117% of the EU average in 2000 to 
under 104% in 2006. Indeed, growth in Objective 1 re-
gions in Italy was slightly higher over the period than in 
the Centre and North of the country. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that ‘the problem is as much that of the whole Italy 
as of the Mezzogiorno’.
Public investment policies at national level did not par-
ticularly favour the Mezzogiorno over the period. The 
Government objective1 of achieving a level of public 
capital expenditure, excluding the specific funds for re-
gional development, in the Mezzogiorno higher than in 
the rest of the country relative to its population was not 
achieved. Excluding public corporations (which account 
for around 25% of total public investment in Italy), public 
investment per head was lower in the Objective 1 regions 
(1 198 EUR per head a year) than in the other parts of the 
country (1 322 EUR per head) over the 2000–2006 period. 
This contrasts with the relative concentration of public in-
vestment in less developed regions in Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, in Spain.
After 7 years of modest growth, the international crisis 
pushed Italy into deep recession in 2008, sooner than in 
most other euro-zone economies. The reduction in eco-
nomic activity extended across all regions, RCE as well as 
CONV ones2. The more open (and resilient) RCE regions, 
however, are likely to recover more quickly than the latter.
1  Financial Bill 311/2004 (Legge Finanziaria 2005), art. 1.17: For 
the same purposes the central government will comply with 
the objective of allocating to the Mezzogiorno at least 30% of 
‘ordinary’ capital expenditure.
2  CONV regions in Italy are Campania, Puglia, Calabria and 
Sicilia, while Basilicata is as phasing-in region. All the remain-
ing regions are RCE ones.Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
162 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
… and private investment tends to be 
higher in the most prosperous regions
Private investment is distributed in a very different 
way across regions than public investment, in that it is 
highly correlated with the relative prosperity of regions 
and, therefore, tends to be concentrated in the most af-
fluent ones both at national and EU level. While public 
investment is not particularly concentrated in less de-
veloped regions, it tends to be higher relative to GDP in 
these than in other regions, so helping to strengthen 
their competitiveness by making them more attractive 
places to live, work and invest in.
Over the period 2002–2006, private investment in the 
EU was highest in a broad area covering the North-
East of Italy, Western Austria and Bayern in Germany 
and, to a lesser extent, in the Flemish part of Belgium 
and some of the Netherlands (Map 2.2). These areas 
have among the highest levels of GDP per head in 
the Union. The North-East of Spain, Ireland and most 
of Denmark also had relatively high investment lev-
els in per capita terms, along with most of the capital 
city regions and a number of conurbations, such as 
Hamburg, confirming that investment tends towards 
places with high accessibility and good endowment 
of physical and human capital where the business 
environment is particularly favourable. Private invest-
ment was equally above average relative to popula-
tion in the Portuguese and Spanish outermost re-
gions, some Alpine regions, and a few Mediterranean 
islands, which are important tourist destinations (the 
Balearic Islands and Crete, especially), indicating that 
geography is not always an obstacle to attracting in-
vestment. 
It was significantly below average relative to popula-
tion in virtually all Central and Eastern European re-
gions (except in some capital cities) as well as in many 
Convergence regions in Southern Europe, in particu-
lar, most of the Italian Mezzogiorno and the Norte re-
gion in Portugal. These regions have GDP per head 
below the EU average and often below the national 
average. (Note that there are no regional data on in-
vestment available for the UK and Bulgaria.)
The public sector is critical to sustaining 
investment in many European regions … 
Accordingly, public investment has an important role 
in these regions in increasing their endowment of in-
frastructure and so improving the competitiveness of 
businesses located there and making them more at-
tractive for the private sector to invest in.
Capital stock
The endowment of physical capital is a major factor of 
growth for regional economies. Capital stock statistics 
are available at the national level for most EU countries 
but are severely lacking for regions and where they ex-
ist, the methods used to produce them are generally 
not consistent across countries.
A pilot study commissioned by DG REGIO tested the 
feasibility of producing comparable estimates of the 
capital stock for NUTS 2 regions. After reviewing the 
main approaches used for estimation, the Perpetual 
Inventory Method (see OECD Manual on capital stock 
estimation, OECD 2001, 2009) was selected as the one 
most in line with data availability and allowing the 
widest geographical coverage. 
Using data from Eurostat or other publicly available 
sources wherever possible, the study produced capi-
tal stock figures for the all EU NUTS 2 regions. Analysis 
suggests that the estimates are generally robust and 
give rise to the following observations. The capital 
stock is invariably larger in the EU-15 than in the EU-
12, with some exceptions like Mazowiecke in Poland. 
A large amount of capital is concentrated in the highly 
industrialised north western part of Germany, as well 
as in the south west around Frankfurt. There is also a 
large net capital stock in Northern Italy, the South of 
France and some Spanish regions, like Cataluña and 
Castilla y Leon. 
The estimates were also used to compute the capi-
tal to labour ratio, which reflects the extent to which 
regional economies have predominantly capital or 
labour-intensive technologies. The ratio tends to be 
higher in the more developed Member States and low-
est in regions where labour is less costly. Clusters of re-
gions with a relatively high capital-labour ratio are in 
Austria, West Germany, and the Nordic countries. The 
ratio is also high in Ile de France and Provence-Côte 
d’Azur and Inner and Outer London.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 163
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It is also worth noting that public investment is rela-
tively important in a number of non-Convergence 
regions with particular geophysical features, such as 
the Northern regions of Sweden, Corse in France and 
the Alpine regions in Italy as well as those undergoing 
industrial restructuring such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 
France or Liège in Belgium.
… and European Cohesion Policy is very 
often behind this substantial public 
support to investment in regions
The ERDF and the Cohesion Fund account for a sig-
nificant share of public investment in less developed 
regions across the Union (Map 2.3). The two together 
over the 2000–2006 programming period accounted 
for over 40% of public investment in Convergence 
regions in Portugal, for over 30% in most regions in 
Greece, 20–25% in the Spanish Convergence regions, 
around 15% in the Italian Mezzogiorno and around 
10% in Eastern regions in Germany. In the last, how-
ever, this was in the context of high concentration of 
national public investment in these regions. In EU-12 
countries, they were responsible for over 20% of pub-
lic investment in Latvia, Lithuania and many regions in 
Poland. The share, moreover, is likely to be significant-
ly larger in the present programming period, because 
of the larger sums involved and the possible adverse 
effects of the crisis on national funding. Indeed, in a 
number of these countries, Cohesion Policy is likely to 
be the main source of finance for public investment in 
this period. It accounted already for a substantial part 
of the total gross fixed capital formation18 (GFCF) of 
the public sector in 2009. Cohesion Policy amounted 
to 90% of total public GFCF in Lithuania and to over 
50% in Hungary, Portugal, Estonia and Slovakia.
EU Cohesion Policy is not only important for the less 
prosperous regions in the Union. It is equal to 25% of 
the public investment undertaken by regional gov-
ernments in non Convergence regions in Spain and 
France (and over 30% in Cataluña and Aquitaine). In 
addition, in the West Midlands and London, it is es-
timated to be responsible for around 15% of public 
expenditure on environmental protection.
18 While the scope of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund is 
larger than GFCF it gives an indication of the relative importance of 
the policy in total public investment.
EU funding is also significant in respect of investment 
in human capital, improving the adaptability of work-
ers and assisting disadvantaged groups into employ-
ment. In regions in the Centre and North of Italy, it is 
estimated to account for some 25% of public expendi-
ture and in the Brussels region for around 10%.
5.3 Current spending and cohesion
Regional and local governments, which are mainly re-
sponsible for the provision of public goods and servic-
es, often face significant financial constraints despite 
high levels of GDP per head. One reason is that the 
number of people using public services is markedly 
higher than the number of inhabitants, which is typi-
cally the case in capital cities and other metropolitan 
areas. Another possible reason is the high debt level 
of many local and regional governments.
Their ability to raise revenue from their own sources is 
also in many cases less than suggested by their GDP 
per head. The base for regional and local taxes is of-
ten property and/or the income of those living there 
which may differ greatly from GDP. Indeed, the en-
dowment of public goods and services and the abil-
ity to provide them seems to be more correlated with 
income per head than GDP per head.
GDP is more concentrated than 
income in all Member States
Economic activity, and therefore, GDP, is more region-
ally concentrated than either population or income 
in the EU. As a result, regional disparities in GDP per 
head are wider than differences across regions in in-
come per head. The main reasons for this, as indicated 
above, are commuting, which effectively transfers the 
income generated by GDP from regions where peo-
ple work to those where they live, the transfer of com-
pany profits and, most importantly, at least at NUTS 1 
and 2 levels, government taxes and transfers. The lat-
ter include both those intended to make regional in-
come levels more equal and those associated with the 
social protection system.
Disparities in GDP per head between NUTS 2 regions 
are widest in Belgium, Slovakia and Romania, in each 
case because of a high concentration of economic ac-
tivity in the capital city region relative to population. 
GDP per head in the latter is around twice as high as Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 165
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the national average in all of them since many of the 
people responsible for producing GDP live in neigh-
bouring regions. Conversely, regional disparities in 
GDP per head are relatively narrow in the Netherlands 
partly because GDP and population are distributed 
across regions in similar ways and commuting be-
tween regions (rather than within them) is much less.
Commuting is important in narrowing 
regional disparities, especially 
in some Member States
Commuting plays an important role in reducing dis-
parities in income across NUTS 2 regions in a num-
ber of countries. Commuting tends to push up GDP 
per head in capital city regions and to reduce it in 
surrounding regions, which tend accordingly to 
have the highest levels of primary income per head 
relative to GDP per head. In Austria, for example, be-
cause of commuting to Vienna, income per head in 
Burgenland is 42% higher than GDP per head and 
in Niederösterreich, over 26% higher. Equally, in the 
Wallonne region in Belgium, primary income is over 
21% higher than GDP. Similar differences are evident 
in other countries, especially those where the capital 
city region is relatively small in geographical terms 
and surrounding regions, correspondingly more im-
portant sources of labour19. In the EU as a whole pri-
mary income is about 8% less dispersed than GDP 
across regions.
The government taxes and transfers 
systems are even more important in 
narrowing income disparities across 
regions at both the national and EU level 
Disparities in disposable income per head across re-
gions are narrower than in either GDP per head or pri-
mary income in all Member States as a result of gov-
ernment taxes and transfers redistributing income. 
The same applies across the EU as a whole. Regional 
disparities in disposable income across regions are 
about 18% less than disparities in GDP.
Average GDP per head in the 10% of regions with the 
highest levels in PPS terms was 4.5 times the average 
in the 10% of regions with the lowest levels in 2007. In 
terms of disposable income, it was 3.9 times higher20.
The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers is es-
pecially large in Denmark which, as a result, has the 
narrowest disparities in disposable income per head 
across NUTS 2 regions in the EU (Map 2.4). The effect 
is only slightly smaller in Sweden, Austria, France and 
the Netherlands. By contrast, the redistributive effect 
is relatively small in Spain, Italy and Romania which 
19  For this reason, the analysis is made at NUTS I level in the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands as well as Belgium. These are the four Member 
States with the highest rates of population density in the EU.
20 The 20% of regions with the highest and lowest levels of GDP per 
head and income per head is here calculated in terms of population 
rather than the number of regions so as to take account of the very 
different population sizes of NUTS 2 regions.
GDP, income and the provision 
of public goods and services
The provision of public goods and services is impor-
tant for increasing the development opportunities 
and standard of living in regions. A high GDP per head 
does not necessarily ensure sufficient provision for 
people living in the region.
GDP per head, which tends to be the indicator used 
to measure the relative prosperity of regions, relates 
to the income generated by the production of goods 
and services in the region in relation to the population 
living there. The GDP generated in a region, however, 
does not necessarily all go to people living in a region. 
Some of it may go to people outside who work in the 
region but live elsewhere — i.e. to those commuting 
into the region to work who are partly responsible for 
the GDP generated there. Some of it will take the form 
of company profits which may then be transferred to 
other regions, or even to other countries. Some of it 
may also be transferred out of the region by individu-
als, in the form, for example, of remittances abroad. 
The income available to households in a region, there-
fore, differs from GDP. The relationship between GDP 
per head and disposable household income at region-
al level is, therefore, by no means a systematic one. The 
final determinants of the income which households 
have available to spend are the taxes levied by govern-
ment and the transfers paid, both of which can vary 
markedly across regions. Regions with a high GDP per 
head do not necessarily have a high level of disposable 
household income per head, nor does a low GDP per 
head necessarily imply a low level of household in-
come and low living standards.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 167
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have the widest income disparities across regions in 
the EU, along with Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria21.
It is equally important to take account of the effect 
of transfers in kind which is not captured by these 
figures. In all countries, education and healthcare are 
provided free of charge and, accordingly, contribute 
significantly to economic, social and territorial cohe-
sion. The quality of these services varies both within 
and between countries which should ideally be tak-
en into account when assessing income disparities. 
Equally, social services, such as child or elderly care, 
are provided free or well below cost in some countries 
— the Nordic countries especially — but not in oth-
ers, so effectively adding to income much more in the 
former than the latter. Ignoring these services distorts 
comparisons across countries — and in some cases 
across regions — though lack of data makes it difficult 
to incorporate them in the analysis. 
Sixteen of the 20 regions in which taxes and trans-
fers have the most effect are either Convergence or 
Transition regions, government interventions increas-
ing disposable income per head by at least 9%. These 
include Asturias in Spain, Calabria in Italy, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in the UK, the Finnish region of Itä-
Suomi and the two eastern regions of Hungary. In four 
of the East German Länder, the increase is over 15%.
The number of NUTS 2 regions (132) in the EU in which 
disposable income per head is increased relative to 
GDP per head is much larger than the number (50) in 
which it is reduced, reflecting the greater concentra-
tion of economic activity than of population.
In sum, household income per head in the EU is signif-
icantly more equal across regions than GDP per head, 
principally because of the net effect of taxes and 
transfers. This effect, however, varies markedly across 
countries, as does the scale of commuting, which is 
important in transferring income generated in capi-
tal city regions in particular to surrounding areas in a 
number of countries.
Developments since 2000 indicate a gradual reduc-
tion in regional disparities in the EU in both income 
and GDP.
21 There are no data available for Greece.
Capital city regions: a particular 
kind of administrative entity
Capital city regions across the EU share a number of 
features. In nearly all Member States, they have the 
highest GDP per head as a result of the higher con-
centration of economic activity in them than of popu-
lation. Berlin is the main exception. GDP per head in 
Lazio in Italy and Madrid in Spain is also not the high-
est in these countries, though well above the national 
average.
Large inflows of commuters occur daily into capital 
city regions from neighbouring ones, pushing up GDP 
per head in the former and reducing it in the latter. 
There are 12 capital city regions among the 20 regions 
in the EU where primary income per head is furthest 
below GDP per head. Brussels is the prime case, with 
GDP per head almost twice the national average and 
primary income per head 7% below this. In London, 
GDP per head is 178% above the national average, 
primary income, 71% above, in Prague, the figures are 
109% above and 47%, respectively, and in Vienna, 34% 
above and 4% above. These large differences partly re-
flect the relatively small geographical size of the cities 
concerned and the fact that they do not constitute co-
herent functional regions. Other geographically larger 
capital city regions, defined in NUTS  2 terms, have 
smaller commuter inflows (much of the commuting 
occurring within the region), though still significant 
in some cases, such as Ile de France and the regions 
in which Budapest, Warsaw and Athens are situated. 
In all of them, the gap between their primary income 
per head and the national average is over 10% smaller 
than that between their GDP per head and the nation-
al average.
Capital city regions also tend to transfer significant 
income to other regions through the operation of the 
fiscal system, which reduces their disposable income. 
Berlin, Brussels and Athens are the only exceptions. 
The amount of transfer is especially large in Romania, 
Slovakia and the UK, disposable income per head in 
the capital being reduced by over 15% in each case. 
It is slightly smaller, in France, Hungary and Poland, 
where the reduction is over 10%.
This outflow of income may affect the ability of the au-
thorities in capital city regions to maintain the public 
services needed by the people working in the region 
as well as those living there or may result in relatively 
high taxes on residents to finance these services.Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
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6. National policies and 
the economic crisis
6.1 The economic crisis and the 
national stimulus plans
The EU economy in 2009 experienced the worst reces-
sion since the Second World War. GDP shrank by over 
4% and unemployment rose to 10% by the end of the 
year. The effects, however, were moderated by the 
European Economic Recovery Plan22 (EERP) endorsed 
by the European Council in December 2008. This had 
two main elements: 
  • a major injection of purchasing power to boost 
demand in the short term and restore business 
and consumer confidence;
  • short-term measures to strengthen EU competi-
tiveness in the longer term. 
The former involved a budgetary expansion of EUR 
170 billion from national sources with an additional 
EUR 30 billion from EU sources, much of it in the form 
of accelerated Cohesion Policy payments (see Box). 
Many Member States adopted 
national stimulus plans … 
From autumn 2008, many Member States adopted 
stimulus packages, amounting together to some 1.5% 
22 A European Economic Recovery Plan. COM(2008) 800 final.
of EU GDP in 2009 and much the same in 2010. The 
size, however, varied markedly, tending to be larger in 
countries with more fiscal leeway (Figure 2.15). 
In five Member States (Luxembourg, Cyprus, Poland, 
Sweden and Finland) the total stimulus amounted to 
over 2% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, while in 11, it was 
under 1%, and in three of these (Greece, Romania and 
Lithuania) below 0.5%.
The nature of the measures adopted also differed. 
They can be divided into four main categories:
  • support to households (about 0.5% of GDP 
2009–2010), the main measure, accounting for 
around a third of the total stimulus and consisting 
mostly of temporary tax and social contribution 
reductions and special support to low-income 
households; 
  • increased public investment (around 0.3% of 
GDP 2009–2010), consisting of new or accelerated 
projects, mostly on infrastructure; 
  • business support (0.4% of GDP 2009–2010) to 
provide temporary assistance to sectors most af-
fected such as the car industry;
  • labour market measures (0.25% of GDP 2009–
2010) to alleviate the social impact of the crisis. 
The relative weight given to each of these varied be-
tween countries depending on the specific impact 
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of the crisis. In Austria, Luxembourg, Finland, and 
the UK, support was concentrated on households, in 
Sweden, Hungary, Denmark and the Czech Republic, 
mainly on the labour market, in Slovenia and France, 
on businesses and in Poland, on public investment. In 
Germany, Spain and Belgium, there was a relatively 
even spread across the measures.
As in the case of other measures, the priority given to 
public investment differed markedly across countries, 
with a number of Cohesion countries (Greece, Latvia, 
Romania, Hungary and Lithuania) not being in a po-
sition to expand expenditure because of the limited 
fiscal space for action.
Most of the increase in public investment took the 
form of infrastructure projects, many of which were 
already under preparation. The main exception was 
in Germany, where priority was given to projects for 
increasing energy efficiency in line with Commission 
guidelines. Only a few countries (Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Latvia among the Cohesion countries) adopted 
measures to boost R&D significantly.
The packages have prevented GDP from falling fur-
ther and job losses and firm closures from being larg-
er. Since they are temporary, most of the measures 
will come to an end in 2011 as economic growth picks 
up.
… in which regions played an active role 
in countering the effects of the crisis
Much of the response to the crisis was at national 
level. Regional and local authorities, however, also 
played an important role in some countries, especially 
in those with a significant degree of fiscal decentrali-
sation.
Major stimulus packages were initiated in a num-
ber of regions. All regions in Italy for instance intro-
duced their own packages, amounting to some EUR 
EU Cohesion Policy in the recovery plan
in 2009, EU Cohesion Policy was a key part of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan. Significant advance payments 
from Cohesion Policy were made in 2009, allowing more 
money to be directed to priority projects (total payments 
of EUR 11.25 billion, of which EUR 6.25 billion was in re-
sponse to the crisis). For many 2000–2006 programmes, 
the eligibility date was extended to give more opportunity 
for funding to be absorbed and many Member States in-
creased the speed and amount of advance payments to 
recipients to help them cope with the recession.
At the end of 2009, over EUR 93 billion had been allocated 
to specific projects on the ground, equivalent to over 27% 
of the total funds allocated for the whole of the 2007–2013 
programming period. 
The biggest injection of funds was in the Baltic States 
which were hit most severely by the recession, payments 
amounting to around 4% of GDP in Estonia and Lithuania 
and 2.5% in Latvia. Payments were also over 2% of GDP in 
Hungary and Poland. The highest rates of absorption are 
evident in countries hit hardest by the recession, namely in 
Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania, where investment declined 
by over 35% in each case and consumption by over 10%. 
Most of these countries had only limited fiscal space for 
counter-cyclical measures and their national stimulus 
packages were among the smallest in the EU. 
The composition of spending was largely in line with the 
European Economic Recovery Plan and the Europe 2020 
objectives. Around EUR 60 billion was allocated to projects 
in areas related to the latter. In particular, 28% of the pro-
jects financed involved support to innovation and busi-
nesses and around 20%, upgrading human capital. In ad-
dition, around half of the funds allocated to making places 
more attractive went on clean transport (rail), the environ-
ment and cultural and social projects.
The absorption of funds was particularly high in respect 
of support to businesses, on which over 36% of the funds 
allocated over the programming period had already been 
committed by 2009, as well as investment in human capital 
(25% of funds being absorbed). 
EU funding accounted for a large part of total public in-
vestment in 2009 in many Member States where budget 
constraints limited the amount of national spending and 
are likely to continue to do so in coming years because of 
the need to reduce government borrowing. In these coun-
tries, therefore, EU funding is key to ensuring some stabil-
ity in public investment levels and, accordingly, a crucial 
part of economic recovery.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 171
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5.5 billion overall or around half of the total stimulus. 
Significant stimulus packages were also implement-
ed in all the German Landër, Vlaanderen (Belgium), 
Gelderland (Netherlands) and Scotland and Wales 
(UK). They included, in general, the same types of 
measure as at national level, with a particular focus on 
infrastructure projects. In Spain, many regions also in-
troduced temporary tax rebates and other support for 
the car industry to complement national government 
measures. In the EU-12, the only example of direct re-
gional support was in Slovenia23.
6.2 The effects of the economic 
crisis on public finances and the 
prospects for public investment
Public finances have been affected dramatically by 
the sharp economic downturn which started in 2008. 
All Member States had budget deficits in 2009 (in 
some — Ireland, Spain, Greece and the UK — amount-
ing to over 10% of GDP) and all of them are expected 
to do so in 2010 and 2011. The average deficit across 
the EU was 6.9% of GDP and is expected to rise to 
7.5% in 2010. Accumulated public sector debt aver-
aged 73.5% of GDP in 2009 and it is expected to rise 
to over 83% in 2011 unless there is a change in policy.
23  Gorzelak, G. and Chor-Ching, G. (2009), Financial Crisis in Central 
and Eastern Europe: From Similarity to Diversity, The World Bank-
EUROREG.
Public deficits and public debt are 
problematic legacies of the crisis … 
The deterioration of public finances is expected to 
continue until at least 2011 despite the fiscal consoli-
dation envisaged in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes recently adopted. The increase in pub-
lic sector debt by 2011 is on average projected to be 
around 25 percentage points of GDP relative to 2007 
in the EU and over 70 percentage points in Ireland, 
over 50 percentage points in Latvia, over 40 percent-
age points in the UK and only slightly less in Spain and 
Greece (Figure 2.16).
Despite the stimulus packages adopted by many 
Member States, only a limited part of the projected 
increase in debt is due to additional government 
expenditure. The main part results from reduced 
government revenue from taxes and social security 
payments as a result of the economic downturn (the 
so-called automatic stabilisers which prevent eco-
nomic activity falling even further). There is also, of 
course, a ‘denominator effect’ caused by the decline 
in GDP in 2009.
High levels of public debt are one of the main lega-
cies of the crisis over the medium term, putting the 
sustainability of public finances at the forefront of 
the policy agenda. Recovery of the economy, and in 
the tax base, together with a withdrawal of stimulus 
measures will not in most cases be sufficient to re-
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duce public debt back to pre-crisis levels. To achieve 
this will require a protracted adjustment24.
… which threatens public 
investment in the coming years
There are serious risks that such adjustment will lead 
to reductions in public investment, just as occurred in 
similar periods of budgetary consolidation in the past. 
This was the case, for instance, in the 1990s when pub-
lic debt was reduced to comply with the Maastricht 
criteria required to join the Monetary Union. This risk 
is especially serious in Member States where public 
debt has increased by most. Empirical evidence shows 
that countries with high levels of public debt tend to 
have lower levels of public investment, especially in 
times of fiscal consolidation.
A ‘golden rule’ of economics, however, is that ‘produc-
tive’ public expenditure should not be cut as severely 
as other elements in times of budget restraint, since 
this may stimulate higher rates of growth in the long-
er term, which are essential for budgetary consolida-
tion to be sustained25. Indeed, reducing public invest-
ment is likely to make it harder to reduce government 
borrowing levels over the long-run because of its de-
pressing effect on growth (see Box).
The impact of the crisis on public finances 
was less for regional and local authorities 
than for central government in 2009
Regional and local governments have been affected to 
varying extents by the economic downturn, depend-
ing on its scale, the composition of their expenditure 
and their sources of revenues. Overall, however, the 
effect was less than on central government in 2009. 
Public expenditure increased by 2.2% in nominal 
terms in the EU in 2009. In the three Baltic coun-
tries, expenditure declined. The overall increase in 
expenditure was larger for central governments (up 
by 2.6%) than for sub-national levels (up by 1.7%). 
Only in Malta, Austria and the Czech Republic, was 
24  European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, European Economic Forecast – autumn 2009. 
Brussels, 2009. 
25 Mintz J. and Smart M. (2006), Incentives for public investment un-
der fiscal rules, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3860, The 
World Bank.
the increase more for the latter than for the former 
(Figure 2.17). 
Public investment in the EU rose in 2009 for both cen-
tral and sub-national levels of government by slightly 
more than total expenditure, reflecting the stimulus 
measures. There were, however, big differences be-
tween Member States. Public investment declined in 
many Cohesion countries, by as much as 35% in Latvia 
and Lithuania and by over 20% in Estonia, just under 
20% in Ireland and close to 15% in Bulgaria. The big-
gest increases also occurred in two Cohesion coun-
tries, Cyprus (36%) and Poland (22%), where the effect 
of the crisis was much more modest. 
Revenue of sub-national levels of government was 
affected by the crisis only to a small extent, since in 
Public investment and 
budgetary consolidation
Economic studies suggest that cutbacks in public in-
vestment in infrastructure and education may have 
damaging effects on economic growth in the longer-
term which may more than outweigh the short-term 
reduction in the budget deficit. For instance, Zagler 
and Durnecker (2003) show the long run growth ef-
fects of government expenditure of public invest-
ments in infrastructure and education. This is very 
relevant because it pushes the research agenda on 
fiscal policy issues from a purely short run view to a 
more long run perspective. Growth-enhancing public 
investment, while causing short run budget deficits, 
has a positive effect not only in economic growth but 
also in the increase of tax revenue. If public investment 
is cut for budgetary purposes until levels of significant 
underinvestment, there is a risk that revenues fall more 
than the immediate improvement in the cash deficit 
as a result of lower economic growth. These authors 
show that the effects of cutting public investment are 
negative not only in terms of economic growth but 
also for the budgetary position of the country. Accord-
ingly, if this is the case, the conclusion is that there is 
not a ‘trade-off’ between public investment and fiscal 
consolidation in the medium and long run but just the 
reverse. Resuming economic growth is a must for a 
sustainable consolidation of public finances and pub-
lic investment can play a significant role in the recov-
ery of the economy.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 173
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general this depends less on taxes than on central 
government transfers, which account for over 40% of 
their total revenue. These increased in 2009 despite 
the crisis, in many cases as part of national stimulus 
measures, though they fell markedly in the three 
Baltic countries because of the depth of the recession.
Despite the generally small impact of the crisis on the 
financial resources of sub-national governments in 
2009, there is concern about prospective reductions 
in the coming years, especially in countries with large 
deficits and high levels of debt. Sub-national govern-
ments are responsible for a large part of public in-
vestment and for the provision of public goods and 
services important to social welfare and to improve 
development opportunities. In many cases, much of 
their revenue comes from central government. While 
regions with significant fiscal autonomy were hit most 
by the economic downturn in 2009, they may fare bet-
ter than others during economic recovery if national 
budgets are consolidated at the same time.
7. Structural conditions for 
successful cohesion 
Government intervention in pursuit of cohesion ob-
jectives does not only entail public expenditure. It also 
includes measures to set the structural conditions for 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Their effective 
design and implementation is necessary not only for 
sustained growth but also to maximise the impact of 
public investment. They may even provide a greater 
impact in regions with higher levels of unemploy-
ment and higher potential for growth. Structural re-
forms are therefore not only important for growth as a 
whole in the EU but also to tackle regional disparities. 
Cohesion Policy provides a significant demand stimu-
lus in the short term in many EU Member States. The 
associated risks in terms of inflation and current ac-
count imbalances can be reduced by appropriate flex-
ibility-oriented structural reforms and stability-orient-
ed policies. It is the synergy between an EU Cohesion 
Policy channelled towards the most productive hu-
man and physical capital investment (complemented 
by national public investment) and supportive fiscal 
and structural reform policies that can have a lasting 
effect on the supply side of the economy.
Member States have implemented a number of 
structural measures as part of their National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) in recent years, the second set 
for the years 2008–2010 being formulated under the 
renewed Lisbon Strategy and focused on growth and 
employment. Priorities are establishing well-function-
ing labour and product markets, creating an environ-
ment favourable for businesses and innovation and 
increasing competition. 
An adequate institutional framework and efficient 
public administration are repeatedly identified as 
prerequisites for creating an environment favourable 
for growth and competitiveness and for fully realising 
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the benefits of public investment and, in particular, 
EU Cohesion Policy. The reform of public administra-
tion has a prominent place on the agenda of many 
Member States, especially those for which structural 
weaknesses in this area constitute an impediment to 
achieving their economic development objectives. 
Member States have made progress 
in adopting coherent and integrated 
approaches to R&D and innovation … 
Research and innovation are critical to an advanced 
knowledge intensive economy based on the produc-
tion of goods and services of high value added. 
Member States have increasingly become aware that 
enhancing their economic performance and respond-
ing to societal needs will require R&D policy to be 
placed in a broader context and to be developed in a 
coherent way with other policy areas. The revamped 
Lisbon process has shown its usefulness by encourag-
ing a common orientation of policy and the setting 
of a limited number of quantified targets but at the 
same time leaving Member States free to experiment 
and design specific measures suited to their economic 
structure, institutional features and national priorities. 
National R&D strategies have evolved gradually to-
wards a more coherent and complex policy mix, cut-
ting across different Ministries and involving changes 
in the institutional setting. In this context, the invest-
ment funded under Cohesion Policy is likely to have a 
greater impact.
… even though expenditure on R&D has 
remained below the Lisbon objective
The target of increasing total expenditure on R&D 
to 3% of EU GDP has been maintained in the Europe 
2020 Strategy. All Member States have set their own 
national targets, which are in most cases lower than 
3%. Progress in increasing R&D has been very slow, ex-
penditure rising only marginally from 1.8% to 1.9% of 
GDP over the period 2000–2008. In general, the sub-
stantial increases in R&D spending have taken place in 
countries where R&D expenditure was relatively low. 
At the same time, government funding of private R&D 
is increasingly taking the form of indirect measures, 
such as tax incentives, rather than direct ones26.
26 Trends in R&D policies for a European knowledge-based economy, 
JRC Scientific and Technical Reports. European Commission, 2009.
R&D expenditures and policies are at risk of being 
downsized due to the enormous strains on both pub-
lic and private budgets. In this context, it is important 
for Member States to build on their progress and 
tackle weaknesses, in order to sustain current positive 
trends and to continue them beyond 2010.
Many regions are increasingly involved 
in R&D and innovation policies
Many regions have come to play a key role in innova-
tion policies of Member States. They have developed 
their own innovation strategies relying on existing 
strengths and local potential. They tend to concen-
trate on selected areas or on technologies focussed 
on specific sectors. The main goal of regional involve-
ment is to promote technology transfer, innovation 
and commercialisation. Such involvement in research 
policies and, more particularly, in the European 
Research Area, however, has had mixed results. A po-
tentially important development is that regions in 
federal countries have been given increasing respon-
sibility over basic science and university funding. By 
contrast, regions which simply implement national 
top-down policies for research and innovation have 
no way of being involved in their own policies other 
than participating in EU funded projects27. 
Progress have been made in the 
modernisation of higher education systems
The post-2000 period has seen widespread policy ac-
tivity in pursuit of reforms to foster the excellence of 
the public research base, particularly as regards uni-
versities. The modernisation of universities was part 
of the Lisbon Agenda. 
European universities have implemented major policy 
changes concerning their governance, funding and 
human resources policies. Increasing competition has 
driven universities to develop strategies to attract stu-
dents, researchers and funding and to raise their sci-
entific profile. In most countries, the institutional au-
tonomy granted to universities has been reinforced. 
This has involved more competitive and output-ori-
ented methods of coordination between the State 
and higher education institutions and among the lat-
27 Contribution of policies at the regional level to the realisation of 
the European Research Area, ERAWATCH, a joint initiative of the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Joint 
Research Centre. European Commission. 2009.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 175
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ter themselves. It has also involved a corresponding 
reorganisation of decision-making processes within 
the institutions. University funding has changed, with 
a decline in block grants and a growth of competitive 
funding and finance from contracts.
However, Member States still face challenges in mod-
ernising higher education. The economic crisis has 
led to significant cutbacks in spending which may put 
at risk the progress already achieved. The strategic 
framework for European co-operation in education 
and training (’ET 2020’), adopted by the Council in 
May 2009, underlines the need to continue with the 
modernisation agenda for higher education and to 
improve the quality and efficiency of education and 
training28. 
Business potential has been gradually 
unlocked, especially in SMEs
Businesses in the EU are confronted daily with a range 
of obstacles which limit their activities. These restrict 
their ability to operate internationally and reduce the 
impact of ERDF support to enhance the competive-
ness of firms. Firms often have to deal with 27 differ-
ent legal systems for the same transaction as well as 
having to cope with administrative burdens and the 
associated costs, including when starting up a busi-
ness. These tend to offset the support provided un-
der Cohesion Policy to increase firm competitiveness 
(EUR 70 billion in 2007–2013). These problems affect 
SMEs, in particular, which are a main focus of policy 
and impede their ability to grasp the opportunities 
created by the Single Market. 
In the second set of National Reform Programmes, 
some progress has been made in improving the busi-
ness environment in a number of Member States, 
partly because of a greater focus on creating more 
favourable conditions for SMEs as a response to eco-
nomic downturn. In 2009, there were 18 Member 
States which had introduced one-stop shops for start-
ing up businesses, with the average time for starting 
a private limited company being reduced to 8 calen-
dar days as against 24 days in 2002 and the average 
cost being halved to EUR 417. While there has been a 
major change in the regulatory culture in the EU over 
28 Focus on Higher Education in Europe 2010: The impact of the 
Bologna Process. European Commission.
this period, much remains to be done to simplify the 
business environment and reduce the administrative 
burden.
The first step towards a comprehensive policy frame-
work for SMEs across the EU was the adoption by the 
Commission of the Small Business Act in June 2008. 
Several measures included in this document have al-
ready been introduced, such as reduced VAT rates in 
June 2009. 
Access to finance for SMEs has become even more 
important in the crisis and most Member States have 
taken measures to facilitate this, mainly through ex-
tending schemes guaranteeing loans to SMEs, inter-
est rate subsidies and increasing the credit earmarked 
for SMEs. Nevertheless access to finance still remains 
fragmented and out of line with current needs, espe-
cially for start-ups and small loans (micro credit). 
… but competition policies have 
progressed relatively slowly
Competition policies, and preventing restrictive 
agreements between firms as well as monopolies, are 
intended to ensure that markets provide the right en-
vironment for investment and innovation and, accord-
ingly, for growth and employment. In the absence of 
competition, there is a risk that public investment and 
aid to business will not produce the expected effects 
in this regard.
Measures adopted by Member States in this area have 
often been general in scope, focusing either on imple-
menting the existing acquis, in particular as regards 
‘network industries’ (i.e. energy, transport and tele-
communications) or on enforcing competition policy.
The regulation of professional services still remains 
restrictive in a number of Member States, so hamper-
ing competition. The implementation of the Services 
Directive should bring about visible improvements 
by facilitating the establishment of services in other 
countries and the provision of cross-border services. 
Progress has been made in most Member States in this 
respect, but there remain a number of Member States 
who have still to implement the Directive fully. There 
has been an increase in financial integration, though 
at different speeds across sections of the market. In 
particular, retail banking remains fragmented, though Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
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a number of Member States have taken specific action 
to correct this, such as Poland which abolished regu-
lations limiting investment in retail and wholesale 
markets. Some Member States have taken measures 
to remove barriers to market entry by new operators 
and the expansion of existing ones. Opening up net-
work industries and services to competition has been 
slow and significant obstacles to market entry remain. 
While many Member States have sought to increase 
competition in gas, electricity and telecommunica-
tions, there remain restrictions due to ‘bundling’ (es-
pecially in the gas, electricity and rail sectors) as well 
as a need to set up clearly mandated and independ-
ent regulatory authorities with adequate resources.
In addition, very few Member States have introduced 
measures to improve the functioning of public pro-
curement markets or intellectual and industrial prop-
erty rights regulations, or to speed up standardisation.
Structural improvements in the 
functioning of labour markets help 
to increase employment … 
Raising employment levels is one of the most effective 
ways of generating economic growth and increasing 
social inclusion. Some 75 EUR billion is allocated un-
der Cohesion Policy in the current programming pe-
riod to employment policies and upgrading human 
capital. This is intended, inter alia, to increase lifelong 
learning, help disadvantaged groups into jobs and 
support active ageing.
The potential gains from such funding will not be 
fully realised if parallel legislative and institutional re-
forms are not made to modernise labour markets and 
social protection systems. The effects of training pro-
grammes in helping people who are unemployed are 
limited if there are barriers and disincentives to take 
up employment. Equally, support for active ageing 
has little point if there is compulsory retirement at 60 
or 65. In sum, the right conditions need to be put in 
place to facilitate employment, whether into a first-
time job, a return to work after a break or remaining 
in work longer.
These conditions entail appropriate levels of labour 
cost, modern forms of work organisation, the removal 
of barriers to entering the labour market or leaving it 
temporarily, and labour market flexibility combined 
with employment security (‘flexicurity’). Active inclu-
sion policies are also important to increasing partici-
pation and strengthening social cohesion.
Despite the increase in employment rates over the 
past decade, the economic downturn has underlined 
the need to reinforce efforts in two areas: (1) imple-
menting integrated ‘flexicurity’ pathways to smooth 
transitions between jobs or from unemployment or 
inactivity into work, and (2) ensuring better matching 
and upgrading of skills, which is important to get the 
unemployed into work and improve security of em-
ployment.
… through increased efforts 
to establish flexicurity … 
One of the most important developments in labour 
market policy under the Lisbon Strategy has been 
the adoption of common flexicurity principles, which 
help meet the need for both enterprises and workers 
to adapt to structural change. Most Member States 
have developed comprehensive strategies in this re-
gard or are in the process of so doing but still have to 
implement the reforms set out in these strategies.
For example, some Member States have introduced 
or announced reforms to develop flexible contractual 
arrangements, while improving the protection of the 
workers concerned or have revised Labour Codes. 
There is in general a move from passive to active la-
bour market policies, which are becoming increasing-
ly oriented towards prevention and early intervention 
with emphasis on training. Innovative measures to 
increase mobility between occupations, especially for 
young people, are also being taken in some countries. 
In addition, many Member States have reformed their 
tax and benefit systems to make it more attractive to 
work and to encourage the unemployed and inactive 
to get a job. Policies to ‘make work pay’ have been in-
troduced and efforts have been made to increase the 
take-home pay of low-wage earners. On the tax side, 
widespread efforts have been made to reduce the tax 
wedge, in particular for low wage earners, young peo-
ple, older workers and disadvantaged groups. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 177
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… and address persisting structural 
weaknesses in labour markets
Some progress has been made in promoting a life-
cycle approach to work. Most Member States have 
implemented pension reforms which strengthen in-
centives to work longer and encourage employers to 
retain older workers. However, progress in advancing 
gender equality has been limited and most countries 
are far from adopting a full gender mainstreaming ap-
proach to employment policies and undertaking sys-
tematic gender impact assessments of policy meas-
ures.
Advances have also been made in some Member 
States in combating youth unemployment through 
improved vocational education and training schemes 
aimed at ensuring a better match with labour market 
needs and in providing personalised guidance and 
support.
Some effort has gone into improving the organisa-
tion of work in a number of countries to the benefit 
of both workers and employers, while regional mo-
bility has been encouraged through subsidising the 
costs of commuting, increasing cooperation between 
regional employment services, language training and 
subsidising housing costs. 
Despite the measures listed above, structural prob-
lems persist. Labour markets continue to be segment-
ed in a number of Member States, participation in life-
long learning remains low almost everywhere, youth 
unemployment is high in many parts of the EU and 
education and training systems remain insufficiently 
responsive to labour demand. 
While much has been achieved, 
the pace of implementing reforms 
has been slow and uneven
Although the Lisbon Strategy has helped forge con-
sensus around the EU over the need for reform, pro-
gress in implementation has been slow and uneven 
across Member States and policy areas. In particular, 
reform in policy areas important for cohesion (R&D 
and innovation, business environment, internal mar-
ket and competition, and the better regulation agen-
da) has lagged behind that in the labour market. 
The implementation of structural reforms in sup-
port of economic growth, employment and cohe-
sion will continue under the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of these reforms 
needs to be faster for them to have a significant im-
pact on economic and social cohesion and the perfor-
mance of Cohesion Policy and a closer link between 
the latter, structural reforms and fiscal policies could 
strengthen the effectiveness of policy and boost 
long-term growth.
8. Conclusions
Regional development policies were increasingly ori-
ented over the last two decades to stimulating en-
dogenous development through support to areas of 
comparative advantage rather than on compensating 
for disadvantages.
Under this new paradigm, public investment has prov-
en essential for the development of lagging regions. 
Cohesion Policy allocations alongside its principle of 
additionality ensure that less developed countries 
enjoy higher rates of public investment relative to 
the size of their economies. This is mostly the reason 
why, on average, public investment is higher relative 
to GDP (though not per head) in Cohesion countries 
than in the rest of the EU and has, moreover, increased 
relative to population over the past decade.
A number of recent studies have concluded that pub-
lic investment tends to boost growth under certain 
conditions among which good institutional govern-
ance is critical. Evidence shows a positive correla-
tion between rates of public investment and rates of 
economic growth over this period, suggesting both 
that public investment is important for convergence 
and that growth is important for public investment. 
Therefore, it is important to maintain the concen-
tration of public investment, in particular Cohesion 
Policy, on less developed Member States and regions 
to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohe-
sion.
Regional and local authorities are key actors of de-
velopment. Public investment is significantly more 
decentralised than public expenditure in virtually all 
Member States. On average, some two thirds of public 
investment is carried out by sub-national administra-
tions in the EU.Chapter II: National policies and cohesion
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Higher rates of public investment in Cohesion coun-
tries are mostly due to expenditure on infrastructure, 
notably transport networks. This reflects the lack 
of endowment of physical capital in less advanced 
Member States and the crucial role of Cohesion Policy 
in narrowing this gap. 
Unlike in the case of EU Cohesion Policy, the relative 
prosperity of regions is not a major determinant of 
their access to national funds for investment, except 
in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Other 
factors such as geophysical features, the extent of fis-
cal and political autonomy or the attraction of capital 
cities seem to be at least as important determinants 
of the geographical distribution of investment. In oth-
er words, cohesion does not seem to be a major de-
terminant in decisions on public investment in many 
Member States.
The economic crisis led most national governments 
and some regional authorities to introduce ‘ad hoc’ 
stimulus packages in order to counter the effects on 
growth and employment. Public investment was an 
important component of these. The legacy of the 
crisis, however, is a dramatic increase in government 
borrowing and debt, mostly stemming from a fall in 
tax revenue. Reducing government deficits in the 
coming years to more sustainable levels is likely to put 
pressure on public expenditure programmes and on 
public investment in particular. 
Accordingly, Cohesion Policy which accounts for a 
substantial proportion of financing for investment 
in many countries is likely to become increasingly 
important in the future. On the other hand, the fiscal 
and budgetary constraints of Member States will have 
a significant impact on the environment in which 
Cohesion Policy will operate. 
It is important that Member States bear in mind the 
potentially significant role of public investment in this 
new context. In any case, the system for the verifica-
tion of additionality needs to be revised. Currently, 
the system is contested on grounds of reliability and 
full comparability between Member States, in view 
of its ad-hoc nature and complexity. A reform of the 
system is necessary with a view to making it more reli-
able, transparent, simple and proportional.
Structural and institutional reforms are of major im-
portance for maximising the impact of Cohesion 
Policy. Yet, the pace of reform over the past decade 
has been relatively slow in some critical areas. This 
affects the impact of the policy ‘on the ground’. The 
Europe 2020 strategy has set a new framework to 
which Cohesion Policy needs to adapt. A central ele-
ment in the reform of the policy will be to establish 
closer links between the design and implementation 
of the policy and the macroeconomic objectives and 
the structural as well as institutional reforms pursued 
in this context.
Conditionality in the current 2007–2013 program-
ming period for Cohesion Policy is confined to the 
macroeconomic criterion linked to the Cohesion Fund 
(apart from the administrative requirements relating 
to financial management and control systems). For 
Cohesion Policy post-2013, it is desirable to explore 
whether this kind of macroeconomic conditionality 
should be extended and if so how. There is also a need 
to examine the desirability of introducing condition-
ality for other purposes, such as to give an incentive 
for structural and institutional reforms in areas closely 
linked to the operation of Cohesion Policy with the 
aim of making the policy more results-oriented and 
of trying to ensure maximum value for money.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 179
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1. Introduction
Economic, social and territorial cohesion is a key ob-
jective of the EU1, which cuts across all policies. Ac-
cording to Article 175 of the Treaty, ‘The formulation 
and implementation of the Union’s policies and actions 
and the implementation of the internal market shall 
take into account the objectives set out in Article 174 (i.e. 
the strengthening of economic, social and territorial 
cohesion) and shall contribute to their achievement.’
While each policy has its own objectives, there is a 
growing need for the overall strategy pursued by the 
EU to become more effective, which has been given 
added weight by the adoption of the Europe 2020 
headline targets. 
This chapter examines the interaction between differ-
ent policies and the extent to which other policies re-
inforce the effect of Cohesion Policy on the objectives 
of the latter, focusing in particular on their effect in 
reducing regional disparities. 
Taking a slightly different approach than in previous 
reports, this chapter distinguishes policies which have 
an explicit spatial (regional) dimension as such from 
those which only have a partial spatial dimension and 
those which are ‘spatially blind’ 2, i.e., policies which 
do not distinguish between different parts of the EU3.
This chapter does not argue that policies need a spa-
tial dimension as such. Many policies do not have a 
spatial dimension nor a spatial impact, such as for 
example intellectual property rights. However, a 
1  Article 3(3) of the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion (TFEU) states that ‘The Union shall promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion’. This is further developed in Article 174: ‘In order 
to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its 
economic, social and territorial cohesion.’
2  Barca, F. (2009), An agenda for a reformed Cohesion Policy,. http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm 
3  For a similar approach see chapter 3 of The territorial dimension of 
environmental sustainability. Technical report No 9/2010, EEA, Co-
penhagen. http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/the-territorial-
dimension-of-environmental-sustainability. 
greater awareness of potential territorial impacts can 
improve policies and facilitate coordination between 
them. This could be achieved by carrying out territo-
rial impact assessments as described at the end of this 
chapter.
2. Policies with an explicit 
spatial dimension
2.1 Competition 
Competition policy is designed to ensure that the 
internal market remains an open one, with equal op-
portunity for firms to compete in whichever place 
they are located and from whatever Member State 
they originate. The intention is to stop both the pro-
tection of national firms and the more prosperous re-
gions from outbidding less prosperous ones in terms 
of the financial inducements offered. As government 
intervention is necessary in some cases, however, the 
Treaty provides for situations where State aid is con-
sidered compatible with competition in the internal 
market. A number of exemptions to the general pro-
hibition on aid are, therefore, specified. Accordingly, 
State aid can be used, for example, to provide risk cap-
ital and funding for R&D and other investment, which 
contributes to the pursuit of the Europe 2020 objec-
tives by encouraging the adoption of more innovative 
and greener technology.
In 2008, State aid amounted to EUR 52.9 billion4, or 
EUR 113 per head of population. In the three years 
2006–2008, it was an average of 0.4% of EU GDP a 
year, but the exceptional measures to combat the cri-
sis pushed it up to 2.2% of EU GDP in 2008. 
State aid differs across Member States. The amount in 
2008 ranged from over EUR 300 per head in Denmark 
and over EUR 200 per head in Sweden and Malta to 
less than EUR 50 per head in Latvia, Romania, Esto-
nia and Bulgaria, reflecting differences in policy ap-
proaches as well as levels of economic prosperity. De-
4  Excluding railways. The total including railways is EUR 67.4 billion.
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spite generally higher State aid figures per head in the 
EU-15, the EU-12 Member States accounted for some 
13% of the total in 2008, much more than their share 
of EU GDP (8%), reflecting the larger share of popula-
tion covered.
Regional aid
The Commission Guidelines on national regional aid 
for 2007–20135 set out the principles for determining 
whether or not aid for the economic development of 
disadvantaged areas, and the support for investment 
or new enterprise creation which it entails, is compati-
ble with internal market rules. The maximum intensity 
of aid allowed is higher in regions with lower GDP per 
head and in the outermost regions. Member States 
are encouraged to concentrate aid on multi-sectoral 
schemes which are part of national regional policy 
and which normally do not require notification to the 
Commission.
In the three years 2006–2008, aid for regional devel-
opment amounted to EUR 11.3 billion, up 14% on the 
previous three years. The share of regional aid in the 
total aid increased from 18% to 22% between the two 
periods. Greece, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the 
Czech Republic were the largest contributors to the 
increase.
Aid in disadvantaged regions
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (in Article 
107(3)(a)) allows aid that promotes the economic de-
velopment of areas where the standard of living is ab-
normally low or where there is serious underemploy-
ment (‘category a’ regions) (Map 3. 1). In practice, the 
areas concerned are defined as NUTS 2 regions with a 
GDP per head of less than 75% of the EU-25 average, 
which broadly correspond to Convergence regions 
(including Phasing-out regions). In 2008, aid in these 
regions amounted to almost EUR 14 billion.
Aid in ‘category a’ regions increased by a quarter be-
tween 2007 and 2008 (from EUR 11 billion), though 
the longer-term trend is downwards (from an aver-
age of EUR 17 billion in 2003–2005 to EUR 13 billion in 
2006–2008). Member States differ in terms of the level 
of aid in such regions, reflecting differences in region-
5  OJ C 54, 4.3.2006, p. 13.
al policy, the extent to which aid is used to support 
development and the size of the eligible population6.
Differentiated state aid possibilities 
for islands, sparsely populated 
areas and other regions categorised 
by geographical isolation 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (in Article 
107(3)(c)) allows aid to be used to facilitate the de-
velopment of certain other areas, where it does not 
significantly affect competition (‘category c’ regions). 
The areas concerned include those regions with a 
GDP per head below the EU-25 average, those with 
unemployment over 15% higher than the national 
average or those undergoing major structural change 
or in serious relative decline, as well as regions with 
low population density, islands with a population of 
5000 or less and regions similarly isolated geographi-
cally, regions neighbouring ‘category a’ regions. Aid 
in these ‘c’ regions totalled around EUR 7.4 billion in 
2008 (i.e. just over half that in ‘category a’ regions), 
down by 23% from 2007.
State aid and the Lisbon objectives
A new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
was introduced in 20087, giving automatic approval 
for a range of aid measures without the need for prior 
notification. Such a block exemption does not have a 
spatial dimension since it applies in all regions.
The GBER covers aid to SMEs, research, innovation, 
regional development, training, employment and 
risk capital, as well as aid for environmental protec-
tion, entrepreneurship, business start-ups in assisted 
regions, and issues such as the difficulties of women 
entrepreneurs to access finance. 
The reform introduced by the GBER was aimed at 
redirecting aid towards the Lisbon objectives by en-
couraging Member States to focus on assistance that 
will be of real benefit to competitiveness, job crea-
tion and social and economic cohesion. At the same 
time, it reduced the administrative burden for public 
authorities, aid recipients and the Commission alike. 
The GBER unified and simplified previous rules, and 
6  It should be noted that aid in ‘category a’ regions might be used for 
purposes other than regional development.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/reform/reform.
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3.1 Regional aid, 2011–2013
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enlarged the categories of state aid covered by the ex-
emption. Almost 19% (EUR 10 billion) of aid to indus-
try and services was already block exempted in 2008 
under the previous regulations as compared with 13% 
(EUR 6.3 billion) in 2007 and 6% (EUR 3 billion) in 2006.
A Best Practice Code and a Simplified Procedure were 
introduced in 2009 to facilitate the treatment of State 
aid cases and accelerate the process. Measures eli-
gible for simplified treatment include certain aid for 
SMEs, the environment, innovation and restructuring. 
In addition, guidelines for State aid for investment in 
broadband networks were recently adopted8 to accel-
erate and extend their deployment and so contribute 
to both the short-term recovery and long term com-
petitiveness of the EU economy as part of the Euro-
pean Economic Recovery Plan9.
2.2 Transport 
Investment in transport inevitably affects some re-
gions more than others, though the selection of 
routes and places to invest in at the EU level has large-
ly been determined by objectives other than reducing 
regional disparities, though it has undoubtedly assist-
ed the development of the less developed countries.
Transport policy is centred on completing the trans-
European transport network (TEN-T), which is aimed 
at ensuring that the transport system in place enables 
the internal market to function smoothly and that the 
main centres of population and economic activity are 
reasonably well connected. 
Since 1996, when the policy was initiated, some EUR 
400 billion has been invested in the network, almost 
a third coming from EU sources10, much of it from the 
Cohesion Fund, which is confined to financing invest-
ment in Member States with relatively low income 
levels. As a result, national rail and road networks 
have become better interconnected.
8 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/specific_
rules.html#broadband.
9  This includes EUR 1.02 billion through the EAFRD that Member 
States could allocate, among other priorities, to the development 
of broadband internet in rural areas.
10 Grants from the TEN-T budget, the Cohesion Fund and the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund, plus loans from the European 
Investment Bank.
An efficient transport network is important for sus-
tained economic development and territorial bal-
ance. The focus of the TEN-T policy, however, has been 
on strengthening links across the EU rather than on 
improving the accessibility of lagging regions as such, 
though it has undoubtedly contributed to this, not 
least through the investment financed by the Cohe-
sion Fund. These countries — Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and (up until 2003) Ireland and the EU-12 countries 
since 2004 — were also the ones with transport sys-
tems most in need of expansion and improvement. 
Thus, it has been left to Cohesion Policy, and in par-
ticular to the ERDF and Cohesion Fund, to strengthen 
transport links both within regions and between re-
gional networks and national and European ones.
The challenge now is to respond effectively to the 
growing need to reduce emissions from transport 
and to save energy by encouraging a shift from road 
to rail, in particular, though also to waterways and 
maritime transport, while at the same time meeting 
the need for improvements in the transport network 
in less well endowed regions. This is especially the 
case in the EU-12 countries, where road as well as rail 
networks are in a poor state of repair and wholly in-
adequate to meet the demands imposed on them as 
their economies grow and develop.
2.3 Environment
The main political driving force for improving the 
quality of the environment and human health is the 
EU Treaty, and body of EU legislation adopted under 
it which must be implemented by Member States. 
EU environmental policy is pursued through Action 
Programmes, the 6th one covering the period 2002–
2012, the aim being to further the EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy (SDS). It covers a wide range 
of activities ranging from protecting ecosystems and 
biodiversity to improving water supply and treatment 
and reducing noise pollution. It aims to reduce envi-
ronmental disparities in the EU, which directly con-
tributes to cohesion in that it will make lagging areas 
more attractive as well as healthier places to live and 
work.
Natura 2000 is a good example of a policy with a 
strong spatial dimension. It is an EU-wide network 
of nature protection areas established to assure the 
long-term survival of Europe’s most valuable and Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 183
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threatened species and habitats. Natura 2000 is not 
a system of strict nature reserves where all human ac-
tivities are excluded. Whereas the network certainly 
includes nature reserves, most of the land continues 
to be privately owned and the emphasis is on ensur-
ing that future management is sustainable, both eco-
logically and economically.
Framework Directives, moreover, require public au-
thorities to draw up plans for management of water, 
flood risk, waste and air quality in cities as well as ma-
rine management to achieve a set of environmental 
objectives, so encouraging the formulation of inte-
grated development strategies for particular areas. 
River basin management plans, for example, may 
lead to better coordination of their use by agriculture, 
tourism, shipping, hydropower and so on, while those 
for air quality might lead to the development of pub-
lic transport, more green spaces and bicycle lanes.
Up until now, the EU biodiversity policy was driven by 
the EU 2010 target — to halt biodiversity loss in the 
EU by 2010 — set by the Heads of State in 2001. The 
EU Biodiversity Action Plan was put in place in 2006 
to accelerate progress towards this target and took an 
integration approach. For the period post-2010, the 
Environment Council on 15 March 2010 agreed a new 
vision for 2050 and target for 2020 for biodiversity, 
halting the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of 
ecosystem services in the EU by 2020, and restoring 
them in so far as it is feasible, while stepping up the 
EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss.
In addition, there are plans for a new strategy for 
the prevention of natural and man-made disasters11, 
which involve heavy costs for some regions (total 
losses from natural disasters are estimated to amount 
to EUR 112 billion over the period 1998–2008 and to 
have led to 98 000 deaths) 12.
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions of 23 February 2009 — A Community 
approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters 
COM(2009) 82 final.
12 European Environment Agency (2010), Mapping the impact of re-
cent natural and technological disasters in Europe. An overview of 
the last decade. 
2.4 Maritime Policy
EU Integrated Maritime Policy is a new approach de-
veloping all marine-related activities in a sustainable 
manner. It uses cross-sectoral tools such as maritime 
spatial planning, integrated surveillance and marine 
knowledge, which will improve the way that our 
oceans are managed. The Commission has also made 
first steps towards implementing this policy on a re-
gional basis, notably in the Baltic Sea and the Mediter-
ranean. 
The objective of this new approach is to identify EU 
actions that have an impact on the sea and to pro-
mote coherence across sectors and areas of activity. In 
addition, it aims to boost the maritime economy, pro-
tect and restore the marine environment, strengthen 
research and innovation and foster development in 
coastal and outermost regions13.The success of this 
approach depends to a large degree on its interaction 
with other policies. For example, Cohesion Policy dur-
ing the 2007–2013 programming period had already 
funded up to end-December 2008 a total of 1 131 
projects relating to maritime policy representing an 
investment of almost EUR 1.2 billion14. 
2.5 Common Fisheries Policy
The objective of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)15 
at present is to ’...ensure the sustainable exploitation of 
living aquatic resources’ by ‘contribut(ing) to efficient 
fishing activities within an economically viable and 
competitive fisheries and aquaculture industry, provid-
ing a fair standard of living for those who depend on 
fishing activities … ’ One of the four main pillars of the 
policy consists of structural measures to strengthen 
economic, social and territorial cohesion.
The European Fisheries Fund (EFF), which supports 
the policy, amounts to EUR 4.3 billion for 2007–2013. 
Three pillars of the EFF contain measures supporting 
the fisheries sector (in particular, with regard to the 
fishing fleet, aquaculture, processing and organisa-
tion of the sector), while the fourth pillar consists of 
structural measures to strengthen economic, social 
13 Progress report on the EU’s integrated maritime policy. COM(2009) 
540 
14 Policy Research Corporation based on the database on EU funded 
projects, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/study_d_base_en.html
15 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002.Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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and territorial cohesion. This is intended to assist the 
development of coastal areas in which fishing is an 
important part of economic activity and to help im-
prove the quality of life there.
To reach these goals, it has set up Fisheries Local Ac-
tion Groups, to draw up integrated local development 
strategies to help maintain viable coastal communi-
ties by diversifying activities and creating alternative 
jobs. The total public budget for this is around EUR 
826.6 million and some 130 Action Groups have so far 
been set up of the 240 which are eventually expected.
3. Policies with a partial 
spatial dimension
3.1 Research and technological 
development 
Policies to promote research and technological devel-
opment along with innovation (RTDI) inevitably affect 
some regions more than others. The regional dimen-
sion, however, is not a central aspect in the design of 
policy and in determining the allocation of EU fund-
ing for research, which is a significant part of the over-
all EU Budget (Maps 3.2 and 3.3).
The 7th Research Framework Programme (FP7) has a 
budget of some EUR 50 billion for the period 2007–
2013. Its objective is to help to make the EU the lead-
ing research area in the world through supporting 
research excellence wherever it takes place. The Risk-
Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) provides EUR 10 billion 
in the form of loans to projects which involve a rela-
tively high degree of risk.
The Capacities specific programme of FP7 has a budg-
et of some EUR 4 billion, which is intended to enhance 
research and innovation capacity throughout Europe 
and ensure its optimal use.
Support is provided for a range of activities such as 
encouraging greater involvement of SMEs in research 
activities (EUR 1.3 billion); supporting the creation 
of large-scale, pan-European research infrastructure 
identified in the ESFRI roadmap16, as well as optimis-
ing the use of existing infrastructure (EUR1.8 billion); 
16  European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures. http://
cordis.europa.eu/esfri/roadmap.htm 
strengthening the R&D potential of European regions 
by promoting, through the Regions of Knowledge 
action, the emergence of regional research-driven 
clusters (involving the triple helix of researchers, busi-
nesses and the public authorities) (EUR 126 million) 
and unlocking and developing the research potential 
in Convergence and outermost regions by support-
ing, through the Research Potential Action, excellent 
research entities in the regions concerned (EUR 340 
million).
As the bulk of the funding for RTDI under Cohesion 
Policy is allocated to spending categories that reflect 
the areas of intervention under the Capacities pro-
gramme there are clear complementarities between 
the two funding sources.
There is also, however, likely to be some indirect ef-
fect on strengthening cohesion from other FP7 
programmes: ‘Cooperation’ (which supports trans-
national collaboration), ‘Ideas’ (which supports basic 
research across the EU) and ‘People’ (which supports 
the development of researchers across the EU).
Equally, part of the ‘Cooperation’ programmes con-
sists of research in the social sciences (‘Research in 
Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities’, with a 
budget of EUR 623 million in 2007–2013)17. The pro-
jects supported include studies of economic growth, 
regional performance, regional innovation systems, 
urban problems and rural regions under pressure 
from globalisation and are designed to increase un-
derstanding of economic and social issues. There are a 
number of studies, moreover, specifically on social co-
hesion, including the impact of inequality, the social 
exclusion and integration of young people and social 
cohesion in cities.
Analysis of FP6 ICT programmes18 indicated that the 
participation of EU-12 countries in projects alongside 
more advanced countries was an important opportu-
nity for these countries to improve the skills of their 
researchers, their infrastructure and the capacity to 
produce new products and processes.
17 Detailed descriptions of the relevant research projects can be 
found on the Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities website 
at the address: http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/re-
search_en.html
18 Watching IST innovation and knowledge, FP6 IST impact analysis 
study, 2009. http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/impact/documents/
wing-pilot-fp6-final-report-18-12-09.pdfFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 185
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3.2 Innovation and entrepreneurship 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Pro-
gramme (CIP) is intended to increase the competitive-
ness of firms in the EU through helping them to inno-
vate. Funding amounts to EUR 3.6 billion in the period 
2007–2013. The main targets are SMEs with support 
going to help them invest in eco-innovation and en-
ergy efficiency and renewables as well as to provide 
better access to finance, business support services 
and ICT. The main instruments used for innovation 
policy are:
  • financial instruments (amounting to around EUR 
1 billion) for SMEs and innovation; 
  • the Enterprise Europe Network to bring together 
national and regional business and innovation 
support providers across the EU (and beyond) 
and to improve and broaden their support with a 
trans-national perspective; 
  • platforms and networks for innovation policy 
makers (PRO INNO Europe19), agencies (Europe 
INNOVA20), the provision of policy and statistical 
analysis on innovation (e.g. the Regional Innova-
tion Scoreboard21) and the European Cluster Ob-
servatory, grants for eco-innovation, market repli-
cation projects and ICT related pilot projects. 
The Lead market initiative22 has set up networks of 
public authorities to provide advice on the procure-
ment of innovative solutions, which is a good exam-
ple of how national or regional public authorities can 
boost innovation. In the same vein, the programme 
has supported the European Enterprise Awards since 
2006, which go to the best initiatives undertaken by 
public authorities to promote entrepreneurship and 
small businesses. More than 300 initiatives in the 29 
participating countries take part in the competition 
19  PRO INNO Europe is intended to become the focal point for innova-
tion policy analysis and cooperation, with a view to learning from 
the best and contributing to the development of new innovation 
policies.
20 Europe INNOVA is a European initiative which is intended to be 
the laboratory for the development, testing and promotion of new 
measures to support innovation.
21 http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/regional-innovation-score-
board 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-
market-initiative/index_en.htm 
every year and winners serve as role models for re-
gions across Europe23. 
There has been increasing recognition in recent years 
of the need to improve the complementarity be-
tween FP7, the CIP and Cohesion Policy24, which led 
to the Commission Communication ‘Competitive Eu-
ropean Regions through Research and Innovation’25, 
which emphasised the need for Member States and 
regions to coordinate their use of the different fund-
ing sources more effectively. 
3.3 Information Society and Media
ICT is a major source of economic growth and is di-
rectly responsible for 5% of EU GDP. There are large 
disparities between countries and regions, however, 
as regards the rate of adoption of ICT and of mod-
ern telecommunications in particular. The extent of 
broadband coverage is, therefore, much less in Con-
vergence regions (47% of the population covered in 
2009) than Competitiveness ones (68% covered)26, 
though there is some evidence of catching up. 
The evidence is that managing authorities in less 
advanced regions have difficulty in absorbing funds 
available for improvements in ICT infrastructure be-
cause of a lack of skills and experience27. 
The Digital Agenda highlights the action needed from 
national, regional and city authorities to help close 
the gap and prevent it from widening further. This 
Agenda includes the following targets for 2020: (i) all 
Europeans should have access to internet speeds of 
30 Mbps or more and (ii) 50% or more of European 
23 This exchange of best practice has already led to the replication of 
successful projects, such as the Y4 entrepreneurship development 
project from Central Finland which has inspired and supported 
similar projects in Finland and in Portugal.
24  The issue has been examined in reports of the European Parliament 
(Synergies between the EU 7th Research Framework Programme, 
the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and 
the Structural Funds, ITRE Committee, European Parliament, May 
2007), the European Research Advisory Board (Energising Europe’s 
Knowledge Triangle through the Structural Funds, April 2007) and 
the Scientific and Technical Research Committee of the EU (How to 
make better coordinated use of FPs and Structural Funds to sup-
port R&D, CREST, May 2007).
25 COM(2007) 474 of 16.08.2007.
26 Digital Competitiveness Report, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/infor-
mation_society/digital-agenda/documents/edcr.pdf 
27 Further evidence of the gap between convergence and competi-
tiveness regions comes from a recent study on EU spending on ICT 
under structural and rural development policies.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 187
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households should subscribe to internet connections 
above 100 Mbps.
In addition, the 2007 Commission Communication on 
pre-commercial procurement28 highlighted the ex-
tent to which public procurement of R&D across the 
EU, of which ICT accounts for 20%, falls below that in 
the US. The bulk of public procurement occurs at lo-
cal and regional level, where less innovation-minded 
authorities in the EU-12 countries spend considerably 
less than those in the EU-15. Because of the fragmen-
tation of demand, cooperation between regions on 
pre-commercial procurement is essential to achieve 
enough critical mass for innovations to reach wide 
markets. The intention is, therefore, to support au-
thorities in coordinating their procurement of ICT un-
der the FP7 programme.
3.4 Poverty and social exclusion
Social inclusion policies, both at EU and national lev-
els, tend to focus on specific groups of disadvantaged 
and vulnerable people (such as lone mothers, elderly 
people living alone, migrants, homeless people, eth-
nic minorities and people with disabilities). One of the 
Europe 2020 headline targets is to lift at least 20 mil-
lion people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion. 
Such a focus tends not to have a spatial dimension, 
measures being directed at helping those concerned 
wherever they live. There is a growing awareness, 
however, of the concentration of social exclusion in 
particular places, particularly in inner city areas and 
deprived neighbourhoods. Such concentrations also 
occur in rural areas, mostly in the EU-12 where eco-
nomic activity is limited and few employment oppor-
tunities outside subsistence farming exist. The analy-
sis carried out in the context of the Open Method of 
Coordination29 on Social Protection and Social Inclu-
sion shows this clearly. This provides the basis for pol-
icy cooperation in this area in pursuit of broad com-
mon objectives and which forms the central plank of 
28 COM(2007) 799 Pre-commercial procurement: driving innovation 
to ensure high-quality public services in Europe. http://cordis.eu-
ropa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/home_en.html
29 The Open Method of Coordination essentially provides a means for 
Member States to exchange information and views on social policy 
on the basis of a common set of agreed indicators of various as-
pects of social developments and to subject their policies to a peer 
review process managed by the Commission.
EU social policy, since competence in this area resides 
mainly with Member States. 
It is increasingly recognised, therefore, that the na-
ture of disadvantage affecting people in situations of 
poverty and social exclusion is influenced by the area 
where they live. The link between individual circum-
stances and local situations runs both ways. A concen-
tration of disadvantaged people in certain neighbour-
hoods results in increased pressure on public services, 
reduced economic activity and private investment, 
the emergence of ghetto situations and an erosion 
of social capital. At the same time, living in deprived 
areas means reduced access to jobs, often inadequate 
public services, stigmatisation and discrimination. 
The concentration of disadvantage also appears to 
be a persistent phenomenon which can spread from 
one generation to the next. Social policies, therefore, 
need to tackle the territorial aspects of disadvantage 
if they are to succeed in helping people in the places 
where they live and to encompass the regeneration of 
deprived areas as well as support to the people con-
cerned themselves. 
This approach is also promoted through the common 
principles on active inclusion30, which emphasise the 
importance of local and regional circumstances and 
the need to ensure access to quality services. Area-
based social policy was one of the main themes of the 
2009 European RoundTable on Poverty and Social Ex-
clusion organised by the Swedish Presidency, which 
called for increased efforts to combine ‘people-based’ 
and ‘place-based’ approaches in the social OMC, as 
well as in Cohesion Policy. 
3.5 Employment 
Employment policy represents a central means of 
tackling issues of poverty and social exclusion, since 
unemployment, or inactivity, is a major cause of both. 
On 17 June 2010, the European Council raised the 
employment target to 75% for people aged 20–64. 
Greater participation of the young, older people and 
the low-skilled and the better integration of migrants 
can make an important contribution to this target. To 
improve the integration of migrants, the Commission 
30  See the Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 (2008/867/EC), 
the Council Conclusions of 17.12.2008 and the Parliament Resolu-
tion of 6.5.2009 (2008/2335(INI)). Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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approved the Stockholm programme31 in 2010 and 
will follow this up with an EU agenda for integration 
in 2011. 
The focus of the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
is, however, national rather than regional, even if it is 
most relevant in areas of high unemployment and 
its success is judged inevitably in terms of reducing 
disparities in employment and unemployment rates 
within, as well as between, Member States. Like social 
policy, it operates through the Open Method of Coor-
dination, since competence for employment remains 
with Member States, though the ESF provides finan-
cial support to assist the pursuit of EES objectives (see 
Chapter IV below).
The essence of the strategy is that well performing 
labour markets are key to increasing employment 
and furthering social and economic cohesion, but 
these need to be accompanied by measures to sup-
port people should they lose their jobs. This flexicurity 
approach, combining active labour market measures 
(especially education and training) with adequate 
unemployment insurance and effective employment 
regulation, reduces the risk of exclusion and helps, 
and encourages, people to move between jobs and 
from inactivity and unemployment into the labour 
market. Moreover, flexible forms of work organisation 
both help to increase productivity by enabling labour 
input to be adjusted to the flow of work and assist 
people to reconcile work with family responsibilities. 
Flexicurity is accompanied by measures to encour-
age labour mobility, in the form of an international 
job placement service (EURES — which held details 
of 805  000 job vacancies across Europe in August 
2009) as well as through support for the freedom of 
movement of workers and the removal of obstacles 
to occupational mobility, and the ‘New skills for new 
jobs’ initiative. The latter is aimed at anticipating fu-
ture labour market needs and encouraging education 
and training systems to become more responsive to 
the prospective demand for particular skills. The em-
phasis, however, is primarily on general tendencies 
across the EU as a whole rather than on the potential 
variations in skill needs across countries and, indeed, 
regions.
31 COM(2010) 171.
3.6 Education 
Policy on education and training is intimately linked 
not only with enterprise and innovation but also with 
employment and social inclusion policies, since it is 
regarded as a central means of achieving the objec-
The European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund
The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 
helps workers who have lost their job as a result of 
changing global trade patterns to find another one 
quickly. When a large enterprise shuts down or a 
factory is relocated to a country outside the EU, or a 
whole sector loses many jobs in a region, the EGF can 
help the workers made redundant to find new jobs as 
quickly as possible. A maximum amount of EUR 500 
million a year is available to the EGF to finance such 
interventions. The economic crisis has led to a massive 
loss of employment across Europe. This was reflec-
ted also in the applications for EFG in 2009 and 2010 
where three quarters of them were related to the crisis. 
In 2007 and 2008, all the applications were related to 
the field of Trade.
The automotive industry was one of the hardest hit 
by the crisis and it is the sector which had the highest 
share of all applications (18%). Together with the tex-
tile industry it accounted for more than a third of all 
applications followed by the printing and mechani-
cal industry with each having a share of around 10%. 
Since its creation in 2007, the EGF has received 63 
applications by the Member States. Spain, the Nether-
lands and Ireland introduced respectively 10, 9 and 6 
applications while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Malta, 
Slovenia, Finland, and Sweden only introduced one 
each. 
The EGF funds active labour market measures such as 
job-search assistance, occupational guidance, tailor-
made training and re-training including IT skills and 
certification of acquired experience, outplacement as-
sistance, and the promotion of entrepreneurship and 
aid for self-employment. It can also provide special 
time-limited measures, such as job-search allowances, 
mobility allowances or allowances to individuals parti-
cipating in lifelong learning and training. 
The EGF does not fund passive social protection mea-
sures such as retirement pensions or unemployment 
benefits.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 189
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tives of the latter two. Its overriding aim is to encour-
age lifelong learning in Member States, which retain 
competence in this broad area (though in some Mem-
ber States, responsibility lies at the regional or local 
level), again through the Open Method of Coordina-
tion. As in the case of employment and social policy, 
the focus is almost entirely at the national rather than 
at the regional level, even though significant dispari-
ties exist in education attainment levels and rates of 
school drop-out across regions within countries — in 
some degree mirroring disparities in economic condi-
tions — as well as between countries.
Nevertheless, education and training is a key element 
in strengthening social and economic cohesion and 
the various Initiatives included in the Lifelong Learn-
ing Programme (such as Erasmus and Leonardo da 
Vinci) increase the opportunities available to young 
people, who could subsequently benefit from EU 
research scholarships, to attain a high level of edu-
cation 32. Moreover, a set of targets has been agreed 
with Member States to increase education levels and 
reduce drop-outs by 2020:
  • at least 95% of children between the age of four 
and starting compulsory primary school should 
participate in early childhood education; 
  • the share of 15-years olds with inadequate abili-
ties in reading, maths and science should be less 
than 15%; 
  • an average of at least 15% of people aged 25–64 
should participate in lifelong learning;
  • the share of early leavers from education should 
be less than 10%; 
  • the share of 30–34 year olds with tertiary educa-
tion should be at least 40%. 
These last two are also Europe 2020 headline targets.
3.7 Gender equality
Over the last decade, greater participation of women 
in the labour market has been the crucial factor for 
achieving the Lisbon targets on employment. Partici-
32 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Devel-
opment: Marie Curie actions.
pation by women in the labour market has increased 
steadily over the last few years, approaching 60 % on 
average in the EU33 (which was the 2010 Lisbon tar-
get34). Addressing gender equality at national and re-
gional levels in the national reform programmes has 
helped to better identify the contribution of gender 
equality to the objectives in terms of employment, 
growth and social inclusion and so has had a positive 
impact on European social and economic cohesion35. 
Equality policies can have a significant effect on indi-
viduals, firms, regions and countries36. In many coun-
tries, a positive correlation exists between high levels 
of economic activity (GDP per head) and higher la-
bour market participation by women and men. There 
are several factors which could lead to gender equal-
ity policy contributing to economic growth, such as 
through measures to help balance work and family life 
and the design of tax systems which can increase the 
participation of women in the labour market, result-
ing in higher employment and so increased growth37. 
Member States which have put reconciliation policies 
in place have succeeded in raising both participation 
rates of women and men and fertility rates. The EU has 
recently helped to improve the framework conditions 
for supporting reconciliation between work and pri-
vate life. The Directives giving the self-employed and 
their partners the right to maternity leave for the first 
time and strengthening the rights to parental leave 
are important in this respect38. Gender equality ena-
bles a more coherent social model to be developed, 
with investment in social infrastructure to support 
33 59.1% in 2008 with huge difference between Member States, see 
SEC(2009)1706 Annual report on equality between women and 
men 2010’
34 The age group (20–64) covered by the Europe 2020 strategy em-
ployment rate target of 75% differs from the Lisbon target which 
covered the 15–64 age group. On the basis of the 2020 target, the 
female employment rate has risen from 57.3% to 62.5% between 
2000 and 2009.
35 Smith, M., Analysis note: gender equality on the labour market: 
challenges of the EU after 2010’ European Commission’s Network 
of Experts on Employment and Gender Equality issues, July 2009.
36 Smith, M. and Bettio, F., Analysis note: the Economic case for Gen-
der Equality, European Commission’s Network of Experts on Em-
ployment and Gender Equality issues, August 2008.
37 Löfström, A. (2009), ‘Gender Equality, Economic Growth and Em-
ployment’, Swedish Presidency of the European Union.
38 COM(2008) 635 final; Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the 
revised Framework Agreement on parental leave, OJ L 68/13, 
18.3.2010; Directive 2010/41/EU on self-employed workers and 
helping spouses, OJ L 180/1, 15.7.2010.Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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Agricultural support
The first pillar of the CAP is financed by the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) with a budget 
ceiling of EUR 313 billion. It consists mainly of direct 
payments to farmers, along with a small number of 
market management measures.
Direct payments to farmers help to sustain employ-
ment in agriculture. They also ensure that farmers 
continue to undertake important land management 
functions across the EU and support the viability of 
rural areas.
The agricultural and food sectors combined account-
ed for some 18.6 million jobs in the EU in 2005 (just 
under 9% of total employment) and for 4% of GDP. 
There are, however, significant variations between 
countries in the importance of the two sectors, this 
being greater in the EU-12 than in the EU-15. 
The structure of agriculture is different in the EU-12, 
consisting of very small holdings mixed with large-
scale enterprises. In Romania and Bulgaria, around 
two-thirds of farms are classified as semi-subsistence 
and over half of them in the other EU-12 countries as 
against only around 16% in the EU-15.
Productivity gains from developments in crop and 
animal genetics as well as mechanisation, together 
with economic pressure, have led to a considerable 
structural reduction in employment over the last two 
decades. In recent years, the CAP has certainly con-
tributed to cushioning this process by slowing down 
labour outflows, whilst increasing productivity, com-
petitiveness and sustainability.
The principal beneficiaries of the first pillar of the CAP 
in 2008 were, as in the past, France (21.5% of the to-
tal), Germany (14.6%), Spain (13.1%) and Italy (10.2%). 
Financial support per ‘annual work unit’ (AWU – i.e. 
per person employed on an annual equivalent basis) 
was higher in the northern Member States than in the 
southern and EU-12 countries. Support per hectare 
was more balanced, though EU-12 Member States, 
where direct payments were still being phased in, re-
ceived considerably less per hectare than EU-15 ones 
(see Map 3.4).
working women and men and to promote sustainable 
employment and social reproduction39.
3.8 Health 
Health forms part of human capital and constitutes 
a key determinant of growth and competitiveness as 
well as of individual well-being. Wide disparities ex-
ist between Member States and regions in terms of 
health status and the quality of health services, which 
have important implications for economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. 
In 2007, the Commission adopted a new Health Strat-
egy for the period 2007–2013 aimed at fostering bet-
ter health and increasing healthy life years, reducing 
health inequalities, protecting people from health 
threats and supporting technological innovation in 
healthcare systems. Although the strategy does not 
have cohesion as an explicit aim, a central aspect is 
to reduce inequalities in access and affordability. The 
approach to achieving this aim is set out in the Com-
mission Communication ‘Solidarity in health: reduc-
ing health inequalities in the EU’ (COM(2009) 567) 
which identifies wide gaps in health between Member 
States and regions as well as between social groups 
as a threat to the EU’s fundamental values. It puts for-
ward a range of measures to be taken by the EU and 
Member States, including through Cohesion Policy. 
Reducing health inequality is equally an objective of 
the Health Programme 2008–2013.
Related to this, a European Health Information system 
has been put in place to monitor developments in the 
situation across Member States and regions. The sys-
tem comprises 30 health indicators, most of which are 
available at regional as well as national level.
3.9 The Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is made up of 
two pillars (agricultural support and rural develop-
ment), with distinct but complementary objectives. It 
has a total budget of EUR 413 billion (in current pric-
es) for the period 2007–2013. 
39 Social reproduction designates the processes which sustain or per-
petuate characteristics of a given social structure or tradition over a 
period of time.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 191
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Rural development
The territorial elements of the CAP are concentrated 
under the rural development pillar, which is entirely 
focussed on rural areas, which Member States have 
to define in their programmes. In addition, this pil-
lar provides more support to farmers in less favoured 
areas (Map 3.6) and it invests in structural measures 
(investment in farms, marketing and processing) in 
rural areas and promotes local development under 
the Leader Initiative. For the period 2007–2009, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) expenditure per head tends to concentrate in 
specific regions, in particular in more remote regions 
and regions which do not include many large cities 
(Map 3.5). NUTS 3 regions which include the capital or 
a large city typically have lower expenditure per head 
in most Member States.
A budget of some EUR 92 billion was allocated to the 
EAFRD for 2007–2013, with a minimum of EUR 31.2 
billion going to Convergence regions. This was in-
creased by EUR 4.4 billion in 2009, in part by reducing 
the amount available under the first pillar, in order to 
reinforce expenditure on climate change, renewable 
energy, water management, biodiversity and innova-
tion, the development of broadband in rural areas as 
well to assist dairy farmers hit by the crisis.
Most of the EU-12 countries, including Poland, Bul-
garia and Romania have allocated an above aver-
age amount to the broad objective of ‘improving the 
competitiveness   of agriculture and forestry’, while 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania are also among those 
allocating most funding to the objective of ‘improving 
the quality of life in rural areas and diversifying the ru-
ral economy’. This objective accounts for some 13% of 
overall EAFRD financing in the EU for the period and 
it is estimated that it will result in the gross creation 
of some 320 000 new jobs, with over 240 000 of these 
being in Convergence regions40. 
3.10 Climate 
Climate policy has two main aims — to reduce green-
house gas emissions and to adapt to the consequenc-
40  It is not always possible to match national or regional rural develop-
ment programmes to the areas covered by the Convergence objec-
tive because the areas in which the programmes are implemented 
do not correspond with NUTS 2 regions.
es of future climate change. The way that both of 
these aims are pursued affects regions differentially. 
Reducing the use of fossil fuels in order to cut green-
house gas emissions implies a need for restructuring 
in regions where the industries concerned are con-
centrated. At the same time, it will tend to increase 
growth in regions where renewable energy sources 
are located, which are not necessarily the same.
Regional and local authorities have an important 
role to play in taking measures to reduce emissions, 
since they are largely responsible across the EU for 
housing, public buildings, local transport, local taxes 
and charges and spatial planning. On an initiative of 
the European Commission, over 1750 mayors of mu-
nicipalities have already agreed to going beyond the 
emission reduction targets defined for the EU and 
have signed a commitment to this effect41.
The need to adapt to climate change also varies 
across regions. The evidence is that the Mediterrane-
an Basin, the outermost regions and the Arctic are the 
most vulnerable, while mountain areas, in particular 
the Alps, many islands and coastal areas and densely 
populated floodplains face particular problems42. 
The Commission White Paper on adapting to climate 
change again emphasises the role of regional and 
local authorities in this and encourages the formula-
tion of national and regional adaptation strategies by 
2012.
4. Policies without a spatial dimension
4.1 Single Market
The single market policy consists of bringing down 
barriers to competition and simplifying rules to en-
able everyone in the EU — businesses and individuals 
— to make the most of the opportunities offered to 
them by having direct access to a market of nearly 500 
million people. It gives individuals a greater choice 
of quality goods and services at competitive prices 
and businesses the possibility of operating across 27 
countries without, for the most part, being hindered 
by national barriers and unnecessary administrative 
procedures.
41 The Covenant of Mayors.
42 COM(2009) 147 final White Paper Adapting to climate change: To-
wards a European framework for actionFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 193
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3.6 Less-Favoured Areas
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
0 500Km
Totally Less-Favoured Areas
Partially Less-Favoured Areas
REGIOgis
Canarias
Guyane Guadeloupe
Martinique
Réunion
Açores Madeira
The area of a municipality can be eligible for one of the 
following articles:
Art. 18: mountain/hill areas
Art. 19: areas in danger of abandonment of land-use
Art. 20: areas affected by specific handicaps.
For Bulgaria, Romania and the French overseas regions 
only Art. 18 areas are included.
Source: DG AGRIChapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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There are, however, gaps, particularly in services43, 
where different national regulations make it difficult 
for providers to operate in other Member States.
At the same time, the obstacles to development, in 
the form of small market size, geographical remote-
ness, access problems and dependence on a few in-
dustries, which a number of lagging regions face, can 
be exacerbated by increased liberalisation. Indeed, 
Cohesion policy was initially conceived as a neces-
sary accompaniment to the removal of restrictions on 
trade within the EU to counter the potentially damag-
ing effects of competition on producers in developing 
regions by providing both direct and indirect support 
to enable them to operate on reasonably equal terms 
to those elsewhere.
4.2 Trade
EU trade policy applies across the whole Union and 
is therefore a clear example of a policy without a spa-
tial dimension. Trade can help to build a stronger EU 
economy, if its exports are sufficiently competitive 
abroad. In relation to its size, the EU is one of the most 
outward-oriented economies in the world. 
Like the European Single Market, the EU’s openness 
to trade and investment has been a major catalyst 
for growth over the last two decades. Trade alone ex-
plains a quarter of the productivity gains which have 
occurred across the EU in recent years, through stimu-
lating greater competition, specialisation in higher 
value added areas and innovation. 
4.3 Energy 
EU energy policy also has potentially important dif-
ferential effects on regions but has no regional di-
mension as such. The objectives are to maintain a 
competitive energy sector and achieve a sustainable 
and secure supply. Policy is implemented through 
various Directives, Regulations and Communications 
which are aimed at creating a single energy market in 
the EU so as to bring down prices for businesses and 
consumers alike, increasing the efficiency of energy 
use, reducing environmental impact and raising the 
share of renewables in energy supply. The latter might 
contribute to economic development in less favoured 
43 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_19_en.htm
regions by helping them capitalise on their natural re-
sources (such as solar power, wind or biomass).
4.4 Economic and Monetary Union
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) helps to estab-
lish financial conditions across the EU which is impor-
tant for the sustained growth of both Member States 
and regions. In the EMU, Member States cannot rely 
on exchange rate adjustment anymore to adjust to 
macroeconomic shocks. Fiscal policy can be used for 
stabilisation only if its room for manoeuvre as defined 
by the Stability and Growth Pact is not exhausted. This 
implies that flexible labour and product markets and 
hence structural reforms improving their flexibility 
should play a vital role in avoiding widening differ-
ences in competitiveness, economic activity and em-
ployment in the euro area. This applies to differences 
both between countries and between regions within 
countries. 
Cohesion Policy can support regions to tackle their 
fundamental structural problems which inhibit the 
competitiveness of their producers, and it can also 
provide support to a part of the structural reforms im-
proving the flexibility of labour and product markets. 
However, for Cohesion Policy to have a lasting impact 
on the supply side of the supported economies, it 
needs to be complemented by stability-oriented pru-
dent fiscal policy and adequate structural reform poli-
cies. Such a supportive policy framework can not only 
support the attainment of the long-term impact of 
Cohesion Policy, but it can also alleviate the potential 
short-term risk associated with the inflation induced 
by the inflow of large-scale capital transfers into euro-
area economies. 
While differences in economic performance between 
countries which are part of the euro area have de-
creased over time, there is scant evidence on the spe-
cific impact of the EMU on regional disparities. At the 
same time, the evidence is that transparency of costs 
and the reduction in exchange risks resulting from 
monetary union have brought to the fore the role of 
specific regional characteristics as factors in deter-
mining the potential for regional development. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 195
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4.5 The Lisbon Strategy
The re-launch of the Lisbon strat-
egy in 2005 improved the over-
all consistency of the economic 
policy framework of the Union44. 
It was considered to be impor-
tant to achieve greater owner-
ship of the Lisbon objectives 
on the ground and therefore to 
increase the involvement of re-
gional and local actors and the 
social partners. Many policies un-
der the Lisbon strategy need to 
be implemented at sub-national 
level, particularly those in areas 
where proximity matters, such as 
innovation and the knowledge 
economy, employment, human 
capital development, entrepre-
neurship, support for SMEs, and 
access to risk capital financing, or 
in areas where local or regional 
authorities have competence (for 
example, education or health).
The position of regions in relation to the key Lisbon 
targets depends on their overall level of development. 
The Convergence Regions tend to score much lower 
on all these indicators (Table 3.1). Nevertheless, they 
made considerable progress in this regard between 
2000 and 2008. The Lisbon Index measures the dis-
tance of regions from eight Lisbon targets (Map 3.7). 
A region scores 100 if it has reached all eight targets, 
while the region farthest away from all eight scores 
zero. The Convergence regions increased their score 
by seven points over the period, almost as much as 
the RCE regions, indicating that all regions contribut-
ed to the pursuit of the Lisbon Strategy and not only 
the more developed.
In 2008, only three regions reached all eight targets: Län-
si-Suomi in Finland and Östra Mellansverige and Västs-
verige in Sweden. Between 2000 and 2008, the five fast 
movers were all Spanish regions which increased their 
score by between 27 and 36 points (Map 3.8). However, 
the crisis led to sharp falls in employment rates in Spain 
44 High-Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (2004): Facing the challenge.  
The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. 
and, accordingly, adversely affected their performance 
in reaching the employment targets.
5. Assessing territorial impacts 
Both policies with and without an explicit spatial di-
mension could benefit from an assessment of territo-
rial impact. Before deciding on a particular policy, such 
an assessment could show in a quantitative or qualita-
tive way which areas or regions might face the high-
est costs or enjoy the largest benefits. After a policy 
has been implemented, the assessment could reveal 
whether the implementation of the policy has led to an 
unbalanced impact across the EU. 
The majority of the stakeholders in the debate on the 
Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion45 as well as Mem-
ber State experts46 have argued that the European 
45 A summary of the contributions has been published by the Com-
mission within the 6th progress report on economic and social co-
hesion, COM(2009) 295, June 2009.
46 See Annex and the Report on the EU Seminar on Territorial Impact 
of EU policies 5 March 2009, Amsterdam, Action 2.2 of the Action 
Programme for the implementation for the EU Territorial Agenda 
http://www.eu-territorial-agenda.eu/Summary%20Documents/
Action%202-2_%20Report%20EU%20Seminar%20Territorial%20
Impact%20(3)_05032009.pdf
3.1 Lisbon Index 2008 and change 2000–2008
Lisbon  
Target
EU-27 CONV TRANS RCE
2008
Employment rate of 
men aged 15–54
85 76 71 75 80
Employment rate of 
women aged 15–54
64 64 57 59 69
Employment rate of 
people aged 55–64
50 46 40 44 49
Early school leavers aged 18–24 10 14 15 19 12
Secondary education attainment 
of people aged 20–24
85 78 80 72 78
Participation in life-long learning 
of people aged 25–64 
12.5 9.4 5.3 8.6 11.6
Business expenditure in 
R&D as % of GDP
2 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.4
Government, higher education 
and non-profit expenditure 
in R&D as % of GDP
1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7
Lisbon index 100 68 38 42 70
Change in Lisbon index 2000–2008 11 7 10 9
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIOChapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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Commission should improve the territorial dimension 
of its impact assessments. This would not require a 
new instrument. Simply ensuring that the territo-
rial dimension in the Strategic Environmental Assess-
ment (SEA)47 and the impact assessment (IA) is given 
appropriate attention could already have significant 
benefits. Currently, the impact assessment guidelines 
contain several elements with clear territorial rele-
vance. When a single Member State or region is dis-
proportionately affected, this should be mentioned. 
Where such disparities appear to be significant, they 
should be analysed as they may be a reason to adapt 
the initiative, for instance to offer mitigating or transi-
tional measures for the ‘outlier’. The IA guidelines also 
offer more specific guidance on assessing territorial 
impacts (see Box). Addressing these issues in a coher-
ent manner and, where possible, mapping the results 
could enhance the quality and scope of these assess-
ments. 
Member States can also develop their assessments 
of territorial impacts for two reasons. First, they have 
more detailed knowledge of their territory which al-
lows them to undertake a more specific impact as-
sessment. Second, the concrete impact of EU legisla-
tion depends on how Member States transpose EU 
47 Directive 2001/42/EC.
directives into national law.48 A 
good example of a national as-
sessment of territorial impacts 
is the Dutch Quick Scan49 ap-
proach which combines quan-
titative and qualitative meth-
ods. 
A simple approach is being 
tested by an ESPON study 
which will assess the sensitivity 
of regions to a number of spe-
cific policies and (non-spend-
ing) directives. An example 
of such an approach is the ex 
post assessment of the impact 
of the ozone air quality direc-
tive (2002/3/EC). This directive 
is aimed at reducing expo-
sure to high ozone concentra-
tions in cities. Combining the 
population share in cities and 
the number of days in which 
ozone concentration exceeds this threshold provides 
an indication of which regions will be most affected 
by the directive (Map 3.9). 
An alternative ozone directive could consider setting 
more differentiated targets according to the initial 
levels in each city. This would reduce the cumulative 
long-term exposure in the cities that have relatively 
high average ozone concentrations but which do not 
exceed the maximum threshold. 
6. Conclusions
Some policies have an explicit territorial dimension, 
like transport or environmental policy. This means 
that during the policy design phase, the territorial 
impact of this policy was considered and the policy 
was adjusted to ensure that the policy has the highest 
impact and the territorial distribution of this impact 
is balanced. Nevertheless, policies with a spatial di-
mension can still have adverse territorial impacts, for 
48 See also Zonneveld, W. and Waterhout, B., EU Territorial Impact As-
sessment: Under What Conditions 49th European Congress of the 
Regional Science Association, Lodz, Poland.
49  See for example, Quickscan energie en ruimte, PBL The Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2010. http://www.pbl.nl/nl/
publicaties/2010/Quickscan-energie-en-ruimte-Raakvlakken-tus-
sen-energiebeleid-en-ruimtelijke-ordening.html
Examples of territorial elements to be considered 
in the Commission ex-ante impact assessments
IMPACTS KEY QUESTIONS
ECONOMIC: 
Specific regions 
or sectors
•	 Will it have a specific impact on certain regions, for 
instance in terms of jobs created or lost?
•	 Is there a single Member State, region or sector which is 
disproportionately affected (so-called ‘outlier’ impact)?
SOCIAL: 
Social inclusion
•	 Does it affect equal access to services and goods? 
•	 Does it affect access to placement services or to services 
of general economic interest? 
•	 Does the option affect specific localities more than 
others?
ENVIRONMENTAL: 
Land use
•	 Does the option have the effect of bringing new areas of 
land (‘greenfields’) into use for the first time? 
•	 Does it affect land designated as sensitive for ecological 
reasons? Does it lead to a change in land use (for 
example, the divide between rural and urban, or change 
in type of agriculture)?Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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3.9 Ozone concentration exceedances in cities, 2008
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example, due to unforeseen effects or changes in the 
context. As a result, it remains important to evaluate 
the territorial impacts of policies with a spatial dimen-
sion once they have been implemented.
Other policies only have a partial territorial dimen-
sion, such as those relating to research, innovation, in-
formation society and health. For example, EU health 
policy provides EU residents with certain rights in all 
EU Member States, but it also considers specific ter-
ritorial issues such as cross-border health care. The 
Digital Agenda fears that high-speed broadband in-
frastructure may not be constructed in remote or rural 
regions without public intervention, which is why it 
adopted the objective that everyone in the EU should 
have access to this type of internet. Another example 
is the Common Agricultural Policy which provides 
direct support to farmers under pillar one based in a 
uniform manner, while some of the support under pil-
lar two is differentiated according to the type of area. 
Policies with a partial spatial dimension should con-
sider the territorial impact of their entire policy during 
the design phase and include the territorial dimen-
sion in their ex post evaluation.
Some policies cannot distinguish between different 
parts of the EU, which is the case for the single mar-
ket or trade. However, this does not mean that these 
policies do not have a spatial impact. For example, 
further trade liberalisation may lead to concentrated 
job losses in a particular area. To reduce such negative 
social impacts in specific areas, the EU has set up the 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund.
In short, this chapter has shown that some EU poli-
cies have an asymmetric territorial impact and that, 
for some of these, concrete steps have been taken to 
avoid an excessive concentration of costs or benefits. 
This implies that new policies which are likely to have 
an asymmetric territorial impact could benefit from 
an explicit discussion of this impact during the policy 
design phase. 
Furthermore, all types of policies, be they spatially 
blind or spatially targeted, should include a territorial 
dimension in their ex post assessment which would 
allow catching both intended and unintended spatial 
impacts. Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion
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Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
1. Introduction
Cohesion was a goal of what later became the 
European Union from the start. In 1957, six countries 
signed the Treaty of Rome which said they were anx-
ious ‘to strengthen the unity of their economies and to 
ensure their harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the less favoured regions’. 
The goal was motivated by a concern that less devel-
oped regions would be unable to benefit from eco-
nomic union, a concern which underlaid the creation 
of Cohesion Policy and which was expressed in the 
Thomson report of 1973: ‘No Community could main-
tain itself nor have a meaning for the people which be-
long to it so long as some have very low standards of 
living and have cause to doubt the common will to help 
each Member State to better the condition of its people’. 
Successive enlargements have substantially in-
creased the extent of regional disparities in the EU. 
When Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Union 
in 1981/86, the proportion of the population living in 
a region with GDP per head 30% below the EU aver-
age jumped from 12.5% to 20%. The last two enlarge-
ments dramatically widened regional differences and 
further strengthened the need for a policy aimed at 
ensuring development in all regions. This need was 
also recognised in the Lisbon Treaty which added the 
aim of territorial cohesion to those of economic and 
social cohesion.
How do these aims fit together?
The overriding objective of Cohesion Policy is to 
achieve the harmonious development of the Union 
and its regions, through:
  • increasing competitiveness especially in less de-
veloped regions;
  • expanding employment and improving people’s 
well-being;
  • protecting and enhancing the environment.
Economic and social cohesion are closely associated 
with the first two goals. Territorial cohesion is associ-
ated with the third goal as well as with using a more 
integrated and territorial approach to policy making. 
The integrated and territorial approach
To pursue regional development effectively requires 
close coordination of public policies. For example, 
while investment in both infrastructure and educa-
tion can contribute to development, the effect of co-
ordinating the two is greater than undertaking the 
two separately. Such coordination, moreover, needs 
to occur at the regional level so as to ensure that 
investment is targeted at the most relevant factors 
within an integrated development strategy.
The territorial approach also implies a need for the dif-
ferent levels of government, local and regional as well 
as national and EU-level, to work together to ensure 
consistency between policies. This co-ordination can 
occur at the local level with an integrated local devel-
opment strategy supported by local authorities and 
other local actors. However the geographic scale can 
change with the policy field. In some cases — envi-
ronmental protection, for example — it might require 
a strategy spanning macro-regions, such as that cov-
ering the Baltic Sea area.
In similar vein, for regional policy to be coherent across 
countries, strategies need to take account of those be-
ing pursued elsewhere. Accordingly, Cohesion Policy 
supports the development of trans-regional coordi-
nation to ensure that potential conflicts are avoided 
and synergies are realised.
The evidence presented below often relates more to 
economic and social cohesion than to territorial cohe-
sion, which only became a Treaty goal of the policy at 
the end of 2009. Evidence on the impact of the territo-
rial approach is most obvious as regards issues such 
as local development, territorial co-operation and 
sustainability. 
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1.1 Investing in green, 
smart and inclusive 
growth — the main lines 
of spending
Cohesion Policy is the main EU 
measure for pursuing balanced 
and sustainable growth across 
Europe. The funds at its disposal 
amount to some EUR 344 billion 
in the current 2007–2013 period 
(Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1), over a 
third of the EU budget — a tan-
gible sign of the Union’s commit-
ment to regional development and 
social and economic cohesion.
The main elements are the 
European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) and the European 
Social Fund (ESF) divided be-
tween: 
  • the Convergence Objective 
(EUR 212 billion over the 
2007–2013 period1) cover-
ing the 100 least prosperous 
NUTS  2 regions with a total 
population of 170 million. 
These are the regions with 
GDP/head of less than 75% of 
the EU average;
  • the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment (RCE) 
Objective (EUR 55 billion2), 
aimed at assisting other re-
gions in the EU to compete 
and maintain jobs in a global economy;
  • the European Territorial Cooperation Objective 
(EUR 7.8 billion3) for strengthening cooperation 
across borders and exchanging experience across 
the EU.
1  Including the 16 regions ‘phasing-out’ over the period.
2  Including the 13 regions ‘phasing in’ over the period.
3  Plus EUR 0.9 billion for co-operation with third countries under 
ENPI and IPA, making a grand total of EUR 8.7 billion 
In addition, the Cohesion Fund (EUR 70 billion) sup-
ports investment in transport and environmental 
infrastructure in the 15 Member States with the low-
est levels of national income (less than 90% of the EU 
average)4.
Achieving the cohesion objectives is complex. Every 
region has specific needs and different regions face 
4  Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Spain is eligible for phasing-out funding. There is there-
fore a close, but not exact, correspondence between eligibility for 
the Cohesion Fund and for the Convergence Objective.
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Distribution of Funds by Objective, 2007-2013 4.1
Source: DG REGIO
4.1 Distribution of Funds by Objective, 2007–2013
EUR billion
Objectives All Funds ERDF ESF Cohesion 
Fund
All Objectives 344.3 198.8 76 69.6
Convergence — CONV 1 281.5 159.9 52 69.62
Regional Competitiveness 
& Employment — RCE 3
55 31 23.9
European Territorial 
Cooperation — ETC 4
7.8 7.8
1 includes phasing-out regions 
2 the correspondence between Convergence regions and Cohesion Fund countries is 
approximate, not 1-to-1. 
3 includes phasing in regions 
4 does not include EUR 0.9 billion for co-operation with third countries. 
Source: Programmed expenditure. These figures can be slightly smaller than the financial 
perspectives, since they do not include money de-committed or not yet programmed.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 203
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different challenges. Economic development, moreo-
ver, has to be sustainable and, accordingly, compat-
ible with social and environmental objectives as well 
as with territorial cohesion, which entails minimising 
spatial disparities and ensuring access to basic ser-
vices.
Correspondingly, spending under Cohesion Policy 
covers a broad mix of measures, though four broad 
policy areas account for more than 80% of the total:
  • Support to enterprise and innovation, which 
are the motors of economic development and the 
source of tax revenue to support social spend-
ing, environmental protection and balanced ter-
ritorial development. This includes direct financial 
aid to investment and R&D, but also, increasingly, 
non-financial assistance, in the form of network-
ing and innovation systems, business advice and 
incubators.
Contributing to smart inclusive growth1 in Eastern Germany2
The East German Länder received EUR 18.6 billion from the ERDF and the ESF in the 2000–2006 period. Except Berlin, all of 
them were eligible under Objective 1. In the 2007–2013 period, Cohesion Policy amounts to EUR 16.6 billion, all the regions 
receiving support under the Convergence Objective, except Berlin (Competitiveness) again and Brandenburg–Südwest 
(phasing -out).
In 2000–2006, Cohesion Policy accounted for a third of the total support to entrepreneurship, a quarter of that to R&D and 
a fifth of that for urban development. It also accounted for 50% of investment in vocational training and 10% of funding 
for active labour market policies.
The contribution of Cohesion Policy to the economic development of Eastern Germany is demonstrated by a number of 
indicators. For example, support to business helped to create 91 000 jobs. Industrial sites covering around 3 250 hectares 
were created or renovated. Some 3 300 km of roads were constructed or upgraded. Over 2.6 million people participated 
in activities aimed at assisting the unemployed into work and at developing human resources. Estimates by the HERMIN 
macroeconomic model (see Chapter IV.6) are that the measures supported by Cohesion Policy had a significant impact on 
GDP and employment creation.
GDP in Eastern Germany grew rapidly during the years following reunification but by 1996, the growth rate was already 
below 2% and it fell to close to zero in the early 2000s. The recovery from 2006, when GDP grew by 2.8%, was halted by the 
economic crisis. Population has been declining since unification. By 2008, it was nearly 9% lower than in 1991. The decline 
coupled with GDP growth led to GDP per head rising to 116% of the EU average in 1995, but it then fell to 95% in 2000 
and 88% in 2008. The level, however, varies from 87% of the EU average in Brandenburg–Nordost to 117% in Berlin. The 
employment rate followed a similar path to economic growth, falling below 60% of working-age population in the early 
2000s and rising to 68% in 2008.
The massive investment in construction in Eastern Germany has led to the gap in infrastructure endowment with the 
Western part of the country being virtually closed. However, to strengthen competitiveness and to face the challenges 
from globalisation, demographic trends, climate change and energy scarcity, there is need to strengthen productive po-
tential. This applies, in particular, to human capital, innovation capacity and transport links within the region. Although 
a third of working-age population is highly educated, due to a lack of demand on the labour market, many of those con-
cerned leave the region to work elsewhere (brain-drain). Gender equality and lifelong learning also need to be improved 
further.
There is equally a need to increase innovation and the marketing of new products so as to make full use of the investment 
in R&D as well as to create stronger links between business and research.
1  Anforderungen und Handlungsoptionen für den Einsatz der europäischen Strukturpolitik in den Jahren 2014-2020 in den neuen 
Bundesländern einschließlich Berlin (GEFRA, EMDS, IFS, MR), 2010.
2  Thüringen, Dresden, Chemnitz, Brandenburg-Nordost, Brandenburg-Südwest, Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and 
Berlin.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Planned investment in this 
area amounts to some EUR 79 
billion over the 2007–2013 pe-
riod and is the largest single 
item of expenditure in almost 
all regions.
  • Transport infrastructure to 
link regions internally and to 
the outside world. Support is 
given to investment in roads 
and rail, though also in urban 
transport, ports and airports 
and in links between different 
transport modes.
Planned investment amounts 
to some EUR 76 billion over the 
2007–2013 period, mostly in 
the EU-12, where road and rail 
networks are in need of modernisation, though 
also in many southern regions where investment 
programmes have stretched over several pro-
gramming periods and are nearing completion.
  • Human capital development which is a key 
source of growth in all Member States and regions 
in Europe as well as means of strengthening social 
cohesion and equal opportunities and improving 
the adaptability of workers and entrepreneurs to 
economic change.
Planned investment over the 2007–2013 period 
amounts to EUR 68 billion, funding going to sup-
port many different forms of vocational education 
and training, structural reform in labour market 
and education and training systems and groups 
of people that face particular problems on the 
labour market, like the long term unemployed, 
those with disabilities and migrants.
  • Environmental protection to ensure the sustain-
ability of economic development as well as to 
make regions more attractive places to live and 
work. 
Planned investment amounts to some EUR 62 bil-
lion over the 2007–2013 period to a large extent in 
waste, water and waste water treatment, especially 
in less developed regions. In other regions, support 
goes mainly to measures such as urban regenera-
tion, the reclamation of old industrial sites, energy 
saving and environmentally-friendly investment in 
enterprises. Nearly half of the Member States5 have 
included indicators for greenhouse gas emissions 
in their programmes. In addition, Cohesion Policy 
provides support to training to raise skills and em-
ployment in this broad area.
The relative scale of spending on these main policy ar-
eas has tended to remain similar over time (Figure 4.2). 
There have, however, been shifts in emphasis in line 
with the Lisbon agenda, most notably from support 
of businesses to support of innovation, much of it tar-
geting SMEs.
1.2 Evaluation — understanding and 
finding ways to improve the effects of 
intervention
Evaluation methods: building up a picture 
over time6
Evaluation attempts to build up a picture of the eco-
nomic, social and environmental impact of Cohesion 
5  Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK.
6 For further information see the evaluation website: http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/eval-
uation_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=701&lan
gId=en&internal_pagesId=616&moreDocuments=yes&tableName
=INTERNAL_PAGES 
Other, 0.2
Technical assistance, 
4.5
Planning, 
rehabilitation, tourism 
and culture, 6.5
Human Capital, 19.8
Social infrastructure, 
4.9
Energy Infrastructure, 
0.5
Transport 
Infrastructure, 22.0
Telecom 
Infrastructure, 0.7
Research Tech. 
Development 
Innovation (RTDI), 
17.5
Enterprise support 
other than research 
and innovation, 5.4
Environment 
(incl. green energy), 
17.9
% of total planned expenditure
Cohesion Policy spending by main theme, 2007-2013 4.2
Source: Planned expenditure - ERDF, ESF, Cohesion FundFifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 205
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Policy. This serves the twin goals of accountability 
(‘what has been achieved with taxpayers’ money?’) 
and learning (‘how could policy be improved?’).
Impact, however, is difficult to measure, since 
Cohesion Policy is only one influence among many. 
Global economic developments, technological 
change, macroeconomic policy and so on also exert 
an influence, as does individual and company behav-
iour. Moreover, the full impact of Cohesion Policy, es-
pecially as regards support for innovation and trans-
port, can only emerge over the long-term.
There is therefore no easy way of measuring the im-
pact of Cohesion Policy. Instead, a variety of methods 
are used to build up a detailed picture over time:
  • Regional statistics indicate what has happened in 
terms of GDP, innovation, productivity, employ-
ment and unemployment, the natural and built 
environment and so on, but they do not measure 
the contribution of Cohesion Policy to the chang-
es.
  • Monitoring of programmes records the activity 
and output of Cohesion Policy — how much was 
given in R&D grants and what firms report doing 
with these? How many kilometres of road have 
been built? Were there delays in implementation? 
How many people have been trained?
Cutting edge econometric techniques demonstrate the contribution to economic 
growth and convergence
A recent academic study of the dynamics of regional GDP growth in the EU-15 (see figure) found a sharp jump between 
those regions in receipt of Objective 1 funding over the period 1995–2006 and other regions. Comparing regions near 
the cut-off for eligibility for Objective 1 funding, GDP of Objective 1 regions grew at an average of 0.6–0.9 of a percentage 
point1 more than similar regions above the cut-off.
This implies something like an extra 10% addition to GDP over the two programming periods concerned (1994–1999 and 
2000–2006).
The scale of this effect is much larger than the amount of funding involved (or the direct stimulus to demand from this) 
which suggests that it mostly reflects a strengthening of the supply-side of the economy in the regions concerned.
1  The range of estimates was generated using a variety of parametric and non-parametric techniques.
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  • Where the data exist, entities supported can be 
compared with similar ‘control’ ones to estimate 
the impact of policy7.
  • Ex post cost-benefit analysis may be able to es-
timate the contribution of infrastructure to the 
wider economy.
  • Macro-economic models, which attempt to rep-
licate the main economic mechanisms, can be 
used to try to capture the effect of policy on the 
economy8.
  • Some models can help to analyse possible re-
forms with respect to their impact on the labour 
market as well as on firms and households9.
  • Case studies, including interviews with stakehold-
ers, can be used to gain an insight into the factors 
underlying the quantified developments and the 
contribution of policy to these.
All of these methods have their uses. Monitoring, for 
example, is an essential management tool to track 
programmes but monitoring indicators (e.g.  km of 
road) say nothing about the social or economic im-
pact of policy.
Since no single method can indicate the impact of 
policy, ‘triangulation’, comparing the results of differ-
ent methods, is an important part of the evaluation 
process.
The European Commission alone cannot deliver all 
the evidence on the performance of Cohesion Policy. 
It, therefore, encourages Member States to carry 
out evaluations and, where possible, to use rigorous 
methods to do so. The more evaluations that deliver 
credible evidence on different aspects of the policy, 
the greater the possibility of building a picture of its 
overall performance as a basis for improving policy in 
the future.
7  This ‘counterfactual’ method is being tested in a variety of settings, 
including enterprise support, urban regeneration and assistance to 
minorities.
8  DG Regional Policy uses two macro models (HERMIN and QUEST) as 
well as a model on transport investment (TRANSTOOLS).
9  Such a model has been developed recently and applied to 6 
Member States: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland and the 
UK, which have different socio-economic features and which may 
be representative of the other countries in the EU.
The main results of the ex post evaluations of Cohesion 
Policy (see box) form the core of this chapter10 and are 
presented under five central and interrelated themes:
  • economic development, including transport and 
cross-border links
10 For details and reports, see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
sources/docgener/evaluation/rado2_en.htm, http://ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?catId=701&langId=en
The ex post evaluation of the 2000–
2006 period
The evaluation of Cohesion Policy is an immense 
undertaking. The ex post evaluation of the ERDF for 
2000–2006 alone generated 105 in-depth case stud-
ies and examined some 29 500 monitoring indicators 
from 382 programmes1. For the ex post evaluation of 
the ESF, 49 case studies were undertaken and more 
than 2 000 measures from 238 programmes were ex-
amined.
The evaluation of the ERDF could not cover all the 
details of Cohesion Policy between 2000 and 2006 
in more than 230 Objective 1 and 2 programmes. 
Instead, it focused on the main policy areas and issues 
in 14 studies, ranging from enterprise support to equal 
opportunities, assessing the contribution of the policy 
to the development of lagging regions (Objective 1) 
and the process of restructuring (in Objective 2 areas).
The ex post evaluation of the ESF likewise could not 
examine in detail every aspect of its contribution to 
238 Objective 1, 2 and 3 programmes (including the 
EQUAL Initiative). Five evaluations were undertaken to 
assess the results of ESF support and its effect on cohe-
sion. A preparatory study focussed on the availability 
and reliability of data. Two evaluations examined ESF 
support to the Open Method of Coordination in Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion and the impact on the 
functioning of the labour market and support for in-
vestment in infrastructure and systems for human cap-
ital development. Two further evaluations examined 
the ESF and the EQUAL Community initiative.
Other evaluations assessed the effects of INTERREG 
and URBAN, while the Cohesion Fund is being exam-
ined in three studies due to be completed in early 
2011.
1  230 Objective 1 and 2 programmes, plus Interreg and 
URBAN   programmes.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 207
Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
  • social inclusion, including training and local de-
velopment;
  • environmental protection and the green econo-
my;
  • governance, including partnership arrangements;
  • macroeconomic modelling results.
These are considered in turn below.
2. Stronger economies
Growth of regional economies was the original focus 
of the ERDF and remains a key priority, generating 
jobs and funding social spending, and environmen-
tal protection, as well as social cohesion and cleaner, 
more efficient technologies, which, in turn, contribute 
to growth.
This section reviews the contribution of Cohesion 
Policy to growth, beginning with support to enter-
prise and innovation and going on to investment in 
transport which is important for accessibility and ef-
ficient internal links. It ends by considering the con-
tribution of Interreg to cross-border cooperation and 
exchange of experience.
2.1 Strengthening SMEs and 
competitiveness
Enterprises and innovation are key to growth. If lag-
ging regions are to catch up and others are to main-
tain competitiveness, encouraging the growth of ef-
ficient and innovative firms is essential. 
The rationale for support to enterprise rests on several 
areas of market failure:
  • Since many of the basic conditions for innovation 
are public goods, there is a role for public inter-
vention to boost investment in them.
  • Since SMEs and — most of all — start ups typi-
cally have difficulty accessing finance, especially 
for innovative, and risky, ideas, public support can 
reduce the difficulty and absorb some of the risk. 
  • Since SMEs and start-ups face difficulties and costs 
in obtaining advice, information and expertise, 
public intervention can provide access to these.
  • Since, in addition, SMEs are the main source of 
jobs in the EU and a breeding ground for business 
ideas11, the focus of policy is, therefore, on them. 
In the 2000–2006 period, they received around 
83%12 of Cohesion support to enterprise and the 
Figure in 2007–2013 is likely to be similarly high.
In all Member States, the overriding aim of enterprise 
support is to increase productivity and competitive-
ness with a view to sustainable growth and employ-
ment. This mirrors the Lisbon goals and in some coun-
tries (notably Germany, Poland and Luxembourg) the 
link has been made explicit.
In Poland, for example, the 2004–2006 programming 
documents emphasised the reliance of the economy 
on firms in traditional industries able to compete only 
in terms of cheap labour. Since low incomes are not a 
socially sustainable form of comparative advantage, 
firms need support in order to invest in new technol-
ogy and more efficient methods of production.
Solid achievements: jobs and productivity
Evaluation evidence13 indicated the following achieve-
ments from enterprise support over the 2000–2006 
period:
  • the creation of 1.4 million gross jobs, recorded by 
Member States over the period, an estimated 1 
million due to enterprise support;
  • an estimated 230 000 enterprises (mainly SMEs) 
received direct financial support — mainly grants 
but also loans or venture capital;
11 European Charter for Small Enterprises, European Commission, 
Directorate General for Enterprises.
12 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 6 on sup-
port for enterprise, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/
docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm. Since the study 
examined the 2000–2006 Cohesion Policy period, Member States 
refers to the EU-25. 
13  Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 6b on the 
30 largest enterprise programmes, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htmChapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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  • an estimated 1.7 million en-
terprises (again, mainly SMEs) 
received advice, expertise and 
support for networking.
Long-run impacts are more dif-
ficult to measure and need to be 
explored on a case-by-case basis. 
But there is a growing body of evi-
dence that support to SMEs in par-
ticular can have significant effects 
(see box).
Structural change: invest in 
the future
Managing and facilitating struc-
tural changes in economic activity 
was an explicit aim of Objective 
2 in 2000–2006. And the adapt-
ability of workers, firms and other 
organisations was one of the five 
core policy areas for the ESF. As 
economies modernise, shifts of 
labour and capital to more effi-
cient uses are essential to sustain 
growth and attain higher living 
standards.
But there can also be significant 
adjustment costs, in the form of 
job displacement and premature 
scrapping of capital, which often 
fall on a small section of the popu-
lation. It is therefore important to 
manage change in a way that limits, or takes account 
of, these costs.
The ex post evaluation14 found that Objective 2 pro-
grammes were successful in managing structural 
change when:
  • they focussed efforts on innovation, the capacity 
of SMEs to absorb new technology, fostering clus-
ters, internationalisation and the creation of new 
jobs rather than on safeguarding jobs in ailing in-
14 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006, Work Package 4: 
Structural Change and Globalisation, http://ec.europa.eu/region-
al_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp4_en.htm
dustries — on investing in the future instead of 
the past;
  • policies were pursued over the long term. This 
was the case in País Vasco, which, for decades, 
has pursued a policy encouraging adaptation to 
structural change and globalisation, which re-
quires solid commitment from all sides.
The evaluation found that, even where Cohesion 
Funding was relatively small, it could be a catalyst for 
change. Evidence from successful regions underlined 
the importance of long-term planning. Cohesion 
Policy played a key role in setting the agenda and 
giving regional stakeholders the chance to meet and 
consider development strategies.
Positive results from a rigorous and innovative 
evaluation of enterprise support in Eastern Germany
In Eastern Germany, an innovative study1 compared enterprises assisted to 
similar ones not assisted in a control group. According to the study, an aver-
age grant of roughly EUR 8 000 per employee generated around EUR 12 000 
of additional investment, a clear leverage effect. As a result, enterprises as-
sisted invested around EUR 20 000 per employee, nearly 2.5 times as much 
as non-assisted enterprises. Though employment gains were significant, the 
main effect was on increasing productivity. This demonstrates that, even in a 
regional context where grants are common, they can be effective.
1  Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 6c: An explora-
tory study using counterfactual methods on available data from Germany, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/
wp6_en.htm
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Non-assisted firms Assisted firms
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Additional investment by firm
Contribution of grants
Baseline Investment per employee (EUR)
Estimated impact of investment grants per employee, 
2000-2006
4.4
Source: European Commission, Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006, Work package 6c 
"An explorative study using counterfactual methods on available data from Germany"Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
210 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
Since the shift of resources to more productive activi-
ties is an integral part of structural change, measures 
to help increase the adaptability of workers and or-
ganisations are of strategic importance. There can 
also, however, be significant adjustment costs in the 
form of job losses, in particular. These often fall on the 
less favoured sections of the population, raising con-
cerns about equity. 
The 2000–2006 ex post evaluation of the ESF found 
that overall expenditure on measures to support the 
adaptability of organisations15 amounted to EUR 33.1 
billion and reached 18 million people over the peri-
od, while spending on measures to increase worker 
adaptability totalled 65.8 billion and assisted 37 mil-
lion people in 335 000 organisations.
2.2 More support for innovation
Cohesion Policy is the largest EU source of finance to 
support RTD and innovation16. A significant shift oc-
curred between the past and present programming 
periods (Figure 4.5) from general support to enter-
prises (typically a grant to modernise or expand their 
capital base) to a broader range of measures targeted 
at innovation. These more innovative measures in-
clude:
  • grants for research, collaboration, and capacity 
building, both to the private 
sector and to research institu-
tions;
  • investment in formal educa-
tion and, vocational education 
and training so as to equip 
workers with the qualifications 
and skills required;
  • indirect measures, such as 
support for business services, 
technology transfer, network-
ing and research infrastruc-
ture;
15 Both public and private sector.
16  The Seventh Framework Programme for RTD, and the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme, are the other main 
sources.
  • venture capital and loan funds, sometimes to a 
particular sector such as biotechnology.
However, support to enterprise, innovation and RTD 
remains inextricably linked. Some EUR 60 billion in the 
current 2007–2013 programming period is planned 
for RTD and innovation — EUR 25 billion of this going 
directly and indirectly to firms. 
Training for micro-enterprises
An evaluation of ESF support to enterprises1 in Poland 
found that it provided a strong stimulus for micro busi-
nesses to train their employees. Some 41% of the mi-
cro-sized enterprises (those with under 10 people em-
ployed) receiving support had not engaged in training 
before (as compared with 20% of small, 13% of medi-
um-sized and only 6% of large ones). Similarly, an eval-
uation of the Sachsen ESF programme for 2007–2013 
found that half of the firms receiving ESF support had 
no prior engagement in training2.
1  Bernard Brunhes International (2010) ‘Reporting on ESF 
interventions in the EU: The European Social Fund: devel-
oping human potential in research and innovation’.
2 ISW, Begleitende Evaluierung für den Europäischen 
Sozialfonds im Freistaat Sachsen, Evaluierung der 
Prioritätsachse A, Endbericht, September 2009.
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Cohesion Policy has boosted R&D in Thuringia (Germany)
An innovative evaluation1 used control 
groups to assess the impact of direct 
grants to enterprise R&D in Thüringen 
over the period 2000–2006.
The results were very positive. On av-
erage, an R&D grant of roughly EUR 
8 000 per employee was almost com-
pletely ‘additional’, generating a similar 
increase in total R&D investment. This 
counters an all too frequent assumption 
that firms take public money for invest-
ments they would have made anyway, 
sooner or later — so called ‘deadweight’.
As a result of ERDF support, assisted 
firms invested some 2.5 times as much in 
R&D as non-assisted firms. Although the 
results are a little less dramatic than for 
general investment grants (there is no 
leverage effect — see box on enterprise 
support above), the study noted that 
increased R&D spending by enterprises 
is likely to generate greater spillovers to 
long term regional growth.
Support to innovation and enterprise in Italy2
In Italy over the period 2000–2006, 
some EUR 1.3 billion of the EDRF went 
to a programme supporting RTD and 
higher education in Objective 1 re-
gions, mainly in investment grants to 
SMEs. Total funding, including from na-
tional government and private sources, 
amounted to 0.7% of the GDP of these 
regions in 2004.
Research on over 250 firms receiving 
support found that over two-thirds 
(69%) of projects were of a high and me-
dium-to-high tech nature and that the 
nearly 100 projects financed (from re-
search activities to commercialisation of 
results) had positive results, from com-
mercial use of research to an impact on 
suppliers.
1  Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, WP 6c: An exploratory study using counterfactual methods on available data from Germany, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm#6c
2  Ismeri Europa — Nova, Intermediate evaluation of NOP SIL, 2005 and Ismeri Europa — IZI, Intermediate evaluation of NOP Research, 2003.
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Across the EU, cohesion programmes emphasise 
stimulating research and innovation as well as tech-
nology transfer. This applies equally to enterprises 
(particularly SMEs), to research centres and institutes 
of higher education. Moreover, there has been a pro-
liferation of programmes for improving innovation 
through cooperation and networks.
A recent study of Cohesion Policy performance in the 
2007–2013 period17 concludes that the ERDF provides 
important support for RTDI policy across the EU, not 
only in financial terms — which is significant — but 
also in stimulating the development of more coherent 
strategies at regional level which take into account lo-
cal characteristics and the needs of businesses. The re-
gional dimension of innovation policies has grown in 
recent years with the support of the ERDF. While more 
advanced Member States spend more on innovation 
and reap significant benefits in terms of the multiplier 
effect on private investment, Convergence Regions 
are now creating the preconditions for innovation in 
17  Expert Evaluation Network delivering Policy Analysis on the 
Performance of Cohesion Policy 2007–2013, Synthesis Report on 
Innovation, 2010.
terms of institutions and absorptive capacity, collec-
tive action and human resource development. The 
Structural Funds are essential drivers in this process.
In the Convergence regions alone, EUR 47.6 billion has 
been allocated to innovation — a significant stimulus. 
Many Convergence regions suffer limited capacity. 
This can stem from limitations in the economic base 
or in higher education and research centres, or both18. 
In peripheral regions, moreover, it can be difficult to 
establish a critical mass of knowledge, capital and 
skills. In the EU-12, there is much potential (including 
a skilled work force) but limited experience and insti-
tutions devoted to RTDI.
In Competitiveness regions, funding is particularly 
concentrated on innovation — EUR 13.4 billion, or 
24% of the total allocated. In France, for example, 
Cohesion Policy enabled continued financing of inno-
vation despite the financial crisis.
Developing human capital
The ESF complements ERDF support in respect of re-
search and innovation through a specific focus on the 
development of human capital and, in particular, the 
education and training of people and the develop-
ment and adaptation of education and training sys-
tems. The impact of the ESF is most evident as regards 
international mobility, the modernisation of tertiary 
education, the increase in the skills of students and 
researchers and the transfer of knowledge between 
research institutes and businesses.
In 2000–2006, 18 Member States (out of 25) used co-
hesion support to invest in human capital in research 
and innovation. Some EUR 3.4 billion of ESF was allo-
cated, national and private co-financing adding EUR 
3.1 billion. Over 3.1 million people are estimated to 
have participated in the measures concerned. 
Tertiary education, in particular, is a crucial compo-
nent of a successful innovation policy and ESF co-fi-
nancing led to EUR 3.5 billion (including the national 
contribution) over the 2000–2006 period going on 
three main types of intervention: raising skills profiles 
and increasing research capacity, increasing the mo-
18  Strategic Evaluation on Innovation and the knowledge based econ-
omy in relation to the Structural and Cohesion Funds, for the pro-
gramming period 2007–2013, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/strategic_innov.pdf 
Delays in ICT measures being tackled 
by innovative financing 
The recently published 2010 Strategic Report on the 
implementation of Cohesion programmes1 reveals 
that on average, only 22% of Structural Funds for ICT 
services and 18% for broadband infrastructure have 
been allocated to projects against an EU average for all 
other measures of 27%. One reason is the substantial 
difficulties managing authorities face in the planning 
and management of broadband projects. In addition, 
in the current economic climate local and regional au-
thorities tend to have more difficult in finding match-
ing funds for these projects. 
In 2011, the European Commission will publish guid-
ance on broadband investment for local and regional 
authorities to encourage the full absorption of EU 
funds. Further, guidance will be provided on public-
private partnerships and other financial instruments 
such as matching funds.
1  COM(2010)110 and Staff Working Document 
SEC(2010)360: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/poli-
cy/reporting/cs_reports_en.htm Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 213
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bility of researchers and encouraging international 
cooperation, and making higher education accessi-
ble to everyone and promoting equal opportunities. 
Almost 2 million people were assisted by these meas-
ures.
2.3 A variety of tools, including financial 
engineering
Indirect support — advice, networking, 
clustering and incubation — can be as 
effective as direct financial aid
Direct measures (mostly grants but also loans and eq-
uity) were the mainstay of support to enterprise and 
innovation in the early 2000s, and accounted for some 
69% of such spending over the period 2000 to 2006. 
However, indirect measures increased from some 
17% of enterprise and innovation spending in EU-15 
Objective 1 regions in 2000 to 28% in 2006 and from 
37% to 45% in Objective 2 regions. This trend seems 
to be continuing in the 2007–2013 period.
Indirect support includes:
  • advice, training, mentoring or consultancy ser-
vices;
  • clustering and networking;
  • infrastructure and support services such as busi-
ness incubators.
These measures are often combined — specialist ad-
vice, for example, with financial support to convert a 
new idea into a commercial success.
By their very nature, indirect support measures tend 
to have effects only over the long-term, but the (lim-
ited) evidence available suggests that they are no less 
effective per Euro than direct financial assistance19. 
For example, in Merseyside (UK), 37% of SMEs receiv-
19 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 6b on the 
30 largest enterprise progammes, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm
Support for technological employment
Almost 10 000 new firms in Finland were helped by 
ESF support over the 2000–2006 period1. In Sweden 
over 50 technology centres were supported, as well as 
over 80 new firms2. In addition, almost 600 coopera-
tion and network projects were funded.
Available data indicate that almost 70 000 researchers 
were helped with the support of ESF funding to re-
search and innovation in 7 Member States (Germany, 
Spain, Finland, France, Sweden, Slovakia and the UK).
Over 40 000 people gained a qualification and almost 
60 000 found a job following participation in ESF-
funded activities. 
The ESF also supported initiatives to launch ‘compe-
tence centres’ in Sweden and Germany. Support for 
the ‘Transfer of knowledge and competence to sup-
port regional structural change’ measure in Schleswig 
Holstein in Germany led to 8 networks and 5 compe-
tence centres being set up in areas such as medical 
technology, tissue engineering, hydrogen and fuel cell 
technology and wind power.
1  Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. The European 
Social Fund: developing human potential in research and 
innovation, Bernard Brunhes International (BBI), 2010.
2  2000SE192DO001, OP, Öarna, Sweden.
Bridging the public/private research 
divide in Italy
In Italy, 34 measures, with a total budget of EUR 1.8 bil-
lion, were implemented in different regions to improve 
tertiary education and research conditions by provid-
ing a link between the school system, universities, the 
training sector and businesses. Almost 600 000 partici-
pants were involved and almost 28 000 projects were 
funded. A broad range of activities were supported:
  • promoting higher and university education by es-
tablishing new programmes for post-secondary 
and post-tertiary education and Masters courses;
  • innovative projects to facilitate exchange between 
research and business;
  • facilitating exchange of practice between research 
institutes;
  • post-secondary training (post diploma) and post-
tertiary education;
  • integrating academic programmes with regional 
vocational training systems in order to create a link 
with the labour market.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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ing advice experienced an increase in employment 
growth and 63% an increase in turnover.
The intensity of support provided can vary consider-
ably. In the 30 largest enterprise support programmes 
in 2000–2006, 387 000 firms were assisted, implying 
that over 600 000 firms in the EU as whole received 
support over the period20.
ESF support for knowledge and technology transfer 
between research centres and businesses, includ-
ing the creation of competence centres, amounted 
to over EUR 3 billion over the period, leading to over 
50 000 new jobs in the regions and countries where 
the measure was monitored.
20  On the assumption that a similar rate of support for a given amount 
of expenditure also applied in the other programmes not covered 
by the evaluation.
Financial engineering — a growing and 
effective form of support
Access of SMEs to finance and risk capital is essential if 
their potential to contribute to economic growth and 
competitiveness is to be realised. Venture Capital and 
loan funds, moreover, help move a region away from 
a subsidy culture towards one that rewards ambition 
and risk-taking. Moreover, money can be recycled 
back into a ‘legacy fund’ and reused in the future.
Loan and equity finance21 are relatively common in 
some Member States (the UK and Germany, especial-
ly) but rare in others. Many schemes and pilot projects 
however, are starting to appear, with EUR 3 billion ear-
marked for venture capital funds in the 2007–2013 
period.
Evidence22 suggests that both instruments lend 
themselves primarily to modernisation, innovation 
and capital deepening, the main effect, accordingly, 
tending to be on productivity growth rather than 
on job creation (though this may occur in the longer 
term as firms grow).
One of the main positive effects is the building of a 
strong venture capital market in the region. A striking 
example is the North East (of England) Co-investment 
Fund, launched in 2005 in a region where the last 
investment firm closed in 1999, leaving a lack of cor-
porate finance professionals with a knowledge of the 
local market. The ERDF helped to set up the fund and 
to develop the local knowledge and networks neces-
sary to manage it, so contributing to the creation of a 
venture capital market in the region.
Set-up costs can mean that loan and venture capi-
tal funds are slow to develop — especially in regions 
where they compete with grant schemes which are 
obviously more attractive to firms. Moreover, it can 
be difficult to identify suitable  projects, without 
funding those which could have been funded from 
21 Loans are repayed, usually at generous terms. Equity finance 
means that, in return for the money, the venture capital fund takes 
a stake in the company. The distinction between loans and equity, 
while clear enough on paper, is sometimes not so cut and dried 
in practice. In fact, umbrella funds sometimes offer the option of 
combining equity with loans or the option to convert between 
equity and loans.
22 Work Package 6b on the 30 largest enterprise progammes, http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/
expost2006/wp6_en.htm
A Baltic Sea Region Programme 
for Innovation, Clusters and SME-
Networks
This flagship project is aimed at fostering R&D and 
transnational clusters, collaboration on innovation 
and networks of SMEs. It is jointly led by Sweden and 
Lithuania and its goal is to establish ‘a new Baltic Sea 
Region brand’, building on ‘smartness’, research, in-
novation and co-operation. The long term aims are 
capacity building, stronger international competitive-
ness, increased foreign investment and world-class 
firms in some strategic sectors.
Support to innovation in Poland
In Poland, 234 projects were funded under the 
‘Regional innovative strategies and knowledge trans-
fer’ measure, aimed at expanding innovation capacity 
in the country by strengthening cooperation between 
research centres and businesses1. The measure funded 
traineeships as well as scholarships for PhD students 
and supported exchange of information and the 
transfer of innovations to local firms. As a result, 381 
firms signed agreements with universities and other 
research centres to support innovative joint projects.
1  2003PL161PO001, PC, Integrated Regional Development, 
Poland.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 215
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JEREMIE and JASMINE: Cohesion Policy supporting  
financial engineering
JEREMIE and JASMINE are joint financial engineering initiatives between the European Commission, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and its venture capital arm, the European Investment Fund (EIF).
JEREMIE
The ‘Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises’ invests in SME expansion and 
innovation, as well as new business creation. Holding funds are created, which in turn provide 
equity, loans or guarantees.
Improving SME access to finance was a Lisbon priority but one for which programme authorities 
lacked both expertise and access to risk capital. JEREMIE was designed to help to overcome these 
difficulties by creating a framework for cooperation with specialised financial institutions, the EIF 
and EIB, as well as other international financial institutions.
The EIF and DG REGIO started to prepare the ground in 2006. The first steps included assessing 
the demand for SME financial instruments in regions and Member States (the so called ‘evaluation 
studies’) and advising interested Managing Authorities on practical arrangements for the imple-
mentation of these JEREMIE funds.
The second phase, consisting of implementing the initiative, began in 2009. EUR 3.2 billion has 
already been committed under the 26 signed JEREMIE holding fund agreements. Of this, EUR 2.1 
billion is managed by national or regional financial institutions acting as holding funds, using 
Cohesion Policy money.
The remaining EUR 1.1 billion is managed by the EIB. To date the EIF has signed 11 agreements 
with Member States and regions, seven of these with EU-12 countries.
JASMINE
‘Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe’ provides additional funding and 
technical assistance to non-bank microfinance institutions. The goal is to help the institutions con-
cerned to increase their access to private capital markets, to expand and to become sustainable.
JASMINE is a 3-year pilot initiative running from 2009 to 2011, managed by the EIF. There are 2 
elements: funding support and technical assistance.
Under the funding support, the EIF has already signed a EUR 1.8 million investment with Coopest, 
an EU-based investment fund, providing financing to small microfinance institutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Additionally, equity operations for greenfield microfinance institutions have 
been approved to reinforce the capacities of four microfinance institutions across the EU.
The technical assistance pilot consists of assessments and ratings (free-of-charge) to selected 
JASMINE beneficiaries (non-bank micro-credit providers active in the EU-27). Following this evalu-
ation phase, beneficiaries benefit from training tailored to the specific needs of each JASMINE 
beneficiary, as identified during the assessment/rating phase. In total at least 30 non-bank micro-
finance institutions will receive technical assistance during the pilot phase. 
In addition, some market development services have also been set up to increase the visibility of 
the European microfinance market (creation of a web-based European microfinance database) 
and to promote exchange of best practices (organisation of specific workshops and creation of a 
helpdesk for microfinance practitioners).Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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commercial sources. The scarcity of credit over the 
recent past, however, has made EU support even 
more important.
Monitoring systems must keep pace with 
new tools
Historically, the success of enterprise support has 
been measured in terms of jobs created, or even jobs 
safeguarded. This has been true of both the day-to-
day management (monitoring) and the longer-term 
assessment (evaluation) of the support. Other possi-
ble indicators of success — such as productivity, prof-
its, added value and innovation — have been moni-
tored only in a few cases. 
With the growing focus on innovation, an increas-
ing proportion of support to enterprises is aimed at 
increasing productivity and competitiveness rather 
than at directly creating jobs, at least in the short-
term, though the objective is that in the long-term 
employment will be increased on a sustainable basis 
as a result of increased competitiveness. 
Measurement systems, however, have not kept up 
with this new reality. Despite the focus on competi-
tiveness and productivity, most programmes con-
What gets measured, gets done — two 
examples from Italy
The Italian law 488/92 for local enterprise develop-
ment was evaluated1 using a control group of non-as-
sisted firms. Assistance had a significant positive effect 
on turnover, employment and investment in support-
ed firms, but labour productivity growth was less than 
in non-supported firms. The evaluation concluded the 
likely reason for this to be that jobs created was the 
main result indicator and that this was a clear signal of 
priorities to programme and project managers. 
The evaluation contrasted this with a small measure to 
promote e-commerce in Piemonte. Here the indicator 
was increased sales, the result being that turnover rose 
by 5% in supported enterprises.
1  Pellegrini, G. and Centra, M. (2006) Growth and efficiency 
in subsidized firms. Paper prepared for the Workshop ‘The 
Evaluation of Labour Market, Welfare and Firms Incentives 
Programmes’, May 11th–13th 2006, Istituto Veneto di 
Scienze, Lettere ed Arti — Venezia.
The EIB and EU Cohesion Policy
The European Investment Bank (EIB), as the European 
Union’s investment bank, currently provides fund-
ing to the EU-27 as well as to acceding and candidate 
countries in order to support Cohesion Policy. EIB loans 
are an important complement to grant instruments in 
Cohesion Policy, as they provide a useful intermediate 
instrument between these and loans from commercial 
banks. 
The EIB’s remit and support is wide. Beyond TENs, en-
ergy and climate change as well as support to envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable communities, 
it encompasses financing projects in the knowledge 
economy (Lisbon agenda) education and training, 
R&D and innovation and ICT, including financing of 
SMEs. Between 2007 and 2009 more than half of EIB 
lending was directed to investment projects in energy 
and transport. Support to competitiveness and the 
knowledge economy also represents an important 
part of EIB lending activities in Convergence Regions.
The importance of EIB support has been further ac-
centuated by the financial crisis and as a consequence, 
lending to Convergence regions has been stepped 
up as part of the EIB contribution to the EU Economic 
Recovery Plan. In 2009, lending to Convergence re-
gions totalled EUR 29.0 billion, i.e. 41% of total EIB 
annual lending, funding 135 projects. Since the begin-
ning of the current programming period, EIB lending 
to Cohesion countries has reached EUR 65.9 billion, 
and a total of 339 projects have been supported.
The current 2007–2013 programming period has 
introduced a greater role for the Bank in common 
initiatives implemented with the Commission to bol-
ster convergence through advisory services, financial 
engineering and customised financial products, espe-
cially in the EU-12 countries. It involves planning and 
programming, including technical assistance in the 
preparation of projects, project appraisal and financial 
engineering and monitoring. 
There are four specially conceived Cohesion Policy Joint 
Initiatives, the so-called ‘4 Js’, originating from partner-
ships established between the European Commission 
(EC), the EIB/EIF and other international financial insti-
tutions. They are (i) JASPERS — Joint Assistance to sup-
port Projects in European Regions (EIB, EC, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
KfW Bankengruppe); (ii) JESSICA — Joint European 
Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (EIB, Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 217
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EC and Council of Europe 
Development Bank), (iii) 
JEREMIE — Joint European 
Resources for Micro to 
Medium Enterprises initiative 
(EIF, EC); and (iv) JASMINE 
— Joint Action to Support 
Micro-Finance Institutions in 
Europe (EIF and EC).
But there are also a number 
of risk-sharing instruments 
such as Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility (RSFF) and Loan 
Guarantee for TEN Transport 
(LGTT) addressing com-
plementary EU objectives 
and developed in partner-
ship with the Commission. 
Financial engineering has 
provided new revolving instruments allowing a better matching between the type of funding and the nature of 
activities and ensuring market impact and leverage of EU financial resources.
Building on established technical assistance products, new technical assistance activities, usually closely linked 
to projects financed by the EIB, are being developed. The European Local Energy Assistance facility (ELENA) is an 
example of a new product that will support public investment in energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and 
clean transport. The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) is another initiative developed in partnership with DG 
REGIO. EPEC supports Public Private Partnerships for infrastructure investment by sharing and transferring knowl-
edge, experience and best practice.
In terms of European territorial cooperation, the EIB has been a key partner in the design, launch and implementa-
tion of the EU Baltic Sea Strategy (BSS) and acted as a pathfinder for the new macro-regional strategy developed 
by the Commission at the request of the European Council. The EIB is contributing to this Strategy via its lending 
activity, development of technical assistance, reinforced cooperation and participation with the Nordic Investment 
Bank (NIB) in the Financial Expert Group for BSS, and further participation in relevant Northern Dimension Fora. The 
EIB is making a similar contribution to the Danube strategy.
4.2 Total EIB support to Cohesion Policy1 (amount signed)
2007 2008 2009
EUR  million % of  total EUR million % of total EUR million % of total
Cohesion countries 11 691 75% 16 398 77% 22 838 79%
Non-cohesion countries 3 898 25% 4 884 23% 6 212 21%
Total 15 588 21 282 29 050
Share of EIB Structural funds co-financing (SPL)
Cohesion countries 1 583 100% 2 612 65% 2 472 97%
Non-cohesion countries 0 0% 1 400 35% 75 3%
Total 1 583 4 012 2 547
1 Including global loans for SMEs & Mid-cap 
Source: European Investment Bank
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tinue to measure their impact in 
terms of jobs created. The risk is 
that this serves to distort the di-
rection of policy on the ground 
towards a focus on the short 
rather than the long-term and on 
maintaining declining activities 
rather than supporting diversifi-
cation into new ones (see Box). 
Evaluation evidence suggests a 
need for greater clarity in the fu-
ture on the objectives of enter-
prise and innovation support with 
a correspondingly greater com-
mitment to rigorously evaluating 
the effects of intervention.
2.4 Transport 
infrastructure
Efficient transport systems are equally important for 
sustained regional development. Indeed, many of the 
problems faced by lagging regions stem from inad-
equate transport links.
The transport network in a region is as important as 
links to the outside and tends to determine the ease 
of access of businesses and people to support ser-
vices of various kinds as well as social and cultural 
amenities. Rural areas often depend on access to re-
gional centres, while urban areas need a good public 
transport system to function effectively. 
There has been a growing concern, however, over 
the past decade to reduce transport emissions and 
save energy, which has led to an increasing need to 
shift between modes of transport — notably from 
road to rail. Environmental considerations have also 
led to an expansion in urban public transport sys-
tems, which needs to be further strengthened in the 
future.
Investment in transport infrastructure is particu-
larly important to Convergence regions (formerly 
Objective 1). The largest share of funding continues 
to be spent on roads, though the share of rail is sub-
stantial.
Transport problems in the EU-1023 were particularly 
pressing at accession. The main deficiency was not so 
much gaps in the network, but general deficiencies. 
Journey times tended to be long both because of the 
poor state of repair of roads and railways and because 
they were not designed for present traffic volumes. 
There were, in particular, few dual carriageway roads 
and even fewer motorways. In Poland, for example, 
there were just 358 km of motorway in 2000 — only 
just over a third of those in Denmark despite having a 
population 7 times larger.
Road building — much achieved in the  
EU-15, much to be done in the EU-12
Despite substantial investment in Objective 1 regions 
in previous programming periods, there remained 
major disparities in endowment across the EU at the 
beginning of the 2000–2006 period as regards both 
fast means of travel between regions and efficient 
connections within them. This was particularly the 
case in Greece and Ireland as well as in the EU-10.
The emphasis on road means that Cohesion Policy 
was a major source of finance for motorway build-
ing. Of the 6 034 km increase in Cohesion countries 
23 The EU-10 refers to those Member States acceding in 2004, that is 
the current EU-12 minus Bulgaria and Romania. This classification 
is of significance in the 2000–2006 period only, where these 
countries had the common experience of joining in the middle of 
the programming period.
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EUR billion
Planned Cohesion Policy expenditure on transport, 
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(4 954 km in the former Cohesion Four24, 1 080 km in 
the EU-10), some 4 691 km (77% of the total) was co-
funded by the ERDF and Cohesion Fund. As a result, 
the motorway density in these countries went from 
90% of the EU average in 2000 to 111% in 2006. Some 
2 080 km of extra motorway were built in Spain, link-
ing major cities in Andalucía in particular and boost-
ing development in the surrounding regions.
In the EU-10, most of the funding focussed on bring-
ing the normal road network up to international 
standards, reducing average travel time in the Czech 
Republic, for example, by 7%. Almost 100 000 km of 
road were built or reconstructed in the 2000–2006 
period with the aid of the ERDF, though only 13% of 
this was new construction. Motorway density in these 
countries grew from 31% to 34% of the EU-25 average 
over the 2000–2006 period.
While the funding provided under Cohesion Policy 
has improved the EU transport network and helped 
to support economic and development in the regions 
assisted, it is clear that in terms of motorway density, 
they have now largely caught up with the more de-
veloped regions. The road network in the EU-12 still 
needs substantial improvement, but increasingly 
transport investment needs to focus on delivering 
sustainable transport solutions at both national and 
regional level. Explicit account has to be taken of the 
need to reduce carbon and other emissions, relieve 
congestion and secure improvements in road safety, 
which involves investment in modes other than road.
Rail 
Over the 2000–2006 period, 56% of all new high 
speed rail links in the EU-15 were co-financed by the 
ERDF and the Cohesion Fund. In Spain in particular, 
the high speed network expanded from 471 km to 
1 594 km and this increase was wholly co-financed by 
Cohesion Policy.
These new links have led to a dramatic reduction in 
journey times: between Rome and Naples (nearly 
halving the journey time, from 114 minutes to 65 
minutes), as well as between Madrid and cities in 
Andalucía (the journey time from Madrid to Malaga 
fell by a third, from 240 minutes to 160 minutes).
24 Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
The ERDF and Cohesion Fund also helped to finance 
the improvement of around 7  260  km of non-high 
speed lines. A significant investment in a context 
where the overall rail network was reduced by 
1 500 km because of rationalisation.
Though high speed rail can have a dramatic effect on 
journey times, the ERDF evaluation found that invest-
ment projects should be examined and justified on a 
case-by-case basis, only providing funding in cases 
where regional development is stimulated beyond 
the main centres served, leaving the development 
of the EU strategic rail network to be financed from 
other sources (e.g. the Cohesion Fund and the TEN-T 
budget). In any event, investment in standard rail is 
often a better choice, achieving similar results more 
cheaply and with less delay.
Urban public transport — a good investment
At the beginning of the 2000–2006 period, there 
were acute problems of congestion in major cities in 
Objective 1 regions, especially in Athens and Dublin 
but also in Lisbon and Thessaloniki. According to the 
ex post evaluation, Cohesion Policy co-financing of 
investment in public transport systems in these cities 
brought significant gains in both economic and social 
terms.
Athens Metro
Traffic congestion is an acute problem in Athens. The 
construction of the Athens Metro, including the ex-
tensions co-financed by the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 
over the 2000–2006 period, served to reduce the num-
ber of car journeys in the city by an estimated 120 000 
a day. This has cut journey times by an average of 20 
minutes, relieved pressure on car parking space and 
reduced traffic emissions by an average of 25%. 
The continuing increase in car ownership, however, 
conceals these gains. Nevertheless, as compared with 
what the situation would be without the metro, it has 
markedly improved the quality of life for those living in 
Athens. It has also added to tourist numbers, created, 
directly and indirectly, an estimated 600 permanent 
jobs and boosted the economic development of areas 
not previously accessible by public transport.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 221
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A good example is the extension of the Athens metro 
(see box), together with the construction of the tram-
way and the renewal of the bus and trolley bus fleets, 
which has substantially reduced traffic in the city be-
low what it otherwise would be.
Ports and airports — the best investment is 
their link to the wider network
In the case of other modes of transport, the contri-
bution of the ERDF is more difficult to assess, but it 
helped to finance the modernisation of 31 airports 
across the EU, almost all of them in Objective 1 re-
gions, and some 45 ports, 33 of them in Objective 1 
and 12 in Objective 2 regions. 
However, ex post evaluation concluded that the eco-
nomic and social benefits of such investment are not 
so clear. In fact, because for airports and ports there 
is often a commercial return from expansion, the so-
cial and economic benefits for the region in question 
need to be demonstrated before funding is given.
The evaluation also found that improving multi-mod-
al links sometimes yields more benefits than expan-
sion of the port or airport itself. At the very least, con-
nections to road and rail should be improved at the 
same time as facilities are expanded.
Management and strategic  
co-ordination are challenges
Managing transport projects is often challenging 
because their typically high costs and long comple-
tion times. This is especially so for new infrastructure, 
where the process of construction from planning to 
completion might take 10 years or more, spanning 
more than one 7-year programming period, which 
might in itself lead to major projects being postponed 
in favour of minor ones. At regional level, a further 
challenge is to coordinate expenditure with national 
transport policy and to ensure that the two are coher-
ent.
2.5 Interreg and territorial co-operation
From Community Initiative to a full Objective 
of Cohesion Policy
Borders place artificial barriers in the way of develop-
ment. Overcoming these barriers and fostering trans-
national and inter-regional linkages has long been an 
important aim of Cohesion Policy. In 2007, Territorial 
Co-operation became one of the three Objectives of 
the Policy. There are 3 main strands:
  • Strand A (cross-border co-operation) is aimed 
at ‘filling the gaps’ created by borders which cut 
off communities in economic, social and cultural 
terms. The ex post evaluation noted that cross-
border areas were often neglected by national 
policies and, as a result, their economies often 
lagged behind. ERDF financing in the current pe-
riod amounts to EUR 5.6 billion.
  • Strand B (transnational co-operation) is aimed at 
promoting collaboration across large groupings 
of regions. The 13 programmes, which have a 
budget of EUR 1.8 billion, cover areas such as the 
Baltic Sea, Alpine and Mediterranean regions.
  • Strand C (interregional co-operation plus Interact, 
ESPON and, in the current period, URBACT (vari-
ous exchange and analysis networks), with a 
budget of EUR 445 million, is aimed at improving 
the effectiveness of cohesion policies through ex-
change of experience between regional and local 
authorities. 
The evaluation25 of Interreg III in 2000–2006 gives im-
portant insights into the achievements of the previous 
round of programmes as well as ideas for improve-
ments. Over the period, it contributed to the creation 
or safeguarding of 115 200 jobs and nearly 5 800 new 
businesses with another 3 900 assisted. Over 544 000 
people attended events on cooperation issues. 
Cooperation was further assisted by the creation of 
nearly 12 000 networks, leading to some 1 285 sepa-
rate plans being formulated dealing with cross-border 
or transnational issues and almost 63 000 agreements 
being concluded.
Over 18 000 km of roads, railways or pathways were 
built or upgraded in border areas, along with invest-
ment in telecommunications and environmental im-
provement, and over 25 000 local and regional initia-
tives supported.
25 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evalua-
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Interreg, therefore, extended well beyond mutual 
learning, supporting a large number of innovative 
projects in the EU-15, while in the EU-10, it initiated 
new forms of cooperation between the areas con-
cerned and established arrangements for longer-term 
collaboration.
There were more difficulties in establishing the in-
stitutional arrangements for cooperation in the new 
border areas (i.e. between EU-15 and EU-12 regions) 
and agreeing common strategies and objectives.
The evaluation also concluded, however, that policy 
learning would have been enhanced if better links 
had been established with mainstream programmes, 
since all too often, the knowledge gained from the ex-
perience of undertaking programmes stayed within 
the Interreg community.
Main areas for further development
The lessons learned from the evaluation for the future 
design and conduct of policy were:
  • Territorial co-operation needs to have clearer and 
more realistic policy goals that are in line with the 
resources available, which means inter alia rec-
ognising the difficulties created by differences in 
circumstances between regions, such as between 
EU-15 and EU-12 regions.
  • To be more effective, programmes need to de-
fine better and more focussed strategies, which 
means identifying the needs in the cooperation 
areas and defining concrete and measurable tar-
gets. This is critical if the effect of interventions is 
to be quantified.
  • The measures funded need to be better coordi-
nated with other EU-assisted programmes in the 
co-operation areas to ensure their compatibility 
and to realise potential synergies.
  • The evidence is that the exchange of experience 
and good practice which is a key feature of inter-
regional programmes is valuable and could use-
fully be extended to mainstream programmes to 
improve policy-making. 
3. Working for the well-being 
of EU citizens
The ESF is the main EU source of finance to directly 
support individuals and their access to employment, 
education, training and equal opportunities as well as 
structural reforms. The ex post evaluation of the ESF 
found that support increased the national action tak-
en in pursuit of EU priorities, extended its scope, sup-
ported policy reforms and innovation, and promoted 
good governance through the partnership principle 
and innovations in procedures.
Employment is an important concern of people 
across the EU. The ESF has been addressing this con-
cern since it was established helping the unemployed 
to find jobs, workers to keep their jobs, the disadvan-
taged into work and the conciliation of family and 
work life and stimulating the modernisation of em-
ployment, training and education systems.
The ESF supports people
In the 9 years 2000 to 2008, the ESF assisted more 
than 82 million26 people in various ways. In Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, every year one tenth of the work-
ing age population received ESF support. In the EU 
as a whole, nearly 50% of participants were wom-
en, while in some Member States (Malta, Lithuania, 
Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Austria) this rose to over 
55%. Some 60% of participants were unemployed. 
About 40% of them found a job immediately after the 
end of the intervention, and evaluations27 show that 
many more achieved this step within 12 months of 
the end of the measure. 
In the present programming period, the share of in-
active receiving ESF support has increased relative 
26 75 million were supported under the programming period 2000–
2006; 7.2 million people have already received support under the 
programming period which started in 2007. No data is available on 
the number of persons assisted under the 2000–2006 programmes 
in 2007 and 2008. These figures do not take into account double 
counting, the extent of which is unknown: participants may have 
benefitted from more than one ESF intervention.
27 In fact, typically half or more of the unemployed participants find 
employment within 12 months of completing an intervention. This 
varies by programme and by type of unemployed person (long 
term unemployment in particular can be very challenging) but the 
range is 40 to 80%. Source: Reporting on ESF interventions in the 
EU. The European Social Fund and Active Labour Market Policies 
and Public Employment Services, Bernard Brunhes International 
(BBI), 2010.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 223
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to 2000–2006. In 2007 and 2008, a third of all partici-
pants in supported schemes were inactive as against 
only 6% in the previous period. In 2009, the share in-
creased to 42%.
The ESF extended the scope of national programmes, 
supporting groups included people with disabilities 
(e.g. in UK and Ireland), long-term unemployed and 
women (e.g. in Hungary), prisoners (e.g. in Malta and 
Italy), young people without basic qualifications (in 
the Netherlands), people in jobs (in Estonia), and small 
and micro-sized enterprises (in Germany, Sweden, 
Belgium).
The ESF ex post evaluation of the 2000–2006 period 
estimated that 65% of the working-age population 
in the EU live in places where Public Employment 
Services have been improved with support from the 
ESF and 68% where training systems had been im-
proved, while improvements in education systems 
covered 25–30% of the population aged 6 to 18.
3.1 Integration into the labour market 
The ESF helps people enter or return to the labour 
market through supporting active labour market poli-
cies (ALMP), including through measures to prevent 
and combat unemployment, increase employment 
and maintain employability. These measures were 
implemented to a large extent by Public Employment 
Services (PES) across the EU. 
In 2000–2006, EUR 18 billion were allocated to ALMP. 
For 2007–2013, the share of programmes which in-
volve ALMP has increased to 90% against 71% in 
2000–2006. 
The ESF was used in 2000–2006 to provide:
  • personalised services and integrated action plans;
  • training for the unemployed, those at risk of un-
employment, and the inactive;
  • incentives for direct job creation and to safeguard 
employment, promoting business start-ups, as-
sisted employment and the inclusion into the la-
bour market of those excluded;
  • active measures for specific target groups, such as 
young people or people with disabilities.
About 28 million people participated in ALMP ac-
tivities co-funded by the ESF over the period, half 
of them women, three out of four unemployed and 
four out of 10, young people under 2528. On average, 
a third of the unemployed in the EU participated in 
ESF supported programmes each year. Evaluations 
carried out by Member States illustrate the positive 
effects of support. As noted above, around 40% of the 
participants in training programmes found a job im-
mediately afterwards, and many more in the months 
following.
ESF support went particularly to measures targeted 
at disadvantaged groups needing assistance to find 
a job, such as the long-term unemployed. In Austria, 
64% of women and 60% of men found employment 
within 9 months after completing training under 
the ‘Prevent and combat unemployment’ priority. 
Monitoring over the subsequent 9 months showed 
that 69% of the people concerned stayed in employ-
ment for more than 3 months. In the UK, a survey car-
ried out among participants in measures supported 
by the Objective 3 programme in England, open to 
both the employed and unemployed, indicated that 
the proportion employed among those completing 
courses, rose from an initial 41% (when entering the 
course) to 56% at the time of leaving and 61% 4–8 
months later. The programme, however, had less of 
an effect on the inactive. Some 19% of participants 
in measures were inactive on entry, this only falling 
to 14% at the time of leaving and rising marginally to 
15% 4–8 months later29.
An evaluation of ESF support for measures combining 
reduced working time (Kurzarbeit) in Germany con-
cluded that, on average, a slightly larger share of peo-
ple completing ESF schemes (44%) were in employ-
ment two years afterwards than those in completing 
national schemes (just under 40%)30. 
Many ESF assisted measures involved the personali-
sation of support, in order to ensure a better match 
between people’s skills and available jobs. This often 
28 Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. Active Labour Market 
Policies and Public Employment Services, Bernard Brunhes 
International, 2010.
29 Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No 376, 
European Social Fund Objective 3, The 2005 Beneficiary Survey for 
England, 2006.
30  IAB Forschungsbericht 3/2009, Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen 
während Kurzarbeit nach endgültigem Arbeitsausfall. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 225
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carried over into training, training for a specific job 
being offered before that intended to increase a per-
son’s general employability. 
An evaluation of the training for the unemployed in 
Italy found that those completing a training course 
were significantly more likely to have found a job one 
year after than those in the control group31. A similar 
evaluation in Germany of further vocational training 
for the unemployed concluded that, compared to un-
employed non-participants, participants in ESF sup-
ported measures were more successful on average in 
the labour market over the medium and long run32.
The ESF was also used to support to business creation. 
An evaluation of the Hamburg OP for 2007–2013, cov-
ering support for business start-ups, concluded that 
ESF assisted projects tailored their support to the spe-
cific needs and characteristics of migrants in general 
and female migrants in particular, unlike national pro-
grammes, which were not flexible enough to address 
the specific needs of the target group concerned33, 34.
31 Study on the return on ESF investment in human capital, p. 76, 
2010. 
32 IAB Forschungsbericht 1/2009, Evaluation der Förderung berufli-
cher Weiterbildung im Rahmen des ESF-BA Programms.
33  Ad-hoc-Evaluierung der Aktion A.5 — Forderung des 
Unternehmergeistes — im Rahmen des ESF-OP Hamburg 2007–
2013 
34 PAG Uniconsult, The Impact of Structural Funds on Employment, 
Final Report, August 2007.
Fostering people’s mobility
Geographical and occupational mobility can help to 
increase people’s chances of finding a job, raise their 
professional qualifications and achieve a better match 
with job requirements. In the previous programming 
period, almost 220 000 people were reported as be-
ing assisted to move abroad or into a new job by ESF-
supported mobility measures, either in the form of 
grants or scholarships or incentive schemes. A further 
450 000 received training or guidance that increased 
their possibility of moving. Almost 17 000 organisa-
tions (mostly firms) participated in mobility related 
support measures35.
Improving the work-life balance
The balance between working and private life has be-
come an increasingly important element of individual 
well-being over the years. This is particularly the case 
for those with caring responsibilities, for whom sup-
port has made it possible for them to enter or return 
to the labour market. Such support has helped an in-
creasing number of women take up employment and, 
accordingly, has been a key factor in raising GDP per 
head.
Over the 2000–2006 period, EUR 1.2 billion of ESF 
financing, 26% of the budget for gender measures, 
went to improving the work-life balance through sup-
port to child care, and flexible forms of employment 
and working time arrangements. The ESF played a 
special role in facilitating pilot projects, such as in 
35  Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. The European Social Fund 
and labour mobility, Bernard Brunhes International, 2010.
Germany: the ‘Thüringen model’
The German Federal Employment Office (Die 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit), in cooperation with mu-
nicipalities in Thüringen, implemented a range of pro-
jects to integrate the unemployed directly into the la-
bour market. The three-phase model combined initial 
qualification, job placement and accompanying train-
ing on the work place. This multi-stage approach was 
designed following a study demonstrating that short-
term qualifications tailored to the needs of individuals 
and a specific work place were the most likely to suc-
ceed. A survey conducted 4 years after the scheme be-
ing introduced found that 42% of participants found a 
job within 6 months after completing training.
Childcare provisions in Ireland
In Ireland, half of the ESF measures on gender were 
aimed at improving the quality of childcare provision 
in disadvantaged areas by assisting community based 
projects to fund salary costs of qualified childcare 
workers. This led not only to an increase in the chil-
dren cared for but also to a number of local childcare 
networks being established (20 partnerships were 
set up in the Southern and Eastern region and 17 in 
the Border, Midland and Western region) and to more 
national non-statutory childcare organisations being 
supported (7 in both regions).Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Greece where full-time primary schools and day care 
were introduced for younger children to allow moth-
ers to work.
The England survey of beneficiaries of the ESF 
Operational Programme for 2000–2006 found that 
one in five (22%) participants had caring responsibili-
ties which limited their daily activities and the work 
they could do. Most of these were women (76%) 
and one in four (24%) lone parents. As a result of the 
measures, the women concerned either found work, 
or were more willing to look for work or felt they had 
a better chance of finding work.
The ESF as a catalyst for change: support to 
systems
The effects of the ESF are more difficult to quantify in 
the case of innovative measures or structural reforms 
but are often sustained over a longer period and have 
greater leverage effects.
ESF assistance to employment and education systems 
was aimed, on the one hand, at improving institu-
tional arrangements so as to improve the matching of 
demand and supply in the labour market and, on the 
other, at modernising training and education systems 
so that they included the qualifications needed in a 
globalised economy and adapt quicker to changes in 
job profiles. Funding was used to: a) foster local initia-
tives and networks better to anticipate labour market 
developments by harnessing the strengths and com-
petences of different stakeholders; b) support the 
modernisation of systems, such as reforming Public 
Employment Services (PES) into needs-driven pro-
viders instead of inflexible bureaucracies, and c) sup-
port the modernisation of professional qualification 
schemes so that they are more capable of adapting 
in the future and reflect the permeability of education 
and training systems.
Over the 2000–2006 period, around EUR 5.1 billion 
was spent on reforming labour market and education 
systems36, 55% of this on improving the conditions for 
employment growth, 24% on local employment ini-
tiatives and 21% on modernising the PES.
Both the scale and pattern of ESF expenditure on 
the reform of systems differed between Member 
States, reflecting the fact that labour market institu-
tions are complex and rooted in national traditions. 
Modernisation efforts have to take this into account 
and adapt. The effects of ESF in this regard have to be 
judged against this background.
While in Poland the ESF has been used to reform the 
whole of the PES, shifting the focus from passive to 
active measures, in the EU-15 especially, it has been 
used to support organisational innovation and to fill 
specific gaps.
36 Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. Active Labour Market 
Policies and Public Employment Services, Bernard Brunhes 
International, 2010.
The Public Employment Services in 
Poland
The performance of the PES in Poland has improved 
since 2004. Support to job–seekers and training of 
the unemployed has been extended increasingly to 
include active labour market policy measures and sup-
port to employers has also been extended. To achieve 
this, almost 20 000 PES employees were trained to ac-
quire new skills and competences and the entire or-
ganisation was restructured. Without the ESF, neither 
would have been possible within a short period of 
time. Surveys among the unemployed and employers 
have recorded a higher level of satisfaction with PES 
services.
Career guidance in Flanders and 
Brandenburg
In Flanders, 16 career guidance centres, spread across 
the region were co-financed by the ESF over the 2000–
2006 period. The most tangible effect is the establish-
ment of career guidance in the region.
In Brandenburg, new types of service for SMEs were 
tested by the INNOPUNKT pilot project. These included 
counselling, career guidance and placement, coaching 
and training. According to an evaluation, 60% of these 
services will continue after ESF support has ended, and 
85% of beneficiaries considered that the services were 
both sustainable and useful for the future.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 227
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3.2 Social Inclusion
One of the tasks of the ESF is to reinforce the social 
inclusion of disadvantaged people, to make sure that 
they have a better chance of staying in work over the 
long-term. The ex post evaluation of 2000–2006 con-
cluded that considerable efforts went into measures 
relating to social inclusion, especially after the mid-
term review of programmes. 
For the 2007–2013 period, all Member States have 
an ESF priority on social inclusion (amounting to EUR 
9  980 million), or at the very least plan significant 
measures in this respect within broader priorities (e.g. 
Denmark). In Spain, an entire Operational Programme 
has been dedicated to ‘Counteracting Social Exclusion’. 
Activities target a broad range of disadvantaged peo-
ple, such as ethnic minorities, migrants, people with 
health problems or disabilities, ex-offenders, older 
people, the homeless, lone parents and carers. 
The ERDF equally provided financial support for the 
social integration of vulnerable groups, complement-
ing the activities of the ESF in this regard by fund-
ing investment in infrastructure. For example, pro-
grammes in Eastern Scotland, Liguria and Gelderland 
included the construction of community centres 
which catered for the specific needs of migrants. In 
addition, the Don Bosco Institute in Genoa (Liguria) 
provides a wide range of services (education, sport-
ing and cultural facilities and practical assistance) to 
various sections of the population, including both 
young and older people and those with disabilities as 
well as migrants).
The ex post evaluation on ESF support to the Open 
Method of Co-ordination in respect of social inclusion 
indicated that the main types of intervention were 
those included under the headings ‘Reducing unem-
ployment and increasing employability’ and ‘Tackling 
disadvantages in education and training’. An online 
survey carried out as part of the evaluation37 revealed 
that the young unemployed (49%) and the long-term 
unemployed (45%) were the main target groups.
An evaluation of ESF support in London concluded 
that ESF-financed measures focused on young peo-
ple with the lowest formal qualifications. Around 67% 
of participants from this group achieved a basic skills 
qualification (Skills for Life), while much lower suc-
cess rates were recorded for national programmes 
targeted at other groups (e.g. the homeless — 28% 
and families — 23%). The same was the case for ESF-
financed measures targeted at migrants (24%) and 
ethnic minorities (20%). The evaluation suggested 
that for these particular groups, the need is to change 
prevailing cultural attitudes and to direct intervention 
to this end.
Integrating people with special needs
In 2000–2006, some EUR 3.7 billion of the ESF, togeth-
er with EUR 4.8 billion of national and private co-fund-
ing, went on measures for people with disabilities.
An evaluation of the effects of the ESF 2004–2006 
programme in Estonia on people with special needs 
concluded that an individual approach was key and 
that for those with multiple disadvantages, it was nec-
37  Ex post evaluation of the support of ESF to the social OMC, p. 38–39.
Social inclusion in England
The Objective 3 programme for 2000–2006 in England 
allocated a large share of the ESF budget to people 
with difficulties entering the labour market. Overall, 
two-thirds of participants experienced one or more 
disadvantages — being lone parents or carers, belong-
ing to an ethnic minority, or having a disability or long-
term health condition. Some 29% of participants were 
disadvantaged in one respect, 21% in two and 16% in 
three or more. Those with multiple disadvantages were 
more than twice as likely to have been inactive on en-
try to the programme and much less likely to have 
been employed (12% as against 40%)1. The evaluation 
found that ESF-funded projects engaged successfully 
with participants with multiple disadvantages and 
identified the added value of the ESF in terms of: 
  • the provision of services to more people;
  • a higher quality of provision, including: a broader 
range of services on offer;
  • a stronger focus on individually tailored support, 
more intensive support, better quality equipment;
  • more leverage of additional funding.
1  Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report 
No 376, European Social Fund Objective 3, The 2005 
Beneficiary Survey for England, 2006.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
228 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
essary to adopt a case-by-case approach so as to find 
the most efficient solution38.
Every Spanish OP in 2000–2006 contained a ‘path-
ways’ measure targeted specifically at people with 
disabilities. While there was some variation in empha-
sis, a common approach was followed across OPs. This 
included counselling, insertion services, promotion of 
self-employment and teleworking and enhancement 
of service provision to people with disabilities. Social 
services were used to support people seeking train-
ing and basic competences of job seekers were devel-
oped through vocational workshops.
Integrating migrants and minorities into the 
labour market
Cohesion Policy has played an important role in sup-
porting the integration of migrants and minorities39. 
The ESF regulations for the periods 2000–2006 and 
2007–2013 contain provisions for supporting both 
either indirectly, through measures combating social 
exclusion or directly by identifying them as target 
groups.
38 Evaluation of Results of Labour Market Projects Intended for 
Persons with Special Needs, Supported by Resources of Measure 
1.3 of Estonian Single Programming Document 2004–2006, and 
Their Applicability in Policies, Research summary.
39  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Third Annual Report on Migration and 
Integration, COM(2007) 512 final, Brussels, 11.9.2007. 
The pathways approach — Conciliation 
Famille Handicap (France)
Pathways approaches are designed to move people 
closer to the labour market, by transferring them from 
protected to non-protected work and finding them 
employment in social economy organisations or as 
self-employed. 
The project gave support to families (particularly 
mothers) with children with disabilities by providing 
information and training on disability. The ultimate 
aim was the upgrading and formal recognition of the 
skills of the parents concerned. Parent associations and 
training centres co-promoted the project and worked 
with companies employing parents of children with 
disabilities to encourage them to adapt their working 
hours and conditions.
EQUAL
The EQUAL Community Initiative was about promot-
ing change and fighting discrimination and exclusion 
in the labour market. The ex post evaluation conclud-
ed that it was very successful in enabling the develop-
ment and mainstreaming of a large number of use-
ful innovations. A database of EQUAL good practices 
has been left for policy-makers and practitioners. The 
evaluation reported 924 innovative approaches, 783 of 
them linked to social inclusion and 141 to equal op-
portunities, as well as 285 successful cases of ‘main-
streaming’, 211 linked to social inclusion, and 74 to 
equal opportunities.
EQUAL had positive effects on policies and systems 
rather than on job creation. These included legislative 
changes (e.g. facilitating the provision of innovative 
credit and support mechanisms for the unemployed, 
migrants and Roma; and fiscal incentives to increase 
the labour market participation of vulnerable groups), 
new policies, the inclusion of EQUAL principles in new 
policies and new ESF operational programmes. It also 
had effects on education and training systems and la-
bour market intermediation and support services and 
led to some operational changes in employment and 
public services. EQUAL, in addition, contributed to in-
creasing the quality of governance and professional-
ism of civil society organisations. It was an important 
means of capacity building for those that participated 
in the programmes — especially in the EU-10 — and 
had a long-term effect in raising awareness and chang-
ing mindsets.
Moreover, EQUAL was a source of Community added-
value by acting as a catalyst for funding for groups that 
would not have received much otherwise, providing 
resources for new areas of intervention, creating new 
partnerships, raising awareness of new ways of doing 
things and stimulating changes in ways of thinking, 
developing practical solutions to problems and filling 
gaps in national policies or complementing national 
measures.
However, the long-term effect of EQUAL on the situa-
tion of vulnerable people is not expected to be signifi-
cant because it involved small-scale, pilot projects and 
depended on the integration of these into national or 
regional ESF programmes.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 229
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Integrating Immigrants into the Swedish work force 
The project focused on immigrants who had poor language skills and in some cases, mental or physical difficulties. 
The idea was to apply the ‘supported employment method’ to the group. The method, already successfully used 
with those with disabilities, involves an individual coach to accompany participants first to their work placement, 
and subsequently to their new place of employment to support them through the difficult early stages of finding 
and maintaining a new job. Key to the method is that the coach should themselves have an immigrant background.
Helping asylum seekers in Greece
In Greece, an EQUAL project was designed to tackle the problem of the dramatic increase in asylum seekers, who 
have difficulties in finding a job, even after obtaining a work permit, and who are often discriminated against, 
with the result that they can in many cases obtain only temporary low skilled jobs. Many of them have multiple 
disadvantages — they do not speak the local language and lack certified educational qualifications and work 
experience. The project culminated in the creation of an electronic network and common online database con-
necting all organisations providing services to asylum seekers. The referral system developed by the project was 
also innovative, in that it not only registered the request for asylum but followed it up until it was treated by the 
relevant official.
Actions supporting Roma people
The Roma are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the EU. They often live in marginalised areas and in poor 
socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion of Roma is caused by a combination of factors: low education 
levels, high unemployment (close to 80–90% in some areas of Central and Eastern Europe), poor health and wide-
ranging discrimination. Because of this, they have high mortality rates and 10–12 years lower life expectancy than 
the norm.
The segregation of Roma is one of the most important barriers to their social inclusion. Roma children who are en-
rolled in segregated schools often end up in unemployment or outside the labour market altogether. Roma com-
munities in segregated neighbourhoods have limited access to basic services and to labour market opportunities.
Member States are making different uses of the ESF to tackle the specific problems of Roma. 
In Hungary, support has been implemented through ‘Fighting social exclusion by promoting access to the labour 
market’, one of the priorities of the 2004–2006 ESF Operational Programme. With the aim of those excluded from 
the labour market, measures were targeted at the most disadvantaged, including Roma. Support was given, for ex-
ample, to NGO initiatives in education and training and social services. The 2007–2013 Hungarian ‘Social Renewal 
ESF OP’ contains a specific measure for ‘Reducing the segregation of severely disadvantaged and Roma pupils’ by 
increasing their access to public education through:
  • detection of negative selection mechanisms that exist at system level and strengthen segregation;
  • support for civil initiatives aimed at reducing discrimination in education;
  • extending the range of schools engaged in integrated education by means of the formulation and application 
of an appropriate quality assurance and verification system; 
  • preventive programmes (mentor-sponsoring programmes, the development of tuition networks, support for 
dormitory programmes and mobility) to encourage enrolment in pre-school of multiple disadvantaged chil-
dren;
  • analysis of the reasons for dropping out of secondary school;
  • dissemination of ‘A new chance’, and ‘A second chance’ type programmes offering flexible and personalised 
learning paths for getting young people who have dropped out of the education system back into school.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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For the period 2000–2006, 12 Member States40 col-
lected data on migrants and minorities, 1.2 million 
participating in ESF programmes. Spain alone ac-
counted for 58% of them, followed by Italy (14%) and 
Greece (8%). Measures were aimed at people or sys-
tems. They included developing inter-cultural educa-
tion in schools and tailoring support to needs.
Roma are one of the largest minority groups in a 
number of Member States, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 2000–2006, however, ESF Managing 
Authorities in only 5 Member States reported on par-
ticipation of Roma in supported measures — Finland 
(500 participants), Greece (33 000), Hungary (23 000), 
Ireland (7 000) and Spain (35 000)41.
3.3 Demographic change
Demographic change has become increasingly 
prominent on the policy agenda. First, working-age 
population is set to decline in many parts of the EU 
and the number of people beyond retirement age to 
rise. This is a challenge for the economy, as well as for 
health and social services and communal amenities. 
Secondly, the significant migration flows both from 
developing countries outside the EU and within the 
Union from East to West since 2004 has given rise to 
concerns about integration and the pressure on infra-
structure (on housing, schools and so on) in destina-
tion countries and about loss of skilled and educated 
labour in the countries left behind.
Demography was not an explicit theme in the EU 
Guidelines for the 2000–2006 period. Nevertheless, it 
featured in programmes in many regions (often im-
plicitly) in the EU-15 and in some in the EU-10 from 
2004 onwards. An evaluation42 found that measures 
addressing demographic issues indirectly accounted 
for 23% of total ERDF financing in a sample of regions.
This illustrates a strength of the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
of Cohesion Policy, that even when a theme is not an 
explicit priority in the regulations, there is the flexibil-
ity for regions to take it up. 
40  Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden.
41 Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. The European Social Fund 
and Roma, Bernard Brunhes International (BBI), 2010.
42 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006, Work Package 7: Gender 
equality and demographic change, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp7_en.htm
Demographic trends show common features across 
the EU, but individual regions are affected in different 
ways. Ageing and migration flows have stronger and 
more immediate effects in some parts than others. 
Demographic issues have come to the fore in Poland 
and the Baltic States especially and are likely to fea-
ture more in Cohesion Policy in the future.
Measures meeting the needs of an ageing 
population
The ERDF supported the provision of care facilities for 
the elderly in rural and urban disadvantaged areas in 
a number of regions in 2000–2006. For example, in 
Castilla y León, it co-funded the construction of 47 
health centres and the enlargement and refurbish-
ment of 91 others, 24-hour medical attention centres 
and hospitals providing care at local level for elderly, 
people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. 
This reduced the need for travel to larger towns to ac-
cess health care, while equally reducing the work load 
of carers (mainly women) in the rural areas concerned. 
It also created some 2 900 jobs, mainly for women.
Older workers aged 55 years and over accounted for 
around 4% of all participants in ESF measures (over 
300 000 people43) in 2007 and 2008 when the new 
programmes were still starting up, most of them on 
training courses or receiving advice aimed at ena-
bling them to remain in employment longer. 
43 Annual Implementation Reports. Because participants’ age is not 
always recorded, the true figure is likely to be higher.
Synergy between Cohesion Policy and 
the Healthcare and Long Term Care 
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) 
Objectives
In Finland, the ESF contributed to the pursuit of healthy 
lifestyle objectives by encouraging cooperation be-
tween workplaces, rehabilitation centres and health-
care services. In Poland, it supported the development 
of human resources in screening centres and other 
healthcare institutions. In Sweden, it was focused on 
helping to develop the local healthcare system and in 
Portugal, where an entire programme was devoted to 
healthcare, high quality human resources in the care 
sector.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 231
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The ex post evaluation of 2000–2006 found that ESF 
supported-measures contributed to extending the 
working lives of older people as well as to pursuing 
the Healthcare and Long-Term Care Open Method of 
Co-ordination Objectives44 in 5 countries, in particular 
(Greece, Finland, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden).
Measures for maintaining demographic 
balance in regions
A key aspect of responding to demographic change 
at regional level is to try to maintain a reasonably bal-
anced age distribution of the population, to encour-
age young people to stay and to ensure not only that 
there are sufficient employment opportunities for 
people of working age but also adequate social and 
cultural facilities. Accordingly improving the attrac-
tiveness of a region through creating or upgrading so-
cial infrastructure and social services is an important 
part of Cohesion Policy. 
In Gelderland in the Netherlands, for example, the 
ERDF supported investment in cultural centres in 
small villages and towns, making it more attractive 
for younger people to seek work in the area. As a by-
product, it also created employment opportunities for 
vulnerable groups. The provision of day-care facilities 
enabled more women to work, while elderly people 
had access to more convenient care facilities. 
The local provision of education and training can also 
be important in that it tends to reduce ‘educational 
commuting’ while improving the employability of 
young people, so making the region more attractive 
for businesses to locate there. In Salzburg, the ERDF 
supported the upgrading of a vocational centre for 
apprenticeships by funding the acquisition of ma-
chinery in the ‘Mechatronic Cluster’, each young per-
son being guaranteed a job in a local firm after fin-
ishing (around 100 young people participate in the 
programme every year). In Salzburg too, the EDRF 
helped to construct a training centre which provided 
IT courses attended by 100 people over 60 each year. 
3.4 Equal opportunities
Horizontal measures can work, but need a concrete 
implementation strategy — they require sustained 
44 The objectives focus on issues related to access, quality and sus-
tainability of healthcare and long-term care.
commitment and active partnership with relevant 
stakeholders.
Ensuring that women and men have equal opportuni-
ties to access a good education, get a decent job, or 
pursue a fulfilling career is a goal in its own right and 
essential to securing a just and equitable society. But 
it is also important for economic reasons. Not only is 
it likely to add to the work force but it will also tend to 
increase the skills available and, accordingly, help to 
raise the rate of growth and to improve competitive-
ness.
The ESF has played an important role in supporting 
gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming 
in Member States, in particular by helping women 
into employment, especially from vulnerable groups 
such as migrants, promoting their lifelong learning, 
combating gender segregation in career selection 
and professions, supporting their participation in sci-
ence and technology as well assisting them to start 
up businesses. 
Evaluations show that the ESF has helped challenge 
existing practices in all Member States with respect to 
gender equality issues. Indeed, in many cases, gender 
equality was neither at the forefront of the political 
agenda nor recognised by the public generally as be-
ing important. In the 2000–2006 period, a total of EUR 
4.4 billion of ESF financing, or 7% of the total, went 
on measures to promote gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming, including reconciliation measures. 
The EQUAL Initiative added an extra EUR 753 mil-
lion (15% of its budget). The largest expenditure on 
gender-related measures was in Germany, accounting 
for 25% of the total across the EU. In some Member 
States, such as Belgium, a large number of measures 
were undertaken on gender mainstreaming and in 
Flanders, a monitoring system was set up to track 
these. In Sweden and Denmark, gender issues were 
fully mainstreamed and there were, therefore, no spe-
cific measures.
The ERDF has contributed to gender mainstreaming 
in all relevant areas, in particular, in the provision of 
support to education and training, to women entre-
preneurs and to investment in care facilities. Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Evaluation45 of a sample of regions suggests that ERDF 
measures in the 2000–2006 period addressing (direct-
ly or indirectly) gender equality accounted for 21% of 
total funding. The evaluation found that the effective 
implementation of the principle of gender equality 
requires effort, political leadership, long-term com-
mitment and — above all — sound measures. Gender 
equality issues were explicitly included in the concep-
tion of most programmes in the 2000–2006 period, 
but evidence is more mixed when it comes to follow 
through in implementation and results.
The need for long-term effort and commitment con-
tinues in the current period. Article 16 of Regulation 
EC 1083/2006 requires that gender equality, non-dis-
crimination and accessibility for people with disabili-
ties be taken into account in all stages of programme 
implementation. Though it is clearly too early to 
measure effects, evaluation46 evidence on their in-
clusion in measures is mixed. While all programmes 
mention gender equality and gender mainstreaming, 
there is less evidence that gender equality considera-
tions have been taken into account in the implemen-
tation of the programmes. 
The evaluation of the implementation of the cross-
cutting themes47 under the Welsh Objective 1 and 3 
programmes in 2000–2006 found that project man-
agers often paid only lip service to the horizontal is-
sues, including equal opportunities, because they 
found it difficult to see how they could be applied in 
a horizontal manner in practice. In most cases (70% 
of those examined), equal opportunities were treated 
as a horizontal priority without a specific strategy. In 
22% of the programmes examined the three themes 
were included as statements of intent without clear 
targets, relevant selection criteria or obligations in 
terms of monitoring. Only 8% of the programmes in-
tegrated the three themes in a comprehensive strat-
egy with clear identification of problems and quanti-
fied targets. Nevertheless the evaluation considered 
45 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006, Work Package 7: Gender 
equality and demographic change, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp7_en.htm
46 Study on the translation of Article 16 on the promotion of gender 
equality, non-discrimination and accessibility for disabled persons 
into Cohesion Policy Programmes 2007–2013 http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/eval2007/art16_
gender_en.htm
47 The horizontal themes under the programmes were equal oppor-
tunities, environmental sustainability and ICT.
that the high profile of the issues in the Programmes 
has raised their importance and has meant that pro-
ject sponsors have been encouraged to take account 
of them48.
Discrimination is perceived differently across coun-
tries. While in the EU-15 the focus of non-discrimina-
tion measures tends to be on women, migrants and 
the elderly, in the EU-12 the focus is more on ethnic 
minorities, especially the Roma (see box above).
Case studies suggest that effective involvement of 
relevant stakeholders in the design and implementa-
tion of measure is crucial if they are to be effective. 
However, while involvement of stakeholders in equal 
opportunity programmes was relatively high, this was 
less so in respect of minorities, migrants and people 
with disabilities.
Specific actions are effective — especially 
childcare and support to women entrepreneurs
Specific, tangible measures are often an essential 
complement to horizontal ones. The evaluation of 
Article 16 found that programmes in the current pe-
riod are centred on public transport, child care facili-
ties, social services and support for entrepreneurship.
The regional case studies carried out as part of the 
ERDF evaluation for 2000–2006 identified a number 
of positive outcomes from support, including:
  • the creation in Eastern Scotland, of over 2  000 
new businesses managed by women and the in-
troduction by some 600 organisations of ‘active 
people friendly policies’ to help manage the work-
life balance;
  • the creation in Norra Norrland in Sweden of near-
ly 100 IT jobs for women and over 1 000 new busi-
nesses managed by women;
  • the creation in Southern and Eastern Ireland of 
over 400 new childcare facilities and the upgrad-
ing of 800 more.
The regional case studies showed strong evidence of 
both job creation and business start-ups for women 
as a result of support for both ‘hard’ measures (direct 
48 Ecotec, Cross-cutting themes research project, final report, April 
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investment aid, physical infrastructure, purchase of 
machinery, etc.) and ‘soft’ measures (advice, support 
for networks and associations of women business 
owners and mentoring activities by and for women). 
They also indicated that support was most effective 
when it combined both hard and soft measures. For 
example, many women entrepreneurs — as men — 
encounter difficulties in maintaining and sustaining 
a business, especially in meeting the financial and 
administrative requirements. Such problems usually 
stem either from lack of experience and knowledge 
or from difficulties in accessing finance. Soft measures 
tackle such obstacles and increase the effectiveness 
of the hard measures.
The data available for the ESF for the period49 suggest 
that support for gender measures assisted 4.6 mil-
lion people of which 76% were women and that over 
800  000 women participated in measures support-
ing entrepreneurship. In Spain, 150 000 participated 
in such measures and 5 500 SMEs were assisted. In 
France, some 220 000 women received support in this 
regard.
Limited data are available on the jobs created. In 
England, the 2005 beneficiary survey for the Objective 
3 programme for 2000–2006 found that female partic-
ipants in relevant ESF supported activities were more 
likely to gain qualifications than men (73% as against 
62%). The most significant employment outcomes oc-
curred in the more innovative projects, which were 
usually smaller and followed a more integrated ap-
proach (i.e. those providing multiple-level support to 
individuals in a personalised way).
Evaluations also tend to highlight the less tangible 
effects of ESF-supported measures in this area — in 
particular the empowerment of women and their sus-
tained commitment to looking for work and remain-
ing, and progressing, in employment. This empow-
erment stems from the skills that they acquire, their 
higher self-confidence and new aspirations, includ-
ing, in some cases, pursuing further education, and 
new opportunities for reconciling work with family 
obligations. These positive consequences are a latent 
force for increasing employment in the longer- term.
49 Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. The European Social 
Fund: Women, gender mainstreaming and reconciliation of work 
and private life, Bernard Brunhes International (BBI), 2010.
For the 2007–2013 period, EUR 2.4 billion, (3% of the 
total ESF budget) has been allocated to broad prior-
ity of improving access to employment, increasing 
sustainable participation, progress of women in em-
ployment to reduce gender-based segregation in the 
labour market and reconciling work and private life. 
In Denmark and Sweden, however, gender equality is 
considered a priority across the whole OP, so has no 
specific budget allocated to it. 
Both the ESF and EQUAL have had important institu-
tional and policy effects as regards gender equality as 
evidenced by new legislation, new policy processes 
being adopted, new organisations being set up and 
existing approaches being adapted. 
However, more could be done — small 
scale measures and general statements are 
no substitute for a more comprehensive 
approach
As noted above, progress is mixed and more could be 
done. All programmes include some kind of formal 
commitment, many are provided with at least some 
social infrastructure and care services, which have 
clear benefits locally. But a complete translation of 
Article 16 into practice requires effort and long-term 
commitment, backed by a comprehensive strategy, 
with a specific budget and quantified targets. For ex-
ample, only 8% of the ERDF programmes have gone 
this far in the 2007–2013 period.
3.5 Local development
Local development is a model which can be applied 
to a wide range of activities. The key features are:
  • a well defined local area, usually small scale;
  • a strong partnership with, and the close involve-
ment of, all the relevant local actors, mobilising 
their unique strengths and local knowledge. This 
work often requires a degree of capacity building 
and administrative support from larger units;
  • an integrated strategy tackling the various chal-
lenges facing the area. This strategy should be de-
veloped in close partnership between the various 
local public and private actors, as well as different 
administrative levels (local authorities and territo-
rial units of central or regional government).Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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A good example of the model in practice is the second 
round of the Urban Community Initiative (‘URBAN II’) 
in 2000–2006. Local partnerships were encouraged 
to develop an integrated approach to the social, eco-
nomic and environmental challenges facing deprived 
urban areas, an approach which was ‘mainstreamed’ 
in the ERDF in 2007–2013.
Local employment initiatives were an important fac-
et of the ESF too, helping to boost job creation and 
improve the matching of supply and demand at lo-
cal level. They took different forms across the EU. In 
Germany, Spain, Greece and Belgium, for example, 
partnerships were set up between local public and 
private stakeholders. In other countries, employment 
and/or business creation networks, human resource 
development foundations or ‘houses of employment’ 
were established. 
In 2000–2006, 16 of the 25 Member States used the 
ESF to support urban areas and local employment. 
The amount allocated was over EUR 11 billion, (11% 
of the total) and overall 1.8 million people participat-
ed in the initiatives: 80% of them unemployed, 50% 
long-term unemployed and 53% women.
The participation figures, however, do not convey 
the importance of the initiatives. As in the case of 
URBAN, by involving stakeholders in a common strat-
egy, these ESF Initiatives, together with the Territorial 
Employment Pacts, yielded results that intervention 
at regional or national level could not achieve. An 
evaluation of ESF funded projects in East London 
highlighted the establishment of strong partnership 
working as a key strength along with the use of local 
support services, particularly in engaging with young 
people50. A common evaluation finding was that local 
initiatives and territorial pacts led to greater speciali-
sation and better adaptation to labour market needs.
The partnership principle and exchange of experi-
ence were central aspects of LEADER, which was de-
signed to help those on the ground and to implement 
innovative strategies for sustainable development in 
their local area. LEADER is an integral part of the rural 
development policy financed under the EAFRD.
Local Development is also at the core of the Fisheries 
Local Action Groups that have been established with 
support of the Axis 4 of the European Fisheries Fund 
in order to alleviate the negative effect of the crisis of 
the fishing sector in fisheries-dependent areas.
50 BMG Research, Evaluation report: ESF-funded projects in East 
London, September 2008.
Local development and local 
partnership — the example of URBAN II
A striking conclusion from the ex post evaluation of 
URBAN II is that the success of projects did not depend 
on the specific issue concerned or the specific means 
of tackling them — successful projects covered a wide 
range of issues and means. The key feature was local 
leadership and local ownership. They were in line with 
local perceptions of need, with the involvement of lo-
cal people and organisations in both their design and 
implementation. Unsuccessful projects were usually 
imposed from above with little local involvement.
The involvement of local authorities was a key fac-
tor. The ex post evaluation noted that 80% of URBAN 
II programmes were led by the local authority con-
cerned — and case studies revealed a clear difference 
in effectiveness between these and the minority of 
programmes which were not.
In addition, over 80% of the local partnerships could 
be defined as inclusive, involving a wide range of inter-
ests such as community groups, private firms, employ-
ment agencies, training providers, development agen-
cies and specialist professionals. The voluntary sector 
was involved in the implementation of many projects, 
which had a spill-over benefit in terms of building the 
capacity of local partners for other projects in the fu-
ture.
Larger partners (e.g. city or regional authorities or de-
velopment agencies) often played a key role by: 
  • providing expertise and helping build the capacity 
of local participants;
  • sustaining projects in the longer term — 60% of 
URBAN II projects continued after funding ended 
and the support of a larger partner was usually key 
to this;
  • helping to provide favourable economic condi-
tions in the wider city or region — the evaluation 
highlighted the strong influence on local areas of 
the situation in surrounding areas.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 235
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Local development measures were also an integral 
part of INTERREG and continue to be so in the cross-
border strand of the Territorial Cooperation Objective.
The local development model is a strong feature of 
Cohesion Policy. It mobilises the strengths, knowl-
edge and enthusiasm of local people. It encourages 
better choices and ‘joined-up actions’ and local meas-
ures which are more coherent, effective and cost ef-
ficient. It also serves to boost the democratic and civil 
participation aspects of Cohesion Policy and gives a 
high visibility to Community intervention in some of 
the EU areas facing the most difficult challenges.
However, successful local development measures 
require sustained, long-term commitment, from dif-
ferent levels of government as well as from local peo-
ple. The success of projects is heavily dependent on 
an enabling and supportive framework, but also on 
training and building the administrative capacity of 
local participants. 
3.6 Urban regeneration
The example of URBAN II
The second round of the URBAN Community Initiative, 
‘URBAN II’, ran from 2001 to 2006 and was aimed at as-
sisting neighbourhoods in crisis. Those selected had a 
wide range of social and economic problems, includ-
ing high unemployment (an average of 17% across 
URBAN II) and a poor urban environment. Green spac-
es, for example — an indicator of the environment 
and amenities — were only half the average for all 
cities in the EU for which data are available (10.5% of 
total surface area, as opposed to 20.5%).
URBAN II provided support amounting to EUR 754 
million, rising to EUR 1.6 billion with co-funding, to 
70 programmes across the EU-15 over the period, The 
areas in question had a total population of 2.2 million. 
There were three main areas of spending:
  • Physical and environmental regeneration projects 
to reverse urban decay and investment in trans-
port hubs and new transport facilities and in new 
community facilities (museums, libraries, crèch-
es). The ex post evaluation recorded, for example, 
2 314 000 square metres of buildings converted 
and renovated and the creation of 3  238  000 
square metres of green space.
  • Building the local economy by providing business 
support services, and incubators for new busi-
nesses, as well as training. The ex post evaluation 
recorded 108 000 people trained and 6 000 busi-
nesses supported over the period, resulting in 
2 000 jobs created.
Territorial Employment Pacts in 
Asturias
The Territorial Employment Pacts (TEP) in Gijón and 
Avilés (Asturias) are examples of the adaptation of sup-
port to the specific economic and territorial character-
istics of the region in two main respects:
  • they focused on local employment problems 
and, specifically, on the unemployed with special 
needs;
  • during the implementation of the main measures 
in the TEP (financing and hiring people for train-
ing and work experience) the profile of the target 
groups changed significantly. Initially there was a 
strong emphasis on training and employing under-
qualified people at risk of exclusion in municipal 
activities (such as gardening, urban maintenance, 
construction and social assistance). However, it 
was also discovered that such experience was very 
useful for recently qualified students as a way of 
helping them into employment. In a second stage, 
therefore, students were also supported.
Le Havre, France — an example of the 
problems facing neighbourhoods in 
crisis
In 2001, the area supported in Le Havre had traditional 
industries in decline, unemployment at 21% and a high 
benefit dependency rate. Low education levels, a high 
crime rate and lack of an enterprise culture hampered 
recovery. The quality of the physical environment was 
poor — including land pollution and many vacant and 
derelict buildings.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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  • Social inclusion. Of the 108 000 people trained, 
more than half were from vulnerable groups and 
were helped to overcome illiteracy and continue 
their education or to enter the labour market for 
the first time. Moreover there were 247 projects 
to reduce local crime, including the provision of 
street wardens, CCTV, landscaping and street 
lighting, in collaboration with community groups 
and neighbourhood watches.
Inclusion and local services 
Social inclusion projects helped to reduce crime, im-
prove educational performance, improve the skills of 
local people and support disadvantaged groups in 
various ways. They also built up the capacity of civil 
society groups and the voluntary sector.
In Scotland, a large majority of deprived households 
(77%) are concentrated in urban areas, half of them in 
Glasgow. In order to improve their situation, ESF activ-
ities included support to those aged 12–16 in school 
in the form of careers advice and guidance in order 
to reduce early school leaving. Public authorities also 
played an important role in helping those excluded 
to find jobs and in addressing skills deficits and other 
barriers to employment (such as a lack of social skills). 
Some 1 067 ex-offenders, 451 homeless people and 
363 drug users participated in the measures, out of 
over 53 000 who were assisted. More than 7 000 com-
panies were actively involved in the initiative51.
2007–2013: URBAN enters the mainstream 
…
Following the success of URBAN II, urban regenera-
tion has been included in the mainstream of the ERDF, 
with an expanded budget52 — around EUR 10 billion 
being allocated to urban development at Priority Axis 
level. Possible operations at sub-Priority Axis level in-
crease the total to an estimated EUR 30 billion.
More than half of the ERDF programmes have an 
identifiable urban dimension, and explicitly address 
51  Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU. The European Social Fund: 
urban areas and local employment, Bernard Brunhes International 
(BBI), 2010.
52 A first full picture of mainstreaming can be found in the Working 
Document Fostering the Urban Dimension — Analysis of the 
Operational Programmes co-financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund (2007–2013).
urban challenges. Operations range from the regen-
eration of disadvantaged areas to actions boosting in-
novation and competitiveness in urban growth poles. 
Roughly half of Cohesion Programmes include provi-
sion for the JESSICA initiative (see box).
The ESF too has been used to support actions in edu-
cation, training and employment in deprived urban 
areas. In particular, the ESF puts emphasis on social 
JESSICA — financial engineering at the 
service of Europe’s cities
The ‘Joint European Support for Sustainable 
Investment in City Areas’ is a joint initiative of the 
Commission, the EIB (European Investment Bank) and 
the CEB (Council of Europe Development Bank) to in-
crease the use of financial engineering for sustainable 
urban development and regeneration. JESSICA gives 
managing authorities the possibility of using outside 
expertise, including in the private sector, to bring not 
just money but associated skills and resources.
Nine JESSICA Fund agreements have already been 
signed with the EIB as fund manager. In addition, three 
other operations are being implemented by national 
or regional financial institutions (Brandenburg, East 
Midlands, Estonia).
At present, over EUR 1.1 billion is already committed 
under JESSICA fund agreements. Operations in the 
pipeline suggest that this could reach EUR 1.8 billion 
by end-2010. An advantage of financial engineering is 
that in 2015 there will be a ‘legacy fund’ for reinvest-
ment in further urban regeneration actions.
Good practice for partnership in the 
mainstream: Nordrhein-Westfalen in 
Germany
Nearly 30% of the programme is allocated to 
‘Sustainable urban and regional development’. The 
programme is built directly on previous experience 
with Dortmund URBAN II, involving an integrated ap-
proach with strong local partnership. Evaluations show 
that previous interventions created a leverage effect 
for public and private investment, increased economic 
activity and improved the quality of life.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 237
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inclusion of disadvantaged people 
through the involvement of local 
communities and companies and 
the promotion of local employ-
ment initiatives. In the 2007–2013 
period, 22 out of the 27 Member 
States have specifically foreseen 
support to urban areas and local 
employment initiatives in their op-
erational programmes.
…  but the local 
development model — key 
to URBAN success — needs 
further work
As indicated above, the ex post 
evaluation of URBAN II found that 
the key factor behind successful 
urban regeneration projects was 
local involvement. Creating local partnerships en-
tailed much effort. For example, in just one initiative 
(in Burnley in the UK), 134 people became involved in 
community management.
In the 2007–2013 programmes, however, direct local 
involvement has started at a low level and the option 
of delegating responsibilities to local authorities has 
been used in only a few cases. Even informally, most 
cities have so far had a limited role in policy design 
and implementation and there are few signs of active 
participation of local residents. It remains to be seen 
how the mainstreaming of the measures will work out 
in the longer term.
3.7 Rural areas
Rural areas are a key element in any strategy for sus-
tainability and territorial balance. There is increasing 
emphasis on tailoring policy to the specific features 
of regions — rural regions often share particular 
strengths and assets, on which Cohesion Policy can 
build. Equally, the growing focus on sustainability 
means that development should not be at the ex-
pense of the rural environment or endanger social 
cohesion.
The situation of rural areas, however, differs greatly 
across the EU. They vary from remote areas in popula-
tion decline (such as in Romania, eastern Poland, and 
northern Sweden and Finland) to more central areas 
with population increase (e.g. in northern Greece and 
southern Sweden and Finland). In some areas, tour-
ism predominates, in others agriculture and forestry.
There is therefore no single ‘one size fits all’ strategy 
for rural areas, although a recurrent theme is the need 
to maintain economic activity (or access to econom-
ic activity) along with services and social amenities 
(such as child-care, care for the elderly and leisure 
facilities). In addition, there is usually an implicit con-
cern to preserve the rural character of the area and 
for development to involve local participation (the ‘lo-
cal development model’) rather than being imposed 
from outside. Finally, rural depopulation is a major 
concern in the Mediterranean for forest management 
and fire risks.
The task of supporting rural development was divided 
in the 2000–2006 period between the ERDF, ESF and 
EAGGF (guidance section only53). The EAGGF guid-
ance section focussed on support for farming activi-
ties and their conversion, including the maintenance 
and reinforcement of a viable social fabric in rural ar-
eas, the ESF on developing human capital, while the 
ERDF assisted a broad range of measures, including:
53 Within the EAGGF, only the Guidance Section was implemented in 
the framework of Cohesion Policy, providing support in the then 
Objective 1 areas. The EAGGF Guarantee section, separate from 
Cohesion Policy, provided support in non-Objective 1 areas and for 
certain types of rural development measures across the EU.
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  • the creation of new economic activity, tourism 
and regeneration of polluted or damaged areas;
  • transport links, often the lifeline of rural commu-
nities and economies;
  • access to social and environmental infrastructure 
and services.
In Andalucía, for example, ERDF support to business 
was found by the evaluation to have been of key im-
portance for the local economy. Measures included 
co-funding premises for craft businesses and small-
scale firms, investment in hotels and catering, im-
provements to villages, the construction of commu-
nity centres and the provision of support services for 
SMEs.
Better access to services often took the form of im-
provements in water supply and wastewater treat-
ment, but many other measures were also co-funded 
across the EU, including:
  • the renovation of rural villages in many areas 
across the EU;
  • the restoration of historical buildings and monu-
ments in rural towns in Italy co-financed under 
both Objective 1 and Objective 2;
  • support for social infrastructure in rural areas in 
Portugal, in particular, and to a lesser extent in 
Greece;
  • support for social infrastructure in the form, for 
example, of childcare centres and catering facili-
ties in the Centre region of France;
  • support to social infrastructure in rural areas in 
the EU-10 countries, especially in Estonia, where 
over 40% of the ERDF in remote rural areas was 
allocated to this, though also in Lithuania, where 
the proportion was over 20%. 
Such actions contributed to improved living condi-
tions and more balanced territorial development as 
well as strengthening social cohesion.
4. Protecting the environment
Regional economic growth without sound manage-
ment of the environment is not sustainable. As well 
as being important in its own terms, a good environ-
ment is an essential input to the quality of life and the 
attractiveness of regions. Environmental problems 
entail social costs, hold back local business expansion 
and deter outside investment. 
Some EUR 50 billion has been allocated to environ-
mental protection and risk prevention over the 2007–
2013 period under the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 
(Figure 4.11), with a further EUR 0.8 billion going to 
renewable energy and EUR 2.5 billion to help SMEs 
adopt environmentally friendly processes and devel-
op environmentally-friendly products.
The largest programme is the Polish infrastructure and 
environment OP, with a total of EUR 28 billion com-
ing from the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund. Although 
it includes infrastructure of various kinds, a majority 
of the operational priorities (7 out of 13) concern the 
environment, including energy efficiency, water and 
waste management, environmentally-friendly trans-
port and habitat protection.
Promoting economic activity in the 
Centre region of France
The ERDF was mainly used to attract new companies, 
in particular small firms with under 10 employees, and 
to provide them with the necessary infrastructure and 
services. Other measures were aimed at improving the 
attractiveness of rural areas for businesses.
The effect was particularly pronounced on the distribu-
tive trades and the crafts sector. 15 ORACs (Opérations 
de restructuration de l’artisanat et du commerce — ac-
tions for the restructuring of crafts and trade, espe-
cially local suppliers) were co-financed, which brought 
together representatives of the various local authori-
ties and of local businesses.
The ERDF also co-financed many tourist projects which 
had a measurable impact on increasing the number of 
visitors (e.g. bringing some of the numerous visitors to 
the Loire chateaux to visit the rural areas of the region).
Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006, Work Package 9: 
Rural Development.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 239
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Traditionally the focus of support has very much been 
on environmental infrastructure (notably clean drink-
ing water supply, waste water treatment and house-
hold and industrial waste management), especially 
in Objective 1, or Convergence, regions. Increasingly 
however the focus is also on renewable energy, green 
transport, the green economy and a greener govern-
ance of Cohesion Policy.
4.1 Water and waste infrastructure 
— a significant investment
A large amount of funding under Cohesion Policy goes 
to investment in water supply, wastewater treatment, 
sewerage and solid waste management (Figure 4.12), 
to assist lagging regions comply with EU standards, 
the so-called ‘acquis’. This was a key reason for setting 
up the Cohesion Fund in 1993. The rationale is essen-
tially to improve the environment per se, rather than 
to increase economic development, though it un-
doubtedly makes the areas in which this occurs more 
attractive places to live and work.
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The ERDF and the Cohesion Fund54 together invested 
EUR 27.4 billion in this area over the 2000–2006 pe-
riod, accounting for 14% of all investment of this kind 
across the EU, and typically a third of the investment 
in Cohesion Countries.
The result has been a significant improvement in envi-
ronmental infrastructure across the EU. The total addi-
tional population connected to wastewater collection 
and treatment of an adequate standard is estimated 
at least 40 million (12% of the population) over the 
period 2000–2006; the ERDF and Cohesion Fund be-
ing involved in financing over half of this total. At the 
same time, at least 20 million people were connected 
to a clean supply of drinking water and 964 unauthor-
ised landfills were closed or rehabilitated.
The private sector has become increasingly involved 
with application of polluter pays principles, though 
this varies greatly between countries. It was especially 
important in the EU-10 in 2000–2006, as well as in 
many more prosperous EU-15 countries, accounting 
for almost a third of investment. The private sector 
is most important in the waste treatment industry, 
where there are signs of a ‘European waste market’ 
emerging.
User charges tend to cover a large part of mainte-
nance and operating costs, so ensuring financial sus-
tainability. These, moreover, create an incentive for 
efficient use and management of resources, though 
there is still a major role for the public sector and 
Cohesion Policy both to reduce financial uncertainty 
over the operation of the infrastructure and to ensure 
that users can afford to pay by covering the difference 
between costs and affordability, to ensure that people 
use the facilities.
Costs depend on the capacity installed, and the ex 
post evaluation noted the difficulties of estimating 
the correct capacity in advance because of the need to 
forecast demand over a long time horizon. Moreover, 
demand is affected by user reactions to charges and 
possible changes in these, as well as by migration. 
Cohesion Policy can play a role not only in mitigating 
54 The impact of ERDF and CF projects cannot always be neatly sepa-
rated. In many cases the two funds financed different elements in 
the same system, e.g. ERDF supported collection and CF supported 
treatment facilities.
the consequences of these risks but in encouraging 
more realistic long-term planning.
4.2 Regeneration and environmental 
protection
Over the 2000–2006 period, EUR 11.5 billion of ERDF 
financing was allocated to planning and rehabilita-
tion, of which the renewal of urban areas was the 
largest area of intervention (EUR 4.5 billion). The two 
other main areas were the protection and improve-
ment of the natural environment (EUR 2.8 billion) and 
the reclamation of old industrial and military sites 
(EUR 2.2 billion). 
These activities were very important in Objective 2 re-
gions: mainly in urban areas (25% of all ERDF support 
for the environment) and in cleaning up industrial 
and military sites (21%).
The measures concerned were aimed primarily at im-
proving living conditions in the areas and their attrac-
tiveness for tourists and for companies contemplating 
investment. Their economic impact tended by their 
nature to be limited to the local area and was usually 
greater when targeted at very specific problems, such 
as the pollution of coastal areas with significant tour-
ist activity.
4.3 A greener economy and long term 
economic development
An increasing focus of Cohesion Policy is the green 
economy and translating EU technical know-how into 
globally competitive resource efficient production, in 
line with the Europe 2020 objectives.
Cohesion Policy measures cut across traditional sec-
toral boundaries — creating a competitive, greener 
economy requires the installation of high-speed in-
ternet, the development of smart transport systems, 
increased energy efficiency and use of renewables, 
environmentally-aware public procurement and well 
functioning administrations. To achieve this requires 
an integrated framework for investment, combining 
expenditure in different areas (innovation, human re-
source development, business support, infrastructure 
etc.) in a coherent policy package that fits the nation-
al, regional or local context and meets local needs. Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Cohesion Policy provides such a framework by in-
tegrating policies in different areas into a single de-
velopment strategy which takes account of the real 
needs and conditions on the ground. 
In particular, Cohesion Policy can help regions realise 
the potential of the green economy as a new source 
of growth. Promoting eco-innovation and new green 
jobs, especially in SMEs is a high priority. In the 2007–
2013 period, Cohesion Policy is contributing EUR 2.5 
billion to support the development of environmental-
ly-friendly products, processes and services in SMEs, 
as well as research and innovation in green technolo-
gies.
4.4 Green governance
The environmental challenge cuts across borders. 
Cohesion Policy, with its numerous cross-border, 
transnational and interregional programmes, pro-
vides a means for new types of green cooperation. An 
example is the EU Baltic Sea Region Strategy for im-
proving the environmental state of the Baltic, which 
is the first EU strategy designed at the level of a ‘mac-
ro-region’ involving neighbouring countries such as 
Russia.
In addition, Cohesion programmes are ‘green-
proofed’: prior to approval by the Commission, in the 
sense that Member States have to submit a strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA)55 to demonstrate 
that their programmes respect EU environmental 
rules. An environmental impact assessment (EIA)56 
must also be carried out for certain schemes, such as 
major transport projects. Beyond this, environmental 
sustainability remains one of the two cross-cutting 
principles for all co-financed actions57.
Applied strategically58 green public procurement59 
can improve the competitiveness of suppliers of 
goods and services. A range of techniques and meth-
ods are already available60 and European Public 
Procurement directives allow public authorities to 
take environmental and social considerations into ac-
count in their purchasing procedures. Cohesion Policy 
can help tackle the challenge of training and inform-
ing officials in charge of public purchasing at all levels 
of public authorities.
In this vein, nearly half of the Member States (Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the UK) have included indicators for 
55 Directive 2001/42/EC.
56 Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended.
57 Article 17 of the General Provisions Regulation1083/2006/EC.
58 Report by the European Network of Environmental Authorities 
(ENEA), Improving the climate resilience of Cohesion Policy fund-
ing programmes.
59 COM(2008) 400 final, 16.7.2008, section 5.2, pp.8–9.
60 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm
Promoting the low carbon economy in 
the East of England
The 2007–2013 programme is focused on helping to 
achieve low carbon economic growth. It comprises en-
terprise and innovation initiatives with the main selec-
tion criteria for projects being the potential to reduce 
the region’s carbon footprint and to integrating eco-
nomic, environmental and social goals. A major pro-
ject is the creation of a low carbon venture capital fund 
of around EUR 20 million, operated by the Low Carbon 
Innovation Centre. The programme is aimed at putting 
the region at the forefront of innovation in low carbon 
growth, clean technology and renewable energy.
Lahti Science and Business Park 
(Finland)
Funding of EUR 1.5 million went to develop the Lahti 
Cleantech Science and Business park in the 2000–2006 
period. The aim was ‘intellectual cross fertilisation’ 
between different areas of expertise and to encour-
age innovation and development of environmental 
technologies by bringing together small and large 
firms, universities and regional authorities. A research 
agenda was established together with a professorship 
in waste management and a Master’s programme in 
environmental technology.
The result was the creation of 170 new jobs and 20 
new clean-tech companies and the attraction of in-
vestment of over EUR 30 million. The ERDF has, there-
fore, contributed to the formulation of a coherent in-
novation strategy and the transformation of Lahti into 
a leader in environmental innovation and an attractive 
centre for companies engaged in this activity.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 243
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the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions into their 
Cohesion Policy programmes. France, for example, 
has developed a carbon evaluation tool to estimate 
CO2 emissions produced by all projects funded with 
EU support61 and the Interreg project GROW has de-
veloped a statistical tool for regional environmental 
accounting involving several countries62.
Networks of environmental authorities have been 
established in several countries (ES, IT, UK, PL, DE), 
as well as, at EU level, the European Network of 
Environmental Authorities for the Cohesion Policy63 
(ENEA).
5. Governance
Well-established, efficient and effective govern-
ance systems are a pre-condition for the success of 
Cohesion Policy. This is not just a question of ensuring 
that the funds allocated are spent in the ways agreed, 
but also of ensuring that the strategy is well designed 
and coherent, the relevant participants are mobi-
lised, high quality projects are selected and rigorous 
monitoring and evaluation systems are established to 
ensure that programmes are on track to achieve the 
objectives set.
Day-to-day management of Cohesion Policy on 
the ground is delegated to Member States and re-
gions under the principle of shared management. 
61  ‘NECATER’. For more information, see: http://www.datar.gouv.fr/IMG/
Fichiers/DEVELOPPEMENT_DURABLE/Necater_presentation.pdf
62 http://www.grow3c.com/project_detail.php?id=21.
63 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/cohesion_policy_
en.htm
Project sustainability assessment tool 
in Brandenburg
A good practice example is the project sustainability 
assessment tool developed under the ERDF for the 
Brandenburg Objective 1 Programme in Germany in 
2000–2006, which has become a standard monitor-
ing method in the 2007–2013 period. The managing 
authority is seeking to develop the tool further and 
make it a legally binding part of the project approval 
process. The financial institution that developed the 
tool is considering extending it to other funding pro-
grammes.
Centralised sectoral policies and 
decentralised integrated ones: getting 
the balance right1
Highly developed Member States rely more on inte-
grated policies to achieve synergies between different 
policy goals in different parts of the country. In the 
process, they often give regions a larger role in policy 
design and implementation. Less developed Member 
States rely more on nation-wide sectoral policies. As 
they develop, the benefits of avoiding negative exter-
nalities and creating synergies tend to outweigh the 
costs of integration and decentralisation. As a result, 
they may also shift towards more integrated and de-
centralised policies.
This shift can clearly be observed in transport policy. 
For example, the development of the French high-
speed rail network started in the 1950s as a national 
policy with the main goal of reducing travel times by 
rail. During the 1980s and 1990s, the policy changed 
and incorporated other goals such as improving de-
velopment in depressed cities or regions and reducing 
pollution by shifting travel from cars and airplanes to 
high-speed rail.
In addition, regional and local authorities became active 
partners in the preparation and identification of new 
links and stations. In several cases, this has allowed a 
strong synergy to emerge between rail investment and 
urban development, for example, in Lille and Lyon. 
This shift towards more integrated and decentralised 
policies can also be detected in innovation policies. 
Sweden and Finland, two of the global top perform-
ers in innovation, have shifted the emphasis of policy 
away from simple sectoral measures such as R&D sup-
port to creating regional innovation systems. The fo-
cus is on investing in a long-term partnership between 
firms, research centres and the public sector (the ‘triple 
helix’ or knowledge triangle) to improve not just inno-
vation in the firms involved but the competitiveness of 
the region as a whole.
This is not to say that centralised sectoral policies 
do not play an important role, but more and more 
Member States recognise that they are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for effective and efficient pol-
icy making which recognises spatial differences and 
the need for coordination between different measures.
1  Forthcoming study Intralab: In search of inspiring policy 
practices by Ecorys.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Management systems are, therefore, a function partly 
of Cohesion Policy regulations and partly of the insti-
tutional and administrative context in each Member 
State.
Shared management is a challenge in terms of ensur-
ing the active involvement of all the key actors, includ-
ing civil society. But it gives an opportunity for increas-
ing ‘ownership’ of programmes on the ground and for 
strengthening their effectiveness and efficiency. 
It also generates spillover benefits to national policies. 
By creating procedures for the discussion and for-
mulation of strategies, project selection, monitoring 
and evaluation as well as by allocating funds for ad-
ministrative capacity building, Cohesion Policy helps 
to strengthen the policy-making and management 
ability of the authorities concerned. Accordingly, 
Cohesion Policy can help to improve the effectiveness 
of policies in other areas.
5.1 Effective governance and results 
based management 
The quality of public management has 
improved in the EU-10
The ex post evaluation in 2000–200664 showed that 
the EU-10 countries successfully put in place a system 
in the period for managing the EU funding available 
and to comply with regulatory requirements. This was 
a big achievement in itself given the short program-
ming period and the lack of prior experience of han-
dling the much larger sums allocated to them than 
involved in pre-accession aid.
Though there were initial problems, the new systems 
were working reasonably effectively by the end of 
the period as a result of learning by doing and some 
reform of public administration, largely triggered by 
Cohesion Policy management practices. The evalua-
tion found evidence of improvements which extend-
ed in many cases to national policy, such as:
  • better strategic planning and more efficient coor-
dination and collaboration between authorities;
64 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 11: 
Management and Implementation Systems, http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp11_
en.htm
  • simplification of procedures, more openness, 
transparency and accountability and provision 
of better guidance. The evaluation noted, for ex-
ample, reductions in processing times for applica-
tions and claims;
  • improved management practices, staff expertise, 
professionalism and human resource manage-
ment;
  • strengthened and broader partnership, with, for 
example, extensive regional involvement in pro-
ject implementation in the Czech Republic and 
Poland;
  • more systematic monitoring and evaluation.
Nevertheless, the evaluation found that there was still 
room for improvement and continuous investment in 
this broad area is necessary, especially in Bulgaria and 
Romania which only started the process in 2007.
… and continue to improve in the EU-15, 
where there are spillover benefits to national 
policies
In the EU-15, the evaluation found further improve-
ments in  strategic management  of programmes in 
2000–2006, particularly in terms of better planning, 
increased partnership and more evaluation. The qual-
ity of monitoring also improved, but some factors 
hindered its further development, over-complicated 
indicator systems, IT operational difficulties and data 
inconsistencies.
The evaluation showed that Cohesion Policy in the 
EU-15 also had positive spillover effects on domes-
tic management practice. These were particularly 
evident as regards strategic planning, the quality of 
monitoring and evaluation and the extent of partner-
ship. In addition, they included institutional changes 
such as the creation or strengthening of territorial 
bodies and the establishment of new coordination 
arrangements. There was also evidence of changes 
in the administrative culture, with more positive atti-
tudes towards monitoring and evaluation.
Spillovers tend to become more visible over time — 
improvements detected in the 2000–2006 period of-
ten originated in the previous period and are continu-
ing in 2007–2013. The influence on other policies was Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 245
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strongest when driven by committed policy manag-
ers and where the scale of Cohesion Policy funding 
was significant. 
Spending the funds is not enough — 
performance and quality are of prime 
importance
Compliance with the regulations and maintaining the 
pace of spending dominated programme manage-
ment in many Member States, with excessive focus on 
financial absorption at the expense of the effective of 
expenditure.
While spending funds in time and in line with financial 
and auditing rules are both essential preconditions 
for the success of Cohesion Policy, there is a need to 
put more emphasis on performance. It is therefore 
important to improve programme design, monitoring 
and evaluation, to invest further in institutional and 
administrative capacity and to encourage exchange 
of experience as well as to strengthen the profession-
alism of those concerned. 
An example is the ‘Regions for Economic Change’ ini-
tiative, cofinanced by the ERDF, which promotes good 
practice in managing Cohesion Policy programmes. 
The initiative was a response to the general recogni-
tion of the need for a more coordinated approach to 
exchange of good practice and more effective net-
working between regions to improve the quality of 
programmes.
The initiative has introduced new ways of making 
regional networks more dynamic and to help them 
to work closely with the Commission, test innova-
tive ideas and to transfer them into the programmes 
themselves. It also includes communication activities 
such as a web site, a database of case studies and the 
RegioStars Awards scheme.
5.2 Administrative costs are relatively low
The administrative costs of Cohesion Policy are similar 
to or lower than those of the funding schemes of oth-
er international organisations, e.g. the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, 
the United Nations Development Programme or the 
International Monetary Fund. A recent study for the 
Cohesion Policy — a valued partner of 
local government
To assess the value of EU funding, the Local 
Government Association (LGA) in the UK conducted a 
survey in 2009 of 450 local authority staff with at least 
7 years experience of EU projects.
The survey covered all the main EU funding pro-
grammes, including the ERDF and ESF. The 157 re-
sponses received demonstrated that local authorities 
appreciated the benefits from EU programmes and 
considered that EU funds should continue to play a 
strong role in regional development after 2013. 
  • 93% of respondents agreed that their local au-
thority values the support from the funds for local 
communities. 
  • 49% of respondents reported that EU funds al-
lowed them to undertake projects which would 
not normally qualify for national funding. They also 
indentified a stable 7-year funding period and the 
ability to lever in matching-funding as key advan-
tages.
  • There was high awareness of the ERDF and ESF 
(73%) as compared with other EU funds for specific 
purposes (typically between 10% and 20%).
  • 88% of respondents expressing a view stated that 
they would increase or at least maintain their cur-
rent level of involvement with EU funds after 2013.
  • On the other hand, 62% of respondents felt that 
Cohesion Policy administrative requirements were 
too complex relative to the size of funding and 
95% considered that the associated administrative 
burden can dissuade voluntary and local organisa-
tions from applying for funds.
The survey, the first of its kind to be undertaken, pro-
vided valuable evidence for the LGA in discussions 
with central government and the EU. The LGA inten-
tion is to explore the possibility of an EU-wide survey 
being undertaken in the future.
Full results are available at:  
www.lga.gov.uk/euregionalpolicyChapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
246 Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
European Commission65 estimated the total costs for 
the administration of Cohesion Policy in 2007–2013 at 
just 3.5% of the total budget. 
Programme management accounts for most of the 
workload (80% of the total) and most of the costs 
(78% of the total). The most time-consuming tasks 
within this are project selection and the verification of 
deliverables. Both costs and workload, however, vary 
between Member States and programmes, the former 
as a result of differences in salary levels, the workload 
because of:
  • Geographical scale: national programmes gener-
ally have a lower administrative workload per EUR 
of total budget than regional programmes which, 
in turn, have a lower workload than territorial co-
operation programmes. This is at least partly be-
cause programmes with national coverage usu-
ally focus on a particular policy area rather than a 
number of these. Furthermore, territorial cooper-
ation programmes often have a broad scope and 
involve coordinating many participants.
  • Financial scale: in general, the smaller the pro-
gramme, the larger the share spent on admin-
istration, simply because of economies of scale 
— management, certification and audit include 
many tasks which do not vary much with the size 
of the programme.
  • Policy areas covered: in general, programmes 
focused on infrastructure or the environment 
have lower administrative workloads than those 
focused on innovation or capacity building. 
Innovative projects (which are intellectually chal-
lenging and often require specialised expertise 
and much co-ordination) are particularly man-
agement-intensive. The same can also apply to 
training.
A significant finding is that different management 
systems, in particular centralised as against regional-
ised, are not associated with major differences in ad-
ministrative costs.
65 Regional governance in the context of globalization: reviewing 
governance mechanisms and administrative costs, SWECO Ltd, 
March 2010.
In itself, the application of EU regulations does not 
add notably to the administrative workload. On the 
other hand, ‘gold plating’, where national regulations 
go beyond what is necessary, could increase the ad-
ministrative burden considerably.
5.3 Partnership
Broad partnership with a wide range of actors has 
long been a key principle of Cohesion Policy since the 
mobilisation of the skills and knowledge of the vari-
ous partners has the potential to make both planning 
and implementation more effective. It can also make 
the programme more inclusive, allowing partners to 
think beyond their own particular interests and come 
to a more strategic, ‘regional viewpoint’. The ex post 
evaluation66 of 2000–2006 found that the application 
of the partnership principle was a widely recognised 
added value of Cohesion Policy, especially in local de-
velopment measures67.
66 Ex post evaluation of the ERDF 2000–2006, Work Package 11: 
Management and Implementation Systems, http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp11_
en.htm
67 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evalua-
tion/expost2006/urban_ii_en.htm 
Partners improve programmes 
The case of the environment in Poland
Environmental issues can be particularly challenging 
in terms of project preparation. All of the Polish pro-
grammes in the 2007–2013 period (except for the 
technical assistance programme) had environmental 
experts in their Monitoring Committee, whether from 
NGOs or the academic and research community. Their 
input was found to be invaluable, notably during the 
planning phase and in establishing the selection cri-
teria for projects.
The case of innovation in France
The Directorate General for Regional Policy and the 
French authorities (‘DATAR’) established in 2005 a 
working group to help regions formulate their inno-
vation strategies. This was extended to include other 
public bodies, businesses, universities and research 
centres. The initiative laid the groundwork for putting 
in place strategies for the 2007–2013 period.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 247
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The ex post evaluation found that partnership in-
creased in the 2000–2006 period in the EU-15 with 
greater involvement of local and regional bodies, 
businesses, social partners and other organisations. 
In Spain and France, for example, a system of co-
responsibility between regional and central govern-
ments was introduced which allowed regions to take 
on more of the strategy design, monitoring, reporting 
and managing, which increased their skills and capac-
ity in these respects.
In most of the EU-15, the involvement of partners was 
found to be stronger in the development of strategies 
and programme design than in implementation. An 
exception was in Finland where, through the Oulu 
Growth Agreement model, the involvement of local 
actors, especially business, was strong in the imple-
mentation stage as well.
The application of the partnership principle was chal-
lenging for many EU-10 countries in the 2004–2006 
period since they largely lacked a partnership tradi-
tion and established means of identifying and involv-
ing partners. Moreover, partners sometimes found it 
hard to influence decisions, especially at the begin-
ning of the period, when their knowledge of Cohesion 
Policy was limited.
These challenges were less pronounced in countries 
where there was experience of domestic policy con-
sultation forums. In Malta, for example, the Council 
of Economic and Social Development established a 
forum for consultation and social dialogue in 2001. 
Similarly in Poland, a Cohesion Policy Working Group 
was set up within the existing Tripartite Commission 
for Socio-Economic Issues, involving representatives 
of government, trade unions and employers, to sup-
port the implementation of Cohesion Policy. 
An indicator of the success of the partnership prin-
ciple is that the ex post evaluation found partner in-
volvement to be generally higher in EU programmes 
than in domestic policies, though there are examples 
of the principle spreading to domestic regional devel-
opment policies:
  • the attribution of increased powers to regional 
self-governments in the negotiation and im-
plementation of Contrats de Projets Etat-Région 
(CPERs)68 in France, together with more negotiat-
ing powers to the regional Prefects; 
  • the devolution in England of responsibility for re-
gional policy to Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs), leading to increased cooperation with lo-
cal authorities and organisations in the regions. 
5.4 Institutional capacity building
Effective public policies require a competent and ef-
ficient administration, that is impartial and client ori-
ented. Strengthening institutional and administrative 
capacity while creating a stable business environment 
facilitates structural adjustment and contributes to 
growth and jobs.
In the 2000–2006 period, the ESF played an important 
role in the modernisation of public administration. In 
Portugal, it took 11 procedures and 78 days to start 
a business in 2005. With the introduction of the one-
stop shop, supported by the ESF, it now takes only 7 
days and only seven procedures to be completed. As 
a consequence, the total cost of setting up a business 
has declined significantly.
In the 2007–2013 period, a new ESF priority on 
Institutional Capacity has been introduced for 
Convergence regions and Cohesion Member States, 
aimed at strengthening the capacity of public ad-
ministration and public services at national, regional 
and local level. Four Member States have devoted 
an Operational Programme to Institutional Capacity 
(Hungary, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) and in many 
others, it is priority within OPs.
The Institutional Capacity priority supports invest-
ment in human capital development and ICT in ad-
ministrative and public services at all territorial levels. 
The aims are to improve legislation, facilitate busi-
ness creation, increase the effectiveness of the man-
agement of public policies and improve the services 
provided to individuals and businesses generally by 
cutting red tape. The focus in the OPs across the EU 
is: better regulation (in Poland, Cyprus and Slovakia); 
reinforcement of the judiciary system (Slovenia and 
Poland); capacity building of employment institutions 
(Malta and Slovenia); ethics and integrity  (Poland and 
68 Formal agreements between the state and region on a multi-annu-
al programme around themes of common interest.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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Hungary); reduction of administrative burden for 
business (Latvia and Lithuania) and enhancing the 
level of transparency and anti-corruption (Italy and 
Romania). In Bulgaria, the ESF is providing support for 
a full review of the national administration that could 
serve as basis for structural reform.
6. Contributing to regional and global 
growth
6.1 Using macroeconomic models to 
estimate effects
Cohesion Policy aims to improve the economic per-
formance of regions in terms, in particular, of GDP, 
employment, productivity, investment and the trade 
balance. Since these and other macroeconomic fac-
tors interact at the regional, national and EU level and 
are affected by a range of influences both internal 
and external, the only way of examining the effect of 
Cohesion Policy on them is by using macro-economic 
models.
Two macroeconomic models — HERMIN69 and 
QUEST70 — are used to do this concentrating on the 
convergence objective. HERMIN is a macro econo-
metric model with neoclassical features on the sup-
ply side. QUEST is a New-Keynesian micro-founded 
dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with en-
dogenous growth. The use of two different models 
with very different assumptions about how economic 
forces work makes the results more robust.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that both 
HERMIN and QUEST do not measure the impact of 
policy, they model it. So far as possible, the proper-
ties of the model are in line with empirical evidence, 
though this is not always unambiguous. However, the 
incorporation of a number of assumptions about the 
69 For a description of the HERMIN model and the results of the ex 
post impact evaluation of the 2000 — 2006 programming pe-
riod, see: European Commission, Directorate General for Regional 
Policy, Analysis of EU Cohesion Policy 2000–2006 using the CSHM: 
Aggregate impacts and inter-country comparisons, 2009. http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/
expost2006/wp3_hermin_aggregate.pdf
70 For a description of the QUEST model and the results of the ex post 
impact evaluation of the 2000 — 2006 programming period, see: 
Varga, J., in ’t Veld, J. (2010), The Potential Impact of EU Cohesion 
Policy Spending in the 2007–2013 Programming Period: A Model-
Based Analysis. ECFIN European Economy Economic Paper, no. 422. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_
paper/2010/index_en.htm
workings of the economy, even if reasonably plausi-
ble ones is inevitable.
Like any evaluation method, macroeconomic models 
have their strengths but need to be used with other 
evaluation methods to complete the picture. This es-
pecially so, since Cohesion Policy has goals which go 
much further than only GDP growth.
Any assessment of macroeconomic impact must start 
from the actual expenditure funded by Cohesion 
Policy (Figure  4.13). Since funding in the EU-10 
countries only became substantial after they joined 
the EU in 2004, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and 
the regions in East Germany and Southern Italy 
(Mezzogiorno) were the main recipients in the 2000–
2006 period.
In the 2007–2013 period, the situation is very differ-
ent. The EU-12 countries now account for just over 
half of Cohesion Policy expenditure, with much of 
the rest going to the EU-15 countries or regions listed 
above (Figure 4.14).
Improving administrative capacity in 
Bulgaria
The ESF programme in Bulgaria includes a broad range 
of measures to support of the ongoing administra-
tive and judicial reforms in the country. Its goal is to 
introduce specific tools for policy making and imple-
mentation (impact assessment, public consultations, 
policy evaluation, public-private partnerships) in the 
everyday administration of policy at central, regional 
and local level. It is also intended to strengthen or-
ganisation and management of human resources in 
public institutions, provide training for civil servants 
and magistrates and improve service delivery, as well 
as to develop a common methodology for functional 
review and its application. The OP, in addition, is aimed 
at improving management of courts and their human 
and information resources and is supporting a number 
of training programmes for improving the knowledge 
of magistrates about different areas of European law.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 249
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6.2 Macroeconomic impact of the 2000–
2006 programmes
When assessing the impact of Cohesion Policy, there is 
a need to distinguish between the short-term (largely 
‘demand-side’) effects and long-term (largely ‘supply-
side’) effects. The short-term effects occur during 
the period when the programmes are being imple-
mented. Expenditure on, for example, road construc-
tion or training schemes, tends to boost output and 
employment (e.g. of construction workers or trainers) 
which creates additional demand. As firms as well as 
individuals earn more, they also invest and consume 
more, which further adds to output (the so-called 
Keynesian multiplier effect). This effect largely occurs 
in the implementation period when expenditure is 
taking place, though can extend beyond it because 
of multipliers. For the 2000–2006 programmes, the 
implementation period lasted until the end of 2009 
(Figure 4.15). 
The demand-side effect can be seen in the HERMIN 
model especially which has a strong focus on this. 
According to HERMIN, Cohesion Policy is estimated to 
increase GDP in the main recipient Member States by 
an average of 1.2% each year over the course of the 
spending period. These effects, it should be empha-
sised are cumulative, so that by 2009, GDP in these 
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countries is estimated to have been around 11% 
higher than it otherwise would have been as a result 
of Cohesion Policy.
As would be expected, the impact in the different 
countries is closely related to the scale of funding. 
However, there are differences in the results of the 
two models. In HERMIN the financing costs of co-
hesion spending are ignored. In QUEST the EU-15 
Member States also contribute to the financing costs 
of Cohesion spending and as a result net Cohesion re-
ceipts for these countries are smaller than the gross 
receipts shown in the section above and simulated in 
HERMIN. Also, in QUEST, the stimulus to demand is es-
timated to be less than in HERMIN because Cohesion 
expenditure leads to real appreciation of exchange 
rates (in those countries not part of the Euro zone) 
and crowding out of some private expenditure and 
therefore the effect on output is smaller. The short-
term demand-side effect, though positive, is not the 
‘raison d’être’ of Cohesion Policy, which is to bring 
about structural change and long-term growth 
through ‘supply-side’ effects — a better transport sys-
tem, a stronger enterprise base, an increased rate of 
innovation and more skilled people. These effects in 
improving the productive potential of regional econ-
omies are long-lasting.
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The estimates of the two models of the effect on GDP 
of Cohesion Policy for the 2000–2006 period in 2014, 
5 years after spending came to an end, again differ 
(Figure 4.16).
In this case, QUEST estimates the effect on GDP to be 
bigger, largely because, being an endogenous growth 
model, it captures the impact of investment in human 
capital development and RTD on growth. HERMIN, on 
the other hand, assumes that the effect from invest-
ment gradually declines over time. The clear message, 
however, is that, under different assumptions about 
how economies work, Cohesion Policy has strong ef-
fects on GDP and growth — both in the short term 
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4.3 Cumulative net effect of Cohesion 
Policy on GDP — long term gains in QUEST
2000–2009 2000–2015 2000–2020
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Note: Cumulated % change in the level of GDP as compared to 
a non Cohesion Policy baseline 
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and in the long term. Even under 
the HERMIN model’s more con-
servative assumptions, Cohesion 
Policy over the 2000–2006 period 
resulted in a return of EUR 2.1 for 
each euro invested. According to 
QUEST, the return in 2009 is the 
equivalent of EUR 1.2 per euro 
invested. However, by 2020, the 
return is estimated at EUR 4.2 per 
euro invested.
Cohesion Policy also helped to in-
crease the level of employment. 
HERMIN estimates that in 2009, 
the number employed was 5.6 mil-
lion higher as a result of policy in 
2000–2006 (Figure 4.17), or an av-
erage of 560 thousand more a year 
than without Cohesion Policy.
6.3 The macroeconomic impact of 
Cohesion Policy 2007–201371
As a result of larger funding in the EU-12 in the 2007–
2013 period, the expected impact of Cohesion Policy 
on their GDP is much bigger than in 2000–2006. As 
before, HERMIN estimates larger demand effects dur-
ing the period, though the effects estimated by both 
models are significant for all countries and in line with 
spending (Figure 4.18).
Again, there are significant and persistent long-run ef-
fects on GDP estimated as well as a substantial impact 
in the short-term.
The application of a HERMIN-type model in Poland 
shows that these results are reproduced at the re-
gional level72. Estimates of the cumulative results of 
expenditure in 2004–2006 and 2007–2013 indicate 
that all Polish regions are likely to derive considerable 
gains to GDP from Cohesion Policy. 
71 A forthcoming working paper, based on the HERMIN model, will 
provide a detailed description of the country results and the main 
features of the beneficiary economies.
72  Zaleski, J. (2009), Regionalisation of the HERMIN macro-eco-
nomic modelling framework in Poland’, paper presented at 
the Sixth European Conference on Evaluation of Cohesion 
Policy, New Methods for Cohesion Policy Evaluation: Promoting 
Accountability and Learning, Warsaw, November 30–December 
1, 2009. Full technical details are available on the WARR web site: 
http://www.hermin.pl
The gains depend in part on the scale of spending, 
but also on the economic structure and spending pro-
file of the region. Central and western regions, with 
sizeable manufacturing sectors, are estimated to ben-
efit most, while eastern regions with large agricultural 
sectors and smaller and less efficient manufacturing 
sectors the least, although the estimated effects here 
are still significant, ranging from 8% to 12% of GDP.
6.4 Impact on net contributors and on 
the EU-27
Cohesion Policy, of course, also affects the countries 
which are net contributors and, accordingly, have 
higher taxes than they otherwise would in order 
to provide the finance required. The countries con-
cerned, however, tend to have more advanced econo-
mies, producing many of the kinds of capital goods 
and services that are required by the net recipient 
countries as they develop. As a result, the effect on 
them of needing to raise finance is mitigated by their 
increased exports73.
This is confirmed by the HERMIN model, which indi-
cates that the boost to exports is significant, though 
more in some countries than others, depending on 
73 The impact of Cohesion Policy on the net donors can take also oth-
er forms (e.g. procurement contracts being awarded to contractors 
from donor states).
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trade relations74. For instance, France and the UK 
gained considerably from their relative high trade 
with Spain and Ireland, respectively, while Germany 
exports relatively large amounts to most of the net re-
cipient countries (Figure 4.19).
The QUEST model has been used to estimate the net 
effects of Cohesion Policy on the EU economy as a 
whole. The cumulative net effect on the GDP of the 
EU-25 of the 2000–2006 programmes expenditure is 
74  Study for the European Parliament, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion 
Policies, Regional Development, The Economic Return of Cohesion 
Expenditure for Member States, 2009.
estimated at 0.7% in 2009 (i.e. GDP was higher to this 
extent as a result of policy). This was estimated to rise 
to 4% by 2020. In the EU-15 alone, the estimate is a 
cumulative net effect on GDP of just over 3% by 2020 
(Table 4.3).
RHOMOLO
The impact of investments in the TEN-T network in five countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) 
spread out over time, as shown by a prototype of a new regional model, RHOMOLO. In the first place, these investments 
lead to significant reductions in transport costs in the areas where they take place but also in others given the general 
improvement of the transport network. 
Reduced transport costs facilitate trade as well as movements of people which results in significant increase in GDP. In the 
short term, the impact is generally bigger in the areas which directly benefit from the improved transport network, like for 
instance Warmińsko-Maruskie in north-eastern Poland or Moravskoslezsko in the Czech Republic (Map 4. 7). 
In the medium and long term however, GDP gains progressively build up, because these investment need time to reach 
their full impact. Moreover, due to inter-regional spill-overs, the positive impact on GDP slowly spreads in space to other 
neighbouring regions, even to regions where no investment took place (like for instance Zachodniopomorskie in north-
western Poland). In the end, taking all direct and indirect effects into account, Polish and Hungarian regions gain most 
from these investments in the TEN-T network. 
The models used so far to evaluate the impact of EU Cohesion Policy are based on national economies without much con-
sideration for sub-national variation. As a result, they did not capture the heterogeneity often present at regional level or 
other links like inter-regional spill-overs or migration.
RHOMOLO can simulate the impact of Cohesion Policy on EU regions through actions that:
  • build up the infrastructure, human capital stock and R&D capacity;
  • increase the region’s attractiveness for productive activities and employment;
  • shift national expenditures between regions or policy domains due to co-financing;
  • lower the cost of transport between regions.
The model has the ambition to not only assess the economic, but also the social and environmental impacts at the regional 
level. Its main characteristics are:
  • use of the regional economy at NUTS 2 (NUTS 1 for Germany) as the basic building block;
  • inclusion of elements of endogenous growth theory, in which human capital and knowledge gains sustain regional 
growth as well as elements from the new economic geography, with agglomeration and dispersion forces determining 
the distribution of firms and workers in space;  
  • explicit links between regional economies through trade and migration flows in a general equilibrium setting, allowing 
for imperfect competition and frictional unemployment.Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 255
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7. Conclusions
Cohesion Policy has a broad vision. This vision encom-
passes not just the economic development of lagging 
regions and support for vulnerable social groups, but 
also the social and environmental sustainability of 
development and respect for the territorial and cul-
tural features of different parts of the EU. The breadth 
of vision is reflected in the variety of Funds, of pro-
grammes, of areas of intervention and of partners.
In terms of the regional economy, Cohesion Policy has 
created some 1 million jobs in enterprises across the 
EU, as well as perhaps adding as much as 10% to GDP 
in Objective 1 regions in the EU-15. As various studies 
indicate, this tends to boost the trade and exports of 
net contributor countries, offsetting their contribu-
tion to the funding the policy.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: grants 
to enterprise and R&D are a useful tool, but too of-
ten in the past they have been used at the expense 
of other instruments. The trend towards a more bal-
anced mix, including financial engineering (loans and 
venture capital) as well as ‘indirect’ instruments (i.e. 
non-financial instruments such as advice, network-
ing and clustering) is a welcome one. The European 
Commission, in close partnership with the EIB, is ac-
tively encouraging such diversification through initia-
tives such as JEREMIE, JASMINE, JASPERS and JESSICA.
In addition, past Cohesion Policy investment in mo-
torways and roads in the less developed parts of 
the EU-15 means that the job is now largely done. 
Investment should shift towards more environmen-
tally-friendly modes of transport (notably rail and 
urban transport systems), though in the EU-12, the 
need to improve transport links considerably remains 
a challenge.
Cohesion Policy also trains around 10 million people 
a year, with a strong focus on young people, the long-
term unemployed and the low-skilled. Through vari-
ous local development initiatives, Cohesion Policy has 
a strong track record of cross-border co-operation, 
regenerating deprived urban neighbourhoods, and 
contributing to access to services in rural areas.
Involving regional and local communities is key for 
improving policy in the future. Evaluation evidence 
has clearly demonstrated that the active participation 
of people and organisation on the ground at regional 
and local level, from the design to the implementa-
tion stage, is a crucial success factor in making devel-
opment initiatives work. In fact, such partnership is 
one of the key sources of the added-value of Cohesion 
Policy, mobilising their skills and knowledge to make 
programmes more effective and inclusive.
In terms of protecting the environment, more than 
half the Member States are tracking the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions as a target in their 
Cohesion Policy programmes for the 2007–2013 pe-
riod. More than 23 million people were connected to 
wastewater collection and treatment systems and at 
least 20 million people connected to clean supply of 
drinking water through ERDF and Cohesion Fund sup-
port in 2000–2006.
As a result, Cohesion Policy has helped many re-
gions to meet the requirements of EU environmental 
Directives. This has also improved the quality of the 
environment and the quality of life. However, the sus-
tainability of the facilities constructed needs more 
careful consideration: investment in environmental 
infrastructure was sometimes made without clear 
plans for long term financing. 
In terms of management, strong and sound admin-
istration at national, regional and local levels is im-
portant for the success and lasting effect of Cohesion 
Policy. While evaluations have found that the new 
EU-12 countries in particular have made very sig-
nificant strides in the years since accession, there is 
a need for continued and intensified effort to ensure 
that the administrative capacity is there at all levels to 
deliver Cohesion Policy effectively throughout the EU.
A recurrent evaluation finding across all areas of in-
vestment was a preoccupation with ‘absorption’, i.e., 
with spending the money more than focusing on what 
the programmes are actually designed to achieve. 
While the former is obviously a precondition for suc-
cess, the latter is ultimately what matters. For exam-
ple, monitoring systems typically prioritise spending 
and outputs (such as the number of people trained 
or kilometres of new roads constructed) rather than 
results (such as the number of people getting a job 
after training or the amount of journey time saved) let 
alone on impacts (the effect of a better trained work Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion 257
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force or more efficient transport networks on regional 
development).
Cohesion Policy needs to cultivate a focus on perfor-
mance. This has to start from programmes identifying 
only a limited number of policy priorities (concentra-
tion) with a clear view of how they will be achieved 
and how their achievement will contribute to the 
economic, social and territorial development of the 
regions, or Member States, concerned.
Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be im-
proved across the EU to track performance and to 
help redirect efforts as necessary to ensure that objec-
tives are attained. This requires a clear strategic vision 
of what the programme aims to achieve and how suc-
cess will be recognised and measured (proper target 
setting). It also requires a greater recourse to rigorous 
evaluation methods, including counterfactual impact 
evaluation, cost benefit analysis, beneficiary surveys, 
as well as a more rigorous use of qualitative methods 
such as case studies.Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy
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